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 Abstract  
 
The present thesis evaluates the responses of the contemporary Greek foreign 
policy structures and processes, conceptualised as the Greek foreign policy 
system, in the face of the transformation of world politics. This transformation, 
precipitated by the concurrent complex processes of globalisation and 
regionalisation, pose empirical and analytical challenges to the national 
management of foreign policy. Consequently, government departments and 
agencies assigned with responsibility for the conduct of what has been traditionally 
termed ‘foreign’ policy, namely the national foreign policy machinery with the 
foreign ministry and the diplomatic network at its core, find themselves challenged 
as roles and responsibilities are relocated. Such change underpins the 
machinery’s institutional responses and the need to rethink its role and structure.  
The thesis synthesises several literatures, primarily those identified with 
international relations, ‘transformational’ foreign policy analysis, and new 
approaches to diplomatic studies informed by insights from institutionalist 
approaches. This is combined with extensive fieldwork within the Greek 
bureaucracy and the diplomatic network, and seeks to cast light on a relatively 
understudied area: namely the organisation and nature of the Greek foreign policy 
system in an era of considerable change.  
The thesis draws a dual image of the contemporary Greek foreign policy system 
which displays elements of both continuity and change. According to the first 
image, the Greek foreign policy machinery embraces contemporary foreign policy 
developments, and is enmeshed in a process of change and adaptation as a 
response to its changing operational environment. The second image depicts the 
foreign policy system as traditionalist conforming to geopolitical approaches, which 
are linked to compartmentalisation in the organisation of foreign policy. This image 
is supported by evidence which suggests that the Greek foreign policy machinery 
is infused with elements of hierarchy, centralisation and verticality in its 
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organisation, which prevent the adoption of integrated and horizontal models 
prescribed by globalist approaches to the management of foreign policy.   
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Introduction 
 
There is nothing new in the proposition that national structures and processes for 
the conduct of foreign policy and diplomacy have been in a process of profound 
change, especially after the end of the Cold War. The emergence of global politics 
weakening traditional distinctions between domestic and international policy 
environments and highlighting the interconnectedness that transcends states and 
societies, challenge national foreign policy structures which until quite recently 
were perceived as embedded in Westphalian conceptions of bounded territories 
(Held and McGrew, 2003; 2002; Held et al, 1999). With the state having become a 
fragmented policy-making arena, permeated by transnational networks as well as 
by domestic agencies and forces (Slaughter, 2004; 1997; Held and McGrew, 2003) 
foreign policy is being recast in such a way that its global, regional and national 
facets are intertwined altering its subject matter and organisation, and reflect the 
changing relationship between domestic and world politics (Smith et al., 2008; Hill, 
2003; Webber and Smith, 2002; Moses and Knutsen, 2001; Rozental, 1999; 
Sundelius, 1984a).  
The dominant argument present in the literature regarding the role, structure and 
functions of contemporary foreign policy institutions is that they are faced with a 
number of challenges stemming from a transforming world politics (Webber and 
Smith, 2002). Much of the discourse concerns the acceleration of the processes of 
change with the overlapping forces of globalisation and regionalisation, which have 
urged governments to reflect upon and re-organise their foreign policy 
machineries. It is precisely such developments that have provided the context for 
this thesis which undertakes the exploration of the Greek foreign policy machinery 
vis-á-vis the transforming world politics in the 21st century.  
Any discussion of foreign policy analysis in the context of this transforming world 
politics must start with an understanding of the transformation of the fabric of the 
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international political environment which has occurred through a combination of 
concurrent complex processes of globalisation and regionalisation (Scholte, 2008: 
42-43). Globalisation and its twin force regionalisation -with the latter being 
understood as referring to the construction of social spaces that span several 
contiguous countries- have rendered international and domestic policy milieus far 
more complex and inter-penetrated than ever before and by expanding global 
social spaces have challenged our theoretical approaches to foreign policy 
analysis (Scholte, 2002). This is because contemporary foreign policy concerns, 
with their global and regional dimensions, go far beyond traditional geopolitics, 
challenging the effectiveness of traditional approaches to foreign policy making 
and posing, with renewed immediacy, the question of how foreign policy should be 
managed by national governments and their bureaucracies in the emergent, non-
spatially defined policy environment (Hay and Marsh, 2000; Nye and Donahue, 
2000; Cooper, 1999: 40; Held at al. 1999; 16-19; Newhouse, 1997: 69). 
The transformative forces of globalisation and regionalisation have brought about a 
significant growth in the spectrum of international policy that foreign policy 
bureaucracies are handling and create a need for horizontal management of 
operational issues thus drawing into the foreign and international policy process a 
large number of domestic entities with a growing international portfolio. This 
effectively means that agents in several policy milieus, which traditionally belonged 
to the realm of domestic policy, become active in areas of international policy thus 
widening foreign policy circles and formulating foreign policy communities 
(Hocking: 2004; 2003; Cooper, 1999: 41; Langhorne and Wallace, 1999: 18) with 
agendas which cut across boundaries.  
This development, coupled with a multiplicity of other international, non-diplomatic 
actors ranging from civil society organisations (CSOs) to non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), to academics and private enterprises outside traditional 
governmental channels, alter the environment in which foreign policy and 
diplomacy are conducted (Melissen, 2005; Rana, 2005: 2; 12; Hocking, 2004; 
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2004b; Bátora, 2003: 120, 122; Hill, 2003; Webber and Smith, 2002: 22; Allen, 
1999: 207; Bertram, 2009; Enjalran and Husson, 1999: 60; Rozental, 1999: 136).  
The weakening of the boundaries between domestic and foreign policy milieus has 
made analysts re-think and expand the term foreign policy so that it encompasses 
the international dimension of domestic issue areas expressed in this thesis with 
the term international policy. At the same time it has made governments re-
consider and re-organise their structures and processes for foreign policy making 
in order to cope with systemic change (Drake and Metzl, 2000: 5; Allen, 1999: 207; 
Cooper, 1999; Hocking, 1999; Muller, 1999; Neumann, 1999: 152). 
As a result, governments which, in their national handling of external relations, are 
called upon to manage and coordinate classical foreign policy together with the 
growing international dimension of domestic policies (Moller, 2009; Hocking, 2004; 
2004b; Hill, 2003; Rozental, 1999: 136) are faced with the following realisation. 
Their traditional foreign policy apparatuses, previously perceived as the 
‘gatekeeper’ between the domestic and international policy milieus and identified 
with the foreign ministry may no longer be able to cope with intensified cross-
boundary external dealings (Wesley, 2002: 202; Sundelius, 1984b: 94) and added 
demands for international policy coordination (Spence, 2005; 1999; Batora, 2003; 
Gyngell and Wesley, 2003; Hill, 2003: 72; Kassim et al., 2000: 83; Allen, 1999; 
Hocking, 1999; Bulmer and Burch, 1998)  
This ‘declinist’ assumption, closely linked to globalist approaches to international 
relations, suggests that the move from vertical to horizontal models of organisation 
has questioned the hierarchical structures of traditional foreign policy machineries 
as well as their monopoly over the management of international policy (Bátora, 
2009; Bertram, 2009; Hocking, 2007; 2003; 1999; Hill, 2003: 4; Cooper, 2001; 
Allen, 1999; 2002; Ahmad, 1999: 117; Enjalran and Husson, 1999: 60; Harris, 
1999: 27; Langhorne and Wallace, 1999: 21; Rozental, 1999: 137).  
Consequently, foreign ministries - the main constituent of the foreign policy 
machinery - have embarked upon a process of change and adaptation translated 
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into extending their functions to embrace new horizontal policy areas such 
economic and trade diplomacy, international aid and development, public 
diplomacy and crisis management as well as international policy coordination. The 
rationale behind this process of change and adaptation is that foreign ministries, as 
do other organisations, wish to retain their relevance in the transforming 
operational environment and maintain their centrality in national foreign policy 
machineries.  
Evaluations of national foreign policy machineries- broadly defined as those parts 
of the national bureaucracies which are concerned with pursuing foreign and 
international policy overseas (Robertson and East, 2005: 1)-  have yielded different 
conclusions with regard to their nature, role and significance in the transforming 
policy environments. On the one hand there are views suggesting that the national 
foreign policy machinery in its traditional form, in which the foreign ministry is 
central, retains its significance and key functions as well as its primacy as the 
government’s ultimate foreign policy actor. On the other hand there are 
assumptions that the twin forces of globalisation and regionalisation have 
challenged the significance of the foreign policy machinery in its traditional guise, 
comprising the foreign ministry and its diplomatic network, and urged governments 
to look for alternative domestic structures to pursue their policies overseas.  
In this light, a broad objective of the thesis concerns the evaluation of the structure 
and nature of the contemporary Greek foreign policy machinery and its responses 
vis-á-vis the changing operational environment. A more specific objective is the 
exploration of the contemporary role and significance of the Greek Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA), traditionally the nucleus of the Greek foreign policy 
machinery. The exploration of the latter is based on reflection upon the 
organisational responses of foreign ministries in general to the changing 
operational environment, in the form of adaptation, as well as questions regarding 
their structure, role and centrality within contemporary national foreign policy 
bureaucracies. For purposes of addressing questions on adaptability and change, 
the thesis employs institutionalist approaches which, as discussed in the following 
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chapter, reflect upon the adaptability of institutions and organisations to their 
operational environment.   
The study of the structure and role of foreign ministries can be very informative in 
understanding the national management of foreign policy. With the foreign ministry 
being the bureaucratic embodiment of the state’s sovereign power in its 
relationship with the international environment, the patterns of change within its 
structure, processes and operation should provide significant evidence regarding 
state responses to external change as well as their fundamental assumptions 
about world politics (Hocking, 2007b: 4). On a similar note, Jorgensen (1997) 
suggests that foreign ministries, because they change form and content and are 
historical-concrete and dynamic organisations are informative indicators of 
international systemic change. Therefore, in the light of the debate concerning the 
impact of the transforming world politics on the ways in which governments 
manage foreign policy, the study of the structure, operation and role of the foreign 
ministry can provide significant evidence. 
Notably, national management of foreign policy in the context of changing 
international and domestic environments constitutes a research area which is 
relatively understudied compared with the attention devoted to systemic change 
(Hill, 2003; Hocking, 1999; Steiner, 1982). In existing literature most of the 
comparative analysis of nation states has focused on advanced industrialised 
states which inform research agendas on changing national foreign policy 
structures and processes (Robertson and East, 2005: 1). In arguments where 
foreign policy machineries change and adapt in ways that reflect the changing 
operational environment prescribed by the twin forces of globalisation and 
regionalisation, it is unclear to what extent this is relevant to smaller nations. In this 
light, investigation of the extent to which smaller states, such as Greece, relate to 
themes emerging in contemporary foreign policy discourse can be very indicative 
of the more general adaptation of their foreign policy processes to the emergent 
world order. Furthermore, systematic country studies can make a significant 
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contribution to the understanding of contemporary foreign policy making generally 
(Hill, 2003).  
 
Focus of the study 
 
Against this background the thesis seeks to investigate the structure and 
processes of the contemporary Greek foreign policy bureaucracy, namely the 
MFA, its diplomatic network and other sections of the Greek bureaucracy, which 
pursue international policy overseas in the context of the changing international 
and domestic policy milieus. More specifically, the thesis aims to reflect upon the 
ways in which the Greek foreign policy machinery responds to the pressures 
exercised by the changing operational environment and how its responses relate 
to the themes that preoccupy other such machineries presented in the respective 
literature. The project tests some commonly held assumptions about the 
adaptability or in some cases decline of foreign ministries and their overseas 
network of representation as well as assumptions concerning widening foreign 
policy communities by examining the relevant literature, governmental 
documentation and by means of a series of 51 interviews conducted during the 
period 2006-10.  
The focal point of this study is centred upon the bureaucratic processes and 
structures for the management of Greek foreign policy in the 21st century for 
purposes of contributing to Greek foreign policy literature which has traditionally 
focused on policy substance. Greek foreign policy literature displays an abundance 
of writings which focus on the substance of the Greek foreign policy over the last 
three decades. More specifically Greek foreign policy literature has been 
particularly concerned with themes such as the dominance of the political 
leadership and especially of the prime minister and its political office in the foreign 
policy process -in other words the politicisation of the foreign policy process- as 
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well as with the europeanisation and securitisation of Greek foreign policy, as the 
section titled ‘the thesis’s relationship to the literature’ discusses on pages 9-12.  
And whilst the substance of Greek foreign policy has generated ample academic 
interest and extensive research in the Greek academic community, the interlinked 
problematique of the bureaucratic processes and structures for its conduct in the 
rapidly changing policy milieus has been under-explored. Therefore, significant 
questions concerning the architecture for the organisation of Greek foreign policy 
remained unanswered at a time when research on the changing fabric of the 
international political system and its impact on national foreign policy 
bureaucracies is considered to be central to our understanding of the ways in 
which foreign affairs are managed in the 21st century. As a result, in the interest of 
informing an under-investigated area in Greek foreign policy literature, the thesis 
focuses on bureaucratic processes and structures for the conduct of Greek foreign 
policy and diplomacy.  
With regard to the thesis’s understanding of foreign policy, despite its state-centred 
focus, it employs a broad definition of foreign policy analysis, namely 
transformational foreign policy analysis (Manners and Whitman, 2001), which adds 
to the equation the international activities of a wide range of domestic actors 
besides the traditional foreign policy actor, the foreign ministry. This approach 
facilitates the exploration of the key themes in the literature on contemporary 
foreign policy systems, and particularly concepts such as widening foreign policy 
communities and domestication of foreign policy whereby domestic government 
departments are involved in its management thus intensifying demands for 
international policy coordination.  
Naturally, with governments facing pressing demands to engage in their entirety in 
international dealings, functions and competences are relocated between various 
departments thus challenging the primacy of the foreign ministry as the central 
foreign policy actor. In the face of such shifting dynamics, states have undertaken 
different courses of action. Some have undergone significant re-arrangement of 
their foreign policy machineries while others have persisted with arrangements 
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shaped by historical and national factors (Robertson and East, 2005). Against such 
trends, the thesis explores to assess Greece’s strategies with regards to change 
and adaptation.  
Therefore, a specific objective is to re-evaluate the Greek foreign policy machinery 
and its main constituents, the MFA and the diplomatic network, on the basis of 
their adaptation as a response to the changing environments. As previously 
discussed, the response of the Greek foreign policy machinery to the changing 
global politics has been under-studied for a number of reasons that are examined 
in detail below. In order to achieve this exploration, the thesis brings together 
contributions from theorists, analysts and practitioners of foreign policy making and 
diplomacy who explore the ways in which governments manage foreign policy in 
the contemporary complex international environment. In doing so, it maps the 
intellectual and empirical debates about the changing nature of foreign policy and 
enhances our understanding of the ways in which it is currently managed. Based 
on the premise that there is a continuing dialogue between the kind of policies 
governments make and the machinery through which those policies are 
articulated, the study of the Greek foreign policy machinery will also provide 
interesting insights with regards to Greek foreign policy. 
As previously mentioned the national bureaucratic management of foreign policy in 
the context of the transforming world politics besides being understudied as a 
research area it is also focused on advanced industrial states, which determine 
contemporary foreign policy research agendas. By this is meant that the issues - 
usually stemming from the twin forces of globalisation and regionalisation- that 
such advanced foreign policy bureaucracies confront as well as their responses to 
them, provide the themes that preoccupy foreign policy research. With themes 
such as the character –based on national politico-administrative traditions- and re-
organisation of foreign ministries and their overseas diplomatic networks as well as 
the involvement of domestic government departments in the management of 
international policy and the creation of foreign policy communities preoccupying 
foreign policy research, the thesis sets out to examine how these themes relate to 
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the contemporary Greek foreign policy system. These themes, presented and 
discussed in greater detail in chapter one, have provided the backbone of the 
thesis against which the research questions and interviews were set up.  
 
Research questions  
 
In this light the thesis sets out to explore the following four research questions 
which have been deemed central to the exploration and evaluation of the Greek 
foreign policy system. These questions, stemming from the key issues that 
preoccupy the study of the management of contemporary foreign affairs and 
having emerged from an extensive literature review which is presented in chapter 
one constitute the backbone of the thesis and determine its structure. The 
significance of each question for this evaluation is further discussed in the 
respective chapters.  
• How is the Greek foreign policy system conceptualised based on the 
particular environment and influences in foreign policy making?  
• Since one of the features of transformational foreign policy is the 
development of foreign policy communities within bureaucracies is there 
evidence of this in Greece? Do domestic government departments develop 
an international policy capacity suggesting a `horizontalisation’ of foreign 
policy? 
• How do the MFA’s organisation, operation and role respond to the 
transformation of world politics?  Given the historic centrality of the MFA in 
the foreign policy process, how does the MFA relate to declinist and 
gatekeeper images of foreign ministries?   
• What are the functions and structure of the Greek overseas diplomatic 
network? How does the recent experience of the Greek diplomatic network 
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relate to arguments suggesting the transformation and domestication of 
diplomatic missions?  
 
The thesis’s relationship to the literature  
 
The thesis builds on the existing literature on Greek foreign policy by employing a 
fresh approach to its analysis which lies in the utilisation of selected literatures 
discussed below and by generating a significant amount of empirical data. In doing 
so it provides a contemporary image of Greek foreign policy structures and 
processes. Such an approach enables the understanding of the management of 
Greek foreign policy in the context of changing world politics. By analysing the 
secondary literature as well as primary sources such as governmental 
documentation and departmental reports relating to aspects of foreign policy 
management from selected states, the thesis offers an overview of the key themes 
that have emerged in the study of foreign policy in the 21st century.  
The study of foreign policy in Greece to date has largely relied on geopolitical 
approaches aimed at explaining the pressing foreign policy issues which dominate 
the Greek foreign policy agenda. The widespread interest amongst Greek political 
scientists in the study of Greek foreign policy has focused predominantly on its 
content with an added emphasis on the triangle of Greek-Cypriot-Turkish relations, 
and the implications of the regional geopolitics of the Balkans and the regional 
configuration of the EU for Greek foreign policy (Tsardanidis, 2006; Economides, 
2005; 1995; 1995b; Gkikas, 2005; Voskopoulos, 2005; Kazakos, 2004; Tsibiribi, 
2004; Kotzias, 2003; Tsakonas et al, 2003; Tziabiris,  2003; Valden, 2003; Zoras 
and Gkikas, 2002; Kavakas, 2000; Tsoukalis, 1998; 1979; Hatzivasiliou, 1995; 
Couloumbis, 1994; 1983; Valinakis, 1994; 1988; Yannas, 1994; Kontovounisions, 
1988; Tsardanidis and Alifantis, 1988; Wallace, 1979).  
There is also a considerable Greek foreign policy literature, which focuses on 
Greek foreign policy organisation examined from a constitutional point of view 
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(Gkikas, 2005; Zoras and Gkikas, 2002). Such literature makes a significant 
contribution to our understanding of the constitutional basis for foreign policy 
making and offers valuable information on the legal principles and rules which 
underpin its organisation. With the majority of the more general Greek foreign 
policy discussions focusing on constitutional, legalistic, geopolitical and historical 
approaches (Tsakonas 2005: 312)  a gap in the literature was identified concerning 
the ways in which Greece relates to current global theoretical and empirical 
discussions on foreign policy.   
To this end research was facilitated by a number of studies (Ioakimidis, 2003; 
1999; Stoforopoulos and Makridimitris, 1997) which focus on the domestic sources 
of Greek foreign policy making and present the prevalent Greek foreign policy 
making models. Likewise, there is a significantly comprehensive and detailed study 
of the history of the MFA from 1833 – the year of Greek independence - to date 
with an emphasis on those historical variables, national and international, that 
have influenced its organisational evolution (Griva, 2008; 2002). A historical 
approach is also assumed by Karabarbounis (2007) who adopts a historical 
framework to examine the formation of the MFA since 1833. Employing this 
literature as a basis, the thesis sets out to investigate the Greek foreign policy 
machinery against contemporary pressures and to evaluate its responses to them.   
Underpinning the analysis and evaluation of the course of change and adaptation 
adopted by the Greek foreign policy machinery is the deployment of the analytical 
framework. The thesis brings together elements from the general international 
relations literature, foreign policy analysis (FPA) and more specifically 
transformational FPA, together with the contemporary diplomatic studies literature. 
It also utilises the organisational device of the foreign policy system (FPS) and 
draws on institutionalist approaches. This analytical framework elaborated in the 
following chapter, constitutes a fresh approach to the analysis of Greek foreign 
policy and contributes significant value added to existing work.  
This is because by adding to the equation assumptions and explanations inherent 
in each of the aforementioned approaches the analytical framework sheds new 
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light on the analysis of Greek foreign policy processes and structures and, thereby, 
aids the understanding of Greek foreign policy itself. Moreover, the analytical 
framework allows for the examination of a large number of variables that are 
particular to the Greek domestic and international operational environments and it 
thus facilitates the understanding of the character of the foreign policy system. As 
a result, it acknowledges current conceptual foreign policy puzzles which demand 
that analytical frameworks embrace structures, processes and policy environments 
which do not belong to foreign policy institutions as traditionally defined. This 
analytical framework departs from traditional Greek foreign policy literature which 
focuses on foreign policy defined in terms of military security and adopts a broader 
approach, which allows for the exploration of developments in international policy 
making more generally.  
With regards to the contribution of the thesis to the realm of empirical research its 
significance lies in its contribution to Greek foreign policy analysis through the 
generation and analysis of  data on those parts of the Greek bureaucracy, the MFA 
and the diplomatic network, that have been understudied and considered as 
closed and elitist. By undertaking a large number of interviews and collecting a 
large amount of data, the thesis provides a valid contemporary image of the 
culture, processes, problems, communication patterns and work of a part of the 
Greek civil service that has remained behind closed doors. The fieldwork managed 
to penetrate the back-office of the MFA, perhaps the most prestigious and elitist 
government department, as well as Greek embassies and other diplomatic 
missions and presents valuable information on the MFA’s general directorates, 
Greek diplomats’ jobs, routines, perceptions of themselves and of the organisation 
which they serve.  
Altogether, by re-evaluating the Greek foreign policy system in the context of a 
transforming world politics, the thesis relates it to the literature on national foreign 
policy systems which has produced different conclusions regarding their nature 
and role. Additionally, by evaluating the responses of the Greek foreign policy 
system to the key issues that have emerged in the study of the management of 
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foreign policy, besides providing an updated image of the administration of Greek 
foreign policy, it also updates the Greek foreign policy research agenda. More 
specifically, it initiates what might be a continuous dialogue between contemporary 
global foreign policy developments and Greek foreign policy and also allows for the 
contextualisation of its management within prevalent IR conceptual approaches 
such as globalist and/or geopolitical approaches.  
 
Methodology 
The research methods employed in this inquiry fall largely within the qualitative 
paradigm and involve the review of secondary sources in the form of literature, 
primary sources such as governmental documents, reports and official websites 
and the conduct of 51 interviews. The research design involved primarily two 
interlinked stages. Firstly, the compilation of a taxonomy of issues that preoccupy 
national foreign policy systems in their management of foreign policy and 
diplomacy in the context of transforming global politics. Secondly, the generation of 
data which enable the exploration of the Greek foreign policy system and its 
response to those issues. 
The taxonomy was achieved with the identification of contemporary foreign policy 
system preoccupations in the respective literature and in primary material such as 
government documents and reports obtained from official government websites 
and the synthesis of these issues into a single checklist. The taxonomy, presented 
and discussed in chapter one, provides the key themes against which the case of 
Greece is set up and researched. Effectively, it is on the basis of these themes that 
both the research questions and the interview questions were conceived and 
formulated. Therefore, the objective of the interviews was to generate relevant 
information on the Greek foreign policy institutions for purposes of evaluating them 
vis-á-vis the themes presented in chapter one. 
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With regards to the second stage, that is the exploration of the Greek case, data 
were generated primarily through interviews but also through systematic 
monitoring of the MFA’s website. In addition, special access was granted to the 
author to review the MFA’s publication on foreign policy issues which is intended 
only for MFA officials. Although the publication has not been used or quoted 
directly in this thesis, some of its material was used for purposes of identifying the 
main issues that concern the Greek MFA and its diplomatic network in their 
management of foreign policy. The same applies to a number of internal memos 
and reports that were made available to the author.  
 
Interviews 
In the course of the thesis, 51 semi-structured interviews using open-ended 
questions were conducted. Interviewees wished to remain anonymous and for this 
purpose the interview list presented in the final draft excludes their names and 
other details. Such information was presented solely to the examiners. The open-
ended questions, formulated on the basis of the aforementioned themes, aimed at 
gathering respondents’ views on certain matters without imposing bias or 
preconceptions.  
The interviewing technique offered significant advantages. Rapport was built with 
respondents and a number of new themes, particular to the Greek case, emerged 
during discussion. Another benefit of the chosen interviewing approach was that 
respondents were able to discuss issues that they believed to be central to the 
discussion, to provide in-depth detailed accounts of their experience and functions 
in given sections of the foreign policy bureaucracy and to raise their 
‘problematique’ concerning Greek foreign and international policy management in 
the 21st century thus contributing to the refining of the research agenda. The 
organisation and conduct of the interviews involved the following four stages:  
planning, developing a protocol, data collection and lastly transcription and data 
analysis. 
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Planning   
At this initial stage the two primary tasks involved determining the kind of 
information required for the exploration of the given themes and identifying the 
Greek officials who could provide such information. The former involved the 
drafting of an interview schedule which would ensure the extraction of information 
that is relevant to thesis’s research questions. The schedule (see ANNEX I), 
comprised some core questions concerning the role and functions of the unit 
represented by each interviewee as well as key themes such as international 
policy coordination, communication patterns, public and economic diplomacy. 
Schedules were diversified and enriched based on the significance of the unit for 
the foreign policy process as well as different competences and locations.   
Therefore, interviewees were selected on the basis of their competence and hence 
capacity to generate the respective data but also on the basis of representing the 
entirety of the spectrum of the bureaucratic sections involved in the foreign policy 
process. For instance, there is representation of MFA diplomats for issues 
concerning traditional and newly emergent domains of foreign policy, embassy 
counsellors and consular officials for issues concerning the overseas network, 
domestic government department officials dispatched to overseas mission, 
including the permanent representation of Greece to the EU for issues relating to 
widening foreign policy communities, and bureaucrats of the national school of 
public administration concerned with public and economic diplomacy.  
The interviewees and their contact details were located through the MFA’s website 
(www.mfa.gr). Initially, letters were sent out explaining the nature of the research 
project and asking for an appointment, which proved ineffective. On some 
occasions, when provided, electronic mail was used to arrange appointments. 
However, the majority of the interviews were arranged through telephone 
conversation with the targeted units. The list of interviewees and the research was 
presented for approval at the Ethical Advisory Committee at Loughborough 
University.   
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Developing a protocol 
The development of a protocol for the interviews proved to be very helpful in the 
conduct of the interviews because it provided consistency. The protocol constituted 
the guide for the conduct of the interview and involved a short presentation of the 
thesis, its main objectives and a short briefing of the interviewee on current themes 
and trends in foreign policy management. This short introduction functioned as an 
‘ice-breaker’ and benefited the discussion that followed by providing an agenda. In 
addition, it involved discussion on the matter of anonymity and confidentiality. 
Interviewees were asked when the appointment was made whether they required 
a confidentiality agreement but they all declined. Lastly, issues such as audio-
recording, taking notes and evaluation of the findings were also discussed in the 
interview. All interviewees refused audio-recording for purposes of confidentiality 
and agreed with note-taking by the interviewer.  
 
Data collection  
The 51 interviews were carried out over four years from 2007 to 2010 and involved 
a number of fieldwork trips. Data collection was organised in the course of three 
week-long trips to Brussels in 2007, 2008 and 2009, two month-long trips to 
Athens in 2008 and 2009 and a number of short trips to other locations. The 
breakdown of the fieldwork into blocks served the purpose of testing data and re-
informing the research agenda. For instance, some interviews conducted in the 
first and second blocks in Brussels in 2007 and 2008 were followed up by further 
meetings in 2009 and 2010 for the purpose of testing findings and clarifying points 
that had remained vague or unanswered. The same applied to the two consecutive 
trips to Athens. As mentioned above, the interviews were organised on the basis of 
addressing and exploring the themes informing the checklist but also of 
representing all the bureaucratic sections that are concerned with the management 
of Greek foreign and international policy.   
More specifically, interviews were conducted with officials at the Prime Minister’s 
Diplomatic Cabinet, at the MFA’s headquarters, the ministries of Culture, 
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Development and Defence, at the Secretariat for Communication and Information, 
at the MFA’s Diplomatic Academy and at the School of National Public 
Administration in Athens. In addition, meetings were held with members of the 
Permanent Parliamentary Committee of Foreign and European Affairs and of the 
European Parliament in Brussels. Additional interviews were conducted with 
officials at the Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU in Brussels, at 
embassies, consulates, and economic and press offices in Canberra, New York, 
Cologne, Brussels and London. The criteria for the selection in the overseas 
missions also involved the politico-economic significance of location and the 
existence of Greek populations. 
 
Transcription and data analysis 
Transcription followed immediately after the conduct of the interviews for purposes 
of imprinting all the information that was recorded through note-keeping in the 
course of the interview. Transcription proved to be a time consuming technique but 
when performed instantly after the interview, proved quite effective. Transcribed 
data were also categorised under themes which enabled the identification of 
response variation over a given theme. This technique also facilitated the analysis 
of the data and allowed for the investigation of patterns in the views of respondents 
based on their seniority, experience, educational background, location and 
function, which formed part of the discussion in chapters four and five.  
Interview data were checked for their credibility to the highest degree possible 
through data triangulation. Checks were carried out through the use of additional 
interviews and continuing contact with researchers and officials in the MFA and in 
overseas missions and material provided by them to the author such as 
departmental reviews and memos. Additional means for data triangulation have 
involved the monitoring of the MFA’s website on a regular basis and ongoing 
search for similar research projects in the libraries of the National School of Public 
Administration, the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy 
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(ELIAMEP), the Greek Centre for European Studies (EKEM) and the University of 
Macedonia in Greece.  
 
Chapter Overviews  
 
The thesis is structured on the basis of the key themes identified in the literature 
review and the chapters that follow explore in greater depth these themes. The 
thesis is divided into five chapters, with the first two being contextual and the 
following three being empirical. Chapter one opens with a more detailed discussion 
on the transformation of world politics and its implications for the conceptualisation 
and organisation of contemporary foreign policy. In doing so it borrows elements 
from international relations, globalisation and diplomatic studies literatures. 
Chapter one provides the agenda for the empirical chapters on Greece that follow. 
The chapter also focuses on the analytical framework which is based on the 
employment of different literatures for purposes of facilitating the evaluation of the 
Greek foreign policy system. More specifically, the chapter reviews institutional 
approaches to organisational behaviour, a transformational foreign policy analysis 
and the behavioural model of the foreign policy system.  
Chapter two conceptualises a Greek foreign policy system drawing on Clarke and 
White’s (1981; 1989) theoretical conceptualisation, identifies its constituent 
elements and discusses the main international and domestic variables that 
influence Greek foreign policy making structures. This chapter comprises two 
sections. The first section explores Greece’s international environment and the 
influence it has over its institutions for foreign policy. The second section focuses 
on the wider domestic politico-administrative culture and environment of which 
foreign policy process is just a part. Chapter two portrays certain administrative 
practices which have dominated Greek politics and have contributed to the 
moulding of the foreign policy machinery.   
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The third chapter focuses on developments summarised in the horizontalisation of 
foreign policy to a number of domestic government departments as well as the 
development of international policy capacity outside the confines of the MFA.  With 
foreign policy proliferation now embracing a wide cast of government departments 
and the creation of foreign policy communities constituting key themes in foreign 
policy discussion, this chapter undertakes the investigation of Greek foreign policy 
decentralisation and a search for evidence of the emergence of a foreign policy 
community.  
Chapter four narrows down the investigation to the traditionally central actor of the 
Greek foreign policy machinery namely the MFA. By focusing on the contemporary 
structure, role and operation of the MFA the chapter seeks to investigate the 
present position of the ministry within the Greek bureaucracy and to assess its 
adaptation to the changing operational environment. With adaptation becoming 
manifested with organisations’ extension of functions and structures, the chapter 
examines the MFA in the context of the transforming environment and evaluates 
its adaptability. At the same time, it places the MFA alongside some key 
assumptions concerning the nature and role of contemporary foreign ministries as 
well as examines its relevance vis-á-vis declinist theses and contemporary foreign 
ministry images.  
Chapter five focuses on the Greek diplomatic network. Some of the key issues that 
are addressed concern its functions and role as well as questions regarding its 
adaptability to current developments. The chapter addresses the key themes 
which emerge in the wider discussion of the role and operation of overseas 
diplomatic missions in the context of transforming world politics against which it 
tests the Greek diplomatic network. The chapter provides a significant amount of 
data for the understanding of the operation of this part of Greek bureaucracy which 
has been significantly understudied.   
Finally the conclusion revisits the research questions set out above and seeks to 
contextualise the Greek foreign policy system alongside key assumptions 
presented in earlier chapters. In other words, by synthesising the employed 
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analytical framework and findings the last chapter analyses the Greek foreign 
policy system against the key themes that preoccupy the contemporary 
management of foreign and international policy.  
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Chapter 1: Thinking about foreign policy structures 
and processes in a transforming world 
 
Introduction  
 
The aim of the present chapter is to explore the main challenges, empirical and 
analytical, that a transforming world politics (Webber and Smith, 2002; Held et al., 
1999) pose to the national management of foreign policy. This exploration is 
necessary for the identification of the main themes that preoccupy national foreign 
policy systems in their management of foreign affairs in the 21st century. The 
chapter is organised on the basis of the key developments in foreign policy 
management in the context of the changing global politics.  Such developments 
constitute the focus of contemporary foreign policy analysis.  
More specifically, the chapter besides discussing conceptual developments in 
foreign policy analysis, addresses the challenges imposed upon foreign policy 
machineries in their management of foreign policy by the changing global politics. 
With the latter constituting the independent variable of the study, the chapter 
discusses its implications for national foreign policy machineries and their foreign 
ministries world-wide. This approach enables the formulation of a taxonomy of 
issues that helps to inform and guide the study of the dependent variable of the 
study, namely the contemporary Greek foreign policy machinery. Given that most 
of the available foreign policy management discourse derives from western and 
European states as well as from what have been termed as mega-foreign 
ministries1 such as those in the US, UK, France, Germany and Japan, it is valuable 
to explore how Greek foreign policy structures relate to such findings.  
                                                            
1
 Foreign ministries are categorised based on the numbers of employees and the number of 
overseas missions (Garson, 2007: 238) 
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In the contemporary environment challenges to national governments’ capacity to 
conduct foreign and international policy is a familiar theme and reflects the blurring 
of the boundaries between international and domestic policy milieus. In this 
environment, agencies assigned with responsibility for the conduct of what has 
been traditionally termed as ‘foreign’ policy, find themselves challenged as roles 
and responsibilities are relocated. The contemporary polycentric international 
environment characterised by a proliferation of actors with international policy 
agendas -including domestic governmental departments with an international 
mandate - poses significant challenges to the national foreign policy machinery. 
This underpins its institutional responses and the need to rethink its role and 
structure.  
With the national foreign policy machinery, defined as the part of the national 
bureaucracy which pursues governmental policy overseas, it is crucial to explore 
the implications of the changing operational environment for foreign policy 
bureaucracies. In this light, a broad objective of the present discussion concerns 
the implications of the changing operational environment for those national 
structures and processes involved in the management of foreign policy whilst a 
more specific objective is to explore the aforementioned implications for the foreign 
ministry, the nucleus of the national foreign policy machinery in its traditional form. 
The exploration of the latter involves reflection upon the organisational responses 
of the foreign ministry to the changing policy environment as well as questions with 
regards to its role and centrality within contemporary national foreign policy 
bureaucracies.  
The discussion is based on the premise that the patterns of change within the 
foreign ministry’s structure, processes and operation should provide significant 
evidence regarding state responses to external change as well as their 
fundamental assumptions about world politics (Hocking, 2007b: 4).With the 
transformation in world politics reflecting the forces of globalization, regionalization 
and, to a smaller extent, localisation creating needs for the management of 
horizontal issues (Harder, 2004: 3) cutting across customary foreign policy’s 
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vertical organisational domains, the foreign ministry’s traditional hierarchical 
organisational structure and models of diplomatic representation are deemed no 
longer sufficient (Cooper, 2001). Therefore, in the light of the debate concerning 
the impact of a transforming world politics on the ways in which governments 
manage foreign policy, the study of the structure, operation and role of the foreign 
ministry may generate useful insights.  
In this light, the present chapter seeks to address the transforming relationships 
between national and international politics and their implications for the 
understanding and management of foreign policy. In doing so, it draws on literature 
from International Relations, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and Institutionalism. 
With this in mind, the chapter starts with a number of key developments which 
make up the changing international environment and their implications for the 
national management of foreign policy. Then it narrows the discussion to the 
foreign ministry and considers its role and mandate within the national foreign 
policy bureaucracy as well as its institutional responses to the transforming policy 
environment. Finally, the chapter undertakes the exploration of the analytical and 
theoretical developments of foreign policy within the context of FPA and employs 
the organisational device of the Foreign Policy System (FPS) which conceptualises 
foreign policy processes and structures as an integrated system in specific national 
contexts.  
 
The transformation of world politics  
   
It is conventional wisdom that the practice and structures of foreign policy and 
diplomacy are undergoing profound change in response to global transformations, 
thereby presenting demanding intellectual challenges (Webber and Smith, 2002; 
Held et al, 1999). In the twentieth century, the end of the Cold War, the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have led to the proliferation of new states and the 
emergence of new patterns of cooperation and conflict between them (Hill, 2003; 
Webber and Smith, 2002; Allen, 1999). The collapse of the bipolar system, the 
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absence of fixed relationships and the increased numbers of actors in the 
international arena have added to the complexity and multiplicity of issues 
confronting foreign policy and diplomatic machineries. Since then, the 
transformation of the international environment has been complicated by the 
overlapping forces of globalisation, regionalisation and localisation commonly 
referred to in the globalisation literature as forces of change and transformation 
(Scholte, 2005; 2003; Held and McGrew, 2002; Langhorne, 2000: 43; Held et al., 
1999).  
Globalisation, regionalisation and localisation as sets of processes subsume a 
variety of transforming forces. The locomotive of this transformation is information 
technology (Anderson, 1998: 105; Slaughter, 2004; 1997: 184). Fast and low cost 
information technology has fuelled ever closer linking of economic, political and 
social communities by facilitating direct channels of communications with market 
actors, companies, networks and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) which 
operate transnationally (Bátora, 2009: 1; Woods, 2002: 25; Keohane and Nye, 
2000: 116).  
The information revolution, lying at the heart of economic and social globalisation, 
by increasing the number of participating actors and linking societies directly has 
increased the relevance of ‘complex interdependence’ (Keohane and Nye, 2000: 
113; Moses and Knutsen, 2001: 360). More specifically, easy and cheap access to 
information and technology has increased the capabilities of actors outside the 
governmental foreign policy machinery while facilitating direct communication of 
national officials with their opposite numbers (Wallace, 2008; Dunn, 1996: 6-7).  
Technological advancements have resulted in change and innovation in the way 
that international relations and diplomacy are being conducted (Wallace, 2008: 23; 
Cooper, 2001: 114; Melissen, 1999). Acceleration in communication methods and 
travel have altered the conduct and conceptualisation of diplomacy in a number of 
ways as well as facilitating ‘summit’ and ‘personal’ diplomacy (Cooper, 2001: 114). 
Langhorne (2000: 41) suggests that a combination of the telephone, microchip and 
25 
 
orbiting satellite has created a global communications network, which has escaped 
from the control and management of governments.  
Against such developments, governmental foreign policy machineries lag behind 
(Moses and Knutsen, 2001). Not only have governments lost control over 
communications but also the entire system of inter-state communication, at the 
centre of which traditionally resided the ministry of foreign affairs is under strain 
(Batora, 2009: 1). This is because one of the primary functions of the foreign 
ministry, namely storing and processing information, is seriously challenged by the 
sheer volume, availability and speed of transfer of foreign policy information 
(Bátora, 2009: 3; Hocking and Spence, 2005; Melissen, 1999). Therefore, the 
foreign ministry’s monopoly of information is challenged2 and together with the 
increase in direct communication of national officials with their opposite numbers 
we are witnessing what Metzl (2001) termed the ‘disintermediation’ of the foreign 
ministry -which refers to its disengagement as the most important intermediary 
between governments- and a shift towards network diplomacy which involves a 
wide array of actors operating horizontally across state boundaries.  
Such operating forces and actors operating horizontally across the global system, 
have little or no reference to state boundaries and challenge the role of the state 
per se as the primary actor in  the international system (Scholte, 2005; 2003; Held 
and McGrew, 2002; Langhorne, 2000: 43; Held et al., 1999). At the same time they 
force a symbiotic relationship with other non-governmental agencies and advocacy 
networks which, having defined stakes, seek to influence the agenda and direction 
of international public policy (Cooper, 2001: 114; Held and McGrew, 2002: 1).  
Ranging from multinational corporations and international organisations to civil 
society organisations (CSOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), foreign 
audiences and other entities these actors have altered the fabric of the 
international policy environment and challenged the processes of foreign policy 
                                                            
2
 According to Wallace (2008: 23) and Hocking (2002) such challenge can be observed particularly 
at the level of the EU where domestic ministries can communicate instantly and informally with their 
foreign interlocutors, whom they often know personally from multilateral working groups  
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and diplomacy (Bertram, 2009; Groom, 2007: 203; Foreign Ministry of Denmark, 
2006: 6; Rana, 2005: 2; Tsardanidis, 2005: 43; Hocking, 2004; 2004b; Bátora, 
2003: 120; Hill, 2003; Rosenau, 2002; Webber and Smith, 2002: 22; Allen, 1999: 
207; Enjalran and Husson, 1999: 60; Rozental, 1999: 136) .At the same time they 
shift the emphasis to the receiving end of diplomacy, the consumer-citizen and to 
new modes of diplomacy such as public diplomacy (Melissen, 2005: 7). With 
NGOs alone having quadrupled from 6,000 to 26,000 only in the 1990s (Keohane 
and Nye, 2000: 116) the emergent ‘global civil society’, representing local 
constituencies, principles and values besides commercial interests3, is expected to 
transform foreign policy processes and agendas even further (Woods, 2002: 29-
30). 
 
Public diplomacy  
In the changing international and domestic environments national governments 
have become concerned with communicating and gaining approval for their foreign 
policies from domestic and foreign audiences rather than governments alone and 
have hence prioritised the national projection of soft power (Nye, 2008; Melissen, 
2005). Nye (2008: 94) defines soft power as the ability to obtain the outcomes one 
wants through attraction and not through coercion or payment. Instead a country’s 
soft power rests on its resources of culture, values, and policies4 (Nye, 2008; 
Melissen, 2005). The prioritization of promoting a state’s soft power is directly 
linked to the elevation of public diplomacy as a key strategic foreign policy priority 
for many national governments (Melissen, 2005). Public diplomacy, defined as non 
state and state actors influencing public opinion in foreign societies through the 
usage of media and other channels of communication5 (Gilboa, 2008: 58), has 
become a new governmental instrument to mobilize resources by influencing 
publics of other countries (Nye, 2008: 95). 
                                                            
3
 For more on the different categories of NGOs based on the interests they represent see Woods 
(2002: 29-30)  
4
 For more on Nye’s discussion of smart power, which is the resultant of soft and hard power see 
Nye (2008) 
5
 For a distinction between public diplomacy and media diplomacy see Gilboa, (2008: 58) 
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The elevation of public diplomacy on national foreign policy agendas after the post-
Cold War era and intensifying with the 11 September 2001 tragedy posed serious 
challenges to foreign policy and diplomatic structures previously focused on 
government to government interaction (Hocking, 2008: 62; Melissen, 2005: 6). The 
conceptual and practical implications of public diplomacy are that national 
governments now have to communicate their policies to and engage with a 
number of new actors and civil society audiences, which reside outside 
conventional diplomatic governmental channels.  
Such developments challenge our understanding of modern diplomacy as a key 
institution of the Westphalian order (Held et al. 1999: 39). If Westphalian diplomacy 
has been about relationships between the representatives of states or other 
international actors then public diplomacy, according to Melissen (2005: 5), targets 
the general public in foreign societies and more specifically non-official groups, 
organisations and individuals. Naturally, the shift of emphasis in the target of 
foreign policy and diplomacy from governments to publics, together with the recent 
developments in information technologies discussed below, raise significant 
questions concerning the role and functions of national foreign policy machineries 
in their contemporary operational environment. Public diplomacy is discussed 
further in chapter five.  
Rosenau (2002: 72) describes the contemporary operational environment of 
national foreign policy machineries as one of ‘extraordinary complexity’ on the 
grounds that overlapping forces of change have unleashed challenges, which call 
for intensified joint movements towards peace and prosperity. At the same time, 
proliferating complex interdependencies and problems pave the way for the 
participation in rule systems by entities other than states, such as advocacy 
groups, NGOs, business associations and other types of collectivities (Keohane 
and Nye, 2000), with which diplomats have to operate effectively.   
Rosenau (2002: 75) depicts the world arena as a ‘bifurcated’ system whereby two 
worlds coexist. The two worlds are the traditional state-centric system, which 
coexists with an emergent multi-centric system of diverse types of other 
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collectivities of actors making up a new, expanding socio-politico-economic arena 
defined by ‘intermestic affairs’. In this arena, authority is increasingly 
disaggregated resulting in a polycentric system of global governance6 comprising 
centres of authority flowing across state borders (Slaughter, 2004; 1999; Rosenau, 
2002: 71; Langhorne, 2000: 42). Such systemic change has dramatically altered 
the underlying structure of international relations with enormous implications for 
the ways in which foreign policy and diplomacy are conducted (Langhorne and 
Wallace, 1999: 17-18). Thus, the investigation of how national foreign policy 
machineries adapt organisationally to such forces of transformation becomes 
necessary (Neumann, 1999: 152; Allen, 1999: 207).  
 
The advent of networks and the challenges to foreign-domestic divides 
The discourse on the forces of transformation in world politics is characterised by 
differing views. Some suggest that at the heart of the world politics transformation 
argument is the conviction that at the dawn of the millennium, globalisation 
constitutes the central transformative force behind rapid social, political and 
economic changes (Scholte, 2003; Held et al, 1999; Giddens, 2003; 1996). The 
analysis of the implications of globalisation in any of its conceived forms ranging 
from internationalisation to liberalisation, to universalisation and westernisation7 
(Scholte, 2005) or as a combination of all those elements (Woods, 2002) for the 
nation state has been linked to assumptions that the nation state as we know it is 
                                                            
6
 Cooper et al. (2008: 1) describes global governance as a pattern of transparent  and inclusive 
processes to address complex transnational collective-action problems 
7
 Scholte (2005) suggests that theorists have portrayed four dominant images of globalisation, 
which seemingly overlap, but substantially differ in their emphasis. The first image describes 
globalisation as internationalisation. In this perspective ‘global’ is just another word to describe 
cross-border relations between countries while globalisation designates a growth of international 
exchange and interdependence. The second image views globalisation as liberalisation, in the 
sense that it refers to a process of moving state-imposed restrictions on movements between 
countries aiming to create an open, borderless world economy. A third conception equates 
globalisation with universalisation. In this context global means ‘worldwide’ and the globalisation is 
understood as the process of spreading objects, ideas and experiences to people in all corners of 
the earth. The fourth image defines globalisation as westernisation or modernisation. According to 
this image, social structures of the west are spread the world over eliminating prior socio-cultural 
experiences. Here globalisation is also seen as imperialism.  
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in a process of transformation (Held et al. 1999). Views which support the 
transformation of the role of the state suggest that ‘a revolution in diplomatic affairs 
is inevitable, with IT being a central factor in such transformative dynamics’ 
(Bátora, 2009: 3). 
Focusing on globalisation as a central transformative force with implications for the 
nation state in the conduct of foreign policy and diplomacy confronts us with an 
analytical puzzle. This puzzle relates to the understanding of regional and local 
forces in relation to the globalisation discussion. Held et al. (1999) tackle this 
analytical conundrum by conceiving globalisation as operating in a continuum with 
regional, local and national dimensions. The authors (Held et al., 1999: 15-16) 
suggest that by implying a stretching of political and economic activities across 
frontiers, globalisation embodies trans-regional interconnectedness due to the 
widening reach of networks of social activity and power. Interaction and flows of 
people, ideas, trade, and finance across frontiers are not random but rather 
regularised, transcending constituent societies and states.  
The velocity, intensity and extensiveness of interactions may be associated with a 
deepening enmeshment of the local and global such that the impact of distant 
events is magnified while even the most local developments may have enormous 
global consequences. In this context, the authors conceive regionalisation as a 
clustering of transactions, flows and interactions between functional or 
geographical groupings of states or societies8 and localisation as referring to the 
consolidation of flows within a specific locale. Thus, globalisation describes, for 
instance, global flows, vertical and horizontal, whereas equivalent flows within 
them can be perceived in regional or local clusters. In all three conceptions, a 
reconfiguration of social geography is entailed with increased trans-planetary 
connections between societies through the emergence and thickening of networks 
of connections –environmental, social and economic9 (Held at al, 1999).  
                                                            
8
 The configuration of the European Union constitutes a characteristic example of a regional 
clustering of transactions between a group of states 
9
 For different approaches to globalisation and the three schools of thought namely the 
hyperglobalisers, the sceptics and the transformationalists see Held et all, 1999. Giddens, A. (1996) 
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The reason why this understanding is essential is because the transformative 
forces described above pose questions regarding the ways in which trans-
boundary problems are dealt with at a national level. More specifically, the issue at 
hand is whether the institutional density, extreme economisation of politics, 
expanding jurisdiction and suprastate regulation denote a structural shift in how 
world affairs are governed. For Rosenau (2002) such developments represent ‘the 
evolving infrastructure of a fragile system of global governance- a new complex 
multilateralism10.  
Such flows of information be they vertical or horizontal, have contributed both to 
the diminution of states’ capacities to manage trans-boundary issues (Woods, 
2002: 26) and to the shifting balance between hierarchical and networked forms of 
organisation manifested in foreign policy machineries. In other words, the shifts of 
dynamics from states to supra-state, sub-state and non state actors with multiple 
allegiances and global reach can be explained with the changing structure of 
organisations which move from hierarchies to networks (Slaughter, 2004; 1997: 
184; Rosenau, 2002: 77). Such developments are closely linked to data and 
documentation concerning the changing organisational approaches adopted by a 
number of foreign ministries which move from hierarchical to horizontal 
organisational structures.  
This shift has been significantly facilitated by the Internet which has enabled the 
disaggregation of hierarchical models of authority and the spreading of power to 
extensive horizontal networks (Bátora, 2008; Slaughter, 2004; 1997: 184; 
Rosenau, 2002: 77). Such networks transcend the traditional divide between high 
and low politics and span states and cultures. With international organisations 
having a lacklustre record on global problem solving and NGOs existing largely to 
compensate for their inadequacies, global spanning transgovernmental11 networks 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
categorises globalisation approaches under two headings instead, as hyperglobalisers and 
sceptics.  
10
 Whether this is displacing traditional geopolitical modes of regulating world order remains the 
source of disagreement (Keohane and Nye, 2000; 2003; Rosenau, 2002) 
11
 Slaughter (1997) suggests that the rationale that transgovernmentalism has more to offer than 
liberal internationalism and medievalism lies in such realities.  
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embracing a dense web of transnational actors appear to be more effective in 
tackling global problems thus promoting global governance (Held and McGrew, 
2002: 1; Slaughter, 1997: 195).  
Horizontal networks, in conjunction with the increasing intensity of transformative 
forces, jointly transform the spatial organisation of social relations and transactions 
(Held et al., 1999: 16). Such conceptions challenge our analytical capacity which is 
rooted in methodological territorialism and translated into a habit of probing 
problems in a broad, geographical or spatial context inherent in geopolitical 
approaches (Scholte, 2005; Anderson, 1998). For much of the twentieth century 
geopolitics provided the dominant framework for the study of international politics 
assuming that geographical and geopolitical dynamics constituted the primary 
variables (Anderson, 1998: 106).  
Changes in conceptions of spatial organisation also challenge traditional 
assumptions of foreign policy analysis (Keohane and Nye, 1989). This is because 
foreign policy and its structures, traditionally understood to be compartmentalised 
in vertical organisational domains (Cooper, 2001), must now be comprehended in 
a networked international policy environment. Here, the methodological constraint 
of the domestic-foreign divide as well as more general spatial and geographical 
distinctions need to be questioned (Scholte, 2005; Rosenau, 2002: 74).  
Naturally, the above changes pose questions for national foreign policy structures 
and processes (Cooper, 2001: 114; 1999: 40; Langhorne, 2000: 34; Giddens, 
1996: 1). Changes in the style of global governance have triggered tectonic shifts 
in national foreign policy machineries. This is because questions of supra-
nationality and horizontal organisation imply the need to change traditional 
configurations for foreign policy (Scholte, 2003; Rosenau, 2002; Held et al., 1999) 
which have relied on the compartmentalisation of administrative responsibilities 
within vertically defined national foreign policy domains (Cooper, 2001: 114).  
As a result, governments have sought to re-think their foreign policy machineries. 
Here, the re-organisation of the foreign ministry and its diplomatic network 
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constitute central themes (Bátora, 2009; Hocking, 2007; 2004; Cooper, 2001; 
Muller, 1999: 192, 197). Hocking (2007: 9) identifies two trends in contemporary 
national foreign policy and diplomatic systems as a result of forces of globalisation. 
These are fragmentation and concentration. Fragmentation relates to the 
diversification within what he terms the ‘national diplomatic system’ as line 
ministries come to assume a growing interest in the international dimension of their 
own portfolios, discussed in the following sections. Concentration relates to the 
enhancement of foreign policy capacity of prime ministerial and presidential offices 
and other central agencies. Both developments trigger a series of shifts of 
dynamics within traditional foreign policy institutions (Langhorne, 2000: 42). 
These are further emphasised through parallel processes whereby webs of 
linkages are created between external and domestic affairs (Komachi, 1999: 105; 
Rosenau, 1974b: 161). With policy arenas becoming more intertwined both 
domestically and internationally and with linkages facilitated by informational 
technologies the same policy areas can be pursued in a range of negotiating 
environments and bureaucracies, which link themselves directly to global events 
and economies12 (Newhouse, 1997: 67).  
 
The transformation of foreign policy agendas and the implications for 
the foreign policy process 
 
Trans-border interactions and joint supra-state attempts to address complex 
transnational collective action have transformed international policy agendas 
(Wesley, 2002). Contemporary global agendas are occupied by complex inter-
linked issues (Rosenau, 2002: 70) and are acutely penetrated by economics 
(Wesley, 2002; Keohane and Nye, 2000). This has led to the growth in the policy 
domains that the foreign policy bureaucracy has to monitor and the involvement of 
a large number of domestic and other entities in the policy process. Economic 
                                                            
12
 See Newhouse (1997: 67) for an extensive account of the professionalisation of bureaucracies 
and for their direct linkages to global economy  
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issues seem to dominate international agendas thus contributing to agenda 
transformation and pulling into foreign policy processes a wide cast of 
governmental and non-governmental agencies (Hocking, 2004; 2004b; Hill, 2003; 
Webber and Smith, 2002; Wesley, 2002; Allen, 1999: 207; Enjalran and Husson, 
1999: 60; Rozental, 1999: 136).  
Keohane and Nye (1987) suggest that interdependence, which promoted peace 
and prosperity, has become complex, binding the economic and hence political 
interests of states even more tightly together. Interdependence, having now 
reached yet another height, transcending borders and states and making, what we 
call, a borderless world has brought into the game of international politics, firms 
and markets, national and international, which seek to influence agendas. 
‘Economic interests become so strong that markets replace politics at home and 
abroad’ (Waltz, 1999: 694) and develop their own private foreign policies13 which 
crowd international agendas (Groom, 2007). This has affected foreign ministries 
and their officials, traditionally seen as lacking both knowledge and interest in 
economics14. Now, as does the entire bureaucracy, the involvement of the MFA in 
economic issues has greatly increased (Waltz, 1999: 698).  
The proliferation of state and societal actors with a stake in international politics 
which seek to influence the direction of international policy has brought both 
quantitative and qualitative changes to the foreign policy and diplomatic agendas 
which expanded and diversified (Rana, 2005: 2; White et al., 2005: 1; Hocking, 
2004: 151; 2004b; Moses and Knutsen, 2001: 356; Harris, 1999: 24). Diplomatic 
agendas are becoming crowded with a number of new issues often directly linked 
to citizens, thus reminiscing national domestic agendas. Furthermore, issues of 
‘high politics’ or ‘high security’ relating to questions of war and peace are changing 
in content as they are joined by issues relating to economic and social well being 
(Cooper, 2001: 114).  
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 For an overview of private foreign policies see Groom (2007) 
14
 There is of course a number of foreign ministries which were set up based on a primarily 
commercial role such as the Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) in Australia  
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The emphasis placed by the Cold War on military security has in most cases been 
downgraded by governments (Webber and Smith, 2002: 19) and there has been a 
qualitative change in the nature of national security which is not confined within 
borders (Bertram, 2009). There are new types of security challenges, global in 
nature, which join traditional security issues on the agenda on the grounds that 
they directly threaten citizens’ wellbeing. Some of the emerging security issue 
areas can be summarised in natural disasters, fires, tsunamis and earthquakes, 
transnational spread of epidemics, huge migration waves, asylum seekers, 
international terrorist groups and competition for resources and energy (Moller, 
2009; Wesley, 2002).  
A very significant development, simultaneous with the changing notions of security, 
is that the evolving system of global governance embracing states, international 
organisations, transnational networks and public as well as private actors has 
prioritised the significance of humanity and elevates the importance of individual 
human activities (Held and McGrew, 2002: 1; Langhorne, 2000: 34). As discussed 
later, such developments have pushed a number of foreign policy machineries to 
extend their functions towards managing international crises and protecting their 
nationals overseas as well as towards humanitarian policies such as international 
development cooperation and aid.  
The growing emphasis on cross-cutting policies besides challenging traditional 
vertical divisions between domestic and international politics inherent in the 
Westphalian organisational approaches of the state (Allen, 1999: 207; 1999; 
Cooper, 1999: 40; Muller, 1999: 192; Rozental, 1999: 139; Keohane and Milner, 
1996; Keohane and Nye, 1989; Sundelius 1980; 1984b; Katzenstein, 1975) has 
also created needs for the deployment of the government in its entirety for their 
management. Such developments have led to the expansion of foreign policy 
bureaucracies.  
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Widening foreign policy communities 
As previously mentioned the proliferation of new policies on national diplomatic 
agendas has resulted in a proliferation of those parts of government that conduct a 
state’s international policy (Hill 2003; Wesley, 2002: 210; Cooper, 2001; 1999: 44). 
Effectively, this is translated into a wide range of government departments of a 
previously domestic mandate becoming involved in the foreign policy process. 
Domestic departments, becoming more and more involved in foreign policy making 
(Muller, 1999: 197) have developed international policy capacity, with the creation 
of specialised bureaus of international affairs and they now handle their own affairs 
abroad (Bertram, 2009; Rozental, 1999: 139).  
The involvement of such actors in the international policy environment has resulted 
in diffusion in the management of foreign policy into a wider cast of agents thus 
creating a ‘foreign policy community’ which embraces actors horizontally outside 
the confines of the foreign ministry with agendas that cross policy boundaries 
(Hocking: 2004; 2003; Hill, 2003; Cooper, 1999: 41; Langhorne and Wallace, 1999: 
18). Foreign policy bureaucracies are increasingly growing outside the foreign 
ministry (Eayrs, 1982: 96) transforming to what has been termed as ‘transnational 
administration’ (Spence, 2003: 23) further discussed in chapter three.  
Bureaucratic elements act in the international arena and create their own linkages, 
thus developing a web of inter-bureaucratic interaction epitomised in the concept 
of transgovernmentalism (Slaughter, 2004; 1997; Keohane and Nye, 2000; 1989) 
facilitated by easy and low cost communications (Bátora, 2009; Moses and 
Knutsen, 2001: 360; Enjalran and Husson, 1999: 60). Consequently, the 
international policy making milieu is becoming more inhabited by domestic 
departments often bypassing the foreign ministry, once considered the linkage 
between the domestic and international policy milieus but now confronted with 
disintermediation (Rozental, 1999: 136). At the European Union level in particular 
there is a growing interconnectedness of domestic administrative systems of 
member states where sector-specific policies are coordinated across national 
borders without directly involving foreign ministries (Bátora, 2003: 117).  
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The rise of domestic departments to international policy making and the resulted 
widening of foreign policy communities, albeit strongly encouraged (Neumann, 
1999: 153), has at the same time challenged the foreign ministry and the foreign 
policy machinery in a number of ways. Firstly, the unprecedented number of policy 
areas preoccupying foreign policy agendas coupled with the fact that it is 
impossible for the foreign ministry, and any other ministry, to possess expert 
knowledge in all foreign policy domains, have led to the former’s decreasing 
monopoly over foreign policy expertise. This limits its foreign policy making 
capacity due to the direct involvement of other government departments in 
multilateral diplomatic fora and policy making networks (Wallace, 2008: 22).  
Secondly, and relevant to the previous argument, the phenomenon of the widening 
foreign policy communities has triggered discussion with regards to the centrality 
and relevance of the foreign ministry in contemporary foreign policy machineries. 
Those discussions are closely linked to the course of change and adaptation that 
foreign ministries have embarked upon which is discussed in the sections that 
follow. Last but not least, widening foreign policy communities, besides challenging 
the role of the foreign ministry as the sole actor in the identification and pursuit of 
national interests abroad, also raise questions concerning ways to ensure and 
improve domestic coherence in national pursuit of external relations (Allen, 1999: 
209; Bertram, 2009). This relates to the task of international policy coordination 
which constitutes a continuing theme in national management of foreign policy. 
International policy coordination is also central to discussions of foreign ministries 
adapting their processes and structures and asserting their centrality in the foreign 
policy machinery.  
 
International policy coordination  
The central argument in this chapter is that the contemporary polycentric 
international environment characterised by a proliferation of actors and renewed 
loci of policy making invites the institutional adaptation of the traditional foreign 
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policy machinery. In this context the last two sections examined how domestic and 
other entities join in pursuing international policies thus altering foreign policy 
agendas and enlarging the foreign policy process. Drawing on the intensified 
cooperation of domestic entities in pursuing policies with a growing international 
significance, the theme of international policy coordination emerges with renewed 
emphasis in the literature.  
At a European Union level coordination became very important with the majority of 
domestic departments acquiring a European dimension15 (Enjalran and Husson, 
1999: 60; Spence, 1999: 249-250). On the international level, policy coordination 
emerged as a theme resulting from the proliferation of domestic actors with 
growing international portfolios and international agendas which extend to the 
bureaucratic responsibility of a large number of government departments (Harris, 
1999: 26-27; 33).  
The direct involvement of home ministries and dealings with their opposite 
numbers in contrast to the past monopoly of the foreign ministry in communication 
has raised a number of questions concerning both the centrality of the foreign 
ministry in the foreign policy process but also the ensuring of effective international 
policy coordination (Allen, 1999: 209; Rozental, 1999: 136). The emerging policy 
areas with their fluctuating boundaries touching simultaneously on internal and 
external issues have stressed coordination demands from the foreign ministry 
(Enjalran and Husson, 1999: 61) while at the same time led to significant intra-
bureaucratic friction as international policy coordination has been considered to be 
highly political and prestigious and has thus given rise to intra-bureaucratic rivalry 
(Kassim et al., 2000: 83).  
According to Allen (1999: 212), governments today encounter two problems in the 
management of external relations. Firstly, they have to ensure effective internal 
communication and coordination both within the foreign ministry and between the 
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 Especially after Maastricht 1993 this coordinating role has grown in importance (Enjalran and 
Husson, 1999: 61; Spence: 1999). 
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foreign ministry and the posts abroad. Secondly, as the agenda expands to involve 
directly many more home departments in both the shaping and the execution of 
external policy, the foreign ministry is in charge of ensuring consistency and 
coherence across the whole of government.  
In pursuing this objective, foreign ministries find it imperative to retain as much 
control over the bureaucracy as possible. These problems coupled with the 
increase in PM’s role in diplomacy and foreign and international policy coordination 
(Komachi, 1999: 104) pressure contemporary foreign ministries to pursue an ever 
stronger position in coordination. Such new modes of interaction and cooperation 
challenge traditional models of the foreign ministry16 and the overall management 
of foreign policy (Moses and Knutsen, 2001: 356).  
A response to the increased demands for horizontal coordination across a large 
number of government agencies and departments is presented by Whole of 
Government (WoG) approaches. WoG approaches primarily adopted by Anglo-
Saxon states, refer to the management of international policy as an integrated 
approach to policy initiatives that cut across issue areas and negotiating arenas 
(Christensen and Laegreid, 2007: 1059-1060)17. WoG or ‘joined up government’ in 
the UK18 is defined in the State Government of Victoria Report (2007) as an 
approach to policy making which recognises that ‘many complex public policy 
issues are cross cutting in nature and do not fit neatly in departmental boundaries 
                                                            
16
 Moses and Knutsen (2001) propose new institution, a bureau of foreign affairs (BFA) to replace 
the old and anachronistic institution of the ministry of foreign affairs. The BFA will be a small 
coordinating body, directly accountable to the executive office which will be in a position to pursue 
more flexible responses to a rapidly changing international environment.  
17
 The Whole of Government approach according to Christensen and Laegreid (2007) seeks to 
apply new holistic approaches to the old doctrine of coordination. WoG is associated with the term 
‘joined up government’ (JUG) introduced by Tony Blair in 1997 main aim was to get a better grip on 
the “wicked” issues straddling the boundaries of public sector organizations, administrative levels, 
and policy areas. JUG was presented as the opposite of “departmentalism,” tunnel vision, and 
“vertical silos.” It denotes the aspiration to achieve horizontal and vertical coordination in order to 
eliminate situations in which different policies undermine each other, so as to make better use of 
scarce resources, to create synergies by bringing together different stakeholders in a particular 
policy area, and to offer citizens seamless rather than fragmented access to services 
18
 As defined by the State Government of Victoria Services Authority Report (2007) joined up 
government refers to government organisation along horizontal structures which is translated into 
more effective collaboration across government which is faced with policy areas requiring cross-
portfolio action.  
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and portfolios’. Hood (2005) describes joined up government as the evolution of 
what is referred in traditional public administration parlance as coordination.  
The 2007 Victoria Report (State Government of Victoria, State Services Authority) 
suggests that joined up government, also termed as holistic, integrated or 
horizontal government, denotes public service agencies working across portfolio 
boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated government response to 
particular issues. Pollitt (2003: 35), drawing elements from a number of 
government reports19 suggests that ‘joined-up government’, besides policy 
coordination, denotes the aspiration to achieve horizontally and vertically 
coordinated thinking and action. WoG approaches have been considered as a 
response to departmentalism20 and competition over the management of 
international policy that dominated bureaucracies until very recently (Kavanagh 
and Richards, 2001: 1).  
 
 
 
                                                            
19The sources Pollitt uses are listed below:  
Cabinet Office (2000a) Wiring it up: Whitehall’s Management of Cross-cutting Policies and 
Services, London: Performance and Innovation Unit. 
Cabinet Office (2001a) ‘Better Policy Delivery and Design: a Discussion Paper’. London: 
Performance and Innovation Unit, March  
(http://www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/innovation/whatsnew/betterpolicy.shtml) 
Cabinet Office (2001b) National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal: Policy Action Team Audit, 
(http://www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/seu/2001/PATaudit). 
Centre for Management and Policy Studies (2000) ‘Joined-up Solutions to Policy Development’, 
summary of a Policy Focus Seminar on Achieving Cross-cutting policies, held at the Royal College 
of Pathologists, 24 October (http://cmps.gov.uk/whatson/cdt/sem). 
DETR (2000) ‘Cross-cutting Issues in Public Policy and Public Service’, report for the Department 
of Environment, Transport and the Regions, produced by a team from the School of Public Policy, 
University of Birmingham 
(http://www.local-regions.dtlr.gov.uk/cross/ccpps/02.htm). 
Prime Minister and Minister for the Cabinet Office (1999) Modernising Government, Cm4310. 
London: Stationary Office.et Office, 1999 
20
 Departmentalism, being the product of older vertical structures and policy processes, has 
provided the context in which agents –ministers and civil servants- operate 
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The foreign ministry in the changing operational environment  
 
Despite the rise of a large number of actors in the foreign policy process and the 
widening of foreign policy bureaucracies, the foreign ministry and the diplomatic 
corps of states, what Hocking (2004: 148) terms the national diplomatic system 
(NDS)21 constitute in most cases22, the core elements23 of the national foreign 
policy machinery with which governments pursue their policies overseas. In this 
light, the objective of the present and the following sections is to consider the role 
and responses of the foreign ministry in the context of its rapidly changing 
operational environment due to pressures exercised by the transformative forces 
of globalisation and regionalism24. Research on foreign ministries and the systems 
of diplomatic representation over which they preside suggests different national 
responses. The overview of such responses is employed for purposes of guiding 
through the exploration of the Greek MFA. 
The contemporary policy environment raises a number of questions regarding the 
relevance of the foreign ministry. This, traditionally located at the boundary of two 
linked systems,25 the national and international (Steiner, 1982), and organised 
around geographical and functional divisions which reflect the 
national/international divide is undergoing serious mutation in the majority of states 
(Hocking, 2002; 1999: viii). The contemporary ‘borderless world’ (Waltz, 1999; 
Keohane and Nye, 1977) has triggered discussions about the foreign ministry’s 
                                                            
21
 The term national diplomatic system refers to nationally based systems of diplomatic 
representation comprising overseas missions –both bilateral and multilateral- overseen by a central 
government department, traditionally designated as the ‘foreign ministry’ (Hocking, 2004: 148). 
22
 For instance, neither in Malaysia (Ahmad, 1999) nor in Israel (Klieman, 1999) is the foreign 
ministry a major or central agency. It is viewed rather as an auxiliary tool in policy making 
23
 Despite traditional and stereotypical views regarding the role of the MFA, research has shown 
that there is significant variation with regards to their origins and roles or even their political and 
bureaucratic status. In some occasions, MFAs lie on commerce logic rather than on a political one, 
despite expectations for the contrary. In other occasions it seems that again despite stereotypes, 
MFAs do not occupy the tip of domestic bureaucratic architectures. 
24
 Whereas it is very difficult to distinguish between the implications of one and the other it has to 
be noted that in two specific areas, coordination of sectoral policies and CFSP, the pressures 
stemming from the EU context have been distinct. Although some could argue that demands for 
policy coordination are equally intensive in international policy 
25
 On the one hand it is part of a global diplomatic network and on the other it is an element of what 
Hocking terms the national diplomatic system.  
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relevance in the emergent globalised policy milieus (Ahmad, 1999: 117). The 
changing nature of international relations which are moving towards patterns of 
horizontal organisation, joint responses to transboundary problems in order to 
protect citizens’ welfare at home and abroad, the reshuffling between foreign and 
economic policy, handling instant financial transfers and dealing with international 
crises have challenged the foreign ministry’s capacity to deal with such issues 
alone (Langhorne, 2000: 43).  
Further complexity is added as foreign policy embraces the implications of 
international activity for national citizens and domestic politics (Wesley, 2002: 209) 
greater emphasis on humanitarian issues and the elevation of the importance of 
socio-economic activities (Held and McGrew, 2002: 1; Langhorne, 2000: 34). The 
growth in the policy domains that foreign policy bureaucracies are handling and the 
domestic entities drawn into the foreign policy process have questioned the 
monopoly of the foreign ministry over national management of international policy 
(Bátora , 2009; Bertram, 2009; Hocking, 2007; 2003; 1999; Hill, 2003: 4; Allen, 
2002; 1999; Ahmad, 1999: 117; Enjalran and Husson, 1999: 60; Harris, 1999: 27; 
Langhorne and Wallace, 1999: 21; Rozental, 1999: 137).  
Such developments coupled with the diminishing monopoly of the foreign ministry 
over communications due its inability to process the available vast amounts of 
information suggest a decline in the centrality of the foreign ministry within the 
national foreign policy machinery26 (Bátora, 2009). In a state of affairs whereby 
foreign ministries are overworked, their resources are diminishing and 
responsibility of international affairs is diffused across a large number of 
government departments (Hill, 2003; Langhorne, 2000: 43) we are witnessing what 
Langhorne (2000: 43) has termed the ‘dismantling of the autonomous foreign 
ministry’. Such developments have challenged the status of foreign ministries vis-
                                                            
26
 It is true that there are cases where the MFA does not hold a central role in the national foreign 
policy system. In Malaysia the MFA is not considered as major or central agency rather the locus of 
foreign policy decision making has shifted towards the PM something which has altered the whole 
government machinery. Still the involvement of other departments in policy making had been 
minimal until the late 1990s (Ahmad, 1999: 125)  
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à-vis other parts of the bureaucracy thus exerting pressures to redefine its position 
(Hill, 2003: 14; Wesley, 2002).  
Despite realisations that in an era of complex interdependence the management of 
interstate relations no longer constitutes the exclusive domain of ministries of 
foreign affairs (Keohane and Nye, 1989) –if it ever did- research findings to date 
suggest that in most cases, the foreign ministry still holds a leading role, and in 
some countries a strengthening role27 amidst the national foreign policy 
architecture. A common denominator underlying all national foreign policy 
institutions is that their foreign ministries and diplomats find themselves operating 
in an environment characterised by expanded horizontal networks which bends, if 
not breaks, rules and orders of the past, thus  ‘globalising’ their role (Hocking, 
2005: 3).  
As previously noted while questions of territorial or spatial integrity and borders still 
matter, the compartmentalisation of administrative responsibilities within vertically 
defined national foreign policy domains is no longer possible (Cooper, 2001: 114) 
thus challenging the organisational structure of the traditional foreign ministry 
which relies on hierarchy and verticality. On an analytical level, breaking up the 
monopoly of the foreign ministry over foreign policy as well as of old and 
compartmentalised approaches to foreign policy offers the opportunity for a fresh 
look at the way we handle international relations in a system of global networks, 
linkages and eroded foreign/domestic divides (Riordan 2003: 9-10) which may 
suggest new forms of organisation that correspond to contemporary diplomacy and 
public diplomacy which are more asymmetrical in nature. 
Public diplomacy differentiates from other diplomacy in that its influence is exerted 
to host governments indirectly, that is  via channels other than official government 
to government channels, notably via the press, mass media communication, the 
Internet and also through specialised networks such as businesses, trade unions, 
scholarly associations and religious or other institutions and affiliations (Henrikson, 
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 This is the case in Slovakia, Bátora, 2003: 124  
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2006: 8). Public diplomacy, which is less a new chapter in foreign policy than an 
element of foreign policy which has become prominent with the increased role of 
the public in the affairs of state and the proliferation of mechanisms of 
communication (Cull, 2008: 17), has significant implications for foreign ministries’ 
diplomatic networks.  
 
The overseas diplomatic network and the diplomatic profession in the 
context of public diplomacy  
 
In the wider discussion of rearrangement of national foreign policy machineries, 
the re-thinking and re-organising of overseas diplomatic missions occupies a 
significant part. Diplomatic missions, the nerve endings of the foreign policy 
machinery, are faced with a number of challenges which call for their rethinking 
and reorganisation (Blue Ribbon Panel Report, 2009; Gyngell and Wesley, 2003: 
122). This is because the information revolution and globalisation have placed 
great demands on diplomatic networks as the spreading of multilateralism and the 
increasing number of organisations require regular attendance and monitoring 
(Wesley, 2002: 219). The increased requirements for speed and effectiveness and 
the large amounts of information have configured the relationship between the 
foreign ministry and the overseas missions, giving the latter an enhanced role in 
formulation of foreign policy (Hocking, 2004b: 98, Wesley, 2002: 217, Ikenberry, 
1986) whilst posing pressing demands for re-arrangement and re-organisation.  
Foreign ministries are now expected to be closer to their nationals (Harris, 1999: 
27), to take on an active role within domestic and foreign communities and develop 
direct channels of communication with civil society and a number of stakeholders28 
(FCO report on Consular Strategy, 2007; Hocking, 2007: 10) as well as to promote 
their business communities in foreign markets (Foreign Ministry of Denmark, 2006: 
9, 11). This, in turn, has altered the agenda and structure of overseas missions. 
More specifically, such expectations exert pressures for a renewed role for 
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 For a list of stakeholders in the UK see FCO report, Delivering change together: The Consular 
Strategy 2007-2010: 31. 
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embassies and consular missions (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Consular 
Strategy, 2007; Foreign Ministry of Denmark, 2006: 13), the operation and 
functions of which are in a process of change towards directions of promoting the 
entirety of governmental policy overseas. Embassies at the turn of the century 
have been described as becoming more like governmental offices rather than 
foreign ministry offices (Cooper, 2001) or else as ‘off shore government hubs’ with 
the whole of government being represented abroad thus raising questions with 
regards to the monopoly of the foreign ministry in representation (Blue Ribbon 
Panel Report, 2009: 37).  
And whilst missions focus on a whole new range of activities such as boosting 
economic and other governmental policies overseas, public diplomacy has gained 
significant prominence (Bátora, 2003: 117). Public diplomacy, having become a 
core element of foreign policy (Cull, 2008: 17) and reflecting a government strategy 
to influence the public, has become a top priority for missions abroad (Srivihok, 
2007: 66) and the main axis for their re-organisation (Rana, 2007: 30-31; Melissen, 
2005; Paschke, 2000). This is because even though overseas missions were 
considered to be the most well informed networks in comparison to outside 
counterparts, they may be less so today as they are challenged by IT and non-
governmental networks which seem to be broader, deeper and more 
comprehensive (Metzl, 2001: 80). 
In this spirit of re-organisation of the overseas missions, a new role is also 
envisaged for the current diplomat. According to the Paschke Report (2000) a new 
role is awaiting the contemporary ambassador who is now much more than a 
negotiator and interpreter of a state’s foreign policy interests. The report describes 
contemporary diplomats as primarily communicators and mediators of national 
positions vis-à-vis all sections of the politically informed public in their host country. 
Their main tasks are not limited to confidential dealings with the foreign ministry 
but rather extend to public diplomacy aimed at explaining and canvassing support 
for national and international policy among government circles, Parliament, the 
political parties, the business community, the social partners, the media and 
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representatives of academic and cultural life. In other words, contemporary 
diplomats must build up and cultivate a dense and stable network of contacts both 
world of traditional foreign policy associated with high politics but also with all 
areas of society thus operating in an environment characterised by expanded 
horizontal networks (Hocking, 2005: 3). 
 
Traditionalist versus globalist approaches: the gatekeeper – boundary 
spanner images of the foreign ministry.  
 
Despite the much debated erosion of the domestic-foreign policy divide there is still 
a tendency to equate foreign with international policy which asserts the boundaries 
between internal and external policy. Such presumptions become manifest in 
discussions concerning the foreign ministry. There are primarily two different 
assumptions regarding the contemporary role of the foreign ministry. The first, 
concomitant to state-centric approaches to international relations, suggests that 
the foreign ministry remains the key agent in the state’s bureaucratic apparatus for 
the conduct of its external relations, signifying the perseverance of 
intergovernmentalism in the conduct of foreign policy and diplomacy. The second 
assumption, associated with globalist approaches to world politics, suggests a 
diminishing role for the foreign ministry following the erosion of the state’s primacy 
in world politics.  
Hocking (2005) has modelled two images of contemporary foreign ministries as 
components of the national foreign policy administrations. These he terms as 
‘gatekeeper’ and ‘boundary spanner’ images, with the latter corresponding more to 
the emergent global policy environments. The author (Hocking, 2005: 10) 
describes the gatekeeper image as resting on a number of inter-linked 
assumptions such as the centrality of the territorial state, the primacy of control of 
boundaries and the communication flows that cross them. Associated with this is 
the equation of foreign policy with high policy and the pursuit of an identifiable 
national interest. In order to retain exclusivity in the management of international 
policy and having recognised that there are increasing demands for policy 
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coordination in the diffuse policy environments, foreign ministries have often 
pursued the role of the coordinator in order to establish their control. It has been 
observed that foreign policy systems where there is assertion of the foreign 
ministry’s exclusivity in international policy management with a simultaneous 
recognition for increased policy coordination are linked to vertical and hierarchical, 
top-down conceptualisations of coordination. Moreover, in such systems the 
foreign ministry acquires the role of the dominant foreign policy agency.   
The rationale for the boundary spanner model rests on the capacity of the foreign 
ministry to span boundaries, which themselves are changing in nature by 
becoming more porous. This porosity has rendered boundaries more penetrable 
and at the same time more colonised by new agents such as epistemic 
communities, specialist groups, think tanks, NGOs and others. In such multi-
environments boundary spanners, such as contemporary foreign ministries 
assume the role of mediators thus gaining renewed significance. The two images 
of the foreign ministry which present the foreign ministry either perceived through 
traditional foreign policy assumptions or through globalisation/regionalisation 
perspectives, have triggered debates concerning its relevance in the contemporary 
environment.  
 
The non-decline versus the decline thesis  
The decline thesis is associated with globalisation literature which questions the 
primacy of the state. It is mostly substantiated in studies of the foreign ministry in 
the context of the European Union policy milieu. This is because the EU has 
permanently altered the relationships between member states in that much of what 
was considered foreign has effectively become domestic resulting in domestic 
ministries communicating directly with Brussels (Spence, 2005; Langhorne, 2000). 
In this light, arguments supporting the decline thesis derive from assumptions 
about the increasing involvement of other government agencies in the foreign 
policy process and the abrogation of the domestic/foreign divide. More specifically, 
the foreign ministry is deemed a symbol of the time when national sovereignty was 
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well defined, international interactions were mostly channelled through official 
diplomatic networks and high politics issues dominated the foreign policy agenda 
(Moses and Knutsen, 2001: 356).  
The literature suggests that in terms of shaping and implementing international 
policy, the foreign ministry has not always been the primary agency. In several 
situations, even in countries with well-developed diplomatic systems, the 
management of international policy has involved bureaucratic bargaining in which 
ministries of finance, trade and other ministries as well as prime ministerial offices 
have competed for pre-eminence (Hocking, 2005: 10). Some countries have also 
merged their foreign ministries with ministries of trade29 (Berridge, 2005: 17). The 
involvement of other government departments in multilateral diplomacy and the 
direct dealings of national administrations officials with their opposite numbers 
(Wallace, 2008: 22; Moses and Knutsen, 2001) take this argument even further as 
they question the entire conceptual and organisational rationale of the foreign 
ministry.    
Wallace (2008) argues that for a foreign ministry to be considered in decline, two 
phenomena must be present, as in the case of the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO) in the UK. Firstly, a state must have a strong international presence 
and as a result its foreign policy agenda must be dominated by issues of 
international significance involving many areas of international policy. In such 
cases the management of international policy would presuppose the involvement 
of many government departments in policy making and would need complex and 
robust coordination mechanisms which could be supported by the Prime Minister’s 
Office (PMO) or other another coordinating department. Secondly, the state’s 
foreign policy content would have shifted away from traditional high politics 
concerns.  
As the agenda of diplomacy changes with the issues of high statecraft being 
displaced by issues which have to do less with the structure of peace and the 
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 This is the case with Argentina, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Korea 
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balance of power, critics contend that we no longer have to entrust the 
management of external relations and policies to the bureaucratic elite of the 
foreign ministry (Eayrs, 1982: 96). On the contrary, international issues have to be 
dealt by the whole state machinery. Arguments about the indisputable increasing 
importance of the growing foreign policy bureaucracies outside the foreign ministry 
led to suggestions that the foreign ministry, as a pillar of the old diplomacy is 
obsolete (Berridge, 2005).  
Eayrs (1982: 96) points out that ‘any government could conduct its foreign affairs 
without a ministry created expressly for that purpose. Its leaders could rely instead 
upon their own resources and those of their staffs to supervise and coordinate 
departments of trade, defence, immigration, agriculture, fisheries and any others 
doing the country’s business abroad [...] and to attend to any residue that might 
show up as ‘foreign policy’. As the agenda [...] and level of diplomacy change [...] it 
is no longer necessary to entrust the management of external relations to an élite 
sector of the public service’. Similarly others (Bertram, 2009; Cooper, 1999: 41; 
Langhorne and Wallace, 1999: 21) suggest that the role of the foreign ministry is 
challenged to the extent that the rationale for the existence of a department 
devoted to international issues has been doubted, while radical voices (Moses and 
Knutsen, 2001) propose a different administrative configuration, such as a small 
Bureau of Foreign Affairs30 with a mainly coordinating role.  
Similar assumptions about the declining role of the foreign ministry derive from 
literature on ‘new diplomacy’ the centrepiece of which is multilateralism. ‘New 
diplomacy’, or else transformational or open diplomacy, is associated with a 
greater emphasis on publicity, summitry and all kinds of direct communication 
between domestic ministries and thus implies the declining authority of traditional 
diplomatic machineries and the bypassing of the foreign ministry (Berridge, 2005: 
Riordan, 2003). The assumptions of new diplomacy, together with associated 
developments of globalisation and IT, substantiate arguments about the 
disintermediation of the foreign ministry (Bátora, 2009; Metzl, 2001) as the latter is 
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 For more on this radical proposal see Moses and Knutsen (2001) 
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viewed as just one element of the government’s foreign policy apparatus (Eayrs, 
1982: 96). In this light, the current organisation of foreign ministries and their 
embassies lose their importance as their structures are deemed anachronistic and 
obsolete.  
Nonetheless, critics of the decline thesis characterise assumptions over 
obsolescence of the foreign ministry as premature. In the context of the EU 
member states, Allen (1998: 54) argues that even though ‘Brusselsisation’ may be 
defined as a gradual transfer of policy making authority away from the national 
capitals to Brussels, this does not mean that foreign ministries are rendered 
irrelevant. On the contrary, arrangements for common foreign policy making in 
Brussels rely on national foreign ministries and diplomats.  
Spence (2005: 23) takes this argument further and suggests that despite the 
changing nature of the policy process at the level of the EU and the dispatching of 
other government department officials to the permanent representations, the 
heads of the missions are still diplomats and the foreign ministry has control over 
the mission. For Berridge (2005) the involvement of other government departments 
in international policy processes signifies the strengthening of the role of the 
foreign ministry. This is because with foreign ministries being able to leave so 
many issues of low politics to the international sections of other departments, they 
can finally focus on their traditional role and deliver their political functions more 
effectively. Similarly, it has been argued that at the level of the EU, where aspects 
of domestic policy affect relations with other member states and therefore fall 
within those states’ remit, participation in the councils has given prominence to 
foreign policy questions on national agendas (Hocking and Spence, 2005).  
Contrasting globalist arguments regarding the rationale for the existence of a 
department devoted to international issues (Bertram, 2009; Cooper, Moses and 
Knutsen, 2001; 1999: 41; Langhorne and Wallace, 1999: 21; Eyars, 1982: 96) 
there are arguments that assess the foreign ministry from an institutional 
perspective. Institutionalist approaches suggest that the the foreign ministry and its 
overseas missions, like other institutions, are resilient and experience processes of 
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change and adaptation (Bátora, 2009; Berridge, 2005; Hocking, 2002; Cooper, 
2001; Melissen, 1999).  
The British FCO constitutes a characteristic example. This is because even though 
the FCO has been described as demonstrating elements of the foreign ministry 
decline thesis with reference to its EU policy making role which is now shared with 
other government departments, it seems to have strengthened its role as overseer 
of the network of overseas embassies (Wallace, 2008; Allen, 2002: 258). This 
argument questions the decline thesis. Berridge (2005) suggests that supporters of 
the declinist thesis do not take into consideration the trade and political analysis 
role of missions overseen by an adaptive bureaucratic unit such as the foreign 
ministry.  The exploration of the latter’s institutional adaptability can further 
illuminate discussions about its relevance in the contemporary environment.  
 
The foreign ministry’s institutional responses to changing operational 
environments   
Questions regarding the institutional adaptability of the foreign ministry to its 
current operational environment offer interesting insights with reference to the 
foreign ministry relevance and decline discussion.  The literature on the responses 
of national foreign policy machineries to global developments suggests that there 
are many dissimilarities and variations between states. At the same time however, 
Europeanisation theories and institutionalist approaches suggest that policy 
processes at the national, regional and international environments influence one 
another on both formal structural and ideational levels (Bulmer, 1994a; 1994b; 
Ladrech, 1994). A considerable literature which examines the implications of 
globalisation and regionalisation on domestic politico-administrative structures and 
processes has evolved from this work.  
In the UK context Bulmer and Burch (2001; 1998) have adopted a historical 
institutionalist approach to trace the responses of the British administrative system 
to EU membership. In the context of Greece there is a significant amount of 
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literature which focuses on bureaucratic adaptation to the EC, and later to the EU 
framework (Spanou 2001; 1998; Georgiou, 1994b; 1994). Dimitrakopoulos (2001) 
who applied a historical institutionalist approach to investigate the responses of 
national parliaments in France, the UK and Greece under the pressures of 
Europeanisation suggested that change has been slow and marginal based on 
existing institutional practices. Spanou (2001; 2000; 1998; 1996) in her 
investigation of Greek institutional adaptation to the EU suggests that it is very low 
and unpredictable.    
It is this notion of adaptation to changing policy milieus that provides a central 
theme in the thesis. Manners and Whitman (2000: 261) suggest that research on 
EU member states’ foreign policy institutions demonstrated that they are generally 
notorious for their conservativism and resistance to change whilst the foreign 
ministry is not considered as a highly adaptive institution. A number of reasons can 
explain foreign ministry resistance to change. Such reasons could range from their 
organisational and bureaucratic culture, to membership of the EU, which allows 
less flexibility or to the persistence of high politics on the national agenda. Other 
reasons could be a turbulent region, ongoing security threats, deep politicisation of 
the administration or even a history of dependence which has created a particular 
national identity and perception of foreign policy. Hocking (2005: 5) disputes such 
claims on the grounds that such conclusion ignores changes that have occurred in 
NDSs and foreign ministries over recent decades. Such changes involve the 
responses of foreign ministries to expanding policy tasks, diminishing resources, a 
revolution in IT and expectations by civil society and business community.   
Both sets of research suggest that the majority of foreign policy machineries have 
maintained the foreign ministry in charge of foreign policy management and in 
most occasions its role amidst the foreign policy bureaucracy has either been 
strengthened or developed within frameworks of interdependence with other 
government departments. Additional observations also suggest that foreign 
ministries and their overseas missions have displayed not only extraordinary 
resilience but a significant degree of adaptability (Berridge, 2005: 8).  
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Adaptability becomes manifest with foreign ministries taking on new tasks and 
functions aiming to become more competitive and promote their image abroad in a 
number of newly added issue areas such as environmental and human rights 
areas (Moses and Knutsen, 2001: 360). This is closely related to the tendency to 
re-organise foreign ministries around the organisational principle of functionality 
which is added to the traditional principle of territoriality thus responding to 
increased economic interdependence and globalisation (Enjalran and Husson, 
1999: 60; Cooper, 1974: 155). As a result, functional re-organisation and 
adaptability of the foreign ministry have challenged arguments based on its 
anticipated decline (Cooper, 1974).  
Evidence for foreign ministries’ adaptability and mutation is drawn from data found 
both in literature and foreign ministry reports. Such evidence suggests that 
contemporary foreign policy structures, including the foreign ministry at home and 
their overseas diplomatic networks undergo significant changes. More specifically, 
foreign policy structures are portrayed as being in a process of mutation to match 
their operational environment and to find a niche within the rising foreign policy 
communities (Blue Ribbon Report, 2009; Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
2007; Foreign Ministry of Denmark Report, 2006; Metzl, 2001; Hocking, 1999).  
Therefore, despite arguments advocating its obsolescence and conservativism, the 
foreign ministry seems to be amongst the most adaptive parts of the national 
bureaucracy (Hocking, 2005; Moses and Knutsen, 2001; Steiner, 1982). With 
adaptation being due to close collaboration with the overseas missions, the foreign 
ministry, and generally, the NDS have seemingly assumed a higher profile in 
adapting to the diffuse and horizontal conditions of the post Cold War era 
(Hocking, 2004: 148; Cooper, 2001: 111). Discussion of the foreign ministries 
institutional responses and adaptation can be further explained through the 
overview of institutionalist approaches. 
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New Institutionalism’s insights to foreign policy institutions  
 
The general purpose of this section is to introduce the relevant literature on which 
the main assumptions governing patterns of institutional resilience or else 
continuity, change and transformation rest. A more specific aim is to provide an 
explanatory framework in order to facilitate the evaluation of the responses of 
Greek foreign policy institutions to the changing operational environment. The 
study of institutions, institutional persistence and change enables the assessment 
and, in some instances, measurement –if performed in a comparative context- of 
the responses of states and their institutions to stimuli received from the 
environments in which they operate.  
States and institutions are subjected to several dynamics, internal and external, 
some of which result in similar responses. Very often, however, individual 
responses differ. Understanding the different mechanisms or reproduction of 
patterns sustained by institutions help us understand why common global trends 
have such different consequences on domestic institutions (Thelen, 1999: 398). 
State responses are examined in the framework of some of the main assumptions 
about the nature of political institutions and the ways in which practices, rules and 
norms that comprise institutions are established and transformed (March and 
Olsen, 1996: 247).  
The hypotheses drawn from the analysis of the impact of globalisation and 
regionalisation on foreign policy machineries, particularly Europeanisation, have 
been examined in an extensive literature (Hocking and Spence, 2005; Bulmer and 
Burch, 2001; 1998; Kassim et al., 2001; Manners and Whitman, 2000; Hocking, 
1999; Bulmer, 1994b; 1994a). From these, a variety of patterns with regards to 
institutional responses emerge. These patterns find, variously, evidence of 
convergence and divergence to environmental pressures depending on the precise 
context. In this light, institutionalism can provide useful insights with reference to 
the responses of national foreign policy institutions to given sets of stimuli and 
pressures. This is because institutionalism, and more specifically the historical 
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strand, adds to the discussion parameters such as national historical legacies, 
organisational traditions and political cultures. 
New institutionalism, or neo-institutionalism, is mostly defined by the work of March 
and Olsen (1998; 1996; 1984). It was boosted in the 1990s by studies employing 
Europeanist approaches which, as mentioned above, tried to explain the impact of 
European integration on domestic institutions (Hocking and Spence, 2005; Bulmer 
and Burch, 2001; 1998; Kassim et al., 2001; Bulmer, 1994b; 1994). New 
institutionalism views institutions in broader terms than old institutionalism31, which 
saw them as formal rules, procedures and organisations of government such as 
the legal system of courts (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001:1; Rhodes, 1997; 1995). 
The explanatory lens of new institutionalism extends beyond formal organisations 
to encompass formal and informal processes and patterns of structured interaction 
between groups as institutions themselves (Bache and George, 2006: 24) while at 
the same time, reinforces aspects of traditional thinking which describe institutional 
approaches in the study of government and politics as the ‘historic heart’ of the 
subject and as ‘part of the toolkit of every political scientist’ (Rhodes, 1997: 5, 64). 
In this light, institutions, which can be either formal or informal, are understood as 
a ‘relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behaviour 
for specific groups of actors in specific situations’ (Campbell, 2004:12). Such 
behaviour is ‘embedded in structures of meaning and schemes of interpretation 
that explain and legitimise particular identities and practices and rules associated 
with them’ (March and Olsen, 1998: 948). Public administration literature 
introduced the term ‘standard operating procedures’ to describe this widened 
conceptualisation of institutions (Rothstein, 1996: 145). Other political scientists 
such as Meyer and Rowan (1991: 41) understand institutions as systems of 
coordinated and controlled activities that arise when work is embedded in complex 
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 Old institutionalism was undermined in the post the post-war era as theories of a structural, 
functionalist or economic nature such as Marxism paid little attention to the significance of 
institutions and explained political processes with social, economic and cultural variables. For more 
on old institutionalism see Rothstein (1996). 
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networks of technical relations and boundary spanning exchanges. In modern 
societies these systems are highly institutionalised.  
New institutionalism, having become one of the most popular approaches in 
modern organisation theory, seems to inform concepts of Europeanization and 
globalization well and to add complementary explanatory value with reference to 
their impact on domestic institutions (Peters, 2000: 1). More specifically, in 
institutionalist approaches states still matter –despite neofunctionalist theorisation 
that supranationality will prevail - and so do institutions, be they international or 
domestic. Institutionalism can be seen as complementary to complex 
interdependence, global governance and networks and can offer explanations 
concerning the decisive effects that participation in such a range of institutional 
environments can have on domestic foreign policy arrangements (March and 
Olsen, 1996:251).  
Despite reservations associated with the variations in prediction that institutional 
theory can offer based on different national experiences and empirical findings 
(Peters, 2000: 2), its significance lies in some of its main assumptions. One of the 
key assumptions is that institutions opt for institutional legitimacy and preservation 
rather than macro-level optimal performance (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b). This 
effectively means that whilst global, regional or local forces may exert similar 
pressures on states and their institutions, the latter respond in ways which ensure 
preservation and continuity.  
In other words, institutions function with the aim to survive rather than on the basis 
of the best macroscopic strategic practice. As March and Olsen (1984: 738) 
emphasise, in the modern world institutions constitute the cumulative consequence 
of their very transformation and their aspiration to become larger and better 
resourced. Therefore, the authors (March and Olsen, 1984: 738) argue, 
bureaucratic agencies such as national foreign ministries or legislative committees 
are not only arenas for contending social forces but also a collection of persistent 
structures and processes fighting for survival.  
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With the natural state of institutions being survival and continuity, new 
institutionalism tries to explain persistence of structures and processes. Such 
persistence is prescribed by the concept of path dependence, which can be 
summarised in that once a path is taken actors adjust to this path (Thelen, 1999: 
385). The concept of path dependence is discussed below. Analysts observe that 
although institutionalist theory allows for incremental adaptation and institutional 
transformation, it does not accommodate actors creating path-breaking change of 
their own volition (Ross, 2007: 93; Bulmer, 1994). They add that doing so would 
describe a fundamentally different history of institutional development. Such 
observations have led to significant criticism of the approach for being ‘almost 
inherently static while the world of politics, which it seeks to explain, is almost 
inherently dynamic’ (Peters, 2000: 7).  
A set of questions that institutional approaches answer concern the ways in which 
institutions influence actors’ preferences and thus political outcomes. Answers to 
such questions range from rational, ‘calculus’ approaches on the one end of the 
spectrum to sociological or else ‘cultural’ approaches on the other (Rothstein, 
1996: 147). Rational institutionalist approaches assume that institutions are sets of 
rules created by actors –who have predetermined and fixed preferences- in a 
strategic fashion to achieve desired goals (Rothstein, 1996; Thelen and Steinmo, 
1992). March and Olsen’s (1996: 252) objection to this assumption rests on 
preferences depending on a logic of appropriateness -that is  a logic which predicts 
specific patterns of normative behaviours on behalf of members of institutions 
learned through socialisation- than on the logic of consequence that underlies 
conceptions of rational action. Rather, institutionalised rules, duties, rights, and 
roles define acts as appropriate or inappropriate. This objection points towards the 
other end of the spectrum where sociological institutionalism resides.  
Sociological institutionalism, taking into consideration both formal and informal 
structures, suggests that institutions are constitutive of identities and preferences 
as they help actors to interpret and give meaning to appropriate behaviour 
(Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001:1). At the sociological end of the spectrum, 
57 
 
institutions are viewed as inseparable from human identity and behavioural choice 
(Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001: 2-3). Another objection to the view that actors 
have fixed preferences exogenously formulated as argued in the calculus 
approach is articulated by historical institutionalism (HI). HI cuts across the 
dichotomy of the two strands and draws on research within both traditions 
emphasising the importance of historical processes (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992:9). 
With reference to preference formation, historical institutionalists argue that ‘actors 
cannot simply be assumed to have a fixed and immutable preference set, to be 
blessed with extensive (often perfect) information and foresight and to be self-
interested and self-serving utility maximisers’ (Hay and Wincott, 1998:954). 
It is very important to note that all strands of new institutionalism, irrespective of 
how they perceive preference formation and institutional behaviour, are 
characterised by a number of common assumptions which are central to our 
understanding of institutions. According to Peters (2000: 5) these assumptions can 
be summarised in that political institutions, that is processes or structures –
however defined- do matter as at their simplest they are structures of government 
and structures tend to persist whereas individuals come and go. Hall and Taylor 
(1998: 959) further reinforce the need for structural approaches, which shift the 
emphasis to structures on the grounds that what we seek to understand is how 
institutions (structures) shape social life and political outcomes.  
 
Historical Institutionalism  
HI has been primarily developed by political scientists who have studied how 
political and economic decision making is affected by the institutional 
arrangements of states, including the organisation of government agencies, 
parliaments, constitutions and so on32 (Campbell 2004: 22). In contrast to modern 
regime theory which views ‘international institutions as deliberate instruments to 
improve the efficiency of bargaining between states’ (Moravcsik, 1993: 507) HI 
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 For an application of HI to a foreign policy making institution see Bulmer (2001; 1998) who 
focuses on the evolution of the FCO in the UK  
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suggests that defined institutions not only shape actors’ strategies but also their 
goals and preferences and by mediating their relations of cooperation and conflict, 
institutions structure political situations and leave their own imprint on political 
outcomes (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 9).  
HI has been described as synthesising aspects from both rational and sociological 
strands (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Hay and Wincott (1998) respond to the 
aforementioned description of HI by portraying it neither as a synthesiser nor as a 
merger of the two strands. Rather, they depict HI as possessing its own ontology, 
which is not to be found along the length of the spectrum but above it. HI takes the 
form of an umbrella, a meta-theory, and transcends the ‘traditional dualism of 
institution and intention, structure and agency and can be identified as a coherent 
and consistent approach to institutional analysis’ (Hay and Wincott, 1998: 953) 
thus prescribing an advancement of the previous two approaches.   
Hall and Taylor (1996: 938) suggest that ‘HI defines institutions as both formal and 
informal procedures, norms and conventions embedded in the polity [...]. They can 
range from the rules of a constitutional order or the standard operating procedures 
of a bureaucracy to the conventions governing trade union behaviour [...]. In 
general, HI associates institutions with organisations and the rules or conventions 
promulgated by formal organisation’. The authors (1996: 938) advocate that HI 
possesses four distinct features in its analysis.  
Firstly, HI tends to conceptualise the relationship between institutions and 
individual behaviour in relatively broad terms. Secondly, they emphasise the 
asymmetries of power associated with the operation and development of 
institutions. More specifically, HI has been attentive to the way in which institutions 
distribute power unevenly across social groups. HI assumes a world in which 
institutions give some groups disproportionate access to the decision making 
process and stresses how some groups win and others lose. Such analyses can 
illuminate the issue of disproportionate power held by political leadership in the 
policy process.  
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Thirdly, institutions tend to have a view of institutional development that 
emphasises path dependence and unintended consequences. Historical 
institutionalists have been strong proponents of a social causation that is path-
dependent in that it views operative forces as mediated by the contextual setting 
often inherited by the past. Fourthly, they are especially concerned with integrating 
institutional analysis with the contribution that other kinds of factors, such as ideas, 
can make to political outcomes. A significant advantage of HI is that it poses a 
broad research agenda. While the three ‘neos’ in IR theory (neo-liberalism, neo-
realism and neo-liberal institutionalism) claim to be a theory in themselves in which 
dependent and independent variables are definable and linear causalities are 
discernible, new institutionalism, sums up instead a set of assumptions about 
social contexts in which actors behave (Morrise-Schilbach, 2002: 12; March and 
Olsen, 1984).   
HI draws its hypotheses from empirical observations and its explanatory 
competence lies primarily in the two principles reflected in its own label; namely 
the historical principle, which acknowledges that political development must be 
understood as an institutional trajectory that unfolds over time and the 
institutionalist principle which stresses that many of the contemporary implications 
of these temporal processes are embedded in institutions – whether these be 
formal rules, policy structures or norms (Pierson, 1996: 126).  
In the study of institutional trajectories, understanding both institutions and the 
environment in which these institutions operate which is associated with the 
development of paths, is crucial. Historical institutionalists, unlike rational choice 
institutionalists, argue that decisions are not made according to abstract rationality, 
but rather according to perceptions and within environmental constraints that are 
structured by pre-existing institutional relationships (Bache and George, 2006: 26). 
For this purpose the organisational device of the foreign policy system, which 
organises the environment surrounding processes and institutions can add 
significant explanatory value. The foreign policy system is discussed later in this 
chapter. 
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Understanding institutional ‘stickiness’ and change: path dependence, 
critical junctures and isomorphism  
 
In a broad sense, path dependence refers to the causal relevance of preceding 
stages in temporal sequence (Pierson, 2000: 252) whilst with reference to 
institutions, path dependence is the mechanism which causes evolutionary 
institutional change as described by developmental ‘pathways’ (Thelen, 1999: 
387). Evolutionary change suggests that institutions continue to evolve in response 
to changing environmental conditions. Krasner (1984) was the first analyst to 
define path dependence and to pose interesting questions regarding the response 
of institutions to changing environments.  
Campbell (2004: 33-35) argues that evolutionary change is perhaps the most 
frequently discussed pattern of change. This provides for small gradual and 
incremental change in the context of a pre-determined path. The main rationale in 
this pattern is that although current institutions have changed and developed they 
resemble the old institutions as they have either borrowed or maintained several 
aspects of them. The author (Campbell, 2004) argues that institutions are by 
nature ‘sticky’ in that they stick to prior practices and forms of organisation as well 
as prone to inertia and therefore, policymakers can only proceed to minor changes 
based on past arrangements. 
According to Pierson (2000: 251) the concept of path dependence in political 
science33 refers to ‘particular courses of action which, once introduced, may be 
impossible to reverse’. Krasner (1988: 83) justifies the persistence of such courses 
of action in that their ‘self-reinforcing positive feedback’ renders transition to 
different courses of action very difficult unless there is a significant disturbance in 
the path. It has been argued that ‘path dependence has to mean, if it is to mean 
anything, that once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of 
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 In business studies the concept of path dependence defined as certain courses of action which 
are preferred over others, is known through the QWERTY model. The QWERTY model33 initially 
introduced by Paul David, attempted to explain how the standardization of the letters in the 
typewriters was established (North, 1990: 93). This model points to the direction of path 
dependency in the sense of a process or practice prevailing over the others. 
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reversal are very high’ (Pierson, 2000: 252) because once a path is taken then it 
becomes ‘locked in’ as all relevant actors adjust their strategies to accommodate 
the prevailing pattern.  
As mentioned above, this is manifested through ‘stickiness’ to prior institutional 
arrangements and commitments (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001: 12). In other 
words, actors ‘locked in’ paths adjust their behaviour in ways consistent with past 
action in order to maximise returns34 (Campbell, 2004: 67). In this sense, path 
dependence is helpful in explaining the persistence of patterns or policies over 
time in individual countries (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 14) and responses of 
foreign policy institutions.  
Path dependence is useful in explaining the responses of institutions and 
organisations to defined sets of challenges. More specifically, it is useful in 
explaining the responses of foreign policy institutions as dependent variables to a 
set of defined challenges and pressures, the independent variables, by taking into 
consideration all those national circumstances that may render evolution sticky. 
According to Hall and Taylor (1996: 941) this can be easily explained if one thinks 
that ‘the effects of operative forces are mediated by the contextual features of a 
given situation often inherited by the past. These features are institutional in 
nature. Institutions are seen as relatively persistent features of the historical 
landscape and one of the central factors pushing historical development along a 
set of paths’.  
In this context, responses and evolution of foreign policy institutions are bound to 
rely on prior institutional arrangements and commitments which condition further 
action, limit what is possible, and cause agents to redefine their interests (Bulmer, 
1994). Institutional change then becomes path dependent since actors define their 
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 Nonetheless, there are objections to this assumption according to which the concept of path 
dependence lacks evidence for increasing returns. It has been argued that for institutions to yield in 
increasing returns they have to become contextually insulated and institutionally strengthened over 
time (Ross, 2007:92).  
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preferences endogenously based upon past preferences and experiences. Agents 
can choose any of the existing paths without any restrictions. In other words, the 
choices available to the actors/decision-makers are constrained as they are 
incrementally adjusted and thus become endogenous to the institution formulating 
the institutional environment (Campbell, 2004: 26). Such perceptions of change, 
that is incremental and endogenous, have led to observations that path 
dependence seeks to describe change in a way that resembles a process of 
adaptation to both external and internal challenges (Ross, 2007: 93).  
Inherent in the concept of adaptation -defined in terms of innovations in the policy 
making structures- are moments of change. More specifically “adaptation refers to 
transformative change, i.e. the institutional development is punctuated by moments 
in which the fundamentals of institutions themselves change and in which the 
quality of the institution itself alters (Morrise-Schilbach, 2002: 38). Such moments 
are termed ‘critical junctures’ (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007; Thelen, 1999; Hall 
and Taylor, 1996). Critical junctures constitute the area of research for historical 
institutionalists who define them as historical moments whereby substantial 
institutional change took place resulting in a point where historical development 
moved into a new path. What circumstances are responsible for critical junctures 
differ for each context and are yet to be decided (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 942). 
Critical junctures have also been described as crucial founding moments of 
institutional formation that send countries along broadly different development 
paths (Thelen, 1999:387).  
For purposes of integrating into thinking about institutional evolution both the 
concepts of stability and incremental change, which are the normal state for 
institutions, and the concept of abrupt change produced by critical junctures 
(Pierson, 2000; 1996) historical institutionalists have developed a dual model. This 
dual model for understanding institutional development and the interchange 
between stability and change is termed ‘punctuated equilibrium’ (Campbell 2004: 
26). 
63 
 
According to this model ‘long periods of path dependent institutional stability and 
reproduction are punctuated occasionally by brief phases of institutional influx –
referred to as critical junctures- during which dramatic change is possible [...] and 
which lead to distinct legacies’ (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007: 341). The question 
that is raised in this context is whether an explanation of rapid and revolutionary 
change squares with the analytic framework of path dependence. In other words 
how can institutions be so important at one moment so that they persist ensuring 
continuity and unimportant at another so that they allow for disruption and change? 
The answer is that what may initially appear as a sudden abrupt change is often 
the outcome of evolutionary, incremental change (Campbell 2004: 26).  
Additional responses to questions of organisational change come from other 
analysts (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; 1991b; 
Meyer and Rowan, 1991) who suggest that besides critical junctures there is an 
additional mechanism with which institutionalism understands and explains 
change. This mechanism is called ‘institutional isomorphism’. DiMaggio and Powell 
(1991b: 66) describe isomorphism as a process of homogenisation whereby ‘one 
unit in a population resembles other units that face the same set of environmental 
conditions. At the population level, such an approach suggests that organisational 
characteristics are modified in the direction of increasing compatibility with 
environmental characteristics.’  In the same context, Meyer and Rowan (1991: 41-
47) with isomorphism refer to the tendency of organisations to modify and 
coordinate their actions based on the complex networks in which they are 
embedded through boundary spanning exchanges. In other words, institutions tend 
to match and reflect the environments in which they operate, with which they are in 
constant exchange.  
Application of this assumption to national foreign policy institutions enhances our 
understanding of their institutional behaviour. Foreign policy institutions appear to 
transform in an attempt to reflect their operational environment and increase their 
returns. The way to achieve this is through spanning their traditional boundaries in 
order to engage in activities prescribed by the environment in which they operate. 
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An enlightening example for isomorphic processes derives from the context of the 
EU, which presented national foreign policy institutions and foreign ministries with 
a given institutional environment. Isomorphic processes are likely to lead to 
convergence with regards to some aspects of the foreign ministry’s organisation 
within the EU. At the same time, in institutionalist terms, a certain degree of 
divergence is also anticipated on the grounds of the different domestic political 
environments. Endogenous forces relate to the nature and operation of the 
bureaucratic apparatus in which foreign ministries operate.  
New institutionalism, together with the concept of the foreign policy system (FPS), 
discussed below  are very useful for the understanding of foreign ministries, which 
are part of that system because they allow for the examination of both external and 
domestic forces. What is distinctive about foreign ministries is that both domestic 
and international forces shape their organisation, more so than sectoral ministries. 
And even though arguments about globalisation and regionalisation suggest that 
national foreign policy institutions respond in certain ways to the changing 
international environment, reflected in re-organisation and re-structuring, it is 
important to note that this depends on the political environment in which they 
operate, thus demonstrating both similar and diverging developments.  
 
Foreign policy in a transforming world: in a process of conceptual 
boundary spanning 
 
So far we have seen some of the main developments prescribing the 
transformation of world politics which results in a series of implications for national 
foreign policy machineries. One of the core assumptions in the literature of world 
politics transformation is that traditional notions of the state as the fundamental unit 
of international society are challenged. State centric perspectives have come 
under attack as forces of transformation woven in processes of globalisation and 
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regionalisation, accelerated by information technology have entangled states in 
dense networks of interdependencies with a number of state and non-state actors.  
At this critical juncture for world politics, it is useful to attempt an overview of where 
we have reached in the study of foreign policy. In this light, we explore what FPA, 
traditionally eclectic and the most obvious source of theories for the study of 
foreign policy has to offer to the understanding of contemporary foreign policy and 
its organisation. For this purpose the thesis explores the development of FPA from 
traditional formulations to the contemporary form of what Manners and Whitman 
(2000) term ‘transformational’ FPA and the behavioural model of the foreign policy 
system (FPS) (Clarke and White, 1981; 1989) for purposes of facilitating the 
conceptualisation of a Greek FPS. The central underlying ontological questions 
concern the changing meaning of the notion of foreign policy and its implications 
for foreign policy studies.  
In seventeenth and eighteenth century European states, foreign policy came within 
the prerogative of the Crown. For new states, such as the United States of 
America, writing their constitution to guard against the dominance of monarchical 
power which they saw in Europe, executive control over foreign policy and defence 
was considered essential to effective government (Wallace, 1971: 9-10). The view 
of foreign policy as a separate area of public policy linked to security, territorial 
integrity and the fundamental values of the state retains much of its force today. 
However, the emphasis on national security and military strategic considerations 
was elitist as it presupposed the monopoly of power by a small group of persons. 
Even the foreign policy budget –largely military- had until the late 1970s been 
immune to domestic considerations and separate from expenditure on foreign aid 
for instance (Cooper, 1974: 153). Based on these assumptions, a conventional 
definition of foreign policy referred to actions taken by governments directed at 
other governments in the environment external to their state (White, 2004: 11; 
Webber and Smith, 2002).  
Such conceptualisations of foreign policy capture the centrality of states and 
governments and perceive the foreign policy process as insulated from other areas 
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of governmental activity. Until recently, this had been translated into conceptual 
boundaries between foreign and domestic politics based on the state’s territorial 
frontiers which separate external and domestic politics. According to earlier 
definitions, ‘foreign policy is the area of politics which bridges the all important 
boundary between the nation-state and its international environment’ (Wallace, 
1971: 7).  
White (1981: 4) adds that foreign policy is made within the frontiers of the state but 
is directed and must be implemented within the environment external to the state. 
[…] For earlier  thinkers ‘foreign’ suggested not only the direction but also a 
particular type of policy which referred to the area of government concerned with 
the vital security interests of the state and that foreign policy as security policy 
should be shielded from the ‘cut and thrust’ that characterised domestic politics 
(White, 1981; Rosenau, 1967).   
Traditional approaches to foreign policy assumed that government is unified35 and 
that foreign policy is insulated from domestic governmental action due to its 
inherent connection to diplomacy and defence, high politics and international 
security. Thus, foreign policy in this sense was distinct from day to day 
management of the broader domain of contemporary external relations (Wallace, 
1974: 2). Rosenau (1967: 34-40), distinguished foreign and domestic policy based 
on a number of assumed parameters36 such as elitism, limited public involvement 
and its secretive nature due to its remoteness from the public. Such assumptions 
arguably find limited applicability in contemporary world politics. The way that 
politics are conducted globally with patterns of horizontal networks and 
transboundary action which cut across states and societies renders the rigid 
differentiation between domestic and foreign policy environments obsolete.  
                                                            
35
 As Webber and Smith (2002:35) argue, the idea of a unified government has been under 
pressure since the 1980s with one source of this pressure being the growth of government itself. 
36
 For the boundaries of foreign policy as an issue area see also Rosenau, (1974), Tracing the 
Outlines of a Field in Barber, J. and Smith, M., The Nature of Foreign Policy: A Reader, (Holmes 
McDougall in association with the Open University Press, Edinburgh and Milton Keynes)  
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In this light, a number of questions are raised concerning the conceptualisation of 
foreign policy based on action beyond the state and targeted at civil societies 
across borders. Influenced by such developments in the course of the last four 
decades, different attitudes towards foreign policy have developed moving away 
from traditional views which held that states were the sole recipient of another 
state’s foreign policy. Indicative is the definition provided by Manners and Whitman 
(2000: 2) who view foreign policy as ‘attempts by governments to influence or 
manage events outside the state’s boundaries’.  
In the same context Gustavvson (1999:  75) sees foreign policy as government 
action which is targeted beyond the territory of the state to the external 
environment37. What is characteristic in these definitions is that they imply the 
transition from the state to the government and imply wider governmental 
participation targeted to unspecified external audiences. Such images of foreign 
policy challenge narrower previous approaches which saw foreign policy as 
defined only by what foreign ministries do38 (Groom, 2007: 197). 
Morse (1970: 371-372) in his discussion of world politics transformation, 
summarises the impact of such transformation on our understanding of foreign 
policy under three general sets of conditions. The first set of conditions concerns 
the breaking down of the classical distinction between foreign and domestic 
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 This definition is the evolution of Wallace’s definition because the recipient could be an actor 
other than a government. Rosati’s definition in the same article is even more progressive as he 
defines the recipient as an environment.  
38
 More specifically the author (2007:199-200) argues foreign policy could be described differently 
viewed in realist, pluralist or structuralist terms. In a realist context foreign policy is a prime 
consideration. Foreign policy is about the management of interstate relations in anarchical society 
in which each major power has ambitions to establish a system of global governance which reflects 
its values and interests. Since it does not wish to be subject to a system reflecting the values and 
interests of another great power it will cooperate with other states in a balance of power to ensure 
that they will not lose if they cannot win. In pluralist terms foreign policy is understood as 
encompassing a wider range of actors beyond states, such as public opinion, the civil society, 
NGOs and international organisations, multinational corporation, churches and others. The pluralist 
framework in its traditional formulation is like a cobweb38 rather than a billiard ball model which 
belongs to the sphere of realism and will be discussed in the following section. It is concerned with 
the movement of goods, services, ideas and various forms of interactions. […] Here foreign policy 
becomes less important than the external relations of a wide range of actors. (See Groom, 2007: 
199-200). Likewise, structuralists start with the notion of transactions. The patterns of transactions 
create structures, which in due course become autonomous and then have an independent 
influence upon the actors.  
68 
 
affairs39. The second relates to the distinction between high policies40 (those 
associated with security and the state) and low policies (those pertaining to the 
wealth and welfare of the citizens) which has become less important as the latter 
has assumed an increasingly large role in today’s societies. The third set of 
conditions refers to the increasing inability of states to control events in an 
interdependent environment despite the significantly developed instruments at 
their disposal.  
The eroding distinction between the domestic and foreign policy environments has 
been repeatedly addressed from a number of viewpoints (Hocking, 2004; 2004b; 
Hill, 2003; Langhorne and Wallace, 1999; Keohane and Nye, 1989; East, 1984; 
Sundelius, 1980; 1984a; 1984b; East and Salomonsen, 1981; Katzenstein, 1975; 
Cooper, 1974; Goodwin, 1974; Morse, 1970; Wallace, 1974; Vital, 1968; 
Birnbaum, 1965). Whether due to globalisation, regionalisation or localisation, or a 
combination of all three, the historical divisions between domestic and foreign 
policies, sectors and issues have been blurred and spanned (Bátora, 2003: 122; 
Featherstone, 1996; 2005; Allen, 1999: 209; Newhouse, 1997: 73). 
Based on the above, the study of contemporary foreign policy must 
reconceptualise the nature of boundaries (Rosenau, 1974b: 160) and the 
intermeshing of foreign with domestic policies (Cooper, 1999: 44; Vital, 1968: 71). 
In a globalised, networked environment, the very differentiation between domestic 
and foreign policy milieus makes less sense as both have to be seen as part of a 
seamless and enmeshed web of actors and actions (Hocking, 2007: 10; Rosenau, 
1974: 25) where a number of new linkages are created (Rosenau, 1974b). In 
networked policy milieus, which need no common territory, foreign policy does not 
need to hold on to territorial definitions (Metzl, 2001: 80). Instead, foreign policy is 
going through a process of ‘vertical disintegration’ (Underdall, 1987: 169) and a 
simultaneous horizontal proliferation through which it spans the whole of the 
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 Even though as the author suggests the myths associated with sovereignty and the state have 
not broken down (Morse, 1970: 371) 
40
 According to Groom (2007: 199) high politics are concerned with issues of war and peace, 
disarmament and alliances 
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governmental apparatus, involving numerous domestic departments (Hill, 2003; 
Webber and Smith, 2002; Sundelius, 1984b).  
 
From traditional to ‘transformational’ foreign policy analysis  
As discussed above, foreign policy in its traditional formulation has been linked to 
concepts of statehood, national sovereignty and the primacy of the state as a world 
politics actor. For Kissinger (1969) foreign policy began where domestic policy 
ended. Such concepts were encapsulated in ‘state-centric’ realism’s main 
assumptions (White, 2004: 24; 1999: 39; Webber and Smith, 2002: 12; Waltz, 
2001; Keohane and Nye, 1989; Banks, 1985: 13). The assumptions of state-centric 
realism lay on the sharp distinction between domestic and foreign policy making 
and in the fact that foreign policy is viewed as pursued by governments on behalf 
of a unitary state. National interest is defined in terms of independence and 
security and is often pursued at the expense of other nation states. Therefore the 
international environment in which states were pursuing their interests, their so 
called ‘national interest’ (Wallace, 1974: 12) is hostile and competitive.  
For realists, international society is a system of billiard ball41 states in intermittent 
collision (Groom, 2007: 199; Hudson, 2005: 2; Banks, 1985:12; White, 1981: 6). In 
this context, foreign policy positions are seen as being primarily determined by the 
interplay of international forces (White, 1999: 422; Hill and Margot, 1985: 157). As 
Webber and Smith (2002: 12) argue, given these assumptions it was not difficult to 
establish a notion of foreign policy which was closely related to ‘national security 
policy’ in the context of which military security was the main aspect of policy 
making. This notion is referred to in the thesis as traditional foreign policy. Not 
surprisingly, this had an enormous impact on both the actors who made foreign 
policy and on the ways in which foreign policy was made. Even though realism 
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 With the ‘billiard ball’ model, or as often termed ‘black-boxing’ the state, theory of actors-in-
general or actor-general-theory, we refer to a given type of state interaction. More specifically this 
approach is related to theoretical work in IR which suggests that whatever decision making unit or 
system is involved can be approximated as a unitary rational actor and therefore be made 
equivalent to the state. See Hudson, 2005: 2)  
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was the best known approach in IR with which both practitioners and academics 
have described international relations42 it failed to probe into decision-making 
processes or other domestic sources of international behaviour (Hill, 2003: 6; 
Rosenau, 1971). 
FPA, albeit viewed by many as fitting best in the realist tradition due to its state-
centred focus, has also grown out of reaction to classic realist assumptions that 
the state is a monolithic actor with clear and rationally calculated national interests 
(Groom, 2007: 198; White, 2004: 24; 1999: 39; Light, 1994). As a result, work 
undertaken in the context of FPA challenges many of the ideas inherent in realism 
such as rationality. As FPA developed, even though it retained the state as an 
important actor it gradually accommodated a range of other actors. Since the 
1950s, FPA has developed and responded by adapting its analysis to the 
challenges of transforming world politics (White, 2004: 24). Thus, despite its 
limitations, FPA as a method of enquiry has been dynamic and transformative in 
itself. In this light, Manners and Whitman (2000: 12) who argue that there is no 
necessary link anymore between FPA and classical realism, developed the idea of 
‘transformational’ FPA thus marking a distinctive line between traditional and 
current accounts of FPA.  
Transformational FPA is understood by Manners and Whitman (2000) as eclectic 
and enhanced, examining various newly added aspects of foreign policy under its 
analytical lens. Transformational FPA is concerned with the involvement of a wider 
range of policy actors, state and non-state, domestic and international, encourages 
the exploration of linkages between foreign and other areas of governmental 
policy-making and investigates a much wider set of issues beyond high politics and 
their inherent military and security connotations. As a result, transformational FPA 
informs a research agenda which touches upon issues of intra-departmental 
cooperation thus abrogating the insulation of foreign policy as a distinct 
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 Some characteristic writings of this school are by Carr, E. H., (2001), The Twenty Years’ Crisis: 
An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan); Morgenthau, H., (2005), Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 
(McGraw-Hill Education, Maidenhead)  
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governmental policy area and extends to issues traditionally falling under domestic 
policy areas. 
Simultaneously, its analytical capacity is further strengthened by provisions for 
eclectic pre-theoretical approaches such as behavioural models of decision 
making and foreign policy systems approaches, which are discussed below. Hill 
(1974: 150-151) reinforces the argument for eclectic approaches under the 
heading of FPA and argues that it should not be concerned only with decision 
making in a narrow sense. There are a lot of questions that are raised regarding 
foreign policy processes which fall outside the usual framework of the different 
stages of policy making or the impact of the policy makers. These questions seek 
to address changing diplomatic techniques, foreign policy instruments and 
institutions, processes and (re-)organisation of the entire foreign policy machinery, 
which constitute the focus of the present thesis.  
A transformational FPA research agenda extends the enquiry to issues such as 
the influence of leaders over institutions in the foreign policy process, the role of 
domestic bureaucratic structures and cultures and the impact of external 
influences on individual member states (White, 1999). In doing so it employs 
organisational devices, such as the FPS (Clarke and White, 1981: 1989), and 
analytical models such as the bureaucratic politics models conceptualised by 
Allison (Allison and Zellikow, 1999; Allison and Halperin, 1972).  
The latter model offers significant explanatory insights to cases where bureaucratic 
bargaining among players positioned hierarchically in the government have 
determined the actions of governments in given circumstances. At the same time it 
has received criticism on the grounds that it has been developed from the US 
experience which involves a certain cast of actors, each pursuing divergent foreign 
policy goals, with the interplay of their competing influence determining the policy 
outcome (Gyngell and Wesley, 2003: 39).  
Added scepticism regarding the applicability of behaviouralist models in the study 
of foreign policy process rests on the argument that they isolate individual policy 
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decisions and examine the influence of certain actors over others thus imposing 
specific requirements on the process. In this context Gyngell and Wesley (2003: 
39) argue that involvement of actors can be gauged only when there are conflicting 
‘stakes’ and competition between self-interested sections of bureaucracy and 
political leadership and even most importantly, a high degree of bureaucratic 
independence is presupposed. Such assumptions may be justifiable for the foreign 
policy making system of the US where competing bureaucracies with their own 
vested interests generate controversy over policies but not necessarily for systems 
where foreign policy making is heavily concentrated in the executive - as is the 
case with most European states. For the purposes of this thesis the FPS approach 
will be further elaborated. The FPS approach investigates systematically foreign 
policy structures and processes thus adding explanatory value to FPA (Smith et 
al., 2008: 12).   
 
The foreign policy system approach 
 
The FPS approach is not a theory but rather an organizational device which, under 
the heading of FPA, enables us to put several aspects of foreign policy processes 
and structures into context and highlight correlations between a state’s 
environment -domestic and external - and the ways in which foreign policy is made 
and managed. It draws on behavioural models of organisation, which define 
variables based on certain patterns of behaviour and not necessarily based on 
formal policy boundaries and institutions (Clarke, 1981: 18)43. Despite skepticism 
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 As Clarke (1981: 18-19) interestingly suggests, traditional accounts of British foreign policy which 
only outline the function of decision-makers according to their official constitutional role can at best 
tell only part of the story. Constitutional functions and official boundaries are always important but 
actual patterns of behaviour, influence and communication will always cross institutional 
boundaries. Clarke gives an example from British foreign policy making in order to clarify this 
argument. More specifically, he argues that even though the House of Commons performs its 
function of scrutinising the foreign policy of the government through debates and the Question-time, 
it is widely known and accepted that such channels are highly ineffective and that real scrutiny is a 
much less formal, interpersonal process that works partly through Select Committees, but mainly 
through channels of intra-party dialogue.  
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that it is a ‘study everything approach’, the FPS approach offers value added to 
research on foreign policy processes and structures because it allows researchers 
to view foreign policy beyond the traditional or constitutional foreign policy making 
machinery and understand it both as a function of the government and as part of 
the changing international and domestic environments.  
The FPS approach was born out of a gradual development of the ‘decision-making 
approach’ which has contributed significantly to FPA. The central pivots of the 
decision making approach are decision, decision-maker and decision-making 
processes or systems. Even though this approach reinforces some of the 
assumptions of traditional realism it also challenges it in several ways. The 
decision making approach firstly, takes away the centrality of the state and 
reasserts a focus on the behavior of policy makers (White, 1981: 8). Secondly, it 
challenges the assumption that foreign policy consists of a series of identifiable 
decisions and argues that decision making is a behavioral activity which requires 
explanation.  
Instead of trying to explain state behavior only in terms of its environment, Snyder 
(2002) suggests that the key to the explanation of why a state behaves the way it 
does lies in the way in which the state’s decision makers define their situation. The 
emphasis on domestic factors which influence foreign policy signifies a departure 
from traditional analyses, which viewed foreign policy solely as the product of 
states’ and governments’ reaction to external stimuli (White, 1981: 9).  
A significant contribution of the decision making approach to the study of foreign 
policy is the understanding of policy processes as a system which comprises a 
number of interacting variables located in both external and internal environments 
of foreign policy machineries (Clarke and White, 1989; 1981; Birnbaum, 1965; 
Hammond, 1965). Through this conceptualization grew awareness that foreign 
policy is to a greater or lesser extent a product of the way it is made or, in other 
words, highly dependent on national domestic processes and structures (White, 
1981).  
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According to White (1981:10-11) scholars have concerned themselves with two 
aspects of the foreign policy process; namely, the identity of the policy making unit 
and the characteristics of the process. However, current understandings of the 
policy process need to acknowledge actors outside the constitutional foreign policy 
configurations. In this context, the FPS approach understands the foreign policy 
process as being more than a distinct area of government policy and determined 
by broader domestic political processes, institutions and political cultures (Clarke, 
1981: 15). 
Clarke (1981: 18) summarises some of the main principles underlying the 
conceptualisation of the FPS as follows. Firstly, foreign policy systems must be 
conceived as a whole. Secondly, they must be conceived dynamically since they 
describe continuous processes through the system reacting to ongoing stimuli. 
Thirdly, the process must be seen as interacting with the environment. Fourthly, 
the variables of the system, represented by its three main components, namely the 
environment, the machinery and the outputs are seen as interdependent and 
continuously interacting with one another. With reference to foreign policy the 
‘environment’ represents both the domestic and external spheres which influence 
the foreign policy machinery and process in the form of ‘input’. The ‘output’ is 
perceived as foreign policy actions, decision, reforms and so on which feed back 
into the environment and thus become part of the new input, indicating significant 
correlation (Clarke, 1981; 1989).  
Essentially, the authors have drawn the foreign policy system in parallel with the 
variables and function of the basic ‘political system’ provided by Easton (1965) 
illustrated in figure 1.1 on the next page. Applying this approach to the analysis of 
national foreign policy process, ensures a broader definition of foreign policy and 
decision making which comprises various foreign policy activities, actions and 
actors (Farrands, 1981: 35). 
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THE BASIC POLITICAL SYSTEM  
     ENVIRONMENT                                                                 ENVIRONMENT                                                         
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    ENVIRONMENT                                                                      ENVIRONMENT                                                                 
Figure 1.1 The Basic Political System adopted from Easton, D., A Framework for Political Analysis. 
Prentice-Hall., 1965, p. 112 
 
Hence, viewed under the light of the transformation of world politics it adds to the 
equation agents outside the traditional foreign policy machinery, located in its 
external environment but at the same time forming an integral part of the system. 
In doing so, a re-defined and transformed foreign policy system allows for the 
incorporation of processes that cut across domestic departmental barriers but also 
foreign and domestic policy milieus. Arguably, despite the space for innovation that 
the FPS approach allows, it is also characterised by certain weaknesses which 
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derive from its very behaviouralist nature (Gyngell and Wesley, 2003; Clarke, 
1982: 20; 1989: 39). However, whilst recognising these problems the FPS 
approach offers valuable insights for the present investigation. 
Behavioral models have been argued to ‘provide the worst possible answer – 
study everything’ to theoretical questions. This problem is aggravated by the 
inability to disaggregate the system without violating the central notion that it 
represents a process. Supporters of the FPS concept argue that the added value 
of the approach is that it essentially acknowledges that not all variables of the 
process are the same for all cases. Environments for instance, which is where part 
of the foreign policy problem is rooted, differ in each case (Allen, 1981: 95; Smith, 
1981: 55-56).  More specifically, the given domestic social, cultural and economic 
patterns or perceptions of the international system itself constitute the main tools 
for the explanation of foreign policy systems’ behavior (Farrands, 1981: 36-50; 
Smith, 1981: 55-56).  
 
Conclusion  
 
The present chapter discussed developments since the end of the Cold War in the 
management of foreign affairs and their implications for national foreign policy 
machineries. The aim of this chapter, as stated in the methodology section, was to 
identify and highlight the major issues that preoccupy contemporary foreign policy 
systems and synthesise them into a single taxonomy of themes upon which the 
research questions and the empirical part of the thesis are based. Such themes 
are directly related to the changing relationship between domestic and 
international politics which result in the re-conceptualisation of foreign policy and 
the re-organisation of its processes and structures.  
More specifically, the chapter highlighted that the changing international and 
domestic policy milieus led to specific developments in the realm of the 
management of foreign policy. The polycentrism of contemporary global politics 
77 
 
enhanced the enlargement of national and international foreign policy and 
diplomatic agendas and brought into the foreign policy process a number of 
government departments with a traditionally domestic mandate.  The involvement 
of such actors in the national foreign policy process has resulted in diffusion in the 
management of foreign policy into a wider cast of agents thus creating foreign 
policy communities, which embrace actors horizontally outside the confines of the 
foreign ministry. The phenomenon of the widening foreign policy communities has 
triggered discussion with regards to the centrality and relevance of the foreign 
ministry in contemporary foreign policy machineries. Those discussions are closely 
linked to the course of change and adaptation that foreign ministries have 
embarked upon which was discussed in the previous sections.  Furthermore, this 
development has raised increased demands for international policy coordination 
which constitutes a continuing theme in national management of foreign policy.  
The direct involvement of home ministries and dealings with their opposite 
numbers in contrast to the past monopoly of the foreign ministry in communication 
has raised a number of questions concerning the latter’s centrality in the foreign 
policy process. Foreign ministries, traditionally the core elements of national 
foreign policy machineries, located at the boundary of two linked systems, the 
national and international and organised around geographical and vertical divisions 
which reflect the national/international divide are faced with challenges stemming 
from the borderless networked world which calls for horizontal management of 
issues. In this environment the foreign ministry’s structure, role and relevance are 
questioned and need exploration.  
In the wider discussion of re-organisation of national foreign policy machineries, 
the re-thinking of overseas diplomatic missions occupies a significant part. 
Diplomatic missions, the nerve endings of the foreign policy machinery, are faced 
with a number of challenges which call for their reorganisation. Based on the fact 
that the content, instruments and target of foreign policy is changing, as previous 
discussion demonstrated, the agenda and structure of overseas missions as well 
as the role of diplomats are undergoing profound change. Embassies are expected 
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to represent the whole of government overseas whilst public diplomacy becomes 
the top priority of their mission and in many cases the axis for their re-organisation.  
The aforementioned issues, as summarised here and analysed in the previous 
sections, have provided the thematic foundation for the exploration of the Greek 
foreign policy machinery pursued in the following empirical chapters. These 
themes are addressed and explored for the case of Greece in order of discussion 
in chapters three, four and five which focus respectively on the Greek foreign 
policy community, the MFA and the diplomatic network. The analysis in these three 
chapters is underlain by institutionalist thinking for purposes of illuminating 
questions regarding the responses of those elements of the Greek foreign policy 
machinery to the changing operational environment. 
And whilst the aforementioned developments have given implications for a number 
of advanced foreign policy bureaucracies, the degree to which they relate to 
smaller states’ machineries requires exploration. In other words, the responses of 
smaller states’ foreign policy machineries need to be investigated. This is because 
the responses of national foreign policy machineries to environmental stimuli are 
determined by their particular bureaucratic culture as well as the historical and 
political circumstances particular to this country. Arguably, foreign policy 
machineries are influenced by social and political circumstances such as social 
modernisation, external penetration and dependence and therefore, they need to 
be conceptualised as systems which receive input from their surrounding 
environments as the model of Clarke and White discussed on pages 72-75.  For 
this purpose, it is deemed necessary, before the exploration of the above themes 
starts, to conceptualise the Greek national foreign policy machinery as a system, 
which comprises parameters and influences drawn from its particular domestic and 
international environments. Chapter two embarks upon this conceptualisation and 
functions as an inventory of factors which, according to the literature, have 
contributed to the existing images of the Greek foreign policy machinery.    
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Chapter 2: The Greek foreign policy system: 
morphology, influences and sources  
 
Introduction  
The previous chapter provided an overview of the transforming global and 
domestic policy environments and the pressures they exert on national foreign 
policy machineries with regard to the management of foreign policy. The previous 
chapter also reviewed analytical developments in the study of foreign policy 
relevant to this thesis and the conceptualisation of the FPS as a set of national 
foreign policy-making processes and structures. Traditionally, this is defined in 
terms of the MFA and the overseas missions, the function and role of which are 
determined by the state’s particular domestic and external policy environments. 
This chapter seeks to investigate those elements that make up the Greek FPS as 
well as the particular parameters, political, cultural and historical, which according 
to the existing literature have contributed to its morphology. 
Utilising conceptualisations of the FPS as a set of structures which receive input 
from the surrounding environment, external and domestic (Clarke and White, 1981; 
1989), and of the foreign policy process as the product of domestic demands 
(Webber and Smith, 2002; Smith, Hadfield & Dunne, 2008; Wilkinson, 1969: 116) it 
is necessary to examine Greek foreign policy structures together with their 
surrounding environment. Besides, a number of studies have indicated that foreign 
policy structures and content are influenced by social and political circumstances 
such as social modernisation, external penetration, dependence (Wilkinson, 1969; 
Birnbaum, 1965: 8) and historical elements as well as geographical dynamics 
(Wilkinson, 1969; Bjol, 1965). For this purpose, Wilkinson (1969: 120) argues, a 
primary task in the investigation of foreign policy structures and processes must 
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comprise an inventory of the special agents and factors which influence policy-
making.  
Such inventories comprise individuals, anomic1 and institutional groups such as 
legislatures, executives, bureaucracies, churches, political parties, and non-
governmental associational groups. In this light, the chapter seeks to provide an 
inventory of factors which, according to the literature, have contributed to the 
existing images of Greek foreign policy processes and structures. The chapter 
starts with foreign policy-making models identified in the literature and then moves 
on to the specific environment of Greek foreign policy structures, investigating the 
international and domestic political influences on the Greek foreign policy 
machinery. 
 
Images of Greek foreign policy making  
The literature has portrayed a number of images of Greek foreign policy processes 
and structures, with the latter largely defined as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) and its overseas network of diplomatic representation viewed in the light of 
different independent variables and sources. All images appear to have a common 
denominator: namely, that Greek foreign policy structures and processes present a 
number of characteristics and weaknesses stemming from their operation in their 
external and domestic environments.. The various accounts of the Greek foreign 
policy-making structures and processes generally suggest centralisation of policy-
making at the level of political leadership, process politicisation, lack of 
macroscopic policy planning and weak institutional structures. The main images of 
the Greek FPS in the respective literature are presented in more detail below.  
                                                   
1
 Anomic groups are mobs, acting through non-organised rioting and demonstration, highly 
changeable in structure and working and representing spontaneous breakthroughs of social groups 
into the political system.  
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Couloumbis (1983) portrays the structures managing Greece’s world 
entanglements using a number of variables ranging from participation in 
international organisations to defence equipment imports. Statistical data gathered 
from this research indicated that Greek foreign policy structures follow neither the 
typical paradigm of small states, nor the paradigms of Eastern, Western or Balkan 
states. Rather they generate more fundamental questions relating to the very 
nature of the Greek foreign policy machinery and, more specifically, questions of 
whether it is a developed, transitional or developing system. What Couloumbis 
suggests as an underlying premise is that Greece and its foreign policy structures 
have suffered, and are still suffering, from a protracted identity crisis (Couloumbis, 
1983: 95).  
Couloumbis (1983) observed in the early 1980s a significant lack of 
institutionalised policy planning as well as short-termism in policy-making. At the 
same time he identified foreign policy formulation as a function conceived by the 
cabinet and carried out by diplomats and the MFA (Couloumbis, 1983: 111). 
Similar short-termism was observed in the work of the MFA, whose input has often 
been replaced by agents outside the diplomatic service. The author observed that 
the main core  the foreign policy-making machinery at the political level were the 
Prime Minister (PM,) the Foreign Minister (FM), and the Ministry of Defence (MoD), 
with the former two emerging as the single overwhelmingly influential locus of 
decision making authority.  
The MFA and its overseas diplomatic network held a central position in foreign 
policy implementation but the latter’s input into policy formulation was minimal. 
Equally limited was the military input into foreign policy formulation especially post-
1974 (Couloumbis, 1983: 113) whereas the need for a widened foreign policy 
community in Greece was already identified in the early 1980s. A widened foreign 
policy community was perceived as ‘consisting of opinion makers involved in 
foreign affairs such as members of parliament, employees of government agencies 
and personalities drawn from the media’ (Couloumbis, 1983: 111). The issue of a 
widened foreign policy community outside the traditional components of the foreign 
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policy machinery, namely the MFA and its diplomatic network, involving other parts 
of the government has not been addressed in the Greek literature and constitutes 
the main focus of the following chapter.  
Couloumbis’s account also delves into the character of the Greek diplomatic 
service in the early 1980s and asserts that, despite its centrality in the foreign 
policy process, its role as a source of policy is very limited and restricted to 
implementing policy made by the MFA’s political leadership (Ioakimidis, 1999; 145; 
Couloumbis, 1983: 108). Couloumbis (1983: 107-109) argues and Ioakimidis 
(1999: 145) confirms in the late 1990s, that not only did Greek diplomatic staff 
rarely submit alternative strategic policy scenarios to the political leadership of the 
ministry but they also never questioned the chosen policy courses. More 
specifically the profile of Greek diplomats at that time is described as  
‘Pro-western with a strong sense of loyalty verging on fear to superiors; 
having a tendency to avoid taking initiative; a tendency to follow 
instructions and carry out assigned (from above) missions; a self-
perception of being realistic, informed and non-political technocratic 
advisors to the political authorities; a proclivity to bend without much 
resistance to the political will of those in power; a feeling of comfort with 
routines; a sense of discretion, if not secretiveness, often without 
discrimination between sensitive or trivial information; a predisposition 
to consider the press irresponsible and journalists […]as untrustworthy; 
a general reticence in giving frequent and systematic briefings to 
members of parliament and especially members of opposition parties’ 
(Couloumbis, 1983: 108-109).  
The author (Couloumbis, 1983: 110) argues that based on empirical evidence, 
foreign policy structures until at least the early 1980s were characterised as rigid 
and hierarchical which in conjunction with heavy disincentives against initiatives 
and debates between superiors and subordinates, cultivated highly malleable 
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personalities in the service that subconsciously extended their intra-ministry 
obedience patterns to their relationships with external centres of authority.  
Couloumbis (1983: 116) attributes the aforementioned image to the long tradition 
of foreign power penetration into Greek domestic politics, a detailed discussion of 
which is provided in later sections. Foreign power penetration was manifested 
dramatically by the formation of the first political parties in the newly established 
Greek state bearing formal names such as the ‘French’, the ‘English’ and the 
‘Russian’. For much of the nineteenth century, Greece was treated as a 
protectorate, with its local elites and party factions seeking external support and in 
return promoting the protectors’ interests thus creating polarised structures.  
In the twentieth century polarisation was even more acute. Civil conflict, foreign 
intervention and manipulation became the norm. In the interwar and 1950-74 
periods, military coups and intervention into domestic politics were seen as both 
the cause and effect of foreign intervention. Similarly, the monarch appointed by 
the foreign powers was also considered as a cause and effect of foreign 
intervention. Couloumbis (1983: 116) depicts the interdependence of domestic and 
external politics in terms of a set of mutually reinforcing relationships.   
 
Figure 2.1 Couloumbis's (1983:116) triangular scheme of interdependence between domestic and 
external politics 
 
External 
Dependence 
Foreign 
Intervention 
Political 
Polarisation 
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More than a decade later Makridimitris and Stoforopoulos (1997) provided a 
snapshot of the Greek FPS, which they define as a set of organisational structures 
and processes with the MFA at its core. The authors describe the FPS as 
characterised by limited strategic policy planning and analysis capacity, a low level 
of strategic planning and orientation, systemic analysis and assessment and a high 
level of concern with bureaucratic procedure. For these reasons, the Greek FPS is 
described as lagging behind other similar systems of foreign policy (Makridimitris 
and Stoforopoulos, 1997: 32-34): 
Moreover, the FPS is described as demonstrating all those characteristics that 
typify the general pathology of Greek bureaucracy namely, fragmentation and 
politicisation (Makridimitris and Stoforopoulos, 1997: 47). On the basis of this 
analysis, Makridimitris and Stoforopoulos (1997) suggest that the contemporary 
pressures exercised by the international environment, necessitate the optimisation 
of the Greek FPS as well as the redefinition of the role and the re-structuring of the 
MFA and of the diplomatic service. Chapters four and five explore those issues, 
namely the role and structure of the Greek MFA and its overseas services in the 
context of the changing policy environments.  
With an added emphasis on the foreign policy process, Kavakas (2000) provides 
an account which addresses the nature of the process and the kinds of 
considerations that dominate it. According to the author (2000:150) the main 
characteristic of the foreign policy area in Greece is that it has been used by 
governments to claim success and national victories for electoral purposes. An 
important aspect of the policy process is that it has been separated into two 
distinct areas. The first has been concerned with all issues that do not affect Greek 
interests directly, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict or Iraq. The second has involved 
issues of primary national importance such as Turkey, Cyprus and the Balkans. 
This second area comprises the so-called ‘national issues’ [ethnika themata] which 
dominate the foreign policy agenda and marginalise other issues of international 
significance.  
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The naming and categorisation of foreign policy processes into distinct areas has a 
considerable impact on the way these issues have been viewed and managed. 
More specifically, Greece has securitised its foreign policy by putting forward 
‘national issues’. ‘Securitisation’ means that the specific issues are removed from 
any kind of party political debate and the policy process is insulated from other 
policies as well as from other extra-governmental agents. Instead, such issues 
become of high national priority, and, therefore, party disagreement is out of the 
question whilst management on behalf of the government takes place behind 
closed doors. In this manner foreign policy becomes nationalistic, politicised and 
‘securitised’ with the political leadership securing independence in its management 
and excluding a bureaucratic input.  
With the two strands of policy considerations dominating the foreign policy agenda, 
until very recently ‘low policy’ areas, such as the environment or humanitarian aid 
were neglected (Sotiropoulos, 2001). According to an official of the MFA’s General 
Directorate for Development (DG YDAS) (Interview, no 13) it has only been in the 
past five years that Greek foreign policy makers discovered that issues such as 
climate change form part of the category of ‘security issues’ and are addressed as 
a foreign policy consideration in the MFA. Such realisations about the changing 
nature of foreign policy by Greek foreign policy makers have opened up the policy 
process to new actors, such as NGOs, which have only recently started to enter 
policy-making in a more organised fashion. The involvement of such actors under 
the aegis of the MFA is further discussed in chapter four. The next section 
presents a model of Greek foreign policy-making conceptualised by Ioakimidis 
(1999; 2003) the value of which for the understanding of foreign policy structures is 
very significant.  
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Ioakimidis’s model of Greek foreign policy-making: personality 
versus institutions  
 
Ioakimidis’s model of Greek foreign policy-making (2003; 1999) builds upon three 
central hypotheses developed from observed practices in the Greek foreign policy 
process. The hypotheses are the dominance of the policy makers’ personalities in 
the foreign policy process, that the particular Greek societal and political cultures 
constitute sources for foreign policy and that the interplay between society and 
politicians is decisive for the Greek foreign policy domain. All these aspects are 
explored in greater detail in the following sections. Ioakimidis (1999; 142) observes 
that ‘the role of institutions and bureaucratic structures as factors in defining the 
policy-making process appears limited or in some cases non-existent’. For this 
purpose the fundamental principle underlying his analysis is the absence of 
effective and institutional structures, procedures and processes, what he terms as 
a ‘systemic institutional framework for public policy-making’.  
The author explains that the observed absence of a systemic institutional 
framework does not mean the absence of constitutional or legal provisions for 
foreign policy structures. On the contrary, he argues, formal constitutional 
arrangements provide for a number of special collective inter-ministerial bodies, 
which are aimed, in theory, at generating foreign policy strategy. Politicians’ 
narratives however reveal that such bodies have only rarely, if ever contributed to 
foreign policy-making (Ioakimidis, 2003: 104).  
Instead their role is limited to rhetoric in terms of discourse and their function is to 
legalise policies and decisions formulated centrally, within small executive 
bureaus2 which operate behind closed doors at the PM’s and the FM’s offices 
(Zoras and Gkikas, 2002; Lyrintzis, 1984: 112). Such small bureaus have been 
created by all Greek governments post-1974 comprising a closed circle of political 
advisors who together with the PM constitute the ultimate source of power in 
                                                   
2
 For instance the eight-member executive bureau of Papandreou is notorious for its power and 
secrecy (Lyrintzis, 1984: 112) 
87 
 
foreign policy decision making3 (Couloumbis, 1988: 62). In other words, there is a 
significant discrepancy between formal arrangements and practice which 
constitutes one of the main assumptions of Ioakimidis’s model (1999; 2003) which 
is illustrated on the following page.  
The significance of Ioakimidis’s model lies in the fact that it links foreign policy 
structures with policy substance by depicting a circular self-sustaining process 
which illustrates how the lack of a systemic institutional framework leads, through a 
number of intermediate stages and components, to irrational foreign policy which 
feeds back into the process and maintains this order. Ioakimidis (1999: 149-150) 
identifies a lack of a systemic institutional framework for foreign policy (which he 
terms an `institutional deficit’ (2003: 104).) as the absence of a set of interlocking 
policy-shaping instruments both at the governmental and bureaucratic levels 
interacting cooperatively.  
Effectively, this institutional deficit creates the conditions for a shift of policy-
making away from the bureaucratic process and towards the levels of political 
leadership. In other words, the absence of bureaucratic process standardisation - 
which characterises wider public policy-making (Ioakimidis, 1999; 2003: 99; 
Sotiropoulos and Bourikos, 2002: 156; Sotiropoulos, 2001; 1996; 1994; 1993)- 
places individual policy makers at the centre of the process with the PM or the FM 
being the sole decision maker operating outside the confines of any institutional 
structure. Thus the foreign policy bureaucracy has no significant input and foreign 
policy itself does not constitute an ‘institutional output’ but rather largely depends 
on the personal preferences of the policy makers (Ioakimidis, 1999: 154).  
 
 
 
                                                   
3
 For an analytical account of this tendency and how it impacted on the foreign policies taken 
between 1974 and 1980 see Couloumbis, 1988 
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IOAKIMIDIS’S GREEK FOREIGN POLICY MODEL 
(1) Lack of systemic institutional framework         leads to   
 
(2) Dominance of personalities in policy-making          leads to  
 
(3) Maximalist/irrational decisions          leads to  
 
(4) Foreign policy in conflict with 
The European Union  
The international community 
The advanced economic interests 
Members of governing party  
 leads to  
 
(5) Isolation of Greece          leads to  
 
(6) Search for compromise          leads to  
 
(7) Compromise at a lower threshold            leads to  
 
(8) Reinforcing traits making institutionalisation difficult  
 
Figure 2.2 ’The Greek foreign policy system’ as depicted by Ioakimidis (2003) 
 
Evidently the premise that supports elaborate administrative structures, in order to 
render individuals’ views less relevant and even stronger bureaucratic processes 
in order to liberate decision making from the ‘accident’ of personalities (Kissinger, 
1966:512) finds little applicability in the case of Greece. In practice, policy-making 
appears to constitute the PM’s or the FM’s prerogative excluding prior bureaucratic 
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consultation or collective and strategic formulation4 thus crystallising a personality-
centred policy process (Makridimitris, 2005; Passas, 2005: 372; Ioakimidis, 2003: 
109). In addition, the fact that Greek foreign policy has been securitised, in the 
sense that it is dominated by issues of great national security significance such as 
the deep-rooted issues concerning Turkey, Cyprus and Skopje has also created a 
crisis atmosphere which reinforces the non-institutional character of foreign policy-
making and the persistence of insulated policy-making in the offices of the PM and 
the FM. Such observations confirm Hill’s (1978: 12) suggestion that a crisis 
atmosphere promotes decision making centred on small and ad hoc groups which 
may reflect the sympathy and trust of the leadership.  
Such practices weaken policy coherence and continuity, cause friction between 
officials and politicians and lead to maximalist –defined as nationalist and 
emotional-  foreign policy often used as a tool to ensure the electorate’s votes5 
(Ioakimidis, 2003: 117-120). Most importantly, maximalist foreign policy has 
traditionally clashed with economic policies, which are ipso facto formulated on 
rational, collective and minimalistic principles and criteria. As a result, maximalist 
foreign policy has sabotaged any symbiosis between foreign economic and 
international policies.  
An additional parameter which upsets the foreign policy process and impacts upon 
coherence,  and continuity, is bureaucratic instability caused by regular changes 
and dismissals of officials managing international and EU affairs for reasons 
related to the clientelistic relationship of citizens and the state (Ioakimidis, 1993b: 
223) elaborated in later sections. For reasons already explained in Couloumbis’s 
                                                   
4
 Ioakimidis offers a list of practitioner writings on the issue (2003: 110) as well as evidence proving 
this point regarding the evolution of the political crisis between Skopje and Greece and the initiative 
of Antonios Samaras, the Greek foreign minister (1990-1992) who insisted on the Greek position, 
without any prior consultation of either the Cabinet or the Greek diplomatic service, both of which at 
this point disagreed, thus leading the country to international isolation. This case clearly illustrates 
the lack of institutional processes and mechanisms. Another example is Andreas Papandreou, 
prime minister of Greece (1981-1989 and 1993-1996) who kept Greek foreign policy his own 
prerogative leaving only routine ‘managerial’ issues to be dealt by diplomats or officials (Ioakimidis, 
1999; 2003: 114; Mitsotakis, 2006)   
5
 Populism in Greece is conventional wisdom and foreign policy is criticised as being sacrificed for 
purposes of gaining political/electoral support 
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image and others illustrated below, the prevailing image of the Greek foreign policy 
bureaucracy is that it does not act as a source of policy initiatives but rather as an 
executive instrument at the service of the political leadership. As a result, 
proceduralism is a phenomenon which characterises both the bureaucrats of the 
diplomatic overseas missions and those of the MFA. More importantly, the 
eagerness of the diplomatic branch to unquestionably support policy initiated by 
the political leaders of the MFA associates diplomats with individual political 
personalities. Naturally, in this environment, promotions, transfers and postings 
come to depend on political affiliations. It is common knowledge that the so called 
personnel review boards of the MFA serve only to sanction decisions for postings 
made at the FM’s office (Ioakimidis, 1999: 147).  
Whilst it is the best organised government department, the MFA suffers from the 
pathology which is symptomatic to the entirety of the Greek public administration 
demonstrated in the following sections. In brief, even though its organisational 
structure does not differ significantly from that encountered in other foreign 
ministries in the EU, its operation and internal dynamics are indicate of its 
traditionally limited input into the foreign policy process (Ioakimidis, 1999: 145). 
The MFA in its contemporary form, its organisational structure, departmental 
culture and functions are discussed in chapter four.  
Returning to Ioakimidis’s foreign policy-making model (1999; 2003) the author 
asserts that the detrimental institutional deficit manifest in the Greek foreign policy-
making system and the failed attempts in the late 1990s to re-arrange foreign 
policy processes lie in deep-rooted political and societal features ranging from 
particular Greek experience of its international environment characterised by 
foreign power dependence, special regional and geopolitical circumstances such 
as EU membership, Hellenic history and heritage, the Byzantine influence in the 
country’s political culture and general administrative tradition. All these factors 
constitute variables determining the functioning of the Greek FPS and are 
reviewed below (Ioakimidis, 1999: 162). 
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Allen (1981; 1989), in his analysis of the FPS’s variables’ ‘input’ to national foreign 
policy-making, argues that these differ for every state based on its special 
circumstances, including its international position, administrative organisation or 
political culture. All these variables together, both external and domestic, make up 
the FPS environment in which foreign policy-making structures and processes 
operate and by which they are influenced (Allen, 1981; 1989). It is exactly this 
analytical approach that makes the FPS such a valuable device. With the FPS 
understanding the foreign policy process as being more than a traditional distinct 
area of government policy and closer to broader domestic political processes, 
institutions and political cultures it achieves a more integrated understanding of a 
foreign policy machinery and can enhance the explanatory value of institutionalist 
approaches. This is because it adds to the equation a number of elements 
regarding the morphology of a given FPS and institutionalist approaches can have 
a wider scope to test the applicability of their various tools such as path 
dependence, isomorphism, critical junctures and others.  
Couloumbis and Yannas (1996: 160) conceptualise the operational environment 
for Greek foreign policy processes as a set of three concentric circles (see figure 
2.2). In the innermost circle, they place the Greek domestic policy environment, in 
the intermediate circle the regional setting covering the Balkans and the Eastern 
Mediterranean and the outer circle comprises the global setting which covers the 
international system after the Cold War. Their approach adds significant value in 
understanding Greek foreign policy structures in the face of pressures stemming 
from different operational political-economic-diplomatic environments which 
present Greece with different foreign policy and diplomatic challenges. 
Featherstone suggests (1996:15-16) that an analysis of how Greece adapts or fails 
to adapt to its external operational environment is crucial to the understanding of 
the position of Greece in the EU, the Balkans and the international system in the 
twenty first century. Based on such assumptions the following sections seek to 
explore this environment starting from the external layers and progressing to the 
domestic.  
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Figure 2.3 illustrates Couloumbis and Yanas’s perception of the Greek foreign policy environment  
 
The external environment   
Greece in the international environment: ‘high politics’ and 
dependence  
Greece with a population of 11m in 20086, limited natural resources and ineffective 
economic structures as the recent crisis has amply demonstrated, as well as with a 
geopolitical and geostrategic7 importance larger than its size would permit, has 
been at a geographical and identity crossroads for most of the twentieth century. 
Greece has been involved in a power race between the two superpowers which 
emerged after the Second World War and sought to control the wider geopolitics of 
                                                   
6
 The Economist, Country Briefings: Greece, 
http://www.economist.com/countries/Greece/profile.cfm?folder=Profile-FactSheet 
7
 The term geopolitical refers to the relationship between the geographical position and the security 
of a state whereas the term geostrategic refers to the dynamic relationship between geopolitical 
factors and the acquisition or loss of strategic gravity. For further elaboration see Ifestos and 
Tsardanidis, 1992: 218. 
Global Setting 
Balkan and Eastern 
Mediterranean 
Domestic setting 
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the Eastern Mediterranean region (Diamandouros, 1983: 48-49). The special geo-
strategic position of Greece has had a catalytic effect on both the substance and 
organisational basis of Greek foreign policy which rely heavily on promoting issues 
of traditional security linked to Greece’s territorial integrity. This is because, to 
date, Greece has had a number of unresolved territorial and security issues on its 
foreign policy agenda concerning the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM), Cyprus and Turkey translated into the dominance of ‘high politics’ in 
foreign policy management and organisation.   
Greece demonstrates a long tradition of foreign power intervention (Verney, 
1990b: 205; 1989: 67) which combined with the country’s limited resources 
prevented it from obtaining an autonomous and distinct role in the international 
arena. Due to its strategic location, Greece had been subjected to competing bids 
for Great Power penetration (Couloumbis and Yannas, 1996: 161) at a time when 
there was little room in the bipolar world for small states to participate in 
international relations. The geostrategic importance of Greece was enhanced in an 
international environment of intensified bipolarity as, for the US and NATO, Greece 
had an important role to play in the conflict between the East and the West as a 
base for deployment of NATO forces8 (Economides, 2005). The notorious quote by 
George Papandreou that in the post world-war era Greece ‘was breathing with a 
British and an American lung’ (Couloumbis, 1993: 380) epitomises the extent of 
foreign intervention in Greek domestic politics and foreign policy.  
At the same time Greece depended on western powers, to which it claimed affinity, 
for purposes of securing efficient security and political stabilisation (Economides, 
2005: 473; 1995: 107; Kazamias, 1997: 75). For this purpose Greece pursued the 
institutionalisation of ties with Western security systems and organisations such as 
NATO and the Balkan Cooperation, of which it became member in 1952 and in 
1954 respectively (Economides, 1995: 107; Ifestos and Tsardanidis, 1992: 225). 
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 For a detailed account of the strategic importance of Greece as perceived by NATO and the US 
see Ifestos, P and Tsardanidis (1992), The European Security System and the Greek Foreign 
Policy towards 2000 [in Greek], I. Sideris, Athens, pp:225-227 
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The need for securing western alliances’ support was intensified as friction came 
to a head between Greece and Turkey in the second half of the 20th century.  
 The ‘Turkish issue’ revolving amongst others around the Aegean Sea shelf has 
constituted the central linchpin for Greek foreign policy, challenging Athens in 
unprecedented ways (Featherstone, 1996: 14). Ensuring Greece’s preparedness 
to encounter the Turkish threat urged Greek governments to consistently appeal to 
western alliances, which infringed the country’s autonomy and imposed their own 
agendas. A characteristic example comes from the deployment of US bases in 
Greece as an exchange for ensuring the notorious 7/10 ratio of US aid to Greece 
and Turkey respectively (Mitsotakis, 2006: 90; Featherstone, 1990: 184; 
Couloumbis, 1983). 
Ensuring military capacity and western support had a significant impact on the way 
that Greece formulates its foreign policy priorities, agendas and structures, which 
for at least a decade in the 1980s, focused on the deployment of American bases 
in Greece (Mitsotakis, 2006). Such priorities, being linked to ‘high politics’, have 
attributed a significant degree of secrecy and security paranoia to foreign policy 
and cultivated an image of the MFA, as the country’s fortress against the enemy 
and the diplomatic service as Greece’s security negotiators (Interview, no 30). 
Furthermore, they reinforced the insulation of foreign policy-making from other 
public policies as well as crystallised the monopoly of the PM and the FM in foreign 
policy making (Griva, 2008; Mitsotakis, 2005).  
Effectively, this meant that the acute politicisation of the foreign policy process 
excluded diplomatic input to the management of foreign affairs as they were linked 
to important national security issues thus requiring flexible political manoeuvring 
(Theodoropoulos, 2005). As a result, the  functional and institutionalised 
communication and cooperation between diplomats and political leadership 
declined and was constrained to the former executing strictly bureaucratic, in the 
sense of administrative, duties (Griva, 2008: 428). These foreign policy-making 
95 
 
patterns have been perpetuated to date by consecutive governments (Griva, 2008; 
Makridimitris, 1994).  
Besides the quest for guaranteeing security solutions from its international 
partners, Greece also sought solutions for modernising its domestic political 
structures and institutions through collaboration with and membership of 
international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Economides, 
2005; 1995; Kazamias, 1997: 76). The search for modernisation in Greece 
arguably predates the impact of EU membership and in the context of a small 
country like Greece it can be viewed as yet another impulse for accession rather 
than only a product of it (Economides, 2005; Ioakimidis, 2002). Greece, having had 
a longstanding tradition of modernisation through adjustment, believed in the 
‘transferability’ of elements from modernised societies and thus became receptive 
to influences from the outside (Economides, 2005); a tactic which soon proved 
flawed (Kazamias, 1997: 76).  
Retrospectively, it has been concluded that international institutions have offered 
no significant modernising value to the Greek foreign policy structures. On the 
contrary, with the aforementioned alliances being predominantly concerned with 
certain foreign policy outcomes, such as security from communism and trade 
liberalism, proved that instead of transferring modernist practices to Greece, they 
caused a preoccupation with security issues often beyond its own and restricted its 
autonomy and development (Kazamias, 1997: 76).  
The Cold War besides offering a stable environment for Greek foreign policy, also 
presented Greece with new opportunities both in terms of its relations with the US 
and the Soviet Union as well as with the rest of the world (Economides, 2005: 474; 
1995). Most importantly, the East-West divide facilitated Greek membership to 
NATO9 and promoted Greek affinity with the West and it was thus decisive for 
Greek ‘Westerness’ or else Greek Western orientation (Economides, 2005: 473). 
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 It also promoted Turkish membership to NATO  
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The end of the Cold War marked a new era for Greece. A new agenda opened up 
for Greek foreign policy, an agenda for international policy, foreign economic policy 
and diplomacy of a small state (Featherstone, 1996: 15). The expansion of webs of 
interaction and multiplication of actors in the international environment as well as 
the increase in global issues such as crime, terrorism and natural catastrophes 
together with the ensuing need for cooperation between states and bureaucracies 
altered, to a significant degree, the scope of Greek foreign policy.  
This grew to involve and prioritise issues such as humanitarian aid at remote 
places on the globe, joint supranational management of energy security and illegal 
immigration and so on. In other words, the contemporary Greek foreign policy 
agenda has been mutated and inhabited by new themes which pervade Greece’s 
involvement in international politics and economics thus increasing demands but at 
the same time creating new opportunities (Kotzias, 2003: 333). Most importantly, 
however, as mentioned above, the contemporary Greek foreign policy agenda has 
emphasised the need for the re-structuring of the Greek foreign policy machinery 
(Ioakimidis, 1996).  
 
Greece and membership of the EU  
Membership of the EU and European integration with the latter being a gradual 
and incremental process, have reshaped national politics and policies (Wallace, 
1990: 9). Naturally, national responses to the new institutional environment differ 
according to domestic politico-administrative systems (Spanou, 2001: 47) which 
constitute a variable of their FPS. For Greece, with its very low levels of 
institutionalization and legalization of bureaucratic processes (Spanou, 2001: 62), 
thus being at the ‘receiving end’ of a set of pressures stemming from a changing 
institutional environment, EU membership has created a number of opportunities 
and demands. EU membership albeit a lengthy and tortuous process for Greece, it 
has influenced Greek foreign policy through adaptation to practices, norms and 
behaviours (Economides, 2005: 472). 
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Greece’s entry into the EC in 1981 was the single most important event that sealed 
the course of efforts on behalf of Greece to become incorporated into the Western 
world. The decision to join the EC was driven by significant political10 and foreign 
policy considerations (Economides, 2005: 473; Ioakimidis, 1996). In the early 
1980s, having come out of a seven-year dictatorship, possessing weak, often non-
democratic institutions and having been dependent on foreign powers for the past 
few decades, Greece sought EC membership in order to ensure solutions for 
issues such as safeguarding national security, modernizing domestic politics, 
eliminating US influence, ensuring growth and defence and promoting Greek 
interests and pressing national issues to European partners for purposes of 
gaining support (Economides, 2005; 1995; Kazamias, 1997; Couloumbis and 
Yannas, 1996; Featherstone, 1996; Ioakimidis, 1996; 1994).  
Since the day of its association agreement in 1961 the EC was perceived by 
Greece as the institutional framework within which it could develop a regional 
identity freed from the pervasive superpowers (Economides, 2005). While the US 
was condemned for having supported the military dictatorship (1967-1974), the EC 
was projected as the main guarantor of democratic institutions (Verney, 1990b). 
Greece was in search of collective security in the EC framework (Tsoukalis, 1996: 
27) and became the EC’s, and later the EU’s, strongest supporter (Featherstone, 
1996). And whilst membership of the EC was viewed as a means of promoting the 
consolidation of the newly established democratic institutions, economic 
considerations were of secondary significance (Tsoukalis, 1988: 195). The 
underlying hope was that EC membership would ‘act as a catalyst for the 
modernisation of Greece’s outdated socioeconomic system, structures and 
institutions’ (Economides, 2005; 11Ioakimidis, 1993: 406). 
Arguably, EC membership consolidated democratic political institutions which have 
never been stronger (Ioakimidis, 1996; Ioakimidis, 1994: 144; Fatouros, 1993: 35) 
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 For a list of the political reasons see Ioakimidis, 1994: 141 
11
 For an analytical account of Europeanisation as Modernisation in Greece see Economides (2005; 
1995) 
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and more than anything else, conferred upon Greece the status of a western state 
which led to a renewed role in the regional and international system, thus allowing 
the country to pursue a relatively independent, at least from protector powers, 
foreign policy (Ioakimidis, 1993: 410). The deep-rooted identity puzzle was 
resolved, Greece belonged to the west and its international orientation and status 
were clarified (Economides, 2005; 1995; Fatouros, 1993: 24; Lyrintzis, 1984: 108). 
In terms of foreign policy and diplomacy, EU membership conferred on Greece 
new diplomatic means with which to promote and defend its interests in European 
policy fora (Featherstone, 1994: 157) as well as added diplomatic capacity 
discussed in chapter five.  
Most importantly, EC membership paved the way for structural modernisation of 
the economic and social systems by providing firstly, the necessary financial 
resources and secondly, the ‘market conditions’ such as large market, economies 
of scale and competition (Ioakimidis, 1993: 408). In terms of policy-making 
institutions at home, the EC and later the EU through the process of 
Europeanisation12 had a huge impact, ‘downloading’ from Brussels new 
procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and 
norms (Radaelli, 2003: 28; 2004: 5). Europeanisation for Greece involving both 
westernisation and modernisation (Economides, 2005; 1999) constituted a force of 
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 Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso (2001: 2) define Europeanisation as the emergence and the 
development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal, 
and social institutions associated with political problem-solving that formalises interactions among 
the actors, and of policy networks specialising in the creation of authoritative rules. Others have 
referred to that as “Europeification” (Andersen and Eliassen 1993) or “Vergemeinschaftung” 
(communitarisation). In the latter Europeanisation is the independent variable which impacts upon 
domestic processes, policies and institutions.   
For other scholars such as Ladrech (1994: 69), Europeanisation depicts “[an] incremental process 
re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic 
dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national politics and policy-making”. In 
essence, Europeanisation connotes the processes and the mechanisms by which European 
institution-building may cause change at the domestic level. Another group of group of scholars 
such as Bache (2006) and Buller (2003) identify Europeanisation as a process of governance and 
of changing understandings of governance in Europe. This approach uses Europeanisation as a 
synonym  for institutionalisation; in other words it conceptualises Europeanisation as a process 
through which formal rules and regulations and informal ways of doing things are firstly materialised 
at an EU level and they are then crystallised and institutionalised inside the logic of domestic 
actors. In order for institutionalisation to happen, a level of discrepancy should exist between 
European and domestic levels; this discrepancy is called “misfit”.  
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modernisation for raising standards, for better public financing alongside fiscal 
discipline and for economic liberalisation13, and at the same time it posed major 
challenges to the Greek state tradition (Featherstone, 1996: 12) which as 
demonstrated below is unique.   
 
The impact of the EU on Greek foreign policy processes: blurring the boundaries 
and de-externalising foreign policy 
It is common wisdom that European integration in the 1990s penetrated deeply 
into domestic politics thus blurring the boundaries between foreign and domestic 
policy milieus, altering policy agendas and reshaping national politics. This was 
effectively translated into the undermining of the ability of the government and its 
foreign ministry to act as a ‘gatekeeper’ between the domestic and foreign spheres 
of policy (Featherstone, 1996: 11) and the broadening scope of the foreign policy 
processes. In the case of Greece, membership to the EU has challenged several 
deep-rooted administrative traditions and policy processes. The traditionally 
secretive, high-politics-centred Greek foreign policy process became less 
defensive and more open, adaptive and flexible (Interview, no 1, 2; 3; 4; 7).  
There is evidence that membership of the EU has prompted a more open style in 
public policy-making, has contributed to a move away from paternalism and 
ideological vagueness towards a more neo-liberal stance (Featherstone, 1996: 11) 
and has harmonised institutions and policy processes with European standards 
(Ioakimidis, 1994: 144-145). With regards to Greek foreign policy making, 
Europeanisation marked a shift away from policy formulation behind closed doors 
(Economides, 1999b: 115) and towards a de-nationalised and multilateralised 
Greek foreign policy agenda (Economides, 2005; 1999) 
More specifically, membership of the EU has significantly broadened the scope of 
Greek foreign policy, which now extends to a number of issue areas and 
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 This view contrasts the impression British and Danish voters may have of ‘Brussels’ 
(Featherstone, 1996: 9) 
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geographic constituencies that never formed part of Greek foreign policy 
preoccupations such as humanitarian aid and regional development. The signing 
of commercial agreements14, the enriched network of trade, business and 
association relations instilled an unprecedented economic element into Greece’s 
foreign policy which called for the re-thinking of its institutions (Interview, no 5).  
Within the first years of EU membership Greece had to formulate national positions 
on economic issues such as multilateral trade negotiations conducted under the 
auspices of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), trade relations with 
the US, trade or cooperation agreements with third countries, community policies 
for agriculture such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the environment 
and monetary issues (Ioakimidis, 1993: 413). The aforementioned areas of 
involvement meant that Greece, previously used to being mainly preoccupied with 
its national issues, was confronted with a large number of economic and technical 
policies as well as other low policy policies which placed issues such as the 
environment and foreign aid at the top of the national foreign policy agenda 
(Interview, no 4).  
New instruments for decision-making were created and the politico-economic 
system took on a new form. The adoption of the Single European Act (SEA) which 
brought with it institutional innovations, the programme for the single internal 
market and the new Structural Policy (the Delors package) introduced in 1988, 
were measures with unprecedented impact on the national political system, 
signifying for the first time in the hitherto Greek experience the economisation of 
Greek foreign policy and the blurring of the boundary between national and 
external policy milieus (Ioakimidis, 1999: 163; 1996: 40; Wenturis, 1994: 225). The 
blurring of the boundaries between foreign and domestic policy brought into foreign 
policy-making a number of other government departments, with a traditional 
domestic mandate, local and regional entities which contributed to the de-
externalisation of Greek foreign policy (Ioakimidis, 1999: 164-165). The new policy 
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 This applies to both the EU and global contexts   
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areas and the resulted functions cumulatively marked the shift of Greek foreign 
policy substance from statist and security related matters to economics and 
international policy15 (Featherstone, 1994: 160).  
Besides the vastly enlarged scope of foreign policy as a result of EU membership, 
what has also been transformed are the ways in which foreign policy is conducted 
within the EU. Changes revolve around patterns of communication such as the 
ones introduced with European Correspondents Cipher Network (COREU), 
patterns of representation to the outside world, a shift of policy-making at the level 
of PeRepGr and multilateral diplomacy (Economides, 2005; Ioakimidis, 1999: 162). 
In short, membership of the EU dictates that foreign policy sheds its parochial 
national character and is influenced by the globalised policy arena. Consequently, 
Greece was expected to present and articulate well defined, concrete positions 
and realised that there was no room for parochialism.  
Greece gradually shifted away from its Hellenocentric view of the world and 
redefined its place in the international system in favor of a more balanced and 
pragmatic approach (Ioakimidis, 1993: 413). A characteristic example of Greece’s 
attitudinal change comes from the framework of European Political Cooperation 
(EPC). In the early years of participation in the EPC, Greece misused its right to 
veto thus blocking the institution’s operation (Ioakimidis, 1993b: 225; Verney, 
1990: 215-216).  
Despite the overwhelming reshaping of national politics under the pressures of 
Europeanisation, Greece has been characterised as experiencing change 
domestically in two ways. More specifically, Ioakimidis (1996: 34) has suggested 
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 It has been argued that Greece experiences institutionally the entirety of its international 
personality through the EU (Interview, no 7). Regionalism, or else ‘peripherialisation’ for Greece is 
neither limiting nor counter acting to globalisation. On the contrary it is the most effective way for 
Greece to participate actively in international policy-making and at the same time to ensure and 
promote its objectives to a world in transformation. In other words, Greece perceives the EU as an 
organised and constrained facet of globalisation and Europeanisation as the means to this end 
(Kotzias, 2003: 351).  
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that Europeanisation in Greece has been ‘asynchronic’ and ‘autarkic’. Asynchronic 
means that certain components of the state have rapidly Europeanised while other 
vital elements of government and administration have been left behind. Whilst 
asynchronic describes the pace and intensity of Europeanisation the nature of the 
phenomenon can be described as autarkic. This means that the political system 
and elites seek to internalise European inputs and logic as a means of fostering 
their continued control in terms of structural stability and practices, ideological 
attitudes, policy objectives, resources and orientations, rather than as a means of 
changing or adapting to the new environmental conditions and new dynamics 
generated by EU membership (Ioakimidis, 1996: 34).  
The phenomenon of asynchronic Europeanisation is considered as the underlying 
cause for the observed duality of the images of the Greek FPS portrayed by 
fieldwork data. The first image depicts an open and Europeanised set of domestic 
structures and policy processes whereas the second portrays domestic structures 
as resistant to change and holding on to Hellenocentric and traditional approaches 
imbued as they are with hierarchy and verticality. Evidence from interviews 
conducted in the PeRepGr (2007, 2008 and 2009) confirms the dual image of 
Greek foreign policy institutions. More specifically, interviewees drew a parallel of 
Europeanisation and structural change with a ‘change spectrum’. At one end of the 
spectrum, the most Europeanized organisations: the PeRepGr, the MFA and 
MNEC are to be found, and at the least Europeanised end, domestic departments 
are located. This duality in the Greek foreign policy structures was further 
emphasised by officials in discussions regarding the MFA explored in the fourth 
chapter. 
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The Balkan region: Greece at the crossroads 
Greece, strategically located at the crossroads of three continents, the European, 
the African and the Asian, has been faced with several security threats over the 
years and caught up in regional geopolitics. Not only is it positioned next door to its 
traditional security enemy, Turkey but it is also in the heart of the Balkans the so-
called ‘cockpit of Europe’s wars’ or else the ‘Balkan powder keg’, right next to the 
nascent states of former Yugoslavia where a bloody war took place just at the 
borders of the European continent (Economides, 2008: 9). The position of Greece 
at the crossroads between the Eastern and the Western world has given birth to 
numerous political and academic debates. In times of global change, European 
integration and Balkan re-organisation, Greece is expected to be an economic 
player, a regional catalyst for further integration and democratisation and a local 
economic and trade leader (Economides, 2005). Such pressures have had a 
considerable impact on both its foreign policy agenda and the organisation of the 
MFA as they posed added demands for foreign economic policy and diplomacy 
(Interview, no 30). 
The geographical position of Greece in the Balkans, located in Europe but 
constituting an ‘un-European part of the continent’ (Economides, 2008) inevitably 
relates it to local and broader geopolitics. Greece, located in the middle of two 
worlds, is the only country in the region which is a member of all the main Western 
institutions such as NATO, UN, WEU, OECD, the EU, and the Council of Europe. 
Greece is the only EU member state positioned in such a unique geographical 
position. When Greece deals with external policy it always has to achieve a 
synergy of aims that derive from two different environments: the European (also 
representing the international environment) and the Balkan. Given that these two 
environments experience economic, political and security issues in distinct 
fashions, Greece is confronted with many demands for representation and 
negotiation capacity as well as constant reconciliation of European low policy-
making and Balkan high politics often linked to territorial claims (Interview, no 18).  
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Greece, as an EU member state committed to democracy and the protection of 
human rights, holds the advantage that it can mark significant contribution to 
international cooperation in the Balkan area (Economides, 2005; Couloumbis and 
Yannas, 1996: 168) which has traditionally threatened stability in both Greece and 
the EU. However, Greece failed for a long time to pursue a coherent Balkan policy 
and instead was often involved in Balkan politics thus becoming part of the 
problem (Tsoukalis, 1996: 26).  
Transformation in the Balkans emerging from the break-up of Yugoslavia had a 
significant effect on the geopolitics of south-eastern Europe. The stability of the 
region during the Cold War was violently disrupted and a number of new borders 
were drawn (Papahadjopoulos, 1998: 9) obliging Greece, a strong supporter of 
normalising relationships with its northern neighbours (Tsardanidis and Alifantis, 
1988: 269) to re-focus its foreign policy and foreign policy capacity to crises and 
economic diplomacy ‘at home’ i.e. in the Balkan region (Economides, 2005; 1999; 
Featherstone, 1996: 13) which had implications for the for the organisation of the 
MFA and the Greek diplomatic network discussed in chapters four and five 
respectively. Just as an indicator, it is useful to point out that the end of the Cold 
War presented Greece, as with other states with demands to enhance diplomatic 
representation in the region but also to re-think the distribution of its diplomatic 
capital to posts that bore economic and political significance.   
Greek foreign policy in the early 1990s has often been termed as ‘Macedonianised’ 
or else ‘Skopjenised’ (Tziabiris, 2003; Kontonis, 2003; Tsibiribi, 2004) due to the 
domination of the issue of FYROM on the foreign policy agenda16. Greece in the 
last three decades has cooperated with the Balkan states on both a multilateral 
and a bilateral level in policy areas such as finance, trade, energy, technical 
cooperation, tourism, education, and joint scientific research projects (Tsardanidis 
and Alifantis, 1988: 275). Most importantly, it is committed to provide financial 
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 For an analysis of the Macedonian issue, its prominence for Greek foreign policy and the lost 
diplomatic opportunities in the early 1990s see Kontonis  (2003), Tsiribiri (2004), Tziabiris (2003) 
and Valden (2003) 
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assistance through the international development programme of the Hellenic Plan 
for the Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans (HiPERB)17 in the framework of 
the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC).  
Having learned from missed opportunities and maximalist18 foreign policy in the 
region -as for instance with regards to the Macedonian issue and prior 
entanglement in Balkan conflicts- Greece transformed its Balkan policy from 1995 
onwards with the underlying target  of turning the southern part of Balkans into the 
core of its diplomatic and business activity. Greece became a major economic and 
trade partner of FYROM, Albania and Romania (Valden, 2003: 413) and used the 
expansion of its private sector as a diplomatic tool for political leverage. The 
signing of the Interim Agreement between Athens and Skopje in September 1995 
marked the end of the previous period of policy improvisations and the beginning 
of a new era for Greek diplomatic and economic strategy19 targeted at its northern 
neighbors (Triantafyllou, 1999: 148; Tsibiribi, 2004: 32-33).  
The turn towards the Balkan region is epitomised in the latest 2007 MFA Charter 
(Law 3566/2007) which raises economic diplomacy to the main pillar of Greek 
foreign policy with an emphasis on Greek regional economic leadership in the 
Balkans. Article 6 of the Charter establishes a General Secretariat of International 
Economic Relations and Development Cooperation20 in northern Greece, in 
Thessaloniki, which constitutes a window on the Balkans. The Secretariat aids the 
running of the MFA’s AGORA, the online portal to Greek businesses 
abroad21.which is discussed in chapter five. AGORA presents business reports 
and information gathered from all overseas commercial offices and consulates with 
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 http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Economic+Diplomacy/HiPERB/Objectives/  
18
 Maximalist is used to denote irrational and assertive foreign policy with exaggerated emotionality 
leading to misunderstandings  
19
 Triantafyllou (1999, 148) offers an enlightening account of Greece’s Balkan strategy which aimed 
to contribute to the stabilisation of the neighbouring states and their transition to democracy, to 
foster human resources, to invest in value-adding activities, to create a stable macro-economic 
environment and to integrate the region with the EU. 
20
 The General Secretariat of International Economic Relations and Development Cooperation was 
set up in 2002 by the Presidential Decree 159 published in the National Gazette (FEK140) vol. A’ 
21
 www.agora.mfa.gr  
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the aim of strengthening and supporting Greek businesses in the Balkan region but 
also internationally.  
The focus of Greek foreign policy on the Balkan region as a key strategic priority of 
Greece was presented by the former FM, Dora Bakoyanni to the Parliamentary 
Committee for Foreign and European Affairs. Bakoyanni (2007) stressed the 
importance of regional economic diplomacy which constitutes the government’s 
key strategy and the MFA’s ultimate foreign policy priority. Nonetheless, efforts to 
rearrange foreign policy organisation seem to hinge on a certain deep-rooted 
political culture and administrative tradition which are discussed in the next 
sections focusing on the Greek domestic environment. Before we discuss these 
domestic elements, which condition the nature and operation of the Greek foreign 
policy machinery, it is useful to look briefly at the constitutional arrangements for 
foreign policy making in Greece.  
 
The Domestic Environment  
The constitutional basis for foreign policy-making 
 
With regards to the constitutional basis for Greek foreign policy making the 
following model applies. At the level of the government the main agents for foreign 
policy formulation and coordination are the Cabinet, KYSEA (Governmental 
Council on Foreign Affairs and Defence) which is presided over by the PM, and 
EDOS (Committee on International Economic Relations). KYSEA22, which is 
similar to the American National Security Council (NSC) and constitutes an ad hoc 
branch of the Cabinet is intended to promote effective coordination of the 
government in foreign and defence policy (Gkikas, 2005: 78-79; Zoras and Gkikas, 
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 KYSEA comprises the ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Interior, Finance and Economy, 
Environment, and the deputy Foreign Minister. Depending on the agenda other ministers can 
participate including the General Secretary of the MFA. For a detailed account of KYSEA’s 
jurisdiction see Gkikas (2005), Zoras and Gkikas (2002) 
107 
 
2002: 26)., Even though KYSEA was conceived in post-dictatorial Greece (after 
1974) as a symbol of the democratisation of the foreign policy process (Makris, 
2007: 235-240) it raises questions with regards to its legality in decision making 
since it operates instead of the cabinet in plenum which is what the constitution 
provides for foreign policy making (Gkikas, 2005: 78). Despite the primacy of 
KYSEA in decision making in the area of foreign and international policy, this 
collective body is frequently bypassed by the PM and the FM. Significant efforts 
have been made to turn KYSEA into the central policy-formulating and decision 
making body (Ioakimidis, 1999:161) but the above synergy has prevailed (Griva, 
2002). In the Greek political system the PM is recognised by the constitution as the 
primus solus actor (Makridimitris and Stoforopoulos, 1997: 46; Makridimitris, 1992: 
28).  
The aforementioned constitutional provision together with the long established 
unquestioned ministerial allegiance to the PM, render him the ultimate foreign 
policy maker whereas significant input is afforded by the FM (Papakonstantinou, 
2004: 268; Griva, 2002: 46; Makridimitris, 1992: 35). The PM is in charge of the 
state’s representation abroad and determines relations with ‘foreign subjects’. The 
participation of the PM in international and European summits is a good example. 
The FM formulates foreign policy based on the special instructions received by the 
PM and represents the state abroad in other fora. The appropriation/distribution of 
the roles between the two depends on the political significance of the issues at 
hand for the national interest (Papakonstantinou, 2004: 268). The FM cannot make 
decisions independently from the PM on high politics but, rather, follows the PM’s 
instructions, whether in agreement with the PM or not. Constitutionally, the FM and 
the rest of the ministers must respect the constitutional dominance of the PM 
(Constitution, 2008, art. 37, para. 1).  
Forming part of the executive and of the governmental mechanism but not a 
governmental body in itself in the sense that it comprises consultants and experts 
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outside the governmental machinery, the National Council of Foreign Policy23 
comprises members of the parliament and external experts (Art. 82 para 4 of the 
2008 Greek Constitution) and makes up the constitutional consultative body to the 
cabinet (Gkikas, 2005: 84-87). Despite the official constitutional role of 
governmental collective bodies such as the cabinet and KYSEA, foreign policy -
especially this part which relates to low policy-is, to a large extent, formulated by 
the bureaucratic mechanism. In this respect the primary role is held by the PMO 
and the Ministers’ offices and most precisely the FM’s office, and to a lesser 
degree the Minister of Defence’s office, together with the MFA’s diplomatic service. 
The upper bureaucratic levels of the ministries provide continuity and coherence 
and remain in office irrespective of the government of the day (Papakonstantinou, 
2004: 270).  
The MFA is considered to be the ultimate bureaucratic actor for foreign policy-
making and implementation.  However, an increasing number of other government 
departments are having an input to the foreign policy process, but as the 
discussion in the next chapter indicates, this input is still limited. The MFA’s role in 
the policy process has been central and unquestioned. Even when other 
government agents participate in foreign policy-making, the MFA is the conditio 
sine qua non in policy planning, formulation and implementation (Makridimitris and 
Stoforopoulos, 1997: 41, 97).  
The MFA’s latest Charter (Article 6 Law 3566/2007) provides that for the coherent 
expression of Greek foreign policy, ministries, other government departments and 
local authorities cooperate with and report to the MFA for all matters relating to the 
state’s foreign and international relations thus affirming the primacy of the MFA vis-
á-vis   other government departments. The article establishes inter-ministerial 
cooperation but most importantly, it establishes the supremacy of the MFA vis-à-
vis the rest of the bureaucracy by vesting the ministry with foreign and international 
policy coordination (Article 6 paras b and c). In charge of the monitoring and 
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 For an analytical account of the National Council of Foreign Policy see Gkikas (2005: 84-107) 
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assessment of foreign policy is the Greek Parliament but, as demonstrated below, 
its role to date has been characterised as ‘cosmetic’ (Couloumbis, 1983).  
 
The Greek Parliament in the foreign policy process  
 
The role of the Parliament in Greek public policy making and especially in foreign 
policy-making has been significantly limited (Featherstone, 1996: 10; 
Stoforopoulos and Makridimitris, 1997: 45). There are two reasons for this: firstly, 
because its role as provided for by the Greek constitution is limited to policy 
review; and secondly, because the Parliament in the Greek political system is 
significantly vulnerable against political pressures (Karabarbounis, 2005: 320). The 
Greek Parliament has been dominated by two major parties, which have managed 
in the last three decades to secure single party majorities. As a result, the 
parliament has always been captive to Greek governments24 and served as a 
forum for political debates (Ioakimidis, 1994: 150). Even though it has the right to 
conduct a referendum if it is decided that crucial national interests are at stake 
(Papakonstantinou, 2004: 270) it hardly ever performs this task.  
A member of the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign and European affairs 
(Interview, no 10) stated that  
‘It is common practice for foreign policy positions to be presented to the 
committee a posteriori. Policy is merely presented to the committee for 
ratification and the whole task of parliamentary control has become 
somewhat procedural’.  
Another official argued that the only incentive for parliamentarians’ involvement is 
that they receive payment for the questions on policy that they direct to the political 
leadership (Interview, no 30). Naturally, the involvement of parliamentary 
committees in foreign policy formulation has been characterised as merely 
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 For more on the Greek parliament and its involvement in policy-making see Ioakimidis (1994) 
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‘decorative’ in the sense that they only validate and legalise decisions rather than 
substantially contributing to foreign policy-making either through recommendations 
or through control (Papakonstantinou, 2004: 270; Couloumbis, 1983: 111).  
In terms of parliamentary diplomacy, the Greek Parliament follows, to an extent, 
patterns observed worldwide with slowly increasing involvement in the promotion 
of Greece’s international relations. Diplomatic action is represented by the 
development of bilateral parliamentary exchange, participation in parliamentary 
fora and association in European processes. The main patrons of such processes 
are the various parliamentary bodies such as the Presidency of the Parliament, the 
Standing Parliamentary Committees such as the committees for Foreign and 
European Affairs, for Religion, for Expatriates and others. Equally important are 
the parliamentary representations to international organisations such as the 
European Council, NATO, CSCE, WEU, BSEC and others. Such parliamentary 
action is supported by a series of bodies of officials such as the Diplomatic Cabinet 
of the Parliament and the MFA’s Secretariat for International Economic Relations 
(Karabarbounis, 2005: 321). 
The inability of the Parliament to contribute to strategy-setting regarding foreign 
policy, economic policy or even education and defence has added to its limited 
exercise of parliamentary diplomacy. An underlying problem is that the majority of 
the parliamentarians who become part of the MFA’s political leadership do not 
believe in the exercise of diplomacy by the parliament. They have a traditional 
approach to the conduct of diplomacy which they consider to be the prerogative of 
traditional diplomats. Once part of the political leadership of the MFA, they do not 
appear in the parliament to inform fellow parliamentarians about their work. There 
have been cases of foreign ministers with a long tenure, for instance of seven 
years, who never appeared before the parliament (Tsouderou, 1992:65). The 
same delays are manifest in the ratification of international contracts by the 
parliament, with large numbers of international contracts remaining non-ratified 
thus posing problems for the governments’ pursuit of Greek interests abroad. With 
the constitutional basis for foreign policy making presented in the present section, 
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the following sections will focus on those elements in the domestic environment 
that form part of the Greek FPS. The next section focuses on Greek political 
culture.  
 
Greek political culture and foreign policy   
Political culture is a crucial determinant of political behaviour and organisation 
(Papoulias et al, 2005: 87) and at the same time, a very a complex area to handle. 
It has been argued that not only does political culture influence foreign policy-
making but it can also amount to a source of foreign policy-making on its own 
(Clarke, 1996: 22). Greece appears to be a distinctive case amongst its fellow EU 
member states because it is the only member-state with a cultural identity with 
elements of Orthodoxy, Byzantine tradition, classical influences as well as the 
Ottoman legacy (Ioakimidis, 1994: 143; 1996: 46; 2003: 107). The search for 
sources of Modern Greek culture should start with the Greek experience, with 
Ottoman rule, under which it existed for four centuries.  
The environment in which Greek society developed its attitude toward politics, law, 
the state and public policy as well as foreign policy is described by Diamandouros 
(1983: 44) as agrarian, theocratic and pre-capitalist, which demanded obedience 
and tax revenues from its subjects thus forcing them to seek protection in families 
and clientage networks25. Such practices seem to be perpetuated today and to 
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 For a more analytical description of the society in which Greece developed its attitude towards 
politics and the state see Diamandouros (1983). Part of the author’s description is provided as 
follows: ‘Basically, we are talking about an overwhelmingly agrarian, pre-capitalist society and 
economy situated at the periphery of a theocratic, Asiatic empire which, true to its military origins 
and pre-modern essence, sought not assimilation but obedience, military service and tax revenues 
from its subject peoples. During the heyday of the Empire, enlightened centralised administration 
afforded the peasant at the bottom of the social pyramid a modicum of security and protection. [...] 
however, from the seventeenth century onwards, western commercial capitalism, precipitated a 
number of centrifugal forces which not only destroyed the traditional bases for security and 
protection in the countryside but, in addition, brought about conditions of lawlessness, arbitrariness, 
increasing oppression, and profound uncertainty which, over time, became endemic features of 
Ottoman society. These conditions, which were even more exacerbated at the periphery of the 
weakening Empire, forced the individual to seek, more than ever before, private means of security 
and protection. And in a deeply traditional pre-capitalistic social formation, where social 
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determine relationships between the state, political parties and society. Political 
socialisation of the individual within such a state of affairs led to the erosion of the 
state’s legitimacy26 which became the cause of discord in the war of independence 
that broke out (Diamandouros, 1983: 46). The same peculiar attitude applies to 
more recent history. The Civil War (1944-1949), the Colonels’ dictatorship and the 
fact that a large number of Greek families were refugees from hostile surrounding 
countries made Greeks very sensitive to any repetition of such humiliating and 
painful experiences and also very conservative and defensive (Pettifer, 1996: 19; 
Wenturis, 1994: 227).  
The country’s geographical position aggravated its tendency for introversion 
manifested in its foreign policy. As a result, the Greek political attitude in the 
international environment became isolationist and xenophobic (Ioakimidis, 2003: 
105), while domestically clientelism underlay all political and social interactions. 
Makridimitris (1994: 23) suggests that there is more than the well established 
clientelism and xenophobia in Greek political culture. Greek politico-administrative 
culture, which is still ‘a culture in transition’ (Featherstone, 1990b: 101) seems to 
derive from two contradicting normative orientations27. More specifically, it seems 
to have lain either on a traditionalist, Hellenocentric and populist orientation or on a 
more meritocratic, rational and modernising orientation both informing Greek 
foreign policy images. The former dominated Greek political attitudes and 
interactions for many decades and played a significant role in the formulation of 
                                                                                                                                                          
differentiation was minimal, the extended family emerged as the foremost defensive institution 
capable of offering invaluable protection to its members at all levels of society. [...] the extended 
family and the broader clientage network to which it gave rise as it spread both horizontally and 
vertically to fill up critical social space, became the central mechanism of social integration and 
organisation. ’ 
26
 For an extensive description of individual socialisation in the antagonistic, unfair and elitist 
environment and particularly for the origins of the Greek attitude toward political power and office 
holding see Diamandouros, (1983) p. 45. In the same section the author also discusses the legal 
confusion that was created with the parallel use of three different bodies of laws. The Shari’a 
applied by the Ottoman authorities, the Byzantine law applied by the Greek Orthodox church and 
customary law applied by local authorities within the realm of their competence.  
27
 For more on the two models of the traditionalist prism society or Gemeinschaft and the rising civic 
culture or Gessellchaft see Makridimitris (1994) 
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the Greek national identity and international interests which focused on 
safeguarding Greek territorial and ethnic integrity.  
In short, the Greek national identity and foreign policy attitude is epitomised in that 
‘whatever is Greek is separate from anything foreign’. This strong view is due to 
the fact that Greece is one of the most homogenous societies in the EU based on 
its ethnic composition, language and religion and has never been faced with any 
demands for secession or separatism (Featherstone, 1996: 13). The ‘ethnos’ 
(nation) in Greece assumed social primacy and supremacy against notions such 
as individual rights. Greeks see themselves as ancestors of Alexander the Great or 
Pericles yet they are unable to conduct properly many of the basic functions of a 
modern democratic state (Pettifer, 1996: 18). They expect that the rest of the world 
appreciates them for their glorious past which has influenced Greek foreign policy 
especially with regards to Turkey (Ioakimidis, 2003: 107).  
Besides the passionate and empathetic foreign policy and the nominal respect for 
the state and its institutions, which as explained above, is historically explained, 
Greeks also always possess a sense of distinctness and a fear of a threat to their 
territorial integrity (Ioakimidis, 2003: 104; Tsoukalis, 1996: 26) which, whilst not 
unfounded, has had major implications for the Greek foreign policy agenda as well 
as foreign policy processes and structures as explained in later chapters.  
Their deep-rooted xenophobia makes them trust, even today, only immediate 
family and friends thus perpetuating the clientage pattern and weakening state 
institutions (Ioakimidis, 2003: 106). The Greek inability to separate the glorious 
past from current realities (Wenturis, 1994: 227) has often led to emotional and 
exaggerated reactions in the field of foreign policy28 in other words maximalist 
foreign policy, which as mentioned above seems to be characteristic of the Greek 
foreign policy-making model. Most importantly, it has attached a significant 
                                                   
28
 A complementary reason of emotional foreign policy reactions comes from the rather excessive 
interaction between foreign policy and domestic politics; and more precisely in the use of foreign 
policy in order to either satisfy public opinion, to divert attention from domestic politics to (Clogg, 
1993; Mitsotakis, 2006) or even to offer solutions to domestic problems (Hammond, 1965: 661). 
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secretive and introverted attitude to foreign policy-making. As an MFA official 
stated, Greek foreign policy makers are paranoid about information leakages 
which would give the enemy an advantage. ‘They, arguably, prefer to be 
traditionalist than to modernise if this means that they have to share information’ 
(Interview, no 30). 
Greek xenophobia and ‘inwardness’ has been termed as the ‘underdog’ syndrome 
or ‘the underdog culture’ which has had implications for Greek foreign policy 
(Diamandouros, 1983). This syndrome translates into the belief that Greece is 
treated as inferior by the Western world because the West envies it for its ‘glorious 
historical tradition’ and conspires against it to humiliate it. This stance has led to 
irrational attitudes both internationally and in the context of European institutions29 
on several occasions, with Greece aligning with whoever appeared to be against 
the West or rejecting instantaneously any compromising act30 (Ioakimidis, 1996: 
47).  
The underdog culture has ascribed a traditionalist view to society and has 
dominated public foreign policy-making (Makridimitris, 1994: 24). The 
aforementioned concept of Hellenicity expressed through Hellenocentrism has 
been traditionally intertwined with orthodoxy in Greece. This dual perception of the 
Modern Greek state has had serious implications for the value structure of the 
society (Diamandouros, 1983: 57). While the overall involvement of the church in 
individual life has been in decline31 it remains one of the most influential institutions 
in terms of values, attitudes and beliefs and provides a parallel forum for political 
socialisation (Lambrias, 1988).  
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 The case of the irrational Greek usage of its veto power in the context of the EPC is 
characteristic 
30
 This impression was further reinforced by the fact that Greece was proclaimed as a ‘delayed 
nation’ in terms of synchronisation with the rest of Europe (Wenturis, 1994: 228) 
31
 Until recently the mid 1980s priests were hired to teach at schools without any relevant teaching 
qualification and the priest together with the teacher constituted the two prominent figures in all 
rural areas. In the large number of villages of Greece, where illiteracy was 24% for those over ten 
years of age, the priest was viewed as the ethical leader of the village.  
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Not only has the Greek Church been a normal segment of national identity and 
domestic politics, a tendency which goes back to the War of Independence in the 
early nineteenth century, but it has also been a major determinant in many foreign 
policy matters (Pettifer, 1996: 18-19). For instance, the identification of Hellenicity 
with Orthodoxy has been an obstacle to the integration of ethnic and religious 
minorities32 into the Greek culture (Diamandouros, 1983: 55) and the Greek 
society, which has been criticised for social intolerance (Pettifer, 1996: 19) and for 
abuse of the rights of minority groups (Featherstone, 1996: 13). Such intolerance 
is even further aggravated and encouraged by schools and school texts which are 
virtually silent on groups such as the Kutzovlachs, the Pomaks, the Sarakatsans, 
the Albanian and Slav-speaking populations in Greece (Featherstone, 1996: 13).  
It seems that such egocentric and xenophobic views are embraced by the entirety 
of the educational system in Greece. The education system in Greece until very 
recently, has been characterised by a significant degree of authoritarianism and 
emphasis on discipline, rote-learning and authority. Critical thought and discussion 
have been strategically ignored and the transmission of finite knowledge in often 
obsolete, centrally prescribed textbooks has been repeatedly imposed 
(Diamandouros, 1983: 56). The worst consequence of this system was the 
creation of para-school private institutions, which prepared students for the 
university entry exams. At the university level, extensive reliance on professors’ 
texts, remoteness and authority of professors as well as pronounced formalism 
and intellectual rigidity make up a rigid system which encourages populism, 
intolerance and antagonism (Lambrias, 1993: 321).  
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 Roman Catholics, Jews, Muslims are some of the religious minorities in Greece 
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Greek society and politics 
Greek society has been characterised by small businesses with a salaried 
population of 42% in 1971 (Mavrogordatos, 1984) which has grown to 64% in 2009 
(Greek statistical services33) with this percentage being significantly lower than 
European average. The low percentages of salaried populations in the Greek 
society, besides the size of economy and industry which is small, are also rooted 
in the creation of temporary posts for the purpose of power maintenance. In 
Greece, there is an absence of strong networks of voluntary associations with a 
specific interest, capable of acting as agents of secondary political socialisation 
society (Diamandouros, 1983: 58; Sotiropoulos, 2001: 64). Movements and NGOs 
or other organisations and unions with sectional interests, lack authority and 
independence and have often been integrated into the structures of political parties 
(Featherstone, 1990: 192) which results in the politicisation of their interests.  
Even though the consolidation of democracy in the post-1974 Greece allowed for 
the representation of interests of ecological, cultural, consumer and health 
substance as well as social provision movements, such movements are still small, 
fragmented and weak, hiding underlying ideological splits between right and left, 
which antagonise for their control (Sotiropoulos, 2006: 2). This phenomenon leads 
to a weak civil society which in turn creates a vacuum allowing political parties to 
gain control of the political system. As a result, Greece is classified among those 
states with political party penetrated and dependent political systems (Couloumbis 
and Yannas, 1996: 161). 
Overall, the ‘third sector’ is dramatically underdeveloped in comparison to other 
European countries and therefore its influence over policy-making has been 
minimal to non-existent (Interview, no 12). Only recently, have environmental 
organisations taken advantage of some form of interaction between the third sector 
and the government merely for the purpose of protesting against already 
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 Greek statistical services 
http://www.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE/BUCKET/A0101/PressReleases/A0101_SJO01_D
T_QQ_01_2009_01_F_GR.pdf  
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implemented policies (Sotiropoulos, 2001: 77) or to polarise public opinion against 
the government (Interview, no 12). The traditional way of societal integration into 
the Greek political system is clientelistic in nature, which does not allow the 
merging of horizontal, party independent, social alliances (Sotiropoulos, 1993:94). 
This is why in order to understand the input of societal interests and ensuing 
bureaucratic initiatives into policy-making in Greece we have to firstly understand 
the relation between the two, which according to Lyrintzis (1983) can be 
summarised in what he terms ‘bureaucratic clientelism’. Bureaucratic clientelism 
describes the process whereby society becomes the client of bureaucracy and in 
the case of Greece, of the political parties.  
Bureaucratic clientelism fully describes societal integration in the post-1977 era. In 
the context of this phenomenon, the political party functions as a collective patron 
to its supporters, who become clients of the state34.  Civil society, being dependent 
on this vertical clientelistic nature of their political participation remains fragmented 
and weak. Furthermore, a lot of societal groups, such as business and industrial 
societal groups, or professional organisations such as those with lawyers and 
doctors as members have become fora of intensive party antagonism and their 
members have often been promoted to the parliament. Deriving from the above, it 
is not surprising that the relations between civil society, parties and the state 
machinery have led to the dependence of Greek society and bureaucracy to the 
government of the day (Sotiropoulos, 1993:94). The Greek ‘bureau-pathology’, as 
it has been termed by Samatas (1994), has established ‘bureaucraticism’ as a 
means of socio-political control. Greek bureaucracy being thoroughly controlled by 
the government of the day does not follow the models of the US or the UK where a 
strong independent civil service works for the state and not for the government and 
influences government policy35.  
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 Before the 1967-1974 dictatorship society members were clients to individual ministers. 
35
 According to Sotiropoulos (2006: 1) Greece presents a theoretically interesting paradox 
according to which ‘the relations between the central Greek state and civil society are shaped by 
state corporatism, which still thrives, although corporatism’s favourable political context - 
authoritarianism - has ceased to exist since the fall of the colonels’ regime in 1974.’ The author also 
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It is not surprising that Greek governments demonstrate disproportionate strength 
to their relatively young organisations while bureaucracy exhibits an inability to 
resist alternate governments, a fact which is matched by the weakness of Greek 
civil society. In the realm of foreign policy-making on several occasions 
bureaucracy has been excluded from the process on the grounds that it would 
pose an obstacle to the state’s national interests (Griva, 2008; Theodoropoulos, 
2005). The extreme dimension of bureaucratic pathology in Greece poses serious 
questions of intention. By this is meant that the continuity of the politicisation of 
bureaucracy represents an idiomorphic fashion of public administration 
organisation based on interests of political parties (Samatas, 1994: 34).  
Since the end of the Second World War, Greek civil servants including Greek 
diplomats have not formulated a set of organised interests, nor have they acquired 
an esprit de corps thus being incapable of attracting external resources and 
sources of power. And even though they emerge as active in terms of reforms and 
policies with regards to their own rights and interest, they appear to have nominal 
input into policies which fall outside their own interests - such as environmental or 
educational policies (Sotiropoulos, 2001: 68). The Greek state,shaped by a patron-
client interaction (Couloumbis and Yannas, 1996: 162; Ioakimidis, 1996: 40), has 
evolved into an over-sized, over-centralised entity and has become seriously 
unresponsive to environmental challenges of adjustment due to its tight control by 
political parties (Ioakimidis, 1996: 40). Naturally, such a modus operandi extends 
into all areas of policy-making, including foreign policy-making which is, by 
definition, the policy area that might be expected to demonstrate the greatest 
responsiveness to external challenges.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
suggests that Greece constitutes a characteristic example of state-civil society relations which differ 
from the Western model in that although West civil societies have been able to limit state action in 
Greece both bureaucracy and civil society have been permeated by pervasive party factionalism. 
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Strong political parties versus weak society   
The uneven relationship between civil society, bureaucracy and the state has been 
extensively discussed in Greece with political parties36 being placed at the top of 
the administrative ‘truncated pyramid’37 (Spanou, 2000). The overwhelming 
conclusion is that political parties possess the largest share of power vis-à-vis 
weak Greek civil society and bureaucracy. This is, partially, the product of an 
uneven distribution of organisational resources38 in terms of which, political parties 
dominate the administration without confronting any societal resistance 
(Sotiropoulos, 1993: 85). Bureaucratic clientelism operated through political parties 
constitutes a significant impediment to processes of modernisation, 
Europeanisation and globalisation of Greek political structures as these require the 
redefinition of the relationship between the state and society in favour of the latter 
(Ioakimidis, 1996: 44; Lyrintzis, 1983), hence their autarkic nature39.  
Such resistance to the aforementioned processes becomes more evident in the 
context of the EU40. Greek traditionalist political parties have often opposed the 
process of Europeanization, using as a pretext the claim that it subverts and 
undermines Greekness. The real reason behind political parties’ resistance to 
allow the process to take its full course lies in the fact that this would result in their 
own loss of access to state resources (Ioakimidis, 1996: 45).  
Greece had a political tradition of clientelistic political parties even before the 
1970s (Couloumbis and Yannas, 1996: 161). Political parties are very strong vis-à-
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 For analytical accounts of the internal structures of Greek political parties from 1974 onwards see 
Featherstone (1990b), Lyrintzis (1983), Mavrogordatos (1983), Verney (1990)  
37
 Spanou (2000) describes administrative organisation and co-ordination in Greece as a truncated 
pyramid where everything is in place apart from the unifying element at the top 
38
 For more on organisational resources see Sotiropoulos (1993) 
39
 As earlier explained  Ioakimidis (1996: 34) defines  autarkic the process whereby the political 
system and elites internalise European inputs as a means of fostering their continued control in 
terms of structural stability and practices, ideological attitudes, policy objectives, resources and 
orientations, rather than as a means of changing or adapting to the new environmental conditions 
and new dynamics generated by EU membership 
40
 Ioakimidis (1996) describes the impact that the EU has had on Greek political parties. 
Specifically, the author argues that the EU has created a schism in political parties, which have split 
into two separate camps, namely the traditionalists and the Europeanists.  
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vis civil society and highly interventionist and in the post-1974 regime the ‘party-
state’ is a crucial manifestation of the new political order. Political parties, which 
played a major role in the process of democracy consolidation (Featherstone, 
1990: 193), are an important indicator of change in contemporary Greek society 
and it has been argued that the domestic dependence on the party in power is 
reminiscent of the older Greek dependence on foreign powers (Featherstone, 
1994: 154). After the 1974 regime, the party system that was established, 
according to Mavrogordatos (1984: 163), was bipolar and of ‘limited but polarised 
pluralism’. The Greek electoral system, based on simple proportionality reinforced 
the two-party system (Sotiropoulos, 1993: 92). Bipolar party competition, based on 
long-established families rather than on abstract belief systems41 (Mavrogordatos, 
1984: 161) further strengthened political parties and at the same time has 
weakened the authority and independence of social structures (Featherstone, 
1990: 191).   
Internally, political parties are characterised by a significant democracy deficiency 
and autocratic leadership (Featherstone, 1990: 188-189). Power is concentrated 
on charismatic leaders who have a populist and demagogic leadership style 
(Featherstone, 1990b: 102; Mavrogordatos, 1983: 80). Leaders have used the 
state apparatus and its resources for party purposes; in other words, as a means 
of extending their own hegemony (Featherstone, 1990: 195; Lyrintzis, 1984: 108). 
Political parties are today still locked into clientelistic patterns of social behaviour, 
viewing the state as the instrument for satisfying clientelistic demands42, a 
mechanism for allocating favours, and a collective patron for their active 
supporters who become clients of the state bureaucracy (Featherstone, 1990b: 
101; Ioakimidis, 1996: 45). These are regarded as essential conditions to ensure 
electoral victory43.  
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 The Greek electoral system immensely perpetuated tripolarity  
42
 It is not surprising that a ‘swelling’ of the state apparatus has been repeatedly observed just 
before elections when recruitment takes place in return of votes 
43
 After the 2009 European Parliament elections a bonus was given to all the officials who were 
involved in the elections in one way or the other, which amounted to €140,000,000 and was 
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Sotiropoulos (1993: 86-88) complements Lyrintzis’s (1984) account of bureaucratic 
clientelism and gives a very clear projection of the problematic development of the 
relationship between bureaucracy and political parties. He argues that even though 
both bureaucracy and political parties have become larger, this has not led to the 
strengthening of bureaucracy vis-à-vis political parties.  
On the contrary, bureaucracy is becoming weaker in containing political parties’ 
intrusion into its internal structures as each political party in government intervenes 
and changes the state apparatus at their own discretion. Interestingly, the 
enormous administrative changes introduced by the two main political parties in 
Greece, New Democracy and PASOK (Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement), have 
not met with any strong resistance from Greek officials. The only leverage on 
behalf of administrative officials derives from their electoral power and is exercised 
only when their own emoluments are concerned. Their involvement in all other 
matters concerning their unions, policy formulation or even administrative 
organisation is minimal. Since there is no counterbalancing power on behalf of the 
parliament, the court or the civil society, political parties can perpetuate their 
monopoly over the state apparatus. 
In contrast to the minimal involvement of bureaucracy to political matters, the 
intervention of political parties to the administration’s organisation and 
performance is disproportionate. Political parties institutionalise their intrusion and 
manipulation of the bureaucratic apparatus44 unquestioned (Sotiropoulos, 2001: 
116) and take control over government departments by establishing ‘camps’ of 
supporters within them and within other state organisations and businesses and by 
appointing party affiliated officials at both the middle and top positions of the 
administrative hierarchy (Sotiropoulos, 1993: 89; 2001: 18).  
                                                                                                                                                          
disproportionately higher than the equivalent bonus in any other EU member state. The specific 
bonus is said to be highly clientelistic and to buy votes for the upcoming general elections. For 
more on this matter see Chiotis, 21st June 2009, To Vima newspaper at  
44
 For a more analytical account of the administrative changes that PASOK and New Democracy 
introduced during their tenure in order to ensure political control over the state see Sotiropoulos 
(1993)  
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Arguably, despite its large size45, the Greek administrative system is ineffective 
and weak and also at the mercy of the party in government. Sotiropoulos (1993b; 
1993) has described Greek bureaucracy as ‘a colossus with feet of clay’ and 
identifies the origins of the political parties’ supremacy against bureaucracy at the 
very early state-building in the 1830s. As a result central state bureaucracy 
becomes indistinct from the ruling party (Featherstone, 1990: 188). Naturally, this 
political culture impacts both on foreign policy processes and structures and can 
explain to an extent the course of change and adaptation undertaken by the MFA 
and its overseas network.   
 
Conclusion 
The above discussion has focused on the elements that make up the Greek FPS. 
The conceptualisation of all those elements inherent in the Greek domestic and 
external environments together with foreign policy making processes and 
structures into a FPS offers significant explanatory value to Greek foreign policy 
making. This is because the FPS model, functions as an inventory of all those 
national aspects and elements that make up the environment in which Greek 
foreign policy making takes place and integrates them into a self-feeding system 
thus making them part of it. For this reason, the FPS model enhances our 
understanding of the morphology of the Greek foreign policy structures as well as 
their institutional responses to change.  
                                                   
45
 In the report prepared by the ministry of Interior in early 2009 regarding the number of officials in 
the Greek public administration the number of 370,517 officials seemed to correspond to the 
European Union average. Nevertheless, this number reflects only tactical staff omitting staff with a 
limited contract, which amounts altogether to 550,000. In essence from the 370,517 civil servants 
268,832 are permanent and 101,685 are contractual staff but with an open-ended contract, which is 
practically equivalent to permanent. The ministry of Interior concealed a large number of officials in 
the report which is said to allow for further recruitment before the next general elections. Such 
practices reinforce the clientelistic relationship between political parties/state and society. For more 
on this issue see Nikolakopoulos, 26th May 2009, to Vima 
http://tovima.gr/default.asp?pid=49&ct=1&artid=269867 
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In the course of the exploration of the Greek FPS the chapter provided a number 
of images of Greek foreign policy-making provided by existing Greek literature. 
These images converge to a significant degree in their portrayal of the Greek 
foreign policy-making model which they describe as unique and idiosyncratic. The 
Greek model manifests a number of characteristics such as personality 
dominance, short-termism and politicisation which stem from the country’s 
particular international and domestic experiences.  
Images of the Greek foreign policy structures focus primarily on the traditional 
foreign policy agents, the MFA and the overseas diplomatic representations which 
seem to be dominant, while, at the same time, suggest the need for a broader 
foreign policy community. This need derives from the growth of the Greek foreign 
policy agenda to accommodate issues and policies of international significance 
generated from global and regional spanning policy milieus. As a result, the Greek 
foreign policy machinery faces demands for rearrangement on the basis of this 
need for a foreign policy community and for re-organisation of its constituents, the 
MFA and the overseas representations. Even though these images address the 
need for the MFA’s and its missions’ re-organisation in the late 1990s there is a lot 
to be said about their changing role in the contemporary environment. The 
following chapter explores the domestic elements in the foreign policy process 
which claim an international role alongside the MFA and its diplomatic network 
which constitute the focus of chapters four and five respectively.   
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Chapter 3: A widening Greek foreign policy 
community?  
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter conceptualised the Greek FPS by employing the FPS 
concept developed by White and Clarke (1981; 1989). The FPS organisational 
device facilitates our understanding of those factors which make up the specific 
environment in which the structures and processes for the management of Greek 
foreign policy operate. The chapter also reviewed the existing literature on foreign 
policy making in Greece as well as the literature concerning the wider politico-
administrative culture of Greece as well as its geopolitical influences, which help 
us understand the morphology of Greek foreign policy structures.  
Most importantly, chapter two presented existing evaluations and 
conceptualisations of Greek foreign policy making processes and structures. 
Those evaluations which identified the Greek MFA and its overseas network of 
diplomatic representation as the core elements of the Greek foreign policy 
machinery are rather traditional in their approach. This is because they study the 
sources of Greek foreign policy making based on a legalistic, geopolitical approach 
–thus maintaining the distinction between domestic and external policy milieus- or 
in the context of earlier approaches to FPA decision making through which they 
examine the role of the Greek foreign policy machinery in policy formulation. With 
the purpose of adding to such approaches, the present and the following two 
chapters will employ a thematic approach which reflects the main themes that 
have arisen in the study of foreign policy management in the early twenty-first 
century.  
In this light, a broad objective of the present chapter is to tackle issues concerning 
the wider discussion of expanding foreign and international policy agendas and 
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communities, and their implications for the national foreign policy machinery in its 
traditional form. A more specific objective is to investigate Greek responses to 
such developments and provide data that test the hypothesis of the emergence of 
a foreign policy community. Evidence from the literature suggests that the growth 
of the Greek international policy agenda as a result of globalisation and 
regionalisation, has confronted the Greek foreign policy machinery with demands 
for management of international policy outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA).  
Such demands had already been identified more than a decade ago and were 
presented in the models of Greek foreign policy making reviewed in the previous 
chapter. With this in mind, this chapter undertakes an analysis of evidence 
concerning contemporary management of Greek foreign policy outside the MFA 
and its diplomatic network which will add to our understanding of the contemporary 
Greek foreign policy machinery. And while a trend towards a more active role for 
domestic agencies in managing international external relations has been 
documented, less systematic evidence has not been available until now for 
assessing the implications of such developments on Greek foreign policy 
processes and structures.  
 
Expanding foreign policy bureaucracies 
As discussed in chapter one,  the development of international portfolios in 
traditionally domestic government departments, their involvement in the foreign 
policy making process and the expansion of foreign policy bureaucracy horizontally 
outside the foreign ministry constitute  recognised themes in the management of 
foreign and international policy at the start of the new millennium. This section will 
pick up on the discussions presented in chapter one and extend the debate to the 
implications of such developments for the traditional foreign policy machinery and 
its foreign policy bureaucracy. Max Weber perceived bureaucracies as constituting 
the memory of processes and institutions meant to ensure continuity, coherence, 
 126
objectivity and expertise. They constitute the core elements in the process of 
public policy making and implementation (Gerth and Wright-Mills, 1991; Weber, 
1983). Foreign policy processes, whilst having distinct characteristics, are no 
exception.  
Foreign policy bureaucracies traditionally identified with the foreign ministry and 
diplomatic service (Smith et al., 2008; Hill, 2003: 76; Webber and Smith, 2002) 
constitute the nucleus of the foreign policy machinery. A standardised 
governmental foreign policy making apparatus extends from the overseas 
missions, through the foreign ministry, up to the Foreign Minister (FM), the Prime 
Minister (PM) and the cabinet (Hopkins, 1976: 411; Wallace, 1975: 40). The  
bureaucratic part or else the foreign policy bureaucracy is located within the 
premises of the ministries concerned with international policy with the majority 
found in the foreign ministry (Hill, 2003; Wallace, 1975: 40).  
However, as the spectrum of states’ international preoccupations expands, foreign 
policy bureaucracies are increasing in size and importance (Jensen, 1982: 121) 
within, but also outside, the foreign ministry (Eayrs, 1982: 96; Vital, 1968: 75) and 
extend horizontally across most governmental departments (Carslnaes, 2008; 
Hudson, 2005; Hill, 2003; Wallace, 1975: 40).  Against this background, our 
understanding and exploration of the contemporary foreign policy bureaucracy 
must reflect such change and adopt a broader perspective than the MFA alone. As 
discussed in chapter one, the proliferation of state and societal actors with a stake 
in international politics which seek to influence the direction of international policy 
has significantly challenged international and national foreign policy agendas 
which become diversified (White et al., 2005: 1; Harris, 1999: 24) more complex 
and multifaceted (Rana, 2005: 2; Hocking, 2004: 151; 2004b; Moses and Knutsen, 
2001: 356).  
Diplomatic agendas are becoming more like national domestic agendas as they 
are crowded with a number of issues directly linked to citizens’ wellbeing and the 
prioritisation of humanity (Moller, 2009; Held and McGrew, 2002: 1; Wesley, 2002; 
Langhorne, 2000: 34). As a result, national foreign policy is now concerned with 
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issues such as human rights, the environment and economic affairs which cut 
across divisions between domestic and international politics inherent in 
Westphalian organisational approaches to the state based on distinct geographical 
and administrative entities (Allen, 1999: 2007; Cooper, 1999: 40; Muller, 1999: 
192; Rozental, 1999: 139; Keohane and Milner, 1996; Keohane and Nye, 1989; 
Sundelius 1980; 1984b Katzenstein, 1975).  
The growth of  governments’ involvement in new issue areas, both internationally 
and domestically, has  been accompanied by a proliferation of governmental and 
non-state actors  such as NGOs   pursuing their interests in foreign policy, and 
becoming involved in the foreign policy process (Bertram, 2009; Rana, 2005: 2; 12; 
Hill, 2003; Gyngell and Wesley, 2003; Held and McGrew, 2002; Webber and 
Smith, 2002: 22; Cooper, 1999: 44; East, 1984: 121; Sundelius, 1984b: 94; 
Jensen, 1982). With regards to the implications of such developments for the 
national foreign policy machinery, there is evidently an increased number of 
government departments which acquire an international interest thus becoming 
involved in foreign policy making (Hill 2003; Wesley, 2002: 210; Cooper, 2001; 
1999: 44).  
This is because conventionally domestic departments acquire an increasingly 
significant role in the international policy process and develop their own 
international policy making capacity, demonstrating a parallel international function 
alongside the long-established government agent for foreign and international 
affairs, the foreign ministry,  thereby  breaking down the traditional divide between 
foreign and domestic policy (Hocking, 2004; 2004b; Hill, 2003; Allen, 1999: 207; 
Enjalran and Husson, 1999: 60; Langhorne and Wallace, 1999: 16; Rozental, 
1999: 136). The increased involvement of domestic government departments 
becomes manifest and institutionalised through the development of specialised 
international policy bureaus (Bertram, 2009; Rozental, 1999: 139). Such 
developments have resulted in diffusion in the management of foreign policy into 
an expanded range of agencies which form foreign policy communities that extend 
horizontally outside the foreign ministry (Hocking: 2004; 2003; Hill, 2003; Cooper, 
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1999: 41; Langhorne and Wallace, 1999: 18; Morse, 1970). This phenomenon has 
been termed as ‘horizontal proliferation’ or ‘decentralisation’ of foreign policy (Hill, 
2003) 
Foreign policy communities constitute a governmental response  for coping with 
the needs for intensified government external involvement (Sundelius, 1984b: 94) 
in an era of ‘complex ‘ (Keohane and Nye, 1989) or ‘cascading’ interdependence 
(Rosenau, 1984) whereby the management of the external environment no longer 
constitutes the monopoly of foreign ministries and their diplomatic services. With 
their monopoly in expertise over policies targeted at the external environment 
having been challenged, foreign ministries find themselves competing for 
leadership in the management of international policy with a number of other 
government departments such as the military, economic and defence ministries, 
the intelligence services and finally political advisors who reside in the ministers’ 
personal cabinets or in the party machine. Arguably, however, the main 
competitors are considered to be ministries of finance, economy and trade. (Hill, 
2003: 82-85; Jensen, 1982: 122). Consequently, even though the foreign ministry 
still plays an important role in the national management of foreign and international 
policy its centrality and role in the national foreign policy machinery is no longer 
self-evident (East, 1984a: 89).  
In addition to the increased involvement of domestic government departments in 
the foreign policy process and the proliferation of the foreign policy bureaucracy 
beyond the confines of the foreign ministry, arguably the processes of globalisation 
and regionalisation have also encouraged direct inter-bureaucratic communication 
(Underdal, 1987: 169; Blondel, 1985: 77) which further stresses the breakdown of 
the traditional distinction between foreign and domestic policy areas (Held and 
McGrew, 2002; Morse, 1970: 374). Domestic bureaucracies and departments have 
developed their own web of transgovernmental linkages and networks with 
counterparts in foreign domestic institutions, international organisations, 
supranational institutions and businesses (Moses and Knutsen, 2001: 360; 
Komachi, 1999: 105; Wallace, 1978: 34; Keohane and Nye, 1974: 42).  
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Policy arenas are more intertwined both domestically and internationally and thus 
policy issues can be pursued in a range of negotiating environments and 
bureaucracies, which link themselves directly to global events and economies1 
(Newhouse, 1997: 67; Tsardanidis, 2006) often outside centralised channels 
(Slaughter, 2004; 1997: 183). Consequently, domestic bureaucratic institutions 
have become part of an enmeshed web of actors and actions (Hocking, 2007: 10; 
Rosenau, 1974: 25). This phenomenon was first encapsulated by Rosenau 
(1974b; 1974; 1971) and later described by Slaughter (2004; 1997) and Keohane 
and Nye (2000; 1989) as ‘transgovernmentalism’. More specifically, Slaughter 
(2004; 1997: 184) argues that a new world order is emerging in which, contrary to 
common assumptions,  
‘The state is not disappearing, it is disaggregating into its separate, 
functionally distinct parts. These parts –courts, regulatory agencies, 
executives and even legislatures- are networking with their counterparts 
abroad, creating a dense web of relations that constitutes a new, 
transgovernmental order. Today’s international problems –terrorism, 
organised crime, environmental degradation, money laundering, bank 
failure and securities fraud- created and sustain these relations. 
Government institutions have created networks of their own, ranging 
from the Basle Committee of central bankers to informal ties between 
law enforcement agencies to legal networks that make foreign judicial 
decisions more and more familiar. [...] Transgovernmentalism today is 
becoming the most widespread and effective mode of international 
governance’  
Such processes have transformed domestic bureaucracies which pursue 
international roles into what has been termed ‘transnational administration’ 
(Spence, 2003: 23). A characteristic example of transnational administration 
comes from the EU and concerns COREPER II which involves not only traditional 
                                                   
1
 See Newhouse (1997: 67) for an extensive account of the professionalization of bureaucracies 
and for their direct linkages to global economy 
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diplomats, but also officials from various lead ministries (Spence, 2002: 23). These 
observations falsify earlier predictions which foresaw that the forces of 
globalisation or regionalism were bound to render foreign policy bureaucracies 
redundant on the basis of the prevalence of the phenomenon of 
‘disintermediation’2 (Wesley, 2002: 207-208). Disintermediation is   understood as 
a process of disengaging those parts of the bureaucracy, traditionally identified 
with the foreign ministry, which operate as an intermediary between interested 
parties due to the availability of In contrast with disintermediation assumptions, it 
seems that globalisation has profoundly challenged foreign policy bureaucracies 
by changing the ways in which they perform  their traditional activities and has 
drawn them into new fields of action thus enhancing their role in the current 
domestic and international policy environments.  
For some, not only are we not confronted with a declining foreign policy 
bureaucracy, but we are also witnessing the bureaucratisation of the international 
policy processes (Makridimitris and Passas, 1993: 4). The traditional function-
related or policy process-related structure of government departments corresponds 
less and less to the increasing complexity of the international policy environment 
and to the cross-sectoral character of public policy (Makridimitris and Passas, 
1993: 3). In an international policy environment characterised by multi-bureaucratic 
processes and inter-bureaucratic linkages, states participate less as unified blocks  
and more as compartmentalised administrative units The EU is the epitome of the 
creation of direct links between domestic and foreign administrative units such as 
those between national permanent representations to the EU (Makridimitris and 
Passas, 1993: 10).   
 
 
                                                   
2
 In other words, in an era when communication technology enables direct communication between 
interested parties, a part of bureaucracy which is traditionally vested with the role of the 
intermediate between those parties is becoming increasingly irrelevant 
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Bureaucratic policy coordination as a whole of government 
approach  
 
Naturally, the overloading of government with large amounts of detailed 
information, actions and actors constitutes a major problem for the state in dealing 
with its international environment. And even though governments’ approaches to 
management of this environment varies, the colonisation of the policy process by 
new actors constitutes more or less a common denominator raising issues of 
coordination and coherence (Hocking, 2005; 1999; Spence, 2005; 1999; Batora, 
2003; Gyngell and Wesley, 2003; Hill, 2003: 72; Ioakimidis, 2003: 134; Kotzias, 
2003: 333; Kassim, Peters and Wright, 2000: 83; Allen, 1999; Bulmer and Burch, 
1998). In other words, governments face the problem of ‘holding together the 
threads which tie national policies to international negotiations, and on maintaining 
an element of steering, of self-direction, amidst the wide and swiftly-flowing current 
of activity’ (Wallace, 1978: 45).  
Reportedly, the lack of coordination and coherence across government 
departments or programmes constitutes one of the major problems facing 
contemporary governments which results in reduced efficiency and increased 
costs in the delivery of services to citizens. For purposes of eliminating redundant 
and contradictory programmes at a time of shrinking budgets, governments and 
civil services are seeking ways to increase horizontal cooperation (Peters, 1998: 
1). The increasing demands for coordination stem from the growth of government 
involvement in international activity which, albeit a consequence of international 
interdependence and globalisation, is also a product of the general growth of 
government’s domestic responsibilities in a welfare society, which spill over 
national boundaries into the international domain.  
Domestic management of economics, the environment, migration policy and others 
on behalf of the government is partly in response to international pressures and 
party in response to domestic objectives (Hill, 2003; Webber and Smith, 2002; 
Wallace, 1978: 42). As previously discussed  irrespective of the reasons that urge 
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governments to get involved in their entirety in pursuing international policies, the 
direct involvement of home bureaucracies with their opposite numbers in contrast 
to the past monopoly of the foreign ministry in communication has raised a number 
of questions concerning both the centrality of the foreign ministry in the foreign 
policy process but also the ensuring of effective international policy coordination 
between horizontally located governmental actors (Allen, 1999: 209; Rozental, 
1999: 136). 
The horizontal proliferation or decentralisation of foreign policy (Hill, 2003) coupled 
with increasing need for specialisation3 (Jensen, 1982: 123) and expert 
consultation in policy making (Hopkins, 1976: 407) have intensified the need for 
such policy coordination which integrates the whole of government (Peters, 1998)  
Before we move on to foreign and international policy coordination in Greece the 
following sections will firstly review evidence concerning the horizontalisation of 
Greek foreign policy and the development of international policy capacity in 
domestic government departments. 
 
Some indicators of horizontal proliferation in foreign policy 
management in Greece 
 
The previous section discussed some of the major challenges that governments 
and their foreign policy bureaucracies are currently confronting in managing 
international policy. The present section focuses the discussion on Greece with the 
aim of exploring the implications of the aforementioned developments for the 
Greek foreign policy machinery. With issues such as widening foreign policy 
bureaucracies and decentralisation of foreign policy making as well as the 
development of international policy capacity in domestic departments constituting 
                                                   
3
 Contemporary international policy issues are complex and require individuals with specialised 
skills together with a simultaneous expansion in the involvement of bureaucracy in foreign policy 
making. Naturally, for this to be achieved, pooling experts other than those involved in diplomatic or 
political affairs is necessary. For more on this see Jensen (1982: 123) 
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key preoccupations within national foreign policy machineries, it is interesting to 
test how such themes relate to the Greek foreign policy machinery.  
The overview of Greek foreign policy making processes in chapter two indicated 
that the political leadership together with external consultants, and more 
specifically the PM and the PMO together with the FM and the FM’s office and 
deputies, constitute the  key agents for policy formulation. The foreign policy 
bureaucracy is of secondary importance and commonly restricted to providing 
information and implementing policy (Griva, 2002: 46; Sotiropoulos, 2001). The 
same section also indicated a significant degree of introversion and secretiveness 
on the part of the government and the MFA regarding the management of external 
issues, which have traditionally revolved around the dominant Greek national 
security issues (ta ethnika mas themata).  
Nonetheless, change in the content of foreign policy and the rise of ‘low policies’ 
on the foreign policy agenda brought forward by globalisation and membership to 
the EU have  brought into the foreign policy process a large part of the 
bureaucracy previously confined in areas of domestic policy. As a result, the 
acutely centralised Greek foreign policy processes opened up to diverse 
bureaucratic agents and effectively augmented in size both within and outside the 
MFA (Interview, no 2; 3; 8; 9; 26; 28). A characteristic example concerns the 
Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU (PeRepGr), which constitutes a 
clear example of foreign policy making power handed over to a bureaucratic unit. 
PeRepGr is discussed in the sections that follow. 
Greek governments, until fairly recently, had never relied on civil servants either for 
new ideas, strategic planning or foreign policy formulation (Sotiropoulos, 2001: 85; 
Theodoropoulos, 2005). Even the short-lived coordinating committees between the 
MFA and several technical ministries were led by and comprised the political 
leadership of the ministries rather than bureaucratic departments (Spanou, 2001: 
65). This practice has been re-enforced and legalised recently by the identification 
of Greek foreign policy as coterminous with issues relating to Greece’s territorial 
integrity and security defined in geopolitical terms. This justifies foreign policy 
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making being the prerogative of the FM, his deputy ministers and the PM and its 
insulation from other policy areas. Such an approach to policy making left limited 
scope for involvement of the foreign policy bureaucracy, let alone of what was 
traditionally understood as domestic bureaucracy: in other words government 
departments with a domestic mandate. The nominal involvement of bureaucrats 
and the focus of foreign policy on issues of national security prevented any 
significant link developing between foreign policy with the domestic political 
agenda (Interview, no 6).  
Recently, however, the scope of the Greek government’s international 
preoccupations has grown and its international engagements have intensified, 
which becomes especially manifest at the level of the EU. Involvement in 
international and EU policy making has brought into the international policy 
processes a variety of actors from the political and business world (Ioakimidis, 
2003: 134; Makridimitris, 1992: 77) and a number of experts from other 
departments and ministries (Ioakimidis, 1993: 414). However, as yet there is no 
hard evidence of significant qualitative shifts or changes in the foreign and 
international policy process. 
 There are indicators that some domestic ministries are starting to acquire an 
international orientation but no hard data that they are formulating their own 
coherent and integrated international policy. For instance, as interviews indicated, 
the ministry of education and religious affairs has intensified its international 
activities in the last decade as well as its international cooperation with a number 
of NGOs and international cultural centres such as the British council, the German 
Goethe Institute and the French Foundation Lycée as well as other such 
institutions. It has also extended its international presence by attaching educational 
consultants to a number of Greek diplomatic missions.  
Similarly, the ministry of health has intensified cooperation with a number of 
international NGOs and foreign state organisations and involvement in  projects of 
a regional or international reach. For instance the ministry of health together with 
the MoD have intensified cooperation with their Balkan counterparts in a joint 
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project for the fight against drugs in the region (Interview, no 16). In addition, in an 
attempt to fine-tune with international developments and increase international 
policy capacity, the ministry of health has promoted training and post-graduate 
studies in state university hospitals on international medical crisis management 
(Interview, no 16).To further support such internationalisation the PMO and the 
MFA have opened up  consultative channels with technical domestic ministries for 
purposes of borrowing technical expertise and, as far as the MFA is concerned, for 
purposes of lending protocol advice and support to ministries engaging in 
international dealings (Interview, no 30).  
The existing literature and past research suggest that in terms of direct 
communication, at least until the mid 1990s, most of the core ministries in Greece 
communicated with the rest of the EU or international institutions and policy 
making fora through the MFA which held the monopoly of expertise on issues 
concerning the international dimension of any kind of domestic policy (Minakaki, 
1992: 44; Sotiropoulos, 2001). This underscored the centrality of the MFA in all 
areas of external policy, both European and international. The direct linkage 
between Greek civil servants -outside the MFA- and international organisations 
has been similarly weak. When it exists it is restricted to Greek civil servants 
travelling to other countries to meet their counterparts and attend seminars, usually 
organised by the European Commission aimed to diffuse new administrative ideas 
and methods. Usually civil servants accompany the minister’s confidant or a 
politically appointed consultant (Sotiropoulos, 2001: 71).  
It is surprising that Greek integration into the EU, which for Greece is the major 
forum of interaction and socialisation with other foreign policy bureaucracies, did 
not result in the direct communication of Greek bureaucrats with international 
organisations. A research project conducted by the Ministry of Interior, Public 
Administration and Decentralisation (MIPAD) indicated that until 1998, 76% of 
Greek civil servants had never had any kind of contact with civil servants of a 
foreign national administration or with the European Commission (Sotiropoulos, 
2001: 71). Given such practices it is not surprising that officials or the majority of 
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ministries have not developed any distinct international identity (Minakaki, 1992: 
44).  
Interviews with a number of officials indicated that even though domestic 
departments have always consulted the MFA on technical matters with an 
international dimension, today the MFA seeks their technical expertise more 
regularly for the purpose of formulating and generally managing international policy 
in conjunction with the PM and the cabinet. For some this suggests a horizontal 
‘spread’ of the management of international policy to a larger number of domestic 
ministries (Interview, no 3; 22; 31). This spread, however, is not always explicit or 
translated into an institutionalised mechanism or structure and is commonly limited 
to information sharing. Nonetheless, expectations and needs for further 
involvement of technical ministries into policy formulation are increasing (Interview, 
no 31). Whether such involvement amounts to the emergence of a foreign or 
international policy community is explored later in this chapter.  
Evidence of the need for foreign policy management by a growing number of 
government departments beyond the MFA can be drawn from the practice of the 
weekly inter-ministerial meetings that take place in the MFA. Such inter-ministerial 
meetings serve the purpose of home departments informing the MFA and seeking 
guidance from the MFA with regards to international dealings. As it is impossible 
for the MFA to have expertise in all technical matters, the lead ministries prepare 
the file under investigation and present it to the MFA for discussion, which then 
gives directions and instructions (Interview, no 31).  
Another source of evidence for some horizontal spread of foreign policy 
management to domestic ministries comes from the creation of MFA linkages with 
the Ministries of Defence, Culture, Economy, Health and Development, which are 
known as ‘fast ministries’. These ministries have been termed fast for a number of 
reasons ranging from the fast ways in which their bureaucracy operates in 
comparison to other parts of Greek bureaucracy and their speedy responses 
concerning domestic and international demands for action. The latter is also 
related to their continuous direct communication with the PMO (Interview, no 21). 
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Based on the MFA’s 2007 Charter (Law 3566/2007, art. 7) the role of the MFA’s 
linkages is the ensuring of ‘systematic, cohesive and effective implementation of 
foreign policy’. From the above linkage offices, however, it is only the office in the 
MoD which is institutionalised while the others are dependent on the continuing 
support of the PM (Interview, no 10).  
MFA linkage offices in fast domestic ministries are considered to have been 
created as a response to increasing needs for information sharing and the carrying 
out of international tasks in the aforementioned ministries and in practice they 
serve only this purpose (Interview, no 44). A number of interviewees confirmed 
that the MFA is still at the centre of both diplomatic interaction and representation 
overseas, while such offices serve to strengthen the MFA’s centrality within the 
foreign policy bureaucracy rather than promote decentralisation in foreign and 
international policy management. Nonetheless, a MFA official (Interview, no 13) 
argued that such offices are expected to increase as they represent the first signs 
of the realisation that ‘Greek foreign policy in the 21st century is expanding towards 
areas traditionally understood as domestic policy but currently acquiring an 
international dimension’.  
The horizontal proliferation of foreign policy to involve other domestic departments 
with an increasing international dimension is more or less limited to technical 
ministries preparing their files and portfolios and then submitting them to the MFA 
for further instructions on policy making (Interview, no 30). As far as direct 
communication between the overseas diplomatic network and home ministries is 
concerned, it is possible that a Greek embassy would communicate with the 
Ministry of the Interior, for example if the issue under discussion is only a strictly 
technical matter, concerning that Ministry alone. Therefore, in theory, officials 
directly refer to, and are encouraged to do so, sectoral departments in order to 
save time and resources. This alternative path, however, outside the MFA’s 
established channel of communication, has been rarely used (Interview, no 27).  
It seems that one of the areas whereby enlargement of the foreign policy agenda 
and widening of the policy process are more clearly observed is security. Security, 
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traditionally coming first in the Greek foreign policy agenda, has always kept the 
MoD in close cooperation with the MFA and the PMO and is now extending to 
include other government departments as explored in the following sections. With 
a revised notion of security to encompass asymmetric security threats such as 
international migration, pandemics, AIDS and drug and human trafficking4 a 
number of government departments have been pooled into the international policy 
process (Nomikos, 2004: 442). The aforementioned security issues which have 
been added to the Greek foreign policy agenda have intensified collaboration 
between a number of domestic departments (Interview, no 18).  
For instance, the MFA largely shares civil protection responsibility with the General 
Secretariat for Civil Protection (GSPC)5 which, administratively, falls under the 
umbrella of the MIPAD, whereas for issues concerning illegal migration it is in 
constant collaboration and intelligence information sharing with the NIS and the 
Police (Nomikos, 2004: 443). Another area of increased horizontal collaboration 
between various domestic ministries, nevertheless under the aegis of the MFA, is 
the management of domestic and international crises. Crisis management, 
discussed in chapter four as it constitutes one of the newly added functions of the 
MFA, is a characteristic example of both interministerial horizontal cooperation and 
of the creation of international links between the relevant ministries. For instance, 
in cases of crisis management, domestic or international 6, there are a number of 
agencies that need to be coordinated such as the Coast Guard under the auspices 
of the Ministry of Mercantile Marine, the General Secretariat for Civil Protection of 
the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Health  and the naval and air forces under 
the military branch of the MoD.  
Based on the above a need for a horizontal spread in the management of foreign 
and international issues today calls for the involvement of a number of home 
ministries. In Greece there has been a tradition of consultation but it seems that 
                                                   
4
 The ‘commodification’ of persons constitutes a serious problem in the Balkans and in the 
Mediterranean countries p: 442  
5
 www.gscp.gr   
6
 For the Greek response to the crises of Imia and Ocalan see Liaropoulos (2008: 34). 
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today further joint ministerial management and policy formulation takes place and 
is encouraged by the MFA.  Two questions are raised in this context. The first 
concerns the extent to which domestic departments participate in policy 
formulation beyond policy implementation and management of international issues 
and the second concerns the development of their own intra-ministerial capacity to 
generate international policy. Both issues constitute the focus of discussion in the 
following sections.  
 
Elements of developing international policy capacity in domestic 
ministries  
 
A well known theme in the literature that tackles the management of foreign policy 
in the 21st century is that the development of international policy capacity in 
domestic government departments usually manifests itself through the 
establishment of international policy departments. Enhancing international policy 
capacity in home departments is closely linked to the horizontalisation in foreign 
policy management discussed in the previous sections. With these themes in 
mind, the present section seeks to explore whether there is evidence of the 
development of international policy capacity in ministries other than the MFA and 
whether this provides evidence of a widening foreign policy community in Greece.  
The selected government departments examined below constitute those actors 
that according to the literature arguably challenge the centrality of the MFA in 
national foreign policy machineries. Even though other departments have been 
acknowledged to develop an international portfolio, such as the ministry of culture 
and the general secretariat for information and communication which is vested with 
the conduct of Greek public diplomacy and is examined in chapter five, they do not 
claim a central role in foreign and international policy management.  
In the course of the fieldwork, when interviewees were asked whether they 
perceive a change in the scope of their policy area in the last couple of decades, 
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they all responded positively. More specifically, all interviewed officials, both 
traditional diplomats and officials from home departments dispatched  to overseas 
missions, including PeRepGr, acknowledged an intensified international dimension 
in their policy area. They suggested that the scope of their foreign policy interests 
has widened so much that they are not yet fully conscious of or familiar with the 
new areas of activity. An official (Interview, no 26) in Brussels argued that  
‘There is so much change going on. All we know is that we need to 
carry out all these new areas of governmental policy abroad. Effectively, 
we need to carry out governmental policy in its entirety. We moved 
away from foreign policy in its traditional, security-centred form and we 
now promote Greek national positions on international environment 
policy, international development policy and a whole new range of 
international policies’ 
Amongst the various government departments, some have translated this 
acknowledgment into operational or structural re-organisation while others, the 
majority, have remained immune and trapped in prior practices and retain their 
purely domestic dimension (Interview, no 23). Not surprisingly, a small number of 
government departments such as the Ministry of Culture or the Ministry of Maritime 
Mercantile have always demonstrated an intense international  interest due to their 
field of competence which has inherent elements of international engagement 
(Interview, no 3; 11). Another such example is the Ministry of Education which has 
traditionally attached educational consultants to Greek embassies and consulates 
who, together with attachés from the Ministry of Culture, worked on the promotion 
of Greek language, history and culture.  
At the same time, however, there are still a few departments which are much less 
‘internationalised’ than they should be such as the Ministry of the Environment and 
Public Works (Interview, no 13). Until 2008 the latter ministry was under-
represented in the EU, demonstrating serious shortage of expert staff to represent 
Greece in EU COREPER’s respective working groups or in other international fora 
thus leaving empty chairs (Interview no, 3). Both PeRepGr and MFA officials 
 141
suggested that the reason for the limited international activity of the given ministry 
lies in the fact that ‘only recently Greece discovered that climate change, as other 
policy areas, is as much a domestic issue as it is international’ (Interview, no 8; 9; 
16; 23). 
The problem identified by a number of interviewees (Interview, no 1; 2; 3; 5; 6; 8; 
13) is that in home ministries there is no leadership and initiative when it comes to 
international policy making. As a result, their international policy performance 
remains domestic in substance and operation while guidance is constantly sought 
from the MFA, not only with regards to protocol, but also with regards to policy 
substance. The fact that a large number of domestic ministries have not to date 
developed specialised units for either international or European policy further 
stresses their unpreparedness to address the increasing complexity of policy 
making in a transforming international policy environment.  
 
This is further aggravated by the fact that even the MFA’s linkages with other 
home ministries  are limited to exchange of only the information that is not 
considered as ‘for internal consumption’ rather than  transparent and intensive 
collaboration in international policy formulation (Interview, no 9). In other words, 
instead of them being the think tank of the ministry and a generator of ideas for 
either European or international issues they are reduced to ‘transmission belts’ 
with no input into the policy process (Minakaki, 1992; Spanou, 2001: 100). In the 
Greek experience, until very recently, only two ministries beyond the PM and the 
FM have claimed an intensive international role, those being the MoD and the 
MNEC (Papakonstantinou, 2004: 269), with the latter being in charge of mostly 
domestic and technical European issues. As far as the involvement of the 
Parliament is concerned the previous chapter demonstrated that in terms of its 
input it can be characterised as merely symbolic (Interview, no 10).   
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Ministry of Defence  
The MoD, Greece’s guardian of territorial integrity has a strong tradition of an 
introverted perception of Greek security that is to say focusing on security inside 
Greek territorial borders.. The current expansion of the notion of state security to 
encompass a large number of cross-national and asymmetric threats has gradually 
altered the role of the MoD, which is becoming more ‘extroverted’ and diversified 
(Interview, no 18). Today, the MoD retains its traditional competence of being the 
central axis for the execution of the government’s national defence policy as 
decided by the Government Council on Foreign Affairs and Defence (KYSEA) but 
also claims a newly enhanced international role (Interview, no 41).  
The main aims of the Ministry and its Armed Forces (the military branch of the 
ministry) have been the protection of territorial integrity, of national independence, 
ensuring Greek citizens’ wellbeing against any external threat (MoD official 
website, 2009). Until very recently, the MoD’s primary concerns, which revolve 
around traditional concepts of foreign policy linked to territorial security, have led to 
a rather limited and obsolete national defence policy and institutional framework 
which did not correspond to contemporary needs and demands (Dokos, 2003: 
269).  
The MoD has always been the most secretive and costly ministry of all the Greek 
government departments due to the importance attached by successive 
governments to issues of national security in terms of territorial integrity and 
military capabilities (Couloumbis, 1983), issues which have always dominated 
Greek foreign policy agenda (Interview, no 8; 18; 30). Military spending, which has 
characteristically constituted an obstacle to development spending amounted to 
4.9% of GNP7 in 2002 while the European average was 1.8% (Kollias, 2003: 207-
210) thus making Greece rank higher in military spending than any other NATO 
member (Tsakonas, 2003: 61). The high military expenditure of Greece reflects the 
                                                   
7
 Military expenditure was 7% of the GNP in the 1980s. In 1996, Greece spent approximately $5.9 
billion, 4.6% of its GDP and Turkey 4.5% of its GDP, much higher percentages of any other NATO 
member (Tsakonas, 2003: 61).  
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emphasis that the government attaches to the military dimension of power and to 
the internal balancing of external threats (Kollias, 2003: 213) thus prescribing a 
traditional approach to foreign policy (Interview, no 30). 
Recently however, in the context of the globalised and interdependent world, the 
Greek MoD has realised that for its constitutional aims to be achieved, its 
traditional introversion and traditionalism need to be abandoned and cooperation 
fostered with other national and foreign government departments as well as global 
agents (Interview, no 41). The MoD cooperates currently with a wide range of 
government departments and agencies in order to respond to non-state, 
asymmetric security threats not only to Greece, but also to its Balkan neighbours 
and its European partners. Most importantly, a qualitative change has taken place 
which relates to the understanding that the security of Greece is not limited to its 
territory but it extends to its nationals, both at home and abroad (Interview, no 17; 
18). Greek security is challenged from a number of threats, some of them newly 
emergent such as physical catastrophes, international crime, illegal migration and 
others, besides the traditional territorial threats posed by Turkey and Skopje which 
have dominated the Greek foreign policy agenda8.  
In the last decade the MoD has successfully launched a number of initiatives in the 
area of military diplomacy which led to the signing of a number of military 
cooperation treaties especially in the Balkan region (Dokos, 2003:248). With its 
strategic planning conducted in cooperation with the MFA and to a lesser extent 
with the MNEC, the MoD has been transformed from a passive supporter to an 
active member in peace operations and UN missions9. In the course of planning 
and developing an institutional framework for the management of the totality of 
environment issues that could potentially threaten Greek security, the MoD has 
established a directorate of Human Capital and Environment, under the aegis of 
                                                   
8
 MOD special issues section at 
http://www.mod.mil.gr/Pages/MainAnalysisPage3.asp?HyperLinkID=3 07-09-09 
9
 A large number of Greek soldiers participated in peace operations in Somalia (UNSOM), in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (IFOR and SFOR), in Albania (ALBA mission), in Kosovo (KFOR), in 
Afghanistan (ISAF) while a number of Greek soldiers have observed missions in Kuwait, N. Iraq, in 
Georgia and in West Sahara, for more see MoD speech to the conference of ambassadors at 
http://www.ypex.gov.gr/www.mfa.gr/Articles/el-GR/300707_F1706.htm  
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the DG for Economic Planning, and a section for health security and environmental 
management.  
The work of the respective Directorates and the section is conducted in close 
cooperation with the ministries of Health and Environment and Public Works (MoD, 
Environment Section, 2009). With such initiatives the MoD aims to claim an active 
role in international policy making which extends beyond its traditional military 
scope and to intensify its cooperation with the MFA in international policy making 
(Interview, no 17).   
The MoD aims to improve and promote its international policy capacity and 
diplomacy and has embarked since 2005 on an intensive plan of regional 
cooperation involving ministries of defence and foreign affairs as well as other 
government agencies in south-eastern countries, in policy areas which supersede 
its traditional military-technical expertise  such as crisis management (Meimarakis, 
2007). Besides the promotion of an individual international identity through 
defence-military cooperation that the ministry promotes in the Balkan region or in 
the context of the EU,10 one of its main aims is to promote the link between 
defence, diplomacy and international policy making as demonstrated by 
participating in a series of multinational rescue exercises such as Dolphin, 2005; 
2006; 2008 carried out in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue. 
For this purpose the MoD works closely with the MFA both at home and abroad 
and has re-organised and strengthened its representation overseas even in small 
missions as well as posts which are of strategic international importance to Greece 
by dispatching more defence attachés but also military, maritime and air marine 
attachés11 who constitute a significant instrument for the promotion not only of 
Greece’s defence policy but also of its international policies (Meimarakis, 2007b).  
One of the most important challenges for the MoD is the management of both 
domestic and international crises for which it shares responsibility with the General 
                                                   
10
 With participating and strengthening EU initiatives such as tactical Battlegroups  
11
 For instance in the Greek embassy in Kiev the special office for the defence attaché was 
established in 1998 http://greece.kiev.ua/page1738.html  13-06-09 
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Secretariat for Civil Protection which falls under the ministry of Interior, Public 
Administration and Decentralisation and the MFA (Interview, no 7; 23).  With 
security issues breaking the monopoly of the ministries of Defence and Foreign 
Affairs national security and crisis management require coordination between 
these departments but also with the police and other government and bureaucratic 
agencies (Dokos, 2003: 274; Meimarakis, 2007; 2007b) which seem to increase in 
the Greek case. Based on the above, the MoD undertakes significant initiatives in 
international policy coordination and a significant degree of international policy 
interaction. Together with the MNEC they constitute the only two other domestic 
ministries which demonstrate evidence for of developing a certain degree of 
international policy capacity without however challenging the centrality of the MFA 
in foreign policy management.  
 
Ministry of Economy and Finance  
The MNEC remains the key actor in Greece’s international and European 
economic policy with most of the issues being handled in conjunction with the PM’s 
department (Featherstone, 1996: 11). The MNEC seems increasingly to be 
developing linkages with other ministries and actors outside the government 
whereas it constitutes the key ministry in economic and technical policy 
coordination. Economic decision making, however, remains tightly controlled by 
the PM and several important issues such as the Single European Act seem to 
have never been discussed in the Cabinet (Featherstone, 1996: 11).   
In the area of international policy making in Greece, policy planning as a 
systematic instrument of foreign policy making has only been observed in the 
context of foreign economic policy in the EU. The first time that the Greek 
government had to embrace policy planning as an operational instrument was with 
the absorption of the Integrated Mediterranean Programs (IMPs) in 1985 
(Ioakimidis, 1996: 42). The adoption of the new structural policy of the EU 
contributed radically to the content and style of foreign economic policy making in 
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Greece and brought the ministry of finance and economy to the core of economic 
policy coordination and implementation.  
Ioakimidis (1996: 42) argues that it was the first time that Greek bureaucracy, both 
within and outside the MFA and the MNEC was compelled to set up bodies and 
procedures to deal with ‘external policy’. The seven IMPs of 1985 were formulated 
exclusively by the Ministry of Finance and Economy, albeit the first Community 
Support Framework (CSF) drawn between 1989 and 1990 was drafted by a much 
wider group of policy makers comprising participants from the regions and from the 
private sector of the economy. The increased participation of non-state actors and 
agencies as well as the various networks of cooperation with corresponding bodies 
in other member states were coordinated by the MNEC which claimed a vigorous 
role in foreign economic policy.  
The transformation of the foreign economic policy process with the widening 
network of actors shaped an unprecedented policy making environment in Greece, 
raising demands for an institutionalisation of channels of participation in the policy 
making process. This led to persistent demands from the Confederation of Greek 
Industries to set up a Social and Economic Council to link the state with other 
economic and social actors in shaping policy (Ioakimidis, 1996: 43). This heralded 
a new era of cooperation between governmental and non-governmental actors, 
domestic and foreign alike, and the MNEC in the context of promoting economic 
diplomacy and exports and supporting Greek businesses abroad and investments. 
Cooperation which takes place in the context of the ‘National Export Plan’ issued 
by the Greek Exports Council, involves the MFA at home, but also all Greek 
overseas missions which are becoming involved with the Plan (MNEC, Press 
Report, 2003). (For more on this partnership see chapter five, more specifically the 
section of economic diplomacy.)  
Such demands were further intensified in the last decade and especially from 2007 
onwards when foreign economic policy and diplomacy were proclaimed as the 
core pillar of Greek foreign policy according to the latest MFA Charter. The 
promotion of foreign economic policy and diplomacy as the central axis of Greek 
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foreign policy had a number of implications for the Greek foreign policy machinery, 
the MFA and the MNEC. This is because this change was effectively translated 
into the transfer of the function of economic diplomacy together with the respective 
bureaucracy from the MNEC to the MFA, thus centralising the competence of 
economic diplomacy under the control of the latter. The extent to which the MNEC 
could develop an active international presence and enhance its overseas 
representation leading to significant decentralisation of foreign policy was 
prevented with the aforementioned transfer. On the contrary, such development is 
indicative of a tendency towards foreign policy centralisation under the 
organisational structure of the MFA, which is discussed in chapter four.  
 
The diplomatic cabinet of the Prime Minister’s Office  
The PMO is the actor in the foreign policy process in which decision making power 
is concentrated. The PMO in Greece has been very strong especially from 1980 
onwards and has often constituted a structure of a mini-cabinet forming something 
of a meta-government (Sotiropoulos, 2001: 124; 126; 127). The PMO has a long 
history of recruiting extra-governmental consultants and is considered to be the 
most politicised unit of the Greek administrative apparatus (Sotiropoulos, 2001: 
142). It comprises sections such as the diplomatic, economic, strategic planning, 
communication and management sections which often bypass the ministry with the 
respective competence and as a result excludes them from the policy making 
process. Chapter two discussed the role of the PM as the prime foreign policy 
actor in the Greek foreign policy process (see pages 101-103).  
This section does not aim to reflect yet again upon either the political role of the 
PM in the foreign policy process or the acute politicisation of the PMO due to the 
tradition of recruiting extra-bureaucratic consultative elements as those aspects 
were presented previously (the role of the PMO was discussed in chapter two as 
analysed by Gkikas, 2005; Griva, 2002; Sotiropoulos, 2001; Ioakimidis, 1999; 
Makridimitris and Stoforopoulos, 1997; Makridimitris, 1992). Rather, it focuses on 
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the bureaucratic dimension of the PMO. The PM, besides the political consultants, 
is also supported by a cabinet which comprises bureaucratic elements. It is these 
which are central to the discussion of expanding foreign policy bureaucracies 
which constitutes the theme of this chapter. With the spectrum of state 
international interests expanding towards new regions and policy areas, foreign 
policy bureaucracies expand both within and outside the traditional foreign policy 
bureaucratic actor, the foreign ministry in their attempt to reflect such change. 
Therefore, the PMO, which is central in foreign policy making, is under 
investigation with regards to its bureaucratic constitution.   
The PMO comprises a diplomatic section, otherwise termed as the PM’s diplomatic 
cabinet. The cabinet is staffed by a combination of officials dispatched from the 
MFA (as well as external consultants and academic experts) and was set up to 
serve as a direct linkage between the PM and the MFA for purposes of overseeing 
the implementation of Greek foreign policy and the conduct of Greek diplomacy. 
Nevertheless, the section has often taken the form of a mini foreign ministry 
(Interview, no 11) bypassing the MFA in foreign policy making, especially when 
key Greek national issues are involved (Interview, no 30). The cabinet is headed 
by a diplomat of ambassadorial rank who is directly accountable to the PM and 
provides significant input in the foreign policy process with regards to protocol 
amongst other things (Interview, no 11; 44). 
The cabinet’s agenda can vary significantly according to circumstances and has 
enlarged over the last decades. Demands for the cabinet’s expertise in different 
policies have grown into areas such as economics, development and the 
environment and therefore more and more experts from other government 
departments are pooled into its structure. ‘The PMO is expanding bureaucratically 
to reflect the changing Greek foreign policy agenda’ (Interview, no 11).  
With regard to its operation there is always a pre-scheduled agenda with issues 
that constitute the core Greek foreign policy preoccupations but there is also a 
parallel, ad hoc agenda. The later is concerned with all aspects of the PM’s foreign 
and international engagements, policy, interests, contacts and issues (Interview, 
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no 11). The cabinet and its diplomats receive instructions and information from the 
MFA and after they filter and analyse it they forwards all relevant information to the 
PM and his advisors. This way the cabinet ensures a valid and comprehensive 
bureaucratic input into foreign policy making. An official at the PM’s diplomatic 
cabinet (Interview, no 11) argued ‘We see what the MFA staff sees but we forward 
it to the PM. We make sure that the MFA has an input in the foreign policy making 
process’.  
 
Elements of European policy capacity  
Evidence for a developing international policy capacity seems to originate largely 
from the level of EU policy. Before accession to the EU, domestic ministries’ 
resources and areas of policy interest were very limited. Membership of the EU 
brought forward an expansion of ‘foreign policy’, traditionally belonging solely to 
the MFA’s competence, to include issues which fell under domestic government 
departments but which started to gain an external dimension (Tsitouridis, 1986: 
861). As a result, certain parts of the Greek domestic administration became part 
of a large European network of cooperation (Kavakas, 2000: 147). A special 
provision of Law 445/1976 established EC Affairs Services in Greek domestic 
ministries, that is offices in charge of EU affairs designed to constitute firstly, the 
ministries’ core for information and research on EC-related issues and secondly, 
the linkage between technical ministries and the MFA. The role of these services 
however, was soon downgraded and limited to linkages with the MNEC on 
economic issues of (Anastopoulos, 1986: 645).  
The first signs  of the development of European policy capacity were manifest in 
the creation of European sections in the ministries of Economy, Agriculture, 
Industry and Energy, Trade, Employment, Public Works, Transportation, Social 
Services, Culture and Sciences. Later in the 1990s, similar structures were created 
in most of the Greek ministries that took the form of European Union affairs offices 
(Interview, no 28). These offices functioned as repositories of information and 
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constituted linkages with the Ministry of Coordination12 (MCo) which was in charge 
of coordinating European policy until 1981 when the task was transferred to the 
MFA (Tsitouridis, 1986: 863).  
Despite the initial importance attached to the aforementioned EC and later EU 
inter-ministerial offices with regards to developing European policy making 
capacity, in practice they were less effective. It has been documented that the 
majority of such offices were merely limited to exchanging information with the 
PeRepGr and their functions and competence were far from that of policy making 
(Interview, no 28).  
In research conducted in the early 1990s (Minakaki, 1992: 38) officials from a 
number of ministries outside the MFA or the MNEC, suggested that in terms of 
policy formulation, policy communication and coordination in the area of foreign 
and European policy, there was amongst other things, a high degree of 
centralisation in the MFA as well as lack of information sharing on behalf of the two 
leading ministries, the MFA and the MNEC with the rest of the ministries regarding 
economic and technical policy13. This model in European policy making crystallised 
the centrality of the MFA and MNEC as the main channels in European and other 
international policy processes. Minakaki (1992: 38) describes the following linear 
process in European policy making and communication.  
Ministry X – MFA/MNEC – PeRepGr – EU – PeRepGr – MFA/MNEC – Ministry X 
In terms of communication and consultation of certain European policies there is a 
linear if not circular pattern which follows this model:  
EU – PeRepGr -  MFA / MNEC – Ministry X – MFA -  PeRepGr – EU 
In most cases policy has already been formulated in the second stage by the 
PeRepGr and is then transmitted to the headquarters (HQ) in Athens and in turn to 
the concerned technical ministry (Interview, no 2; 6). The tendency to formulate 
                                                   
12
 Which was later replaced in European policy coordination by the MFA 
13
 For more research data on the matter see Minakaki (1992)  
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polices at the level of the PeRepGr in direct communication with the technical 
ministry concerned becomes more and more regular (Interview, no 6).   
The limited European policy capacity of domestic government departments, albeit 
more developed than international policy capacity, has shifted the weight of EU 
and also of international policy formulation to the PeRepGr, which is discussed in 
the following section. A number of interviews conducted at the PeRepGr in three 
consecutive years from 2007 to 2009 stressed a twofold deficiency in terms of 
domestic ministries’ European policy capacity. Such deficiency lies both in the 
malfunction of departments for EU affairs in domestic ministries and in the lack of 
their qualitative representation in the PeRepGr14. This deficiency coupled with the 
majority of domestic ministries’ ‘slow- speed’ performance and administrative 
pathology poses significant limitations to the development of European as well as 
international policy capacity (Interview, no 2; 8).  
The increasing number of issues with a European or international dimension in 
technical or else vertical ministries’ preoccupations is not without implications, 
qualitative and quantitative alike, for the ways in which the structures for their 
management are organised (Makridimitris and Passas, 1993: 11). Therefore, not 
surprisingly the cross-cutting dimension of European policy is at odds with existing 
vertical organisation. The same applies to the MFA and MNEC, which Makridimitris 
and Passas (1993: 12) characterise as horizontal ministries15. As a result the 
aforementioned implications become manifest in the augmentation of foreign and 
European policy bureaucracy within and without the MFA, with the PeRepGr 
constituting a prime example. 
                                                   
14
 Three interviewees referred to the report of Stavros Dimas (European Commissioner for the 
Environment) on the poor Greek environmental policy and measures. This was an illustrative 
example of a case whereby the lack of a department for EU affairs was felt as despite the need to 
cover existing posts with experts in the ME (YPEXWDE) those posts were vacant. It was 
emphasised that it is a matter of urgency for the Greek government to have the right people, ie 
policy makers and consultants at the right positions. This report and the Greek reaction is bound to 
poison the relations between Greece and the Commission. 
15
 This characterisation is accepted only if it refers to their preoccupations which are horizontal and 
are becoming more so. As far as their structure and operation is concerned both ministries are 
hierarchical and vertical 
 152
Despite the nominal European policy making capacity constituting the dominant 
trend in most home departments some ministries such as the Ministry of 
Mercantile Marine and the Ministry of Agriculture have functioned quite effectively 
in policy making and policy-uploading to the EU. The Ministry of Agriculture has 
always maintained significant direct relationships with the Union’s institutions and 
participates actively in EU policy formulation. Part of its effectiveness is due to the 
disproportionately large resources it has received from the central Greek 
government unlike other ministries, in order to enhance representation in the 
PeRepGr but also in other key missions abroad (Interview, no 3; 28). The Ministry 
of Agriculture was one of the first ministries to attach a large number of officials 
and consultants to overseas missions and to create an office for Agriculture 
Consultants which secured large amounts of European funds when mostly needed 
in the early 1980s (Tsitouridis, 1986: 863).  
 
Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU: expanding the 
foreign policy community   
 
As discussed in the previous sections, one of the key developments in the 
contemporary management of foreign and international policy is the transformation 
of domestic bureaucracies into what Spence (2003: 23) terms ‘transnational 
administration’. A characteristic example of such bureaucracies concerns the EU’s 
COREPER II which comprises not only traditional diplomats, but also officials from 
various lead ministries. The rationale of national public administrations, in the form 
of national representations to the EU, participating in European policy making 
attaches renewed significance to national bureaucracies while at the same time 
exemplifying arguments for the growth of foreign policy bureaucracies outside the 
MFA.  
National representations to the EU are largely similar in terms of their internal 
organisational structure which reflects their functions in the EU bodies where they 
participate and when they differentiate this is due to those elements particular to 
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their given political culture (Spanou, 2001: 120). Spanou (2001: 121) argues that 
national permanent representations to the EU constitute a characteristic example 
of institutional isomorphism as defined by Di Maggio and Powell (2001) while at 
the same time reaffirm assumptions discussed in chapter one according to which 
national factors and elements condition isomorphism. Based on this, the form and 
operation of national representations reflect national responses to the same 
demands for certain functions and coordination. 
The Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU (PeRepGr) termed by its 
officials as an ultra-ministry [υπερ-υπουργείο] or meta-ministry [µετα-υπουργείο] 
where the whole of government is represented (Interview, no 2; 5; 8; 9) provides 
us with the ultimate and perhaps the sole evidence of growth of a foreign policy 
bureaucracy outside the MFA. The PeRepGr, one of the largest national 
representations in Brussels16, numbering 130 officials in 2008 (Interview, no 2) was 
set up initially in 1962 under the responsibility of the MCo17 due to the 
economic/technical substance of pre-accession negotiations. The responsibility of 
the PeRepGr was transferred to the MFA in 1981 (when Greece entered the EC) 
based on the increased role envisaged for the MFA in EC affairs. Responsibility for 
the PeRepGr lies with the MFA and it is a MFA diplomat of ambassadorial rank18 
who heads the mission.  
In terms of communication and liaison with the home administration, the MFA 
constitutes the first and ultimate linkage of PeRepGr. Communication between 
sectoral officials dispatched to the PeRepGr and their home ministries is not 
permitted unless in cases of emergency. Communication with national 
administration in Greece must take place through the PeRepGr hierarchy and 
through the Permanent Representative or his deputy who monitor information flow 
to sectoral ministries (Spanou, 2001: 134). In theory, this hierarchical and 
                                                   
16
 Spanou (2001: 126) argues that two reasons can explain the large size of the Greek 
representation. Firstly, the long distance of Athens from policy making centres in Brussels and 
secondly, the tendency of sectoral ministries to dispatch many of their own officials as 
representatives to Brussels. Ths way, they believe,  they can ensure direct communication with 
their counterparts by passing the MFA    
17
 Renamed the Ministry of Economy (MNE) in 1982 
18
 For a detailed account of the structure and functions of the PeRepGr see Spanou (2001) 
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channelled practice aims to strengthen coordination nonetheless at the same time 
it reflects a climate of suspicion and resentment against direct communication 
which would potentially lead to bypassing the MFA. Therefore, in order to 
safeguard the MFA’s centrality in the European policy process this hierarchical and 
centralised modus operandi is systematically preserved (Spanou, 2001: 134-135).   
PeRepGr has come to constitute one of the main actors in coordinating European 
and international policy. With coordination of external policies being facilitated at 
the level of the PeRepGr due to its immediacy to policy making loci and physical 
proximity of the representatives of various domestic departments, the mission has 
undertaken a large share not only in policy coordination but also in policy 
formulation. A PeRepGr official (Interview, no 8) in Brussels argued ‘ 
‘When you have people from every domestic ministry represented at the 
PeRepGr located on the same floor and literally next door it is only 
natural that they both make and coordinate policy in the premises of the 
PeRepGr and then transmit positions home rather than the other way 
around.’  
The official argued that significant decentralisation takes place in Brussels with the 
PeRepGr undertaking most of the formulation and coordination of European and 
international policy. However one factor that impedes effective coordination relates 
to the HQ’s weakness to transmit timely unified positions to the PeRepGr. More 
specifically, a PeRepGr official (Interview, no 2) argued that very often national 
positions arrive after the meetings of the working groups have been held if at all. 
The official (Interview, no 2) suggested that ‘there is some sort of a  rolereversal in 
the case of Greece’ and explained that for a large number of issues, national 
positions are formulated in Brussels and are then transmitted to the HQ to be 
ratified and implemented rather than the other way around.  
As mentioned above, in many cases the PeRepGr improvises and formulates 
national positions on an ad hoc basis, whereas policy coordination becomes 
something of a rapid negotiation between experts dispatched from each ministry 
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within the PeRepGr premises. In order to serve purposes of fast and effective 
coordination the various branches of the PeRepGr which were previously scattered 
in different buildings moved together in 2008 in a newly hired building at the centre 
of Brussels19. The realisation that it is time and cost effective to make and 
coordinate policy with colleagues next door gave a pragmatist approach to 
organising the mission and transformed coordination into an intra-PeRepGr 
process involving all sectors of Greek administration away from the MFA 
(Interview, no 8). 
PeRepGr officials emphasise that if a degree of foreign policy decentralisation 
exists outside the MFA then this has to be in the PeRepGr, which is increasingly 
inhabited by extra-MFA officials (Interview, no 2; 3; 8; 9). This is both natural and 
necessary, as a PeRepGr official (Interview, no 8) argued because ‘a policy 
manager in Brussels knows much more about the current status of policies and is 
in a position to defend more effectively the national position if not to formulate the 
national position than officials or political leadership back home’ (Interview, no 8). 
Such realisations were not without implications for the status and recruitment 
processes of the Greek representation. 
More specifically, the PeRepGr which in the past functioned as a national 
repository for staff unwanted at home and as a forum available to the political 
leadership to pay back promised positions before elections (Interview, no 2; 8) has 
changed its recruitment and functional approach. 
‘It has been over a decade that the PeRepGr has been recruiting taking 
into consideration candidates’ credentials and qualifications. Unlike 
previous patterns, today Greek governments do not fool around with the 
PeRepGr any more’ (Interview, no 8). 
Such attitudinal change has gradually given the mission significant autonomy to 
decide their budget and logistics as well as freedom to manage Greek European 
and international policy away from home. As a result significant policy making 
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takes place at the level of the PeRepGr thus  reinforcing horizontal  trends in 
Greek foreign policy management (Interview, no 2; 3; 8). Nevertheless, despite 
significant change, the PeRepGr does not offer incentives to Greek officials to 
pursue a career in the mission. Evidently, PeRepGr officials’ wages are 
significantly lower than those of their counterparts whereas it still does not offer an 
expense account despite Greek governments’ expectations that Greek officials in 
Brussels socialise, lobby and entertain their counterparts (Interview, no 2; 8).   
 
The system of foreign and international policy bureaucratic 
coordination in Greece  
 
The growth in the domain of government action brought forward by globalisation 
and regionalisation with the latter exemplified in Europeanisation, have increased 
demands for foreign policy coordination. This is because the increased complexity 
of decision making and the raised national stakes in a whole new range of policy 
areas have increased the needs for coordinating internal policy making activities in 
order to ensure coherence abroad (Kassim et al., 2001: 1). With different countries 
responding differently to increased coordination demands the exploration of 
individual responses can provide further evidence regarding state management of 
their international and domestic environments at the start of the new century. For 
countries like the UK and France coordination has always been an important goal 
to ensure that the government speaks with a single voice abroad whereas for 
others coordination constitutes a low priority (Kassim et al., 2001: 2).  
Even when coordination constitutes a goal in itself, there are questions regarding 
how it should be achieved. Those questions enquire whether coordination should 
be allocated at the level of central government and work its way down to 
bureaucracy (top-down) or at lower levels of bureaucracy (bottom-up) (Peters, 
1998: 20). Such views suggest allocating the function of coordination to the centre, 
at the core executive, at the cabinet or the PM, or even to a specially designed 
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organisation or to an existing ministry which may however reinforce existing 
bureaucratic rivalries and raise questions such as which ministry would be 
appropriate. The two usual ministries are the ministries of foreign affairs and 
economy. With the above being said, Peters (1998: 20) suggests that such 
dilemmas are false because governments need both types of coordination. 
Research indicates that policy coordination constitutes one of the key themes in 
the management of governmental policy and some national bureaucrats, such as 
the British and Canadians, have been in a continuous search in the duration of 
their career for means to enhance coordination (Peters, 1998: 2). In Greece, 
interview respondents pointed to a rather different direction. The theme of 
coordination received different levels of attention at different external policy 
domains. More specifically, policy managers and officials who are involved in 
policy areas concerned with traditional national security issues and who cooperate 
mostly with the MoD do not acknowledge major coordination problems. An official 
at the PM’s diplomatic cabinet (Interview, no 11) argued that ‘In all my years of 
experience I have never felt that coordination is a problem. Foreign policy 
coordination in Greece is centralised and effective’.  
Similarly other officials argued that coordination is adequately performed for their 
hierarchical structures and operation (Interview, no 11; 17; 41). However, as the 
enquiry moved towards units involved in more cross-cutting policy areas , such as 
European or other international policies, respondents acknowledged that the 
Greek hierarchical coordination scheme or else the Greek ‘top down’ scheme 
suffers from significant inadequacies (Interview, no 2; 3; 4; 5; 8; 9; 13; 16; 23).   
More specifically, officials who are involved in European policy making 
acknowledge significant coordination inadequacy which is however compensated 
by the work of PeRepGr whereas officials involved in international policy and more 
specifically those involved in international cooperation and aid as well as foreign 
economic policy report that policy coordination constitutes to be one of the major 
weaknesses in Greek policy making and implementation. The discrepancy in 
respondents’ images of coordination is due to the fact that in the context of 
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traditional foreign policy, coordination between the PM, the MFA and the MoD has 
been institutionalised at all stages of the policy process, involving both formulation 
and implementation20. Most importantly, however, the discrepancy in respondents’ 
views is due to the increasingly divergent substance of cross cutting policies which 
involve networks and horizontal operation. An official at the MFA’s DG 
International Development Cooperation (Interview, no 13) stressed that  
‘Coordination over sectoral policy with an international dimension is a 
new thing and so is the phenomenon of so many home departments 
and other foreign entities working together over a single policy’.  
As previously mentioned the inter-ministerial coordinating scheme in Greece is 
centralised, hierarchical and top-down21 with policy making coordination allocated 
to the level of the cabinet’s KYSYM and coordination of policy implementation 
allocated to the MFA. This scheme by definition seems problematic especially in 
an era where governments’ ethos supports decentralisation and their 
preoccupations towards cross-cutting policy domains. This hierarchical scheme is 
further reinforced in Greece by the vertical and hierarchical organisation and 
modus operandi not only of the MFA but also of all other Greek government 
departments. Even though centralisation as well as the use of hierarchy and 
authority inherent in hierarchical coordination approaches are meant to minimise 
bureaucratic conflict, reduce coordination costs and increase coordination returns 
(Peters, 1998: 22) in Greece they seem to have the opposite effect.   
In Greece, government departments have functioned on the basis of ‘competing 
fortresses’ rather than parts of an integrated system22 (Stoforopoulos and 
Makridimitris, 1997: 47) and are far from whole of government approaches 
(Interview, no 2; 3; 8; 9; 16). Inter-ministerial coordination in Greece relies on the 
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 More or less the same applies to the context of the EU policy for which the MFA, the MNEC and 
Ministry of Agriculture cooperated on a regular basis 
21
 For an analysis of the various schemes of coordination such as market and network approaches 
see Peters (1998) 
22
 A tendency which is expected to be extended with the current waves of governmental 
reorganisation and reform, including privatisation measures which lead to competition rather than 
cooperation among public organisations. For more on this see Peters (1198).  
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following principles (Passas, 2005: 370): Firstly, it relies on information sharing 
between other ministries and the MFA and on the provision of technical information 
by the former to the latter. Secondly, it relies on the MFA’s coordination of action 
and the provision of guidance and directions to other ministries and the PeRepGR. 
Thirdly, it relies on MFA’s support of inter-ministerial or governmental committees 
through the provision of administrative, secretarial and scientific contributions; and 
lastly, it depends on special collaboration of the MFA and other ministries over 
certain issues and policy areas. A characteristic example is the close partnership 
between the MFA and the MoD over the action and policies of the political branch 
of the latter such as Greek positions on CFSP and ESDP (Interview, no 41).  
As previously mentioned, the Greek policy coordination scheme is highly 
centralised for purposes of ensuring effectiveness. Bureaucratic foreign policy 
coordination has always constituted the prerogative of the MFA and in recent years 
the Ministry has been established as the primus inter pares coordinator of all areas 
of Greek external policies.  Article 5 of the 2007 MFA Charter23  stipulates that the 
MFA is in charge of monitoring and formulating all aspects of international policy. 
This is further discussed in chapter three in the context of international policy 
coordination becoming a new function of the MFA. The positioning of the MFA at 
the centre of the bureaucratic mechanism for foreign and international policy 
reaffirms the centrality of the MFA in the contemporary Greek foreign policy 
machinery.  
Naturally, the MFA is far from claiming expertise over sectoral policy and technical 
matters. Rather it gets involved in consultation when the matter under discussion is 
of international significance. The MFA’s consultative role is of growing significance 
and its input into the policy process is now more welcome by domestic 
departments (Interview, no 30). For instance, notwithstanding that the portfolio for 
environment and energy policies belongs to the ME and  irrespective of the fact 
that in some instances the MFA and MNEC are involved in policy formulation, it is 
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the MFA which coordinates, manages and negotiates ME’s policies in European 
and international fora (Interview, no 30).  
Policy coordination on behalf of the MFA takes place through intensive inter-
ministerial meetings which are convened on an ad-hoc basis determined by the 
issue at hand (Interview, no 30).  In projects such as the Turkey-Italy-Greece (TGI) 
gas/oil inter-connector which has enormous political and economic implications for 
Greece and demands negotiations in international fora, the MFA holds a leading 
role in the process (Interview, no 32). There are also a number of instances where 
a home department may deal with a problematic state and ask for the MFA’s 
guidance (Interview, no 11). As mentioned above, European and international 
policy coordination is facilitated to a significant degree by the PeRepGr in 
Brussels. The physical proximity of staff dispatched from various government 
departments enhances coordination and makes it time-effective (Interview, no 3).  
Horizontal coordination has been aided in recent years with the creation of a 
number of ad hoc inter-ministerial committees that focus on policy coordination 
and monitoring of implementation (Stoforopoulos and Makridimitris, 1997: 47).The 
mechanism of inter-ministerial committees seems to be a preferred practice and is 
supported by the MFA where such committees normally convene. The procedure 
is that the lead ministry or ministries prepare a folder/portfolio and the MFA 
provides guidance and consultation regarding the international dimension of the 
policy under discussion. Naturally, representation on the policy has been provided 
by the MFA but in the last few years it has been shared with lead ministries 
(Interview, no 30). 
Horizontal coordination has been further facilitated by the creation of linkage 
offices examined above (Interview, no 30).  However, these offices constitute more 
of an ad hoc response to specific needs and are far from constituting evidence of a 
move towards more horizontal and integrated approaches to policy coordination. 
External policy coordination remains largely fragmented in Greece where terms 
such as ‘whole of government’ or ‘integrated’ approaches to policy coordination do 
not resonate as familiar themes in the foreign policy management discourse. 
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Policy coordination at the level of the government 
The above section indicated that foreign and international policy in Greece is 
largely formulated at cabinet level, whereas implementation lies with the MFA. 
Spanou (2001: 83) in her analysis of domestic coordination of European policy 
suggests that the problem with policy coordination in Greece is to be found at the 
policy making stage rather than the policy implementation stage. In other words, it 
can be identified at the core of the central government, at the Cabinet and 
KYSEA24 where governmental strategy and targets are defined. It has been 
repeatedly suggested in interviews that in the Greek case such strategies and 
positions are either absent or inadequately defined. In a policy environment where 
‘frequently there is not much to coordinate’ (Interview, no 2) discussion on the 
effectiveness of a top-down bureaucratic coordination scheme becomes by 
definition irrelevant. Spanou (2000: 162) has described the policy coordination 
scheme in Greece as a ‘truncated pyramid where everything is in place apart from 
the unifying element at the top’ 
 
A number of interviewees emphasised the lack of strategic and macroscopic 
planning from the centre which renders the existing bureaucratic coordinating 
mechanisms ineffective.  This explains to a considerable extent claims – made 
both in the literature (Ioakimidis, 2003; Spanou, 2001; Storoforopoulos and 
Makridimitris, 1997; Couloumbis, 1988) and during interviews (Interview, no 2; 3; 
23; 17; 18; 42; 43) that even when institutional mechanisms and processes for 
coordination are in place, they are either bypassed or unused due to the lack of a 
central governmental strategy. A PerRepGr high ranking official described the 
instructions from the centre as late and incomplete if not non-existent (Interview, 
no 22). Specifically, the official argued: ‘National positions from the centre arrive 
late, if at all, and there is always something missing’.   
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 KYSEA, reviewed in chapter two, is a mini-cabinet comprising as tactical members the PM, FM, 
MoD, the minister of economy, interior, environment and development 
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To further add to the weakness of external policy coordination from the centre, a 
research study conducted by the PM’s office25 in the 1990s indicated that the lack 
of appropriate structures for coordinating European Community policy led to 
substantial losses of Community funds and delays in policy implementation. 
Additionally, it led to Greece’s loss of influence as well as to its exposure in 
European and international fora due to uncoordinated and incoherent positions 
(Ioakimidis, 1994: 147-148). The latter was discussed by PeRepGr officials in 
Brussels, who also attributed their increased workload and problems with regards 
to European policy making to the lack of instructions and coordination from the 
centre (Interview, no 2; 6; 8; 9; 28).  
As a response to the coordination discourse revolving around arguments about the 
lack of coordination from the centre and the description of coordination mechanism 
as a ‘headless monster’ (Interview, no 37) an official in Brussels suggested that: 
‘In Greece we need to understand that coordination at the top does not 
constitute the only approach to coordination. Coordination at the level of 
the Cabinet, even if it is effective, is not a panacea and this is 
exemplified largely with the coordinating function of the PeRepGr. 
Coordination can be achieved at different levels and we officials have 
come to understand this well. Greek understanding of coordination, 
however, lags behind. Obsession with coordination from the capital 
demonstrates fear of responsibility (efthinofovia), of information 
leakages as well as fear of taking the blame. Beyond doubt, 
coordination from the centre is crucial but arguably, so is coordination at 
the level of the PeRepGr’ (Interview, no 8). 
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 Based on the constitution, coordination of policy implementation at the level of the government is 
materialised at the PM’s office, which amongst others, is in charge for conflict resolution and 
mediation between conflicting parties/ministries (Sotiropoulos, 2001: 125; Tsinizelis, 1996). The 
arrangement of an ultra mini structure for policy formulation and coordination in Greece has been 
dominant since the early 1980s when a series of offices, directly accountable to the PM were 
created. Such offices were a legal office, a diplomatic office, an economic and a security office and 
the PM’s private office as well as secretariats and services of the PM’s political office (Sotiropoulos, 
2001: 126-127).  
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The same PeRepGr official suggested that especially in terms of European policy it 
seems that coordination is easier to achieve at the level of the PeRepGr where 
every ministry is represented by at least one official. Physical proximity facilitates 
policy coordination and hence significant coordination decentralisation takes place 
at the PeRepGr’s premises. The official added that in terms of international policy 
closer cooperation is required at lower levels, at the level of officials and this is 
where the emphasis should be placed. 
The reported lack of coordination from the centre seems to be compensated to a 
significant extent by personal initiative and inter-personal collegial relations. MFA 
and PeRepGr officials, despite acknowledging external policy coordination as 
problematic, emphasise vigorously that under the circumstances: 
‘Officials have created their own linkages both within and outside their 
DGs and eventually they get the job done. Besides policies and 
developments move so fast that there is not time for hierarchical 
operation. Instead every official must develop reflexes and respond 
instantly’ (Interview, no 13).  
An MFA official compared the Greek approach to international policy coordination 
to that of other EU states at EU working groups. Specifically, he stated: 
‘In Greece we do not produce coherent positions to present at the 
various EU fora. We do not allocate time to international policy planning 
and coordination as our counterparts do. In Finland for instance, there is 
a working group for ‘daily coherence and coordination’. It is an 
institutionalised group of people which does not change every time the 
government changes as would be the case with Greece. Therefore, 
when there is an issue which demands cooperation between several 
ministries they coordinate them and produce a folder for action. In 
Germany, they put their positions, which are the product of serious 
policy coordination, in a folder and on its cover they put the initials of the 
officials who were involved in policy formulation and assessment from 
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every single ministry. In our case, we do not know who should read what 
and to which DG official messages should be forwarded’ (Interview, no 
13).  
 
Conclusion 
The present chapter reviewed some of the current phenomena observed in those 
parts of national domestic bureaucracies which deal with the management of 
foreign and international policy and explored the extent to which they relate to the 
Greek experience. With globalisation and regionalisation having intensified 
governments’ international dealings they present us with a significant new 
research agenda, part of which explores developments in bureaucracies outside 
foreign ministries, traditionally the core elements of national foreign policy 
machineries. More specifically, the cross-cutting policies brought forward by the 
aforementioned transformative forces have necessitated governments’ 
engagement as a whole in foreign policy making and led to foreign policy 
horizontalisation and the creation of distinct foreign policy communities raising 
added demands for coordination.  
The exploration of the Greek experience has provided us with a variety of evidence 
and indicators with regards to foreign policy management outside the MFA. There 
is evidence concerning the realisation that in an era of cross-cutting policy 
demands there is a need to expand the foreign policy template outside the MFA 
and to develop international policy capacity within departments with previously a 
strict domestic mandate. Evidence also indicates a degree of horizontal 
proliferation in the management of international issues across various government 
departments, manifested in rigorous collaboration between them and the MFA, 
information sharing and consultations. At the same time however there is a lack of 
evidence suggesting the development of international policy making competence 
to the extent that centrality of the MFA in the Greek national foreign policy 
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machinery is challenged by the usual suspects, the treasury and ministry of 
defence.  
Despite early acknowledgment in the Greek literature of the need for the creation 
of a foreign policy community in Greece (Couloumbis, 1983: 111) which would 
promote decentralisation of foreign policy and active involvement of bureaucracies, 
interview data suggests a significant degree of foreign and international policy 
proliferation but not policy making decentralisation to other domestic entities. 
Arguably, intensified internationalisation of domestic departments does not 
necessarily lead to decentralisation (Sundelius, 1984b: 95) and, evidently, in 
Greece foreign policy remains the prerogative of the PM and the MFA. 
Nevertheless, even though the concept of a growing foreign policy community has 
little substance in the Greek bureaucracy, it is nonetheless partially supported by 
evidence which suggests a significant degree of policy horizontalisation and a 
lesser degree of decentralisation.  However, this is only apparent in the microcosm 
of Greek administration in Brussels, the PeRepGr, thus suggesting a ‘micro-foreign 
policy community’ under the command of the MFA. 
The intensification of the Greek government’s international engagements have 
raised demands for coordination. Far removed from whole of government 
approaches to coordination, the Greek system remains hierarchical, reflecting 
hierarchical approaches to foreign policy and reinforcing the centrality of the MFA 
as the ultimate coordinating agent in the Greek foreign policy bureaucracy. With 
the MFA seemingly constituting the unchallenged core element of the 
contemporary Greek foreign policy machinery it is crucial to explore its role and 
operation in the transforming international and domestic environments. To this 
end, the following chapter focuses on the MFA. 
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Chapter 4: Rethinking the Greek Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs  
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter explored the scenario of a widening Greek foreign policy 
community as the result of the intensification of Greek international engagements 
resulted from globalisation and regionalisation. The available evidence suggested 
a significant degree of internationalisation in several government departments as 
well as horizontalisation of foreign policy. Nevertheless, concepts of expanding 
foreign policy communities appear to have little substance for the Greek 
bureaucracy. Rather, there is strong evidence that the MFA remains the dominant 
actor in the Greek foreign policy system. Based on the premise that foreign 
ministries are faced with demands for re-organisation and re-definition of their role 
and mandate in the post-Cold War era, a broad objective of this chapter is to 
rethink the nature of the Greek MFA in the context of the rapidly changing 
international and domestic environments and a more specific objective is to 
explore its institutional responses.  
The term ‘rethink’ is used here to reflect the new approach taken in the exploration 
of the MFA which is thematic and focuses on questions of its responses to the 
changing operational environment. It is also crucial to note that aspects of the 
nature of the MFA have been considered before in relation to its operation in the 
European Union (Makridimitris and Passas, 2001). In this chapter however, the 
MFA is examined in a wider context than that of the EU. Research presented in 
the previous chapter and evidence gathered by the author in the course of this 
thesis, indicates that the MFA poses fundamental questions relating to its role, 
functions and institutional character in the changing contemporary environment.  
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The literature on foreign ministries and systems of diplomatic representation over 
which they preside presents different conclusions regarding their role and 
significance in the contemporary environment (Hocking and Spence, 2005; 
Hocking, 1999). On the one hand, there are arguments which view foreign 
ministries as retaining their critical functions and significance. Such approaches 
suggest that the foreign ministry remains at the centre of traditional national 
foreign policy machineries with which governments pursue their international 
relations. On the other hand there are suggestions that the twin forces of 
globalization and regionalization, creating demands for integrated approaches to 
the management of foreign and international policy, have challenged the 
significance of these traditional foreign policy and diplomatic institutions (Shrivhok, 
2007).  
In this light, it is important to reflect upon the significance and role of the Greek 
MFA in the transforming world politics of the 21st century. A more specific objective 
of this chapter is to explore the responses and adaptation of the MFA to a number 
of new tasks and issues that have arisen in the management of foreign and 
international policy suggested by the literature and foreign ministry documentation 
worldwide. Such new tasks stem from the increased international engagement of 
governments and involve issues such as foreign and international policy 
coordination, crisis management and international aid. Reflecting the increased 
demands on foreign ministries and linked to their institutional adaptation are issues 
concerning the reorganization of the foreign ministry on the basis of new or 
extended functions. In order to aid the understanding of the main themes that 
preoccupy the study of contemporary foreign ministries the following section 
reviews the current literature before embarking upon the exploration of the Greek 
MFA.    
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An overview of the challenges to the 21st century foreign ministry   
The foreign ministry, commonly regarded as the central bureaucratic agent of 
national foreign policy and diplomatic machinery, (Hocking, 2007; 2005; Rana, 
2004) and simultaneously a key institution of the global diplomatic network 
(Steiner, 1982: 11), is actively engaged in a complex process of change and 
adaptation to transforming international and domestic policy environments 
(Hocking, 2005). Given that the foreign ministry is the bureaucratic embodiment of 
the state’s sovereign power in its relationship with the international environment, 
the patterns of change within its structure, processes and operation should provide 
significant evidence regarding the state’s responses to external change. Similarly, 
evaluations of the foreign ministry’s position in its domestic and international 
settings reflect states’ fundamental assumptions about world politics (Hocking, 
2007: 4).  
With the conduct of foreign policy and diplomacy1 in the era of complex 
interdependence becoming less and less the exclusive domain of foreign 
ministries (Keohane and Nye, 1989) – if it ever was - and with their content 
becoming more concerned with the implications of international activity for national 
citizens and domestic politics than ever before, (Wesley, 2002: 209) the foreign 
ministry is in an ambiguous position. Not only does the foreign ministry not 
monopolise governments’ actions outside the state’s boundaries (Hill, 2003: 4) but 
it also finds itself in a relationship of deepening engagement with the public and 
the media heralding the strengthening nexus between diplomacy and society2 
(Heijmans and Melissen, 2007: 193).  
Therefore, unlike traditional views which held that the foreign ministry was and 
should be distant from the public (Harris, 1999: 27), it is now expected to take on 
an active role within domestic communities and develop direct channels of 
                                                   
1
 Diplomacy according to Rana (2004) is the delivery method of foreign policy  
2
 What the Heijmans and Melissen (2007: 193) term as trend towards the ‘societization’ of 
diplomacy 
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communication with civil society and a number of stakeholders3 (Hocking, 2007: 
10; FCO report on Consular Strategy, 2007) as well as to promote the national 
business community in foreign markets. (Foreign Ministry of Denmark, 2006: 9, 
11). The implications of this for the embassies and consular missions are 
discussed in the following chapter.  
As a result, governments seek to re-organise their foreign ministries and train their 
diplomats to work with the shifting dynamics of global affairs and information 
technology (Bátora, 2009; Hocking, 2007; 2004; Cooper, 2001; Muller, 1999: 192, 
197) in carrying out governmental policies overseas (Shrivhok, 2007: 63). Thus the 
role of the foreign ministry and the diplomatic network are being transformed 
precisely because the context in which they operate has shifted so profoundly, 
creating a need for redefinition of their role and responsibilities (Blackwell, 2007: 
49). 
The role of the foreign ministry is also challenged on the domestic level as 
discussed in the previous chapter. The growing international policy spectrum 
brought about by globalisation and regionalization, has diffused international 
responsibility across a wide range of government departments and expanded 
foreign policy communities which challenge the monopoly of the foreign ministry in 
the management of international policy (Bátora , 2009; Bertram, 2009; Wallace, 
2008; Hocking, 2007; 2004; 1999; Hill, 2003: 4; Allen, 1999; 2002; Ahmad, 1999: 
117; Cooper, 1999: 41; Enjalran and Husson, 1999: 60; Harris, 1999: 27; 
Langhorne and Wallace, 1999: 18;21; Rozental, 1999: 137).  
Related to arguments concerning foreign and international policy involvement by 
domestic departments, direct communications between them, and the added 
importance of public diplomacy, are views which perceive the foreign ministry as 
losing one of its core roles: that is the monopoly over communications (Berridge, 
2005: Riordan, 2003). This is because IT has enabled the availability and speedy 
transfer of sheer volumes of foreign policy information (Bátora, 2009: 3; Hocking, 
                                                   
3
 For a list of stakeholders in the UK see FCO report, Delivering change together: The Consular 
Strategy 2007-2010: 31. 
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2002; Melissen, 1999) which facilitates direct communication between agents. 
Direct communication epitomized in transgovernmentalism4 has led to the 
bypassing of the foreign ministry (Berridge, 2005: Riordan, 2003) or alternatively to 
the ‘disintermediation’ of the foreign ministry, effectively translating into losing its 
traditional status as the most important intermediary between governments 
(Bátora, 2009; Metzl, 2001) and is now becoming just one element of the 
government’s foreign policy apparatus (Eayrs, 1982: 96). This means that its core 
role of gathering, analysing and disseminating information is challenged (Hocking, 
2007: 8). Such a challenge can be observed particularly at the level of the EU 
where domestic ministries can communicate instantly and informally with their 
interlocutors in other member states (Wallace, 2008: 23; Hocking, 2002).  
Some of the fundamental issues regarding the understanding of the challenges 
that confront the foreign ministry in the 21st century are its character as an 
organisation and the significance of organisational culture in understanding this 
(Hocking, 2007: 3). Literature on foreign ministries’ pathology and change reflects 
states’ responses to the transforming global environment. Jorgensen (1997) 
argues that foreign ministries, because they change form and content and are 
historical-concrete and dynamic organisations, are indicators of international 
systemic change.  
With globalization and regionalization creating the need for the management of 
horizontal issues ranging from day to day operational issues to management of 
crises (Harder, 2004: 3), the foreign ministry’s traditional hierarchical structures 
and models of diplomatic representation are no longer sufficient (Cooper, 2001). 
The role of the foreign ministry and its missions is further challenged as it has to 
coordinate and represent the perspectives and priorities of the whole of 
government (Blackwell, 2007: 47). Therefore, in the light of the debate concerning 
the impact of globalisation and regionalisation on the ways in which governments 
manage foreign policy, the study of the structure, operation and role of the foreign 
ministry becomes ipso facto necessary.   
                                                   
4
 See Keohane and Nye (1987) and Slaughter (2001) 
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Questions regarding the ability of the foreign ministry to adapt to its current 
operational environment can provide insights regarding the decline and non-
decline theses. In the literature there is no uniformity of opinion regarding the 
responses of the foreign ministry vis-à-vis pressures stemming from the 
transforming international and domestic policy environments. Thus, as Hocking 
(2007) suggests, a number of differing conclusions are drawn from similar bodies 
of evidence. On the one hand, lie arguments which suggest that the foreign 
ministry is in decline or else irrelevant in the current international setting. Such 
assumptions associated with globalist approaches which assert the spread of 
diplomacy amongst a greater cast of bureaucratic agents and the diminishing 
monopoly of the foreign ministry over communications, suggest a decline in its 
centrality within the national foreign policy system5.  
On the other hand, there are arguments which suggest a changed and possibly 
strengthened foreign ministry in the national system for foreign policy and 
diplomacy due to its adaptability. Discourse on the adaptability of the foreign 
ministry can be informed by institutionalist thinking which suggests that institutions, 
such as the foreign ministry, transform in response to changing environmental 
conditions (Krasner, 1984) and display the tendency to reflect their environments 
and with which they are in constant exchange as summarized in the term 
‘institutional isomorphism’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1991: 41-47). Institutional 
isomorphism, or transformation as adaptation to changing operational 
environments, serves the purpose of survival and preservation (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991) and the aspiration to become larger and more resourceful (March 
and Olsen, 1984: 738). 
In our case, this effectively means that the foreign ministry, by being responsive to 
stimuli from the environment in which it operates, adapts its structure and 
functions in order to maintain, re-define and/or re-launch its centrality in the 
                                                   
5
 It is true that there are cases where the MFA does not hold a central role in the national foreign 
policy system. In Malaysia the MFA is not considered as a major or central agency. Rather, the 
locus of foreign policy decision making has shifted towards the PM, something which has altered 
the whole government machinery. Still the involvement of other departments in policy making had 
been minimal until the late 1990s (Ahmad, 1999: 125) 
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national foreign policy system. Due to its positioning at the interface of the two 
interlinked policy milieus -the domestic and international- and the close 
collaboration with its overseas missions, the MFA has seemingly assumed a 
higher profile in adapting to the diffuse and horizontal conditions of the post Cold 
War era (Hocking, 2004: 148; Cooper, 2001: 111). In this light, the foreign ministry 
appears to be the most innovative, responsive and adaptive part of the national 
bureaucracy (Hocking, 2005; Moses and Knutsen, 2001; Steiner, 1982) despite 
arguments suggesting its obsolescence and conservativism.  
Such arguments however, are not unfounded. On the contrary, they fall within the 
realm of institutionalist theory and more specifically of path dependence which 
focuses on resistance to change and perpetuation of prior practices (Thelen, 
1999). As indicated in chapter one, the foreign ministry, similarly to other 
institutions, is not considered as highly adaptive However it is still seen as more 
adaptive than other parts of national bureaucracies. Some research has argued 
that EU member states’ foreign policy institutions have been notorious for their 
conservativism and resistance to change (Manners and Whitman, 2000: 261). The 
reasons behind foreign ministries’ resistance to change could be due to a number 
of reasons such as a particular organisational culture, membership of the EU 
which allows less flexibility or to the persistence of a high politics agenda.  
Other reasons explaining foreign ministries’ responses cited by Berridge (2005: 8) 
and viewed by Clarke and White (1981; 1989) as variables of the foreign policy 
system itself, could be a turbulent region and specific security threats6, deep 
politicisation of the administration, and a history of dependence which has created 
a particular national identity and perception of foreign policy. At the same time, 
what this and other research suggests is that in the majority of cases, the MFA’s 
centrality in the foreign policy machinery has continued, the institution displaying 
resilience and a significant degree of adaptability (Berridge, 2005: 8).  
                                                   
6
 Based on Clarke and White’s (1981; 1989) foreign policy system such variables would originate 
from the external dimension of the environment  
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Adaptability becomes primarily manifest with the foreign ministry taking on new 
tasks and functions with the aim of becoming more efficient and developing its role 
overseas in a number of newly added issue areas such as the environment, 
human rights, provision of humanitarian aid and crises management (Moses and 
Knutsen, 2001). Such efforts translate into a well-established trend to re-organise 
foreign ministries around the organisational principle of functionality which is 
added to the traditional principle of territoriality in order to respond to all those 
issues that stem from increased economic interdependence and globalisation 
(Enjalran and Husson, 1999: 60; Cooper, 1974: 155).  
Organisation based on a functional or thematic approach provides for horizontal 
management of issues which do not fall into country or regional boxes but involve 
cross-cutting interconnections (Rana, 2007: 28-29). Such themes for instance, in 
the case of the British FCO are public diplomacy and the EU budget. Additionally, 
single ‘bilateral affairs departments’ are often replaced with territorial units7. 
Thematic approaches render vertical policy processes within the foreign ministry 
outdated and inadequate. For this reason traditional practices8 of hierarchical 
submissions going from the division to the head of the directorate general (DG), to 
the director general and only then to the general secretary have been abandoned 
as they are not cost and time effective. Instead, divisions may now submit a rule 
directly to the Secretary and then see if it is relevant to the Commissioner or 
political leadership (Rana, 2007: 29-30). Thematic approaches are to be found in 
countries such as in Sweden9, Thailand and the US10. All these changes have one 
purpose: namely the facilitation of the foreign and diplomatic processes by 
coordinating all departments involved in newer policy areas such as energy 
diplomacy (Rana, 2007: 29). It is precisely this functional re-organisation, which 
the majority of foreign ministries appear to have undergone, which are perceived 
                                                   
7For example: the MFA in Malta. Canadian reports indicate that they went even further merging 
several territorial departments into two; one which deals with the US and Mexico and one for the 
rest of the world  
8
 For instance in Berlin 
9
 Sweden has appointed a dozen ambassadors at the MFA to deal with similar cross-cutting issues 
such as the reduction of conventional arms 
10
 The US has a tradition of naming home-based ambassadors to cover regional or thematic 
issues. 
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by some as challenging the arguments anticipating their decline and hence their 
relevance in the contemporary environment (Cooper, 1974).   
Other nations, such as Canada, responded to globalization and the economisation 
of politics, which require integrated approaches in the management of foreign 
affairs (Shrivhok, 2007: 62), by reintegrating trade and foreign policy into one 
department (Blackwell, 2007: 53). Such integration is commonly accompanied by 
changing recruitment patterns and training curricula in national diplomatic systems 
(Rana, 2007). In 2002 Thailand introduced a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
scheme11 adapting a business model to its bureaucratic system. The emphasis of 
the scheme was on leadership and teamwork as well as a shared vision, mission 
and strategy on behalf of the whole government (Shrivhok, 2007: 63). Such 
integrated approaches are currently common. Around twenty countries have 
unified their ministries of foreign affairs and foreign trade such as Australia, 
Mauritius and Sweden whilst others have unified their foreign aid activities into the 
foreign ministry12.  
At the same time, however, despite the new tasks, roles and responsibilities that 
foreign ministries have taken on this adaptation is conditioned, in most cases, by 
the persistence of hierarchical structures and vertical operating principles. This is 
is despite the fact that it is widely acknowledged that the prerequisites for 
organizing the state machinery to conduct foreign policy have changed (Larrson, 
2007: 68). Undoubtedly, questions related to territorial or spatial integrity and 
borders are still relevant but it is the compartmentalisation of administrative 
responsibilities within traditional vertically drawn foreign domains that is 
problematic (Cooper, 2001: 114).  
Nonetheless, the available evidence indicates that, to a great extent, foreign 
ministries remain highly compartmentalised by function. They remain imbued with 
verticality in terms of design and function and inculcated with traditional 
                                                   
11
 For more details on the scheme see Shrivihok, 2007: 63 
12
 There are of course other cases such as the FCO which has separated aid into a distinct 
department: the Department for International Development. 
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perceptions of foreign policy which reinforce a hierarchical structure often related 
to secrecy at the expense of information sharing networks (Cooper, 2001). Foreign 
ministries often appear to operate in silos, or else in vertical sections with little 
dialogue between them13 which poses significant obstacles to policy coordination - 
one of the main tasks they are expected to perform (Blackwell, 2007: 48). In this 
context the question that is raised is where the foreign ministry is heading as an 
institution, as reorganisation of the foreign ministry appears to be imperative if it is 
to perform the functions expected of it (Cooper, 2001).  
Moving away from the foreign ministry’s institutional responses to environmental 
issues, another theme that arises in the evaluation of the 21st century foreign 
ministry is the closer relationship between the HQ and the overseas missions 
represented by ‘foreign ministry-embassy integration’ (Rana, 2007). Although the 
role of embassies constitutes the focus of the following chapter, it is important to 
view the implications of this changing relationship for the overall foreign policy 
process. Foreign ministry-embassy integration alters prior symmetrical 
relationships between HQs and missions which prescribed that the HQ created 
policy and missions implemented it (Blackwell, 2007: 48). The relationship 
between the two has been altered with the aid of ICT and intranet and changed 
the old notions of the embassy being a tool of implementation for the centre, run 
by the centre. As a result there are fast channels of mutual communication 
between the DGs located at the HQ and the embassies.   
Some countries, such as the UK, Canada and Germany have reorganised the 
functioning of their embassies on this premise. The 2000 Paschke report suggests 
that a significant amount of work such as dossier contributions and briefings for 
the minister previously being carried out by HQ staff must now be prepared by 
embassies and communicated through the intranet. As a result the German 
Foreign Office has implemented such changes, which has led to the gradual 
thinning of territorial units. Accepting that the bilateral embassy is in the best 
position to advise on relationship management, has drastically reduced staff in 
                                                   
13
 As in the case of Canada 
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territorial departments redeploying HQ personnel for thematic tasks (Rana, 2007: 
26-27). Austria and Canada also recognised this need and delegated more power 
to the envoy. Nevertheless, other countries such as China, India and Japan are 
reluctant to use intranet fearing security leaks (Rana, 2007: 28) thus sticking to 
prior practices.  
Based on the above, institutional responses of foreign ministries to the themes that 
arise in various discussions, as expected, differentiate significantly. The literature 
portrays differing accounts of foreign ministry responses to pressures stemming 
from globalization and regionalization.  Such variations depend on the nature of 
national foreign policy systems which, defined in Clarke and White’s terms (1981; 
1989), comprise foreign policy structures and processes together with their 
surrounding operational environment. . In this light, and having considered the 
nature of the Greek foreign policy system in the previous chapters, the following 
sections seek to explore various aspects of the MFA relating to its organisation, 
culture and character and whether these are changing under the pressures of the 
transformative forces of globalisation and regionalisation.  
 
The Greek MFA in organisational terms: hierarchy, fragmentation 
and co-responsibility  
 
The MFA was one of the seven ministries created at the time of the founding of the 
Hellenic State in 1833 and has been one of the leading actors in the Greek 
governmental machinery ever since. The MFA, which has always played a key 
role in defending and promoting Greek interests overseas, has undergone 
significant change following the 1974 restoration of democracy in Greece. Such 
change reflects the efforts of Greek governments to reform their foreign policy 
bureaucratic machinery, in which the MFA has been central, and is epitomized in 
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the MFA charters of 197414, 199815 and 200716. As this study focuses on the 
Greek foreign policy bureaucratic structures in the 21st century, the present 
chapter explores change and adaptation emerging mostly in the last decade.  
The MFA comprises the Headquarters (HQ) in Athens, the Peripheral Services in 
northern Greece and the External Services, with the latter involving the diplomatic 
and consular missions. The latest MFA Charter which came into effect in 2007 
with Law 3566/2007, besides introducing a series of changes as a response by the 
Greek government to the demands of the contemporary international and domestic 
policy environments, provides for the current organisation of the MFA. This 
comprises seven General Directorates17 (DGs) below the DG-A Political Affairs 
which coordinates all DGs beneath it in the structural hierarchy. The seven DGs 
are as follows: 
1. DG-A Political Affairs  
2. DG-B Economic Relations 
3. DG-C European Affairs  
4. DG-YDAS International Development Cooperation and Hellenic Aid 
5. DG-D International Organisations, International Security and Cooperation  
6. DG-E Cultural, Religious and Consular Affairs  
7. DG-ST Personnel, administrative organization and financial management 
The organization of the MFA rests on the following three criteria: Firstly, the 
distinction between bilateral and multilateral issues, secondly the thematic 
distinction, which to date has effectively meant a division between political and 
economic matters, and thirdly, the division into geographic desks (Griva, 2002: 
24). Besides the aforementioned DGs and secretariats which constitute the 
skeleton of the MFA there are a number of services, offices and diplomatic 
cabinets of the foreign minister, deputy and alternate ministers as well as two or 
                                                   
14
 Law 419/1976 
15
 Law 2594/1998 
16
 Law 3566/2007 
17
 DG YDAS is also referred to as a secretariat 
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three General Secretariats18 namely, the General Secretariat for Political Affairs, 
the General Secretariat for European Affairs and the General Secretariat for 
International Economic Relations, with the latter being added with the last MFA 
Charter in 2007. The secretariats are headed by a general secretary, the General 
Secretary for Political Affairs (GS), the GS for European affairs (GS-EU) and the 
GS for International Economic relations (GS-IER) respectively. The GS is always a 
diplomat of ambassadorial rank and heads the diplomatic service whilst the latter 
two can either be diplomats of ambassadorial rank or political persons appointed 
by a joint decision of the PM and the FM (Law 3566/2007 art. 3) thus depending 
on the political government of the day (Passas, 2005: 366). The variation in the 
number of the general secretaries has been closely linked to regular government 
reshufflings and to the complicated organisational and political structure of the 
MFA. 
The GS heads the MFA which comprises both diplomats and administrative staff 
(Dontas, 1982:269). The GS is regularly aided by the general director of DG-A for 
Political Affairs. A vertical coordinating scheme applies to all foreign policy issues 
with sub-sections of all DGs referring to their director, who in turn refers to the 
general director of DG-A. With regards to issues falling under the heading of 
European Affairs and International Economic Relations also the GS-EU and the 
GS-IER get involved in coordination. See figure 4.1 below for the MFA’s 
organisation chart. The complication in the operation and organisational structure 
of the MFA lies in the verticality and multiplicity of layers. This involves 
multilayered political leadership as, for instance, one or two alternate foreign 
ministers and one or two deputy foreign ministers under the foreign minister (FM). 
Arguably, this multi-headed scheme leads to fragmentation, co-responsibility and 
bureaucratic overlaps (Stoforopoulos and Makridimitris, 1997: 101) as a number of 
policy issues can no longer be neatly categorised along vertical organisational 
compartments.   
                                                   
18
 There have been instances when there were four general secretariats with the fourth being a 
General Secretariat for Greek Expatriates  
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The issue of co-responsibility is considered to be one of the main problems of the 
MFA’s current organisational arrangement and is directly linked to the distinction 
between ‘technical/economic and political’ issues (Passas, 2005: 366). This 
tendency is manifest in the compartmentalisation of foreign policy into distinct 
organisational units. For instance, DG-A reflecting areas of traditional foreign 
policy, DG-B reflecting  foreign economic policy, DG-C managing European policy 
and DG-YDAS in charge of international policy cooperation. The inability to 
categorise cross-cutting policy into neat vertical domains results in co-shared 
responsibility and overlaps. This becomes evident in the management of EU 
affairs discussed below.  
This is because the post-2007 revised structure of the Ministry distinguishes 
between the three EU pillars. DG-C is responsible for issues under pillars one and 
three whereas DG-A is responsible for pillar two. DG-C is headed by the GS-EU 
affairs and is under the supervision of the alternate Minister for EU affairs. Issues 
of CFSP constitute the subject of DG-A11 which is part of DG-A headed by the GS 
(Kavakas, 2000: 145). The shared responsibility for European affairs between DG-
A and DG-C displays elements of co-responsibility (Kavakas, 2000).  
The phenomenon of co-responsibility [synarmodiotita] is elaborated by Kavakas 
(2000: 146-147) who suggests that DG-A is split into two parts, each one 
responsible to a different deputy General Director. The first part comprises A1, A5, 
A6, A7, A8, A9, A10 and A11 which fall under the jurisdiction of the first Director 
who is responsible for all foreign policy issues except for those that constitute 
Greek ‘national issues’. Greek national issues are the responsibility of DGs A2 
(Cyprus), A3 (the Balkans) and A4 (Turkey) which come under the second deputy 
General Director under the direct leadership of the deputy foreign minister in 
charge of Greek national issues. This separation creates problems of coordination 
when these issues are discussed in the context of CFSP where DG-A11 is 
involved. Similarly, there are overlaps when issues arise which fall under DG-A3 
on South-East Europe (directly linked to the deputy-FM) but which at the same 
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time touches on the responsibilities of DG-C1 on European External Relations 
which is directly linked to the alternate-FM for EU Affairs (Kavakas, 2000: 146).  
Further confusion is added with DG-A being in charge of coordination of political 
issues coming under all other DGs but not DG-C for EU affairs. Kavakas 
(2000:146) gives one example: when DD-C 3 on EU-Turkish relations deals with 
the fourth financial protocol to Turkey there is a problem in both representation 
and coordination with DG-A 4 on Turkey and DG-A 11 on the CFSP as this issue 
is highly politicised and is linked to the Greek position on Turkey in the CFSP. Co-
responsibility as a problem in the current organisation of the MFA was widely 
acknowledged by interviewees. According to them the problem of overlapping 
responsibility constitutes a major issue for the structure of the MFA but also for the 
wider administration (Interview, no 12; 16; 23; 30; 31; 32; 33; 37; 38; 39; 42; 43).  
‘Co-responsibility effectively means that several DGs simultaneously 
are in charge of coordinating a large number of agents, who somehow 
are also in charge of the same thing; this vicious circle makes 
coordination problematic and causes bureaucratic friction’ (Interview, no 
43).  
 
The role of the DGs: a model of hierarchical operation  
The DGs constitute the back office of the MFA (Interview, no 13). Their multiple 
roles involve monitoring political developments, information gathering, archiving 
and storing, analysis and channelling, preparation of positions and policy 
recommendations and submissions as well as policy coordination (Interview, no 
33; 38; 39; 42; 43). The model of communication is similar in all DGs. They 
receive, data, information and suggestions from embassies overseas and they 
analyse, produce memos and recommendations which are then uploaded to the 
political leadership. Very often they prepare ‘talking points’ so that political leaders 
are able to present national positions with continuity and consistency (Interview, 
no 43). They regularly receive ‘verbal notes’ from other states’ embassies in 
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Athens for joint organisation of missions and events with the purpose of deepening 
bilateral relations. Official meetings with foreign embassies take place mostly at 
the level of ambassadors and the DG at the MFA performs a preparatory role.  
DGs are headed by a diplomat of ambassadorial rank and are accountable to DG-
A Political Affairs in the MFA’s bureaucratic hierarchy. Their operation has been 
described as linear and hierarchical with a number of inherent flaws such as 
insulation from other policy areas, overlaps, delays, grey areas of responsibility, 
restricted freedom in action at the lower levels, and loss of information (Interview, 
no 33; 38). The diagram below demonstrates the pattern of communication 
between the centre – through the DGs - and the overseas missions, which 
constitutes an integral part of the foreign policy process. The established channel 
of communication is rather circular in that it is initiated by, and completed at, the 
embassies. Embassies constitute the DGs’ business partner unless the issue at 
hand concerns the EU, in which cases communication takes place with PeRepGr 
(Interview, no 42; 43) as discussed in chapter three. The process starts with a DG 
receiving input from the embassy, usually in the form of raw data. In theory, 
information should reach the DG after having been processed and analysed at the 
embassy but serious under-staffing at the embassies and increasing volumes of 
information prevent this (Interview, no 38).  
‘Lack of processing and analysis at the embassies makes our job 
ineffective. If one considers that understaffing at the HQs is also a big 
problem, then one can understand that we have to work fast to the 
detriment of the quality of what we produce’ (Interview, no 39).  
The DG in turn analyses the information and prepares memos which are 
forwarded to the DG’s political director, the DG-A political director, the GS and 
then to the political leadership. There are cases however, whereby the 
ambassador contacts directly the FM and/or the PM when matters of high political 
urgency occur. The memos fall usually within two main categories, unless there 
are other issues of an ad hoc nature (Interview, no 38). 
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a) memos which concern the internal political developments in a given state 
b) memos which concern bilateral relations between Greece and the given 
state on political, religious, economic and diaspora issues. 
Communication and the flow of information within the MFA is highly hierarchical 
and non-flexible in that it moves up and down the hierarchy within the 
organisational silos of the MFA. Figure 4.1 below depicts the standard hierarchy in 
communication between a Greek embassy and the MFA.  
 
The standard hierarchy in communication 
        
                                                            
                                             
PM 
FM 
Deputy FM 
GS 
DG-A 
Political Director 
DG Director 
DG official 
Embassy 
 
                                                          Figure 4.2 
 
The most challenging part of the job is input synthesis and analysis in order to 
present the case to the political director. ‘This is a very important part of the 
foreign policy process in that we filter and channel information as well as influence 
national positions. In the last two years the latter has been most welcome’ 
(Interview, no 38). However, shortage of staff to perform the analysis and 
synthesis tasks very often reduces DGs to mere ‘transmission belts’ to the political 
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leadership. This is because of limited personnel and administrative back-up, 
combined with large amounts of input from embassies, (Interview, no 33). 
Indicative of the extent of understaffing is the ratio between staff and countries 
monitored. For instance, there is only one official in the MFA to deal with nearly 10 
Middle Eastern countries, and 4 diplomats in total to deal with 22 Eastern states in 
which Greece has major vested interests. While at the same time, Portugal, of a 
similar size to Greece, has allocated 6 to 7 diplomats to deal with Syria and 
Lebanon alone (Interview, no 39).  
Emerging from the problem of understaffing, limited ‘socialisation’ was identified by 
MFA officials as another weakness, which arguably leads to constrained ‘learning’. 
MFA officials feel that due to personnel shortages they do not have the chance to 
‘socialise and circulate’ with counterparts as is common with other foreign 
ministries’ officials. An MFA official argued that low income in conjunction with 
minimal administrative back-up and the Greek government’s cuts in professional 
trips discourage officials from travelling (Interview, no 33). Therefore, due to 
limited travelling they feel that they are disconnected from new diplomatic 
practices and techniques and are locked into old ineffective practices which their 
opposite numbers may have abandoned.   
Amongst such practices are traditionalism, strict operational hierarchy and protocol 
within the service or mission (Interview, no 48; 49) as well as lack of personal 
initiatives, resources and incentives (Interview, no 33; 38). The issue of hierarchy 
emerged in the majority of the interviews and was characterised as the major 
problem of the MFA with high costs in terms of timely operation and efficiency at a 
time when most of the MFAs move towards flatter organisational structures 
(Interview, no 2; 32; 33; 38).   
‘The case at the moment is that we pass on information to the DG 
Director, the DG-A Director, the GS and political leadership and this 
creates a need for intensive coordination. Often the Director does not 
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respond and automatically there is a lack of coordination and a waste of 
time and resources’ (Interview, no 33).  
 
Officials argued that they should be given more operational flexibility and 
autonomy for the purpose of completing the processing of tasks they carry out by 
bypassing their DG’s political director and/or DG-A political director.  
‘Even though the contribution of the DGs as the bureaucratic link 
between two different parts of the diplomatic network that is the 
overseas mission and the centre, is becoming more important and we 
are given more freedom in terms of proposals and submissions, our 
input to the MFA’s vision and strategy is not encouraged’ (Interview, no 
43).  
Officials claimed that they do not feel part of an integrated machinery and that a 
high workload in conjunction with understaffing limits socialisation and renders 
their offices ‘memo producing industries’ (Interview, no 33). Interviewees 
emphasised that verticality in their modus operandi does not encourage horizontal 
cooperation either; rather their working model resembles a number of parallel silos 
headed by DG-A.   
‘In many instances the preparatory work of the DGs overlaps and is 
disconnected from work prepared in the office next door. Thus, the 
overlap is realised only when our preparatory work reaches the top of 
the ladder. To add to the frustration DGs memos and talking points are 
often ignored thus eliminating our contribution to the policy process’ 
(Interview, no 38).  
A MFA official gave the example of a DG submitting a recommendation regarding 
the freezing of entry visas for one country’s nationals for a specific reason which 
was ignored by the political leadership and explained that this is how the foreign 
policy process becomes politicised. He argued that  
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‘If one thinks that bureaucrats have one eye set on Greece (domestic 
environment) and one eye set on the international environment  - 
whereas the political leadership cares only for ensuring votes for the 
coming elections- then it is easy to understand why our 
recommendations are ignored. This is very sad when you think that we 
are talking about the MFA’ (Interview, no 39).  
 
Critical junctures: change, adaptation and new functions  
 
The Greek MFA performs the basic functions of foreign ministries which, according 
to Hocking (2007: 7), are as follows: 
• filtering, analysis and dissemination of information  
• a policy advice function providing expertise to other government 
departments, the political leadership and other agents 
• a memory bank where information is stored and archived  
• a policy transfer function through which the channels of diplomatic 
communication are used to exchange information and ideas on a range of 
issues between countries on diverse issues 
• administrative functions relating to the management of the overseas 
diplomatic network, relationships with the resident corps diplomatique and 
associated diplomatic protocol matters. 
In the last three decades, however, a fluctuation has been observed in the 
importance attached to each function as well as an addition of functions. 
Interviews revealed that in the past, the operation of the MFA centred mostly upon 
the first and third functions, namely filtering, analysing and storing information 
(Interview, no 38), whereas in the last decade there has been a shift of emphasis 
towards policy advice, policy transfer and administrative functions relating to 
lending expertise over matters of protocol to other government departments 
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(Interview, no 32). The latter is closely linked to the increase of international 
engagements of other government departments and constitutes one of the main 
functions of the MFA’s linkage offices in other ministries (Interview, no 44). 
The functions of policy advice and consultation, which are increasing in 
significance, are closely linked to the widening reach of the MFA to a new range of 
sectoral policies and thus to the transformation of its role which, from being limited 
to mere policy implementation, is moving towards added input to the foreign policy 
process. Seen as ‘inevitable’ due to the increasing international activity of other 
home departments and the inability of the MFA to catch up with sectoral expertise, 
the function of policy advice revolves around the transfer of the MFA’s expertise 
over negotiation and representation  (Interview, no 30). Altogether, the variation in 
significance attached to the various functions is due to the changing mandate and 
character of the MFA epitomised in the turn towards economic diplomacy and 
international policy discussed later in the chapter.  
In post-1974 Greece, the Charter of the MFA has been reformed three times in an 
attempt to adapt the MFA to international developments. The three reforms took 
place in 1976 with Law 419/76, in 1998 with Law 2594/98 and in 2007 with Law 
3566. The three revised organograms emerging from the reforms introduced 
significant change by extending the scope and functions of the MFA and adapting 
its character to the changing operational environment. There is no official 
organisation chart of the MFA.  Figure 4.1 portrays the organisation chart of the 
current organisational structure of the MFA which was collated with evidence 
gathered from the interviews and the MFA’s website. 
The three reforms, viewed in the light of institutionalism, constitute moments of 
transformative change which qualify as ‘critical junctures’. These are defined as 
moments when substantial institutional change takes place (Capoccia and 
Kelemen, 2007; Thelen, 1999; Hall and Taylor, 1996) or as crucial founding 
moments of institutional formation that send countries along broadly different 
development paths (Thelen, 1999:387). Consequently, they are embedded in the 
concept of institutional adaptation - defined in terms of innovation in the policy 
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making structures (Morrise-Schilbach, 2002:38) occurring within existing 
institutional frameworks in order to maintain existing structures (Löf, 2010). 
Therefore, in order to understand the process of adaptation and transformation of 
the Greek MFA, the aforementioned moments of change need to be evaluated. In 
this section, as mentioned above, we are mostly concerned with the latest reforms 
introduced with the 2007 Charter for the purpose of focusing on the time 
framework set at the beginning of the project.  This, of course, does not exclude 
some of the MFA reforms initially introduced in the 1998 Charter and finalised in 
2007. Prior to these reforms the average interval between MFA charters had been 
forty years (Griva, 2008). The 2007 reform came into effect only nine years after 
the 1998 charter and there is another reform which was being drafted 2010 
(Droutsas, 2010). This indicates the urgency of addressing the pressures that the 
contemporary environments, international and domestic, exercise upon the 
national machinery for foreign policy and diplomacy. Former FM Bakoyianni (2009; 
2008; 2007), in a number of addresses to the parliamentary committee for foreign 
and European affairs, declared that  
‘Greek foreign policy and diplomatic institutions need to catch up with 
contemporary foreign policy and diplomacy, which are expanding 
towards new fields of economic, social and cultural action.’  
Reflecting the changing perception with regards to the conduct of foreign policy 
and diplomacy in conjunction with Greece’s widening spectrum of international 
policy and strategic priorities for economic and political leadership in the Balkans 
region, the 2007 Charter aims to turn the MFA into a contemporary and flexible 
ministry by modernising its structures both at home and overseas (Bakoyianni, 
2008). As a MFA official suggested when referring to the 2007 reforms:  
‘In the 21st century, if the MFA wishes to retain its relevance and 
centrality in the Greek foreign policy machinery, it has to find a role and 
a way to re-establish itself’ (Interview, no 32).  
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The 2007 reforms aimed at addressing the failures of existing MFA organisational 
arrangements and sought to enhance its operation and functions in a way similar 
to other foreign ministries in the EU. The central objectives of the reforms were the 
promotion of economic diplomacy as the core function of the MFA, the 
reaffirmation and rearrangement of the functions of crises management and 
international development and aid, the enhancement of the Ministry’s 
communication with civil society and technological modernisation, as well as the 
assertion of the MFA’s leading role amidst the national bureaucratic architecture 
as the ultimate policy coordinator of Greece’s foreign and international policy. Also 
evident in the Charter are the changing perception of the MFA’s mandate and role 
amidst the Greek foreign policy bureaucracy. For this purpose, the Charter 
introduced a number of institutional additions and innovations which are translated 
into new areas of action and functions elaborated in the sections that follow.  
Another area of innovation of the 2007 Charter concerns the promotion of direct 
communication with Greek nationals overseas and with civil society. Direct 
communication with Greek nationals is implemented through a series of new 
institutions and mechanisms such as the ‘centre for information and support of 
Greek nationals abroad’, ‘the office for promotion of Greek candidates to 
international organisations’ and the ‘centre for analysis and planning of Greek 
foreign policy’ (KAS in Greek or according to the latest charter EKAS). The latter 
aims to bring together diplomats and scientists for the purpose of analysing 
information and submitting proposals thus increasing extra-MFA input to the 
foreign policy process (Karabarbounis, 2007: 200 and 212). KAS19 aims to analyse 
and propose policy after consultations and cooperation with academics, diplomats, 
and special scientific consultants and research centres such as ELIAMEP, EKEM 
and others (Griva, 2008: 448-449).  
It has to be mentioned, however, that the operation of KAS has been 
characterised as ineffective and unproductive on the grounds that it does not 
address the real problems and challenges that the MFA is currently confronting 
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(Interview, no 22). On the contrary, views and opinions of some senior diplomats 
are recycled and the input from overseas missions is rather limited (Interview, no 
22). Such comments were further supported by the review of a significant number 
of issues of the MFA’s Bulletin which is aimed at informing diplomats about current 
developments. The issues reviewed were rhetorical and generic in nature, only 
touching upon global trends and phenomena as interpreted by Greek diplomats 
and politicians as opposed to in-depth analyses found in the existing literature.  
With regards to the MFA reforms, the 2007 Charter reinforced the MFA’s position 
amidst the bureaucratic architecture whilst maintaining the Ministry’s special legal 
status within the Greek bureaucracy. More specifically, under the 2007 reforms the 
insulation of the MFA from state employment law was retained (Griva, 2008: 490).  
‘The MFA albeit being part of the rest of bureaucracy is at the same 
time unique. It has its own system for recruitment, promotions and 
management which are insulated from any other government 
department. It is sui generis and has its own legal regime provided for 
by its charter’ (Interview, no 30).  
The 2007 Charter reaffirms the leading role of the MFA vis-à-vis the rest of Greek 
bureaucracy in terms of the management of international policy by attributing to 
the MFA the prestigious role of the ultimate policy coordinator (Law 3566/2007 art 
6). This function is discussed in the following sections.  
Despite its innovative nature, the 2007 Charter was greeted with lukewarm 
response from the Union of Greek Diplomats20. It was severely criticised for being 
anachronistic, unable to respond to current demands and for encouraging 
favouritism and party affiliation. In a letter addressed to the FM in 2008 the 
Diplomats’ Union accused the political leadership of perpetuating a legalistic and 
constitutional approach to the foreign and diplomatic process by allocating the 
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 As well as from the Union of Commerce and Trade attachés and the Union of Press and 
Communication attachés 
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drafting of the charter to lawyers and legislators and for ignoring the country’s 
diplomatic needs.  
For instance, the charter’s increase in the number of Celebrity Diplomats –that is 
the tendency to employ celebrities for purposes of diplomatic tasks- from 5 to 15 
was condemned on the grounds that citizens cannot be trusted with the 
competence of exercising diplomacy21. Other criticisms relate to art. 1 of the 
Charter on the MFA’s mission which, in conjunction with art. 5 on the MFA’s 
competence, fails to confirm the necessity of diplomatic input into the foreign 
policy process, thus limiting the role of the diplomatic service with regard to policy 
implementation.  
 
The function of economic diplomacy 
The ultimate innovation of the 2007 Charter is the organisational re-structuring of 
the MFA on the basis of economic diplomacy as a response to globalisation and 
the post-Cold War order. The shift of its traditional political profile towards 
economic diplomacy in its international relations came naturally as the result of the 
normalisation of relations in the post Cold War era and the development of 
regional cooperation in sectoral policies (Karabarbounis, 2007: 207). Here a 
clarification must be made. In Greek foreign policy discourse the term ‘economic 
diplomacy’ is used to describe the Greek diplomacy which aims at promoting 
Greek commerce, trade and businesses abroad, in other words, commercial 
diplomacy22.  
In the case of Greece, economic diplomacy is defined by Law 2297/1995 art. 1 
para.5 as the monitoring of foreign countries’ economies, the systematic research 
of the market at the locus of the mission, the pursuit of foreign investment in 
Greece and the promotion of Greek investments abroad, the monitoring of trends 
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 See Bayne and Woolcock, 2003: 4-5 for the distinction between economic and commercial 
diplomacy 
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in bilateral trade and the ensuring of trade and economic agreements, mediation of 
trade disputes and the monitoring of agricultural policy, sea and air transfer policy. 
Stoforopoulos and Makridimitris, 1997: 139). In this sense, what has been 
conventionally termed as Greek economic diplomacy would be more appropriately 
defined as commercial diplomacy. Nonetheless, the former term is used 
throughout the thesis for purposes of consistency with existing Greek literature. 
Economic diplomacy prior to 2007 was the ‘Cinderella’ of Greek foreign policy with 
its management allocated to economic and commercial offices (Interview, no 13). 
The 2007 Charter heralds an attitudinal change involving a major organisational 
change in the MFA reflecting a strategic reorientation towards economic 
diplomacy. More specifically, the charter aims at setting up the appropriate political 
and institutional environment with the MFA as its primary vehicle in order to 
facilitate the building of business networks in order to support the Greek economy 
and business interests overseas (Bakoyianni, 2008; 2007). In this light, it mobilises 
and centralises under its institutional umbrella the entire the foreign policy 
bureaucracy, including the sector of commercial and trade attachés, who 
previously belonged to the MNEC.  
In other words, the MFA, under the current reforms, absorbs the competence of 
what has traditionally been the section of ‘Economic and Commercial Affairs’ 
executed by economic and commercial attachés (Interview, no 23). 
Organisationally, the MFA responded by creating new positions such as the 
General Secretariat for International Economic Relations in the MFA, the 
peripheral General Secretariat for International Economic Relations which resides 
in Thessaloniki, special overseas offices for Greek national interests, and the DG 
for International Development Cooperation YDAS (2007 Charter). Arguably, the 
Charter has marked a shift in the MFA’s mandate from political to economic work 
(Interview, no 32; Karabarbounis, 2007: 200).  
The turn towards economic diplomacy was further substantiated with changes in 
the diplomatic academy’s curriculum and the diplomatic career path which are 
reviewed in the following chapter. The Charter declares that from 2007 onwards all 
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diplomats who graduate from the Diplomatic Academy must serve as economic 
and commercial attachés, thus gradually taking over the posts which previously 
belonged to the graduates of the School of National Public Administration. The 
compulsory three to five-year posting to an economic and commercial office is to 
be supported by the extension of studies in the Diplomatic Academy which 
increases the six-monthly training on economic and commercial issues to a one-
year compulsory module. This reflects the transition of economic diplomacy from a 
marginal activity to the MFA’s core function and as the underlying principle for the 
re-organisation of the MFA’s overseas network (Karabarbounis, 2007: 200) which 
is also discussed in the following chapter.  
This transition aims to create a new generation of diplomats freed from the 
traditional political-economic divide between diplomats and trade/commercial 
attachés, causing friction and a lack of coordination. This change aims to ensure 
the preparedness of the Diplomatic Academy’s graduates to manage issues of 
economic nature and to vest them with the appropriate diplomatic elements 
(Diplomatic Academy of Greece, 2008; Karabarbounis, 2007: 200; Interview, no 
44). The turn towards economic diplomacy has major implications for the overseas 
network and more specifically for the economic and commercial offices as well as 
the role of Greek diplomats.  
 
International development cooperation and aid 
Another function consolidated and strengthened with the latest reform is 
international development cooperation under the heading of YDAS Secretariat. 
YDAS or Hellenic Aid23 comprises six directorates: namely humanitarian aid, 
rehabilitation and development, strategic planning, NGO development education 
and technical and administrative services. Hellenic Aid is the national coordinator 
for Greek international cooperation policy and constitutes one of the three main 
pillars of contemporary Greek foreign policy. Hellenic Aid reflects the gradual 
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change in the substance of Greek foreign policy which aims to strengthen bridges 
with civil society and enhance communication between different civilizations 
(Hellenic Aid Yearly Report, 2006).  
Greek international cooperation policy has coordinated its action with the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and its 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and promotes its renewed and 
alternative approach to diplomacy while enhancing its soft power overseas 
(Hellenic Aid Yearly Report, 2006: 8). Greek international cooperation policy could 
be portrayed in three concentric circles with one circle representing the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) as set by DAC, another circle representing EU 
international development priorities and another corresponding to Greek foreign 
policy priorities.  
The shared space between the three circles defines the area of Greek action 
(Hellenic Aid Yearly Report, 2006: 26). Greek strategy for development 
cooperation has a five year horizon and is organised with geographic and thematic 
criteria. Until recently the Balkans constituted YDAS’s ultimate geographical 
focus24 through the Hellenic Plan for Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans 
(HiPERB)25 which simultaneously forms one of the main pillars of Greek economic 
diplomacy. Recently, YDAS’s agenda has expanded to issues of wider economic 
development, to the fight against people trafficking and international health 
(Hellenic Aid Yearly Report, 2006: 26).  
Greece became a donor country for the first time in 1997 by participating in a five 
year development program and officially joined the international coalition against 
poverty in 2000. It was then that the portfolio for development cooperation and aid 
was transferred to the MFA together with the respective bureaucracy from the 
MNEC. However, arguably, only as recently as 2004 did YDAS start to work ‘quite 
effectively’ (Interview, no 13). For Greece this new function heralds a new era for 
                                                   
24
 For 2008-2011 the geographical focus of Greece or else Greek strategic development partners 
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its diplomacy as it can promote an image of good will abroad removed from the 
traditional focus on Greek antiquity and thus strengthen its political and economic 
relationships.  
Hellenic Aid Greece aims to promote a modern and alternative approach to 
diplomacy and encourage the involvement of NGOs and civil society. Most 
importantly, by embracing development diplomacy, Hellenic Aid aims to promote a 
renewed wave of philhellenism in the societies of the aid-receivers and strengthen 
its influence in the international community on the basis of its provision of 
development and humanitarian aid (The Bridge Magazine, 2010). An YDAS official 
characterized the creation of the secretariat as:  
‘The concrete proof of the Greek governments’ realization that the 
changing international environment increases demands for allocation of 
funds in international policy and enhancing your soft power. We have 
moved away from our traditional national concerns. Only international 
stability, cooperation and sympathy26 can guarantee our national 
existence’ (Interview, no 16).  
The interviewee suggested that the fact that the MFA now works closely with 
NGOs is a big step for Greece. It constitutes the realisation that ‘there is life 
outside the PMO, the MFA and MNEC (Interview, no 16).  
‘Most importantly however, it constitutes a shift in Greek understanding 
of the international environment and of the appropriate foreign policy 
levers in the 21st century which relate to one’s overseas likeability and 
improved image’ (Interview, no 13).  
Greek diplomatic missions are now adapting to this new role of becoming missions 
of ‘compassion’ and promoting alternative diplomacy (The Bridge Magazine, 
2010). This adaptation reveals the realization that offering aid improves a state’s 
public/foreign image in a much more effective way than would a speech by a 
politician/diplomat (Interview, no 18). Greece was named by UN General 
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 The term sympathy was used in its Greek original meaning which refers to likeability  
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Secretary Kofi Annan as ‘an international power in humanitarian aid’ and it now 
wishes to uphold this role (Platis date not available).  
Hellenic Aid, headed by a diplomat of ambassadorial rank, is a very small unit in 
comparison to similar units in other countries. Aid is provided as a response to 
official requests through international organisations, by another country or people 
within that country. The MFA at the turn of the 21st century is in a state of 
increased vigilance and alertness about crises away from home (Interview, no 26) 
and its major aid contribution focuses mostly on the Mediterranean area 
(Interview, no 16). Traditional good relations with the Middle East, deriving from 
Greece being considered as ‘less Westernised than the rest of the West’ have 
enabled it to provide help in situations where aid from other countries was 
declined. For instance in 2006 Greece was the first donor country to provide help 
to Lebanon with the UNHCR mission using Greek vessels. Amongst western aid, 
only vessels with the Greek flag were allowed to anchor in Lebanon (Interview, no 
16). 
 ‘In the case of Gaza, Greece was again the first to send C130 military 
transport aircrafts to deliver humanitarian aid. Belgium had the brilliant 
idea to transfer wounded kids and Greece aligned straight away and 
offered humanitarian aid. It was a reflexive response which shows 
growing diplomatic substance’ (Interview, no 26). 
Hellenic Aid works very closely with a) Greek and other embassies and consular 
offices b) NGOs c) international organisations d) other domestic ministries such as 
the Ministry of Health and MoD and e) domestic municipalities. ‘Such multilayered 
cooperation is a new thing for Greece despite our long tradition in offering 
humanitarian aid on an ad hoc basis’ (Interview, no 16). YDAS on a European 
level communicates with the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office 
(ECHO) via situation reports and on an international level with the UN through the 
Relief Web.  
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Greece has a growing international presence through Greek NGOs which 
systematically fund Niger, Sudan and Ethiopia and provide military aid for 
transportation (non-armed personnel) and trade shipping (Interview, no 16). The 
only international NGO that the Greek government formally sponsors is the Red 
Cross. An YDAS official drew the attention to the fact that there is difference 
between offering help and having one’s help accepted. For instance in Myanmar 
(Burma) Greek help was accepted and Greece got to the field straight after the 
International Organisations. French aid for instance was declined despite the fact 
that they were carrying 200.000 tonnes of food (Interview, no 16).  
The operation of the secretariat largely depends on the issue at hand. As a 
Hellenic Aid official (Interview, no 16) explained, normally, with a request being 
received, a coordinating committee is set up with officials of the DG backed by 
political leadership to coordinate action amongst various domestic departments 
and municipalities if necessary. Usually the first departments to work together are 
the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, of Defence and Health and then, depending on 
the matter, the police or mayors may be involved.  
If for instance extra workers are needed in the port of Athens to load a ship with 
aid usually aiming to embark within the following 12 hours, that is an expense 
covered by the Greek public sector and needs to be organised by the mayor of 
Athens in conjunction with the Minister of Transportation or/and Maritime. If, for 
example, there is need for medicines, the committee instantaneously 
communicates with the Ministry of Health and coordinates action with the Red 
Cross. This committee will meet several times if needed with NGOs, as was the 
case with the Asian Tsunami in 2004, and draw a plan of action and allocate 
responsibilities. If for instance an airplane has to be sent within twelve hours – 
which, in practice, means that it has to be ready in eight hours - then Hellenic Aid 
will oversee preparations.  
Despite the renewed significance attached to development aid and assistance, the 
allocated budget is very small. Development assistance since early 2010 
comprises 0.50% of Greek GDP in compliance with OECD’s Development 
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Assistance Committee’s guidelines (Platis, date not available). YDAS officials 
(Interviews, no 13; 16) stated that budget limitations do not allow Greece to 
participate in all aid missions. For instance, in places considered as not cost-
effective such as Africa, Hellenic Aid would not be directly involved, offering only 
funds but without committing people, aircraft or ships.  
Greece is a small donor in comparison to many other countries which allocate 
large funds to humanitarian aid, proportionate to their population or economy, and 
for this reason, Greek influence in international developments and policies is 
limited.  
‘We cannot intervene to the extent that Sweden does in terms of 
formulating international development policy. When Sweden allocates 
60 billion Euros for development and we allocate 60 million Euros and 
we are the last on the list of funding then, naturally, we would be 
followers and observers most of the time. At least what we have 
learned, which took a long time, is not to cause a problem! Our attitude 
has changed dramatically. Until relatively recently our ‘old school’ 
diplomats would not hesitate to oppose common international positions 
as a result of their unrealistic understanding of our objective means and 
international position’ (Interview no, 13).  
‘We are improving and we aim in the near future to participate more in 
programmes of human safety and good governance’ (Interview, no 16).  
At the moment YDAS appears to suffer from the same problems as the rest of the 
Greek administration. Under-staffing, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, 
keeps staff busy with their basic tasks (Interview, no 13; 16).  
An official compared the organisational arrangement of the Greek secretariat for 
development and assistance with that of other countries and argued that the 
Greek case lags behind. Other countries even have development consultants in 
their permanent overseas missions, and it is these, in cooperation with the 
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embassy, that decide upon the mission’s budget. The embassy submits a proposal 
to the HQ for assessment and government funding.  
‘In Greece we do not even have a budget! We only have extreme 
centralisation. The magnitude of aid and organisational funds are 
determined at the core of the political leadership and this is why they do 
not correspond to contemporary demands’ (Interview, no 13).  
Centralisation was characterised as a significant weakness in the organisation of 
international development cooperation in Greece leading to overlapping 
responsibility. YDAS officials, in a power point presentation on the ‘Hellenic Aid’s 
Priorities and Objectives’ presented to the author, submitted a proposal to 
decentralise the process by setting up ad hoc development offices in overseas 
missions based on given needs and which would be removed with the ending of 
the program. A development office was set up in Sri Lanka with significant 
success. However, the proposal until now remains largely on paper despite its 
significance in terms of resource and personnel management (Interview, no 13). 
Arguably, as noted in the presentation, the only step towards decentralisation 
involved diplomats performing project monitoring in developing countries beyond 
monitoring procedures undertaken at the HQ. 
 
Crisis management  
Closely linked to the function of development aid and assistance is the function of 
crisis management, which constitutes a relatively new competence for the MFA. 
The function formed part of the MFA’s central organisational structure in the 1998 
reforms and was reaffirmed in the 2007 charter. The competence of crisis 
management was allocated to the GS of the MFA and the unit responsible for it 
resides in the GS office at the central building of the MFA. This function reinforces 
the overarching position of the MFA in the bureaucratic coordination scheme 
elaborated below and reasserts the MFA’s role in civilian protection both at home 
and abroad. At the same time, it heralds a new era for extensive cooperation 
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between the HQ and the overseas missions but also between the HQ and other 
government departments (Interview, no 18).  
A Crisis Unit official (Interview, no 18) explained that the activation of the crisis 
management mechanism resembles somewhat the operation of YDAS. The Unit 
receives information with regard to crises from Greek and other embassies, NGOs 
and other agencies such as international organisations. Crisis situations that reach 
the unit in the form of ‘requests’ are assessed at the GS office and are then 
forwarded to the PMO where action is jointly decided. The Crisis Unit makes a 
case for the appropriate level of response and draws up the ‘action plan’. This 
translates into the setting up of a committee which comprises lead ministries and 
other government departments under the supervision of the Crisis Unit and the 
GS. The Unit puts in place a channel of communication between those making a 
request, international organisations, NGOs and other government departments. 
The Unit works closely with the EU Civil Protection Agency and Situation Centre 
(2007 Charter art. 14) and has seconded civil protection representatives to 
PeRepGr as a response to the increasing demands for managing international 
crises (Interview, no 18). 
The core role of the MFA in crisis management and civil protection has two 
aspects: firstly, macroscopic policy planning; and secondly representation and 
support of nationals overseas. Macroscopic policy and planning reach beyond 
countering crises to rehabilitation. As a Crisis Unit official (Interview, no 18) 
suggested, there is little point in offering aid and assistance without any further 
planning with regard to rehabilitation in the area. For a small national economy 
such as Greece, involvement in managing international crises and provision of the 
required level of support for rehabilitation is challenging.  
This is because, in the case of evacuation for instance, Greece cannot offer 
evacuees jobs at home. For this reason Greece puts added emphasis on the 
resetting of local balances. This approach has resulted in substantial change in the 
relationship between HQ and overseas missions as well as in the operation of the 
missions per se. 
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 ‘Ever since crisis management climbed higher up on the Greek agenda, 
missions’ job routine has changed to include intense involvement in 
local communities and reporting back home. This is because in places 
where crises have emerged, previously ‘easy posts’ where seconded 
representatives attended a couple of business activities in the area and 
threw a couple of cocktail parties in order to boost the exports of Greek 
olive oil and feta, have become intensive information hubs ’ (Interview, 
no 18).  
Similar intensification in the activities of overseas missions is related to an 
increased need for representation and support for nationals overseas who are 
there either through maritime activities, studies, travelling or for health reasons. 
Greece has intensified consular representation and assistance for issues that fall 
outside the sphere of politics or diplomacy.  
‘Greek governments have realised that such issues are becoming more 
important as they are directly linked to our nationals. The proof is the 
increase in funds allocated for consular purposes since 2000’ (Interview, 
no 18).  
Nevertheless, this has to be put in the right context. The function of crisis 
management for Greece, and for any country of the size and economy of Greece, 
should not be magnified. Greece is not directly involved in a large number of 
international crises. For this reason Greece does not prioritise a holistic strategic 
approach to international crisis management in the sense of strategically 
reorganising its overseas missions to support this function. Rather, the function 
remains operative at the centre where action is coordinated at the Crisis Unit. 
Notably, change observed in certain post-crisis posts is symptomatic rather than 
strategic in that it appears only as a result of already emergent crises (Interview, 
no 30). 
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International policy coordination  
International policy coordination in Greece, as elsewhere, has been seriously 
challenged both by globalisation and membership of the EU (Interview, no 2; 3; 18; 
32). Persistence of traditional vertical organisation and operational modes in the 
MFA, as well as of other ministries, has had serious implications for policy 
coordination in an era when a number of agencies involved in foreign and 
international policy management cut across several government departments. 
Foreign and international policy coordination, a prestigious bureaucratic task, has 
often caused friction and antagonism amongst Greek bureaucratic agents who 
have competed over it (Interview, no 1). The centrality of the MFA in foreign policy 
coordination has been very well established. The MFA has always been the main 
coordinator of Greek foreign policy associated with high politics and issues of 
national and territorial significance.  
However, in the current domestic political environment, the MFA is reaffirming its 
primacy in coordination in all areas of Greek external policy, thus extending its 
function to the broader agendas of international policy becoming the primus inter 
pares coordinator (Interview, no 1; 14). Article 5 of the standing 2007 charter 
stipulates the role of the MFA, which inter alia involves the monitoring of bilateral 
and international policies, economic, cultural and other matters as well as matters 
of international security and the formulation of recommendations to the 
government (para. 2). Paragraph 7 of the same article provides for the 
coordination of ministries and departments with regards to formulation, 
implementation and assessment of both European and foreign policy.  
Based on the 2007 Charter, the MFA takes charge of monitoring and coordinating 
all external policies, both economic and political27. The MFA holds a monopoly 
over coordinating and consulting all ministries and state departments with regard 
to actions with an external dimension (Law 3566/2007 art. 6 para b) whilst 
overseas representation is shared with other ministries (Law 3566/2007 art. 6 para 
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2a). The allocation of international policy coordination to the MFA aims to 
strengthen and reaffirm its centrality and significance vis-á-vis other departments 
in the management of all Greek external policies (Interview, no 3). Most 
importantly, it seeks to centralise all external competence political and 
economic/sectoral under a single organisational structure, that of the MFA, with 
the aim to merge political and technical aspects of external policy as a response to 
globalisation and the economisation of foreign policy (Interview, no 32).  
During the pre-accession negotiations for Greek entry to the EC, the leading role 
in European policy coordination was allocated to the MCo - renamed the MNEC in 
1982 28 - on the grounds that EC policy would concern issues of an economic and 
technical nature (Passas, 2005: 365; Passas and Makridimitris, 1993; Spanou; 
Tsinizelis, 1996: 218). After Greek accession to the EC, in 1981, the role of the 
MNEC was limited to coordination of the technical/economic ministries as well as 
the adjustment of the Greek economy to the EC while policy coordination for 
political matters of the EC was transferred to the MFA.  
Since 1981, there has been antagonism and friction between the two ministries as 
well as confusion due to the increasingly overlapping nature of foreign policy. Even 
though this scheme was initially intended to enhance centralisation, in practice it 
proved to be decentralised and it was only in the early 1990s that a government 
committee for the co-ordination of the relations between Greece and the EU was 
set up. This committee is presided over by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and is 
composed of the economic and main technical ministers. Its success depended, 
however, not only on the adoption of a more coherent policy but also on the 
acceptance of a more collective approach to decision-making (Spanou C. 1998: 
475) which was the result of membership to the EU. 
The increasingly unclear and dual - political and economic - content of foreign 
policy has often caused confusion with regard to the two ministries’ jurisdiction and 
responsibility for coordination (Interview, no 9; 12). Obscurity concerning each 
department’s involvement in the coordination of given policies has resulted in 
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friction that has reached levels requiring the intervention of the PM (termed as 
negative coordination) whose office is in constant communication with the MFA 
(Passas, 2005: 365; Tsinizelis, 1996: 220).  
It has been argued that the task of international policy coordination has been both 
underestimated and overestimated by the two ministries (Interview, no 8). 
Underestimated because its significance in policy management is not adequately 
appreciated and thus never effectively performed. Despite the fact that 
coordination has been the cause of discord between the MFA and the MNEC, 
neither of the two departments has ever had a strategic approach aiming at 
maximising it (Interview, no 8). At the same time it has been overestimated 
because it is seen only as a political rather than a bureaucratic problem (Interview, 
no 8).  
In practice, the distribution of coordination responsibility is determined on a 
pragmatic basis based on the agenda of the General Affairs and External 
Relations Council (GAERC) and the Economic and Financial Affairs Council 
(ECOFIN) at the European level and, more generally, to the agenda of the specific 
international forum in which Greece is involved. ‘Even though coordination of any 
external policy is the MFA’s job in strictly financial matters the MNEC steps in’ 
(Interview, no 2). For instance it is the MNEC which is in charge of coordinating 
policy related to the EU Budget as well as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
and the economic aspects of CFSP, even though for the last two, responsibility is 
shared with the Ministry of Agriculture and the MFA respectively (Interview, no 2).  
A coordinating committee under the MFA’s GS or the Deputy FM for dual 
economic-political issues was set up in the 1990s but  was short-lived because ‘in 
the Greek bureaucracy such committees are doomed to fail due to the nature of 
the very bureaucratic architecture and the politicisation of the foreign policy 
process’ (Interview, no 2). Over the years, coordination of international economic 
issues has passed to the MFA as set out in the 2007 Charter. It has been argued 
that the gradual rise of the MFA to the top of the coordination pyramid can be 
attributed to the fact that the economic ministry in Greece has been so drawn into 
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domestic economic problems, such as unemployment, deficits and debts, that the 
foreign and international dimension of its economic policies are left to the MFA 
(Interview, no 30). 
As indicated in the first section, compartmentalisation in the organisational 
structure of the MFA results in co-responsibility as a response to cross-cutting 
policies. This produces overlaps leading to lack of clarity in bureaucratic 
responsibility and in definitions of functions of posts and sections both at the 
political and bureaucratic level (Interview no, 32). Co-responsibility, effectively 
translating into two, three or even four DGs sharing responsibility over the same 
policy area, has significant implications for policy coordination (Interview, no 22; 
32; 37; 42; 43). Even at the level of political leadership, there is vagueness in 
relation to the distribution of responsibility and function between the Foreign 
Minister and the deputy Foreign Minister due to the blurred distinction between 
technical/economic or political matters (Anastasopoulos, 1986: 640).   
Passas (2005: 370) suggests that the grouping of services under three main 
headings, with the first being coordinated by the MFA’s GS, the second by the GS-
EU and the third by the GS-IER, further stresses the distinction between political, 
technical or economic issues. International policy has been seen until recently as 
comprising technical issues with an international dimension - in other words as low 
policy and of secondary importance to traditional foreign policy associated with 
high politics. However, things are now changing and as an MFA official stated:  
‘2000-2010 has been a decade of merging of foreign and international 
policy in the sense that you cannot tell them apart. International policy is 
becoming equally important alongside our traditional foreign policy 
concerns. The older approach of distinguishing between political and 
economic/technical issues has caused major coordination problem but 
this is now expected to change with the Lisbon Treaty. Besides, this 
realisation has been the main linchpin of the re-organisation of the MFA’ 
(Interview, no 32).  
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Changing perceptions of the MFA’s role and culture: towards a 
business approach? 
 
Evidence from the 2007 reforms demonstrates significant change in the 
institutional adaptation of the MFA to contemporary developments through the 
addition of functions and areas of action. At the same time, evidence from MFA 
reports, governmental documentation and a large number of interviews in the 
Ministry in Athens and in overseas missions, indicate ongoing discussions with 
regards to the MFA’s changing culture. Such discussions, however, produce an 
unclear image of the MFA bureaucratic culture. This is because, on the one hand, 
significant data portray the MFA culture as changing in a way that reflects the 
changes introduced by the 2007 reforms, whereas, on the other hand, some argue 
that it continues to reflect general characteristics of Greek administration such as 
politicization, hierarchy, centralisation and resistance to change.  
Analysis of the evidence points to the direction of a discrepancy in cultural 
perception, which is directly linked to the experience of the officials interviewed. 
More specifically, the argument for a ‘new MFA culture’ seems to be supported by 
the political leadership which aims to instil a degree of newness and innovation, 
and by bureaucrats who socialize into EU policy making fora. At the same time, 
the experience of a number of officials located in Athens differs significantly. They 
describe the departmental culture as stagnating and stuck in its nepotistic and 
politicized tradition. Without necessarily constituting contradictory accounts, a 
number of conflicting elements make up the MFA’s contemporary departmental 
culture which could be described as of delayed ‘maturity’ elaborated below. 
The protracted dilemma discussed in chapter two, as to whether Greece belongs 
to the West or the Balkans, has been imprinted on the MFA’s departmental 
culture. The Greek foreign policy system, with the MFA at its centre, has been 
seeking an identity. Prolonged preoccupation with high politics relating to Greek 
national interests defined in terms of its ‘national issues’ of Skopje, Cyprus and 
Turkey, demonized Greek foreign policy and thus strengthened the MFA’s political 
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character and identification of its role as a gatekeeper (Interview, no 14; 17). 
Accession to the EC and later to the EU added a more technical dimension in the 
form of low policies while global demands and economisation of foreign policy 
pushed the MFA towards a quest for an identity or, according to some, for a new 
identity (Interview, no 32). Such a quest was reinforced by the changing 
perception of Greek strategic national interests. The MFA, together with the Greek 
government, in early 2000 redefined the ‘Greek national interest’ both in qualitative 
and geographical terms. Effectively, Greek national interests have hitherto been 
defined in terms of regional economic and business leadership, strengthening 
bilateral economic and commercial ties and promoting Greek exports in South 
East Europe, the Black Sea region, the Arab and the Gulf states, Russia, China 
and India (Doukas, 2007; Platis, date not available).  
The newly defined perception of Greek interests and agendas has been central to 
the attitude of the MFA and its officials. The MFA’s political leadership has 
proclaimed a new attitudinal approach of the MFA which is characterized by 
‘openness’ and ‘outwardness’ in terms of business activity and socialisation 
(Interview, no 28; Bakoyianni, 2008). This turn reflected the ‘metamorphosis’ of the 
MFA from a gatekeeper to a Greek businesses promoter. The MFA, which 
previously perceived itself as the gatekeeper safeguarding Greek territorial 
integrity in a turbulent region, wishes to portray itself in the 21st century as a 
ministry engaged in promoting business activity with a regional - if not international 
- range of vested interests (Interview, no 28). According to officials in charge of 
Greece’s economic diplomacy in overseas posts 
‘This metamorphosis is reflected also through the models of 
organisation that we adopt. Our foreign policy system, with the MFA at 
its core, was initially set up based on the French École Nationale 
d’Administration (ENA). In the 21st century we are moving towards the 
British model29. How do we understand this? We have always worked to 
an extent with line ministries but now these ministries, as we call them - 
                                                   
29
 The same statement was made by interviewee no 26 
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the productive ministries - are our main linkage and the promotion of 
their international portfolio is our number one priority. The MFA’s aim, 
which reflects the government’s strategy, is to produce salespeople who 
sell Greek interests overseas. We need to sell overseas and this is a 
new thing for Greece. This is a new culture that the political leadership 
is trying to instil […]. The Greek foreign policy system is becoming a 
neural system, a network of salesmen with the aim of developing   
existing underdeveloped business activity. It is no longer enough to play 
ambassadors in cocktail parties. We are sales representatives and the 
heads of overseas missions must perceive themselves as CEOs and 
not as cardinals as used to be the case. We are a culture in change’ 
(Interview, no 28).  
This changing perception heralds the emergence of a new identity for the MFA. An 
MFA official stated when analysing the changing nature of the Greek MFA, that ‘an 
evolutionary process has started here which signifies a change of character’ 
(Interview, no 42). Similarly, the Deputy FM Valinakis in 2007 (Valinakis, 2007) 
stressed in his address to the parliamentary committee of foreign affairs in 2007, 
that the MFA is moving away from its traditional character of an ‘exotic’ ministry 
dominated by high politics preoccupations and working behind closed doors 
towards a ‘new identity’.  
According to this new identity, a ‘new MFA’ is at the front line of the Greek 
government’s development efforts overseas and is heading an expanding 
overseas network which is  in close partnership with Greek businessmen and 
nationals all around the globe. To aid this objective the MFA is reorganising itself, 
including the HQ and the overseas missions, with a new embassy and consular 
policy and with new Information Technology (IT) tools which are elaborated in the 
next chapter.  
The nascent perception of the MFA as the locomotive of an overseas network is 
reflected, amongst other things, in the changing attitude towards internal 
personnel movement. The Greek foreign policy machinery was traditionally divided 
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into three insulated blocks: the headquarters, the embassies and the consulates, 
each of which were governed by their own legislation, rules and practices. This 
effectively meant that the movement from one block to the other was not 
encouraged30 (Karabarbounis, 2007: 222). At the dawn of the 21st century this 
practice seems to have radically altered. Circulation between the three blocks is 
now common and encouraged and is targeted at the better understanding of the 
foreign policy and diplomatic system in its entirety (Karabarbounis, 2007: 222; 
Interview, no 28).  
The changing culture in the MFA also becomes evident in officials’ jargon and the 
communication of MFA strategies. More specifically, the deputy FM for 
International Economic Relations (Interview with D-FM Loverdos, 2003) is 
paralleled to a ‘yuppie amongst diplomats’. The Deputy suggests a whole new 
‘business’ approach to Greek diplomacy which is based on personal networking 
and making overseas missions more fine-tuned with businesses both in terms of 
function and results.  
More specifically, the deputy FM suggests that the MFA and the foreign policy 
bureaucracy are entering a new era, demonstrating a shift from the old obsession 
with the dominant Greek national issues. Even the role of the deputy FM has been 
transformed to focus on the promotion of economic affairs, and, for this reason 
deputies focus on accompanying business missions abroad rather than promoting 
dialogue with Turkey or FYROM in international fora. The new approach has been 
termed as a ‘business-like’ approach and aims at increasing trade and commercial 
agreements within given parts of the world as discussed in the next chapter.  
The renewed identity based on openness and outwardness within the MFA is also 
manifest in the changing substance of its relationship vis-à-vis other government 
departments and civil society. Traditionally, the MFA used to be the ‘crème de la 
crème’ (Interview, no 32), or for others, the ‘outsider’ (Interview, no 23) in relation 
to the rest of the Greek bureaucracy. This is now changing with the MFA creating 
                                                   
30
 For more on the different chronological phases of movement between the three blocks see 
Karabarbouni (2003) 
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linkages in other government departments and supporting their international 
activity as discussed in chapter three. The MFA has abandoned its previous ‘air of 
superiority’ vis-à-vis other ministries and is now aspiring to be considered as a 
more technocratic and productive ministry (Interview, no 31). Most importantly, the 
promotion of other ministries’ international portfolios is becoming the number one 
priority of the MFA (Interview, no 28) whilst the role of consultation is now seen as 
one of the Ministry’s main functions (Interview, no 32). 
On a similar note, the MFA promotes a relationship of openness and directness 
with civil society through the intensification of collaboration with NGOs and with 
Greek nationals overseas by making the embassies and consulates more 
accessible to the public. A service for public diplomacy and information for Greek 
journalists has been established and in 1999 a citizens’ support and information 
centre was set up (MFA website at www.mfa.gr). The MFA’s prioritization of 
deepening its relations with Greek citizens at home and abroad also becomes 
evident with the newly established twenty-four hour hotline, the setting up of a 
telephone centre for Greek nationals (Interview, no 12) and the availability of the 
MFA on social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook, thus opening up 
channels for digital and public diplomacy.  
A systematic study of the MFA’s website by the author from 2007 to 2010 
demonstrates a significant increase in publicised information ranging from 
information on signing of international agreements, to the announcement of 
cultural events around the world, Greek embassies’ news and international news 
channelled back to the HQ from the diplomatic network. The significance attached 
by the political leadership to promoting direct communication and deepening the 
relationship between Greek and other nationals and the MFA was reflected in the 
creation of the office for ‘citizens information’ established in 1999 (Griva, 2008: 
509-510) as well as in the creation of the post of press attaché overseas (Griva, 
2008: 449).  
Arguably, in Greece, some of the major MFA cultural and ideational changes, 
alongside structural changes, of the last three decades can be attributed to EU 
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membership. This is because the MFA became responsible for the functions of 
forming, coordinating and presenting Greek policy in the EU institutions (Kavakas, 
2000: 145). Membership of the EU has meant that Greece, especially through the 
CFSP, has received vast amounts of information from the diplomatic services of 
fellow member states, which provided a fertile ground for Greece extending its 
network of external relations both in political and economic terms (Kavakas, 2000: 
155).  
The increasing importance of sectoral policies (Interview, no 13) and exposure to a 
large number of policy fora have been translated into a faster work rhythm and, 
most importantly, have instilled a new ‘work ethic’ in the foreign policy bureaucracy 
(Interview, no 2; 6). Familiarisation with new ways of doing things, socialization in 
EU policy making fora and the widening spectrum of Greek international policy 
interests has brought about an ‘increased sense of responsibility (Interview, no 2; 
3; 6) and ‘ a whole new consciousness’ into the MFA’s bureaucratic culture 
(Interview, no 2; 3; 8; 16; 18; 43).  
However, this new consciousness is present mostly in young officials and 
diplomats. A young diplomat stated that  
‘Both our job and attitude are changing. We are becoming more flexible 
and less concerned with protocol. What we need is a couple of mobile 
phones and a laptop and we can work anywhere and anytime. We are 
‘laptop diplomats’. The old school diplomats, of whom we have many in 
Greece, are very resistant and demanding. They do not allow changes 
to take effect. They are the ones who make the MFA slow and rigid. We 
do not perceive ourselves as needing a big office with velvet drapes to 
accommodate our counterparts. We can negotiate over coffee and we 
do not need cocktail parties; rather we need expertise which seems to 
threaten senior diplomats who now run the HQ’ (Interview, no 32).  
Similar statements indicating resistance to change and adaptation to 
contemporary demands were proclaimed passionately by a number of officials in 
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Athens. According to them, neither the identity change nor the attempted merging 
of economics with foreign policy in the name of economic diplomacy seemed to be 
widely shared. On the contrary, officials’ experience seems to lag behind. The re-
organisation of the MFA around the function of economic diplomacy and the 
resultant departmental cultural change sound like mere rhetoric for a number of 
MFA Greek policy managers who view themselves as defending Greek territorial 
integrity such as the Aegean continental shelf in international fora backed by 
limited resources and departmental rigidity and politicisation of the diplomatic 
hierarchy (Interview, no 22). For others, the turn towards economic diplomacy is 
already part of their daily routine. Nevertheless, a generally renewed 
understanding of their world perception seemingly lags behind, demonstrating 
elements of delayed maturity. As an MFA official stated: 
‘It is only in the last couple of years that this turn is starting to be 
digested by Greek diplomats and it was about time Greek governments 
realized the importance of economic diplomacy. Economic diplomacy is 
proving to be the strongest, wisest lever of our external policy. 
Nevertheless, its significance is only now starting to be accepted by 
older hard core diplomats who are still stuck in the old ways of 
exercising diplomacy and are still obsessed with our traditional foreign 
policy concerns, namely Turkey, Cyprus and Skopje! The nightmare of 
Turkey is slowly fading away but is still haunting the foreign policy 
machinery. Only a few years ago we were negotiating exports of Greek 
cheese to South Africa. Negotiations were not fruitful because Greek 
diplomats did not support the business case well. When the mission 
returned home, its feedback report was overwhelmed with assumptions 
about the possibility of Turkey undermining the cheese trade 
agreement! Such thinking has delayed maturity in our understanding of 
the world. Evidence shows that this is gradually changing and it will only 
be a matter of a few years before it is radically changed. Young, bright 
and well educated and travelled diplomats have a new and different 
perception of Greece in the world’ (Interview, no 13).  
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The difficult symbiosis of politics and economics 
 
Despite the latest reforms which promoted economic diplomacy as the core 
function of the MFA - and thus triggered a process of change in the character of 
the institution - the division between politics and economics seems to persist both 
in terms of organisation and operation. This is manifested in their organisation in 
distinct vertical organisational units which leads to co-responsibility and overlaps.  
For instance, as illustrated in the section which discusses the organisational 
arrangement of the MFA, that management of European policy with a political 
content is dealt with by DG-A political affairs whereas issues with a technical 
content are dealt with by DG-C European affairs (Passas and Makridimitris, 1993: 
31).  
The traditional division between high and low politics, with the former classified as 
being of primary importance, is still acutely present in the structure and operation 
of the MFA, as in most EU member states (Passas, 2005: 366; Passas and 
Makridimitris, 1993: 10). The division of foreign policy into three general domains, 
namely political or else traditional, European or technical and international 
economic under the heading of the GS, GS-EU and GS-IER respectively 
reinforces a multi-pillared structure within the MFA. The resulted fragmentation is 
also evident in the overseas missions in which there is a distinction between 
different sections of representatives such as traditional MFA diplomats and 
technocrats for purposes of delivering the different MFA functions discussed in the 
following chapter. Problems occur with regards to management and representation 
when issues of a dual nature - of added political and economic substance – are at 
hand. In such instances management of dual (if not more complex) issues is 
ineffective as it falls within a grey area of unclear responsibility and shared 
competence which results in lack of action and overlaps (Interview, no 30; 32; 37).  
The problem of the grey area between economic and political diplomacy and 
diplomats was first identified in the late 1990s (Stoforopoulos and Makridimitris, 
1997: 139) and has been aggravated with pressures of globalisation which has 
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added an economic dimension to foreign policy (Interview, no 30). The MFA, 
traditionally uni-dimensional in character and mission which focused on high 
politics and with a vertical and compartmentalised organisation has been unable to 
address contemporary cross-cutting policies.  
With its organisation relying on a model of vertical organisational silos 
corresponding to distinct foreign policy domains that operate hierarchically and 
with an emphasis on geographical desks it resists horizontal models of foreign 
policy organisation prescribed by globalist approaches to foreign policy (Interview, 
no 32). This explains why for a number of interviewees the merging between 
economics and politics attempted in by the 2007 Charter was considered as 
awkward and spasmodic because it attempted to address globalization and the 
economization of foreign policy by simply transferring a new competence to the 
MFA and adding another vertical organisational unit without any horizontal 
organisational rearrangement (Interview, no 30). 
Therefore, organisational verticality and the insulation of the distinct hierarchical 
organisational domains still remains strong (Passas, 2005: 371). It is hoped that 
such fragmentation in the organisation of different branches of foreign policy and 
specifically the division between economic and traditional foreign policy will be 
eradicated with the changing curriculum of the diplomatic academy which aims at 
gradually creating a multi-diplomat for the 21st century (Interview no 44) which 
shows evidence of more holistic approaches to foreign policy discussed in the next 
chapter. The new multi-diplomat will engage in economic, technical and politic 
dealings (Interview no 44). Nevertheless, at the moment: ‘The intended fusion 
between economics and politics is on the way but not there yet (Interview, no 28).  
Organisational fragmentation and verticality constitute persistent traits of the 
Greek foreign policy system and render it resistant to integrated approaches to 
foreign policy organisation. The system is far from horizontal globalist approaches 
and different competences such as those of public and economic diplomacy fall in 
distinct organisational units and are managed by distinct bureaucratic sections 
both at home and overseas as the following chapter demonstrates.   
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The character of the Greek MFA: between institutional 
isomorphism and path dependence  
 
The previous sections demonstrated a range of changes that the MFA has 
undergone in the last decade in its attempt to retain its relevance and re-establish 
its centrality in the Greek foreign policy and diplomatic system in the 21st century. 
Such change ranges from competence expansion and operational change 
reflected through the addition of new functions such as economic diplomacy and 
crisis management to change in the MFA’s culture and mission. Seen in the light 
of its institutional responses to environmental stimuli, The MFA presents a case of 
institutional isomorphism being engaged in a process of adaptation. Nevertheless, 
a closer look at the course of its adaptation demonstrates that certain prior 
practices and patterns of organisation persist thus conditioning its adaptation and 
displaying elements of path dependence.  
More specifically, the MFA demonstrates evidence of transformation through the 
adaptation of its structural, operational and cultural arrangements to the changing 
environmental conditions in which it operates. The latest reforms, besides 
indicating the MFA’s attempts to reflect the changing operational environment, 
also constitute proof of the MFA’s intention to preserve its role and significance 
and become larger and stronger by extending its scope and resources. Such 
elements can be understood with the help of institutionalist thinking which 
describes ‘institutional isomorphism’ or else ‘transformation’ as adaptation to 
operational environments which serves the purpose of survival and preservation 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991).  
Nevertheless, even though the case of transformation is adequately supported in 
the previous sections there is additional evidence, originating from the literature 
and interviews, which draw a rather different image of the MFA. According to this 
image old policy making practices and organisational traditions persist and 
demonstrate resistance to change. This latter image, which should not be seen as 
conflicting but, rather, as complementary as elaborated below, accords with 
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institutional accounts which explain the character and evolution of institutions on 
the basis of persistence of prior courses of action.  
Chapter one demonstrated that such institutionalist approaches can be 
summarised in the phenomenon of path dependence, which refers to ‘particular 
courses of action which, once introduced, may be impossible to reverse’ (2000: 
251). Path dependence is very useful in explaining the persistence of policy 
making patterns and styles over time in individual countries (Thelen and Steinmo, 
1992: 14) and as Aspinwall and Schneider (2001: 12) suggest, it can elucidate 
‘stickiness’ to prior institutional arrangements.  
Interview data concerning the Greek foreign policy system suggested the 
persistence of a number of prior institutional practices in the management of 
foreign policy. Such practices broadly involve the politicisation of the foreign policy 
process, lack of macroscopic policy planning and centralisation of policy making at 
the level of political leadership. More specifically, with regards to the MFA’s 
operational and organisational culture the following practices re-occur: hierarchy, 
verticality, fragmentation and centralisation of external competences in the MFA’s 
organisational culture as well as resistance to change.   
Despite being viewed as ‘the agent of change’ for Greece (Interview, no 3; 5; 8) 
and the ‘most innovative government department’ (Interview, no 30) the MFA is 
resistant to change. Such resistance is expressed with the persistence of the given 
fragmentation in its organisational arrangement and hierarchical modus operandi 
favoured by a number of ‘old school’ senior diplomats who have a ‘traditionalist’ 
approach to foreign policy and its organisation. Such diplomats wish to reinforce 
their control over the MFA and propagate a hierarchical, introverted and secretive 
image of the Ministry whilst supporting its administrative insulation from other 
government departments (Interview, no 22; 30). It is for such purposes that the 
MFA has raised an organisational shield against any law or legislation which could 
threaten its internal control by diplomats. This organisational shield ensures the 
MFA’s administration by diplomats/bureaucrats who have often used the MFA for 
clientelistic purposes (Interview, no 30).  
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An MFA senior official characterised the MFA as part of the Greek bureaucracy 
but at the same time distinct from it. This is because it has maintained its own 
system for recruitment which is insulated from other departments. It organises its 
own entry competitions and recruitment panels comprise diplomats. This is 
something that differentiates the MFA from other ministries. The system of 
recruitment and entry to the diplomatic academy is often controlled by diplomats, 
‘family dominated [oikogeneiokratiko] and nepotistic’ (Interview, no 30). 
Nevertheless, arguably, even though it is only the middle of the recruitment 
spectrum which is influenced by such bureaucratic intervention in the sense that 
very good candidates move forward and very bad candidates are rejected, still 
intervention affects the competition process (Interview, no 30). This is also evident 
in the career paths of staff dispatched in the overseas representation (Kavakas, 
2000: 150). As a diplomat in Brussels argued, 
‘The system works in such a way that there is no standardised 
professional ladder for civil servants. You do not know where you are 
going to be next year. When the government changes everything 
changes and you can find yourself dispatched to a place you have not 
heard of before’ (Interview, no 28). 
In the last few years, however, career paths have been standardised after a long 
court case initiated through an appeal made by diplomats to the Greek Supreme 
Court (Interview, no 30). Nevertheless, even today promotions, transfers and 
overseas postings seem to depend on political criteria (Ioakimidis, 1999: 147; 
Interview no 22) perpetuating ‘human resources mismanagement’ (Interview, no 
27; 28) despite arguments that the phenomenon of acute politicization tends to 
decline with globalisation raising demands for specialisation and expertise 
(Interview, no 5; 8; 44). The majority of interviewees suggested that the MFA 
suffers from an explicit personnel deficit, in both quantitative and qualitative terms 
or else from ‘the problem of under-staffing’ (Interview, no 2; 6; 8; 13; 22; 23; 28; 
30; 32; 38; 39; 42; 43; 48; 50).  The problem of qualitative under-staffing has been 
exacerbated with another persistent tendency of the MFA, namely centralisation. 
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Centralisation becomes manifest in the pooling of all external competence under 
its existing structure without organisational rearrangements (Passas, 2005; Griva, 
2002). 
Centralisation of all external competence under the MFA’s existing structures is 
exemplified by the transfer of the PeRepGr and the competence of European 
policy from the MNEC in the 1980s and of the competences for international 
economy and economic diplomacy and development cooperation together with 
their respective bureaucratic sections31 also from the MNEC. In addition, the 
Secretariat for Greek expatriates was transferred from the Ministry of Culture to 
the MFA in 1993 (Griva, 2008: 448) further emphasising the wider tendency to 
centralize policies with a growing international significance under the 
organisational structure of the MFA (Interview, no 30).  
The MFA’s organisational model is another area which can be explained with path 
dependence. The MFA’s persistence over organisation on the basis of 
compartmentalisation of foreign policy into distinct domains is reflected in the 
contemporary structure of the Ministry. Despite arguments that its bureaucratic 
culture is changing towards business approaches which largely correspond to 
horizontal organisation, the MFA presents a fragmented, vertical and hierarchical 
model of organisation which by holding on to geographical desks and territorial 
divisions, corresponds to state-centric Westphalian models.  
 
Conclusion  
 
The first sections of this chapter demonstrated that there is ongoing discussion 
regarding the role and significance of contemporary foreign ministries within 
national foreign policy machineries. Such discussion suggests that foreign 
ministries are faced with a need to redefine their status vis-à-vis other parts of the 
                                                   
31
 Another transfer expected to take place in the next MFA charter concerns the section of press 
and communication attachés which is discussed in the next chapter 
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bureaucracy and to reassert their role in the national foreign policy system. In the 
process of re-inventing themselves, foreign ministries tend to change form and 
content as a response to international systemic change brought about by the 
transformative forces of globalisation and regionalisation. With these forces 
creating the need for integrated and horizontal approaches to the conduct of 
foreign policy a number of foreign ministries abandon their traditional hierarchical 
structures and models of diplomatic representation and reorganise their structure 
and mode of operation as well as reconsider their culture.  
The exploration of the Greek MFA against the aforementioned themes gives 
ample evidence in support of both change and continuity displayed by the Ministry 
in terms of its responses to the changing operational environment. Change and 
adaptation as a response to the transformed operational environment becomes 
evident through organisational reform and functional expansion as well as through 
the changing culture and self-perception of the institution in the last decade. 
Organisational reform is materialised with expansion of its organisational structure 
through the addition of new organisational units which correspond to distinct areas 
of foreign policy. Such units reflect the MFA’s extended functions and competence 
into new areas of action such as crisis management, economic diplomacy, 
international development cooperation and international policy coordination which 
are closely linked to the changing perception of the MFA’s mandate. The enlarging 
and changing competence of the MFA signifies a course of adaptability for the 
purpose of maintaining its relevance and centrality within the foreign policy 
machinery and of re-enforcing its supremacy vis-a-vis other government 
departments in the management of international policy.  
However, as with other institutions, the course of the MFA’s adaptation is 
conditioned by the persistence of the existing hierarchical modus operandi and 
organisational practices which involve patterns of verticality, centralisation and 
fragmentation. More specifically, the organisation of the MFA conforms to 
compartmentalised models of foreign policy organisation closely related to 
geopolitical approaches to foreign policy.  
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Given that patterns of change within the MFA’s structure and operation provide 
significant evidence regarding the state’s responses to external stimuli and reflect 
its fundamental assumptions about world politics, one could suggest that in 
Greece foreign policy management follows a different course from that suggested 
by integrationist globalist approaches. Foreign policy management displays 
instead a model of parallel vertical silos which represent distinct areas and 
bureaucratic sections of foreign policy.  
The responses of the Greek MFA to changing international and domestic 
environments can be understood with institutionalism’s explanatory tools of 
isomorphism and path dependence. Isomorphism can elucidate modernisation 
efforts and adaptation to operational environments whereas path dependence 
helps explain the persistence of certain organisational and operational ‘stickiness’ 
to prior practices. The above explanatory tools help towards reconciling the two 
arguably conflicting images of the MFA drawn by interview data. Far from 
invalidating one another, the two apparently contradictory sets of data combined 
reflect the contemporary institutional character of the Greek MFA, the course of 
adaptation of which is conditioned by certain organisational practices.   
Overall, the Greek MFA does not accord with declinist images and irrelevance 
assumptions and has assumed a relatively active profile in adapting to the 
complex conditions of the post-Cold War world. The preferred courses of action 
and organisation however, have been conditioned by well established 
organisational pathologies which render its adaptation slow in the face of the 
dense and diffuse policy making environments which require integrationist 
approaches to policy management. Similar challenges confront the Greek 
diplomatic network, which is discussed in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 5: The contemporary Greek diplomatic 
network: ‘sticky’ or transforming?  
 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter explored the MFA in the light of a number of assumptions 
regarding foreign ministries’ responses to transformative forces of globalisation 
and regionalisation. Such assumptions are linked on the one hand with views 
which consider the foreign ministry as transformative and adaptive and thus 
retaining its critical functions and significance and on the other hand with views 
which regard the foreign ministry as diminishing in significance in foreign and 
international policy management due to pressures emanating from the dense 
international policy environment and growing interdependence. In this 
environment, governments seek to enhance and redefine the role of their 
foreign ministry through a process of organisational restructuring and 
operational rearrangement. Evidence presented in the previous chapter 
demonstrated significant adaptation and resilience on behalf of the Greek MFA. 
Such evidence relates to the extension of MFA functions and changes in its role 
and mandate as well as its redefinition as the key actor of the Greek foreign 
policy machinery. 
Reorganising and rethinking the role of overseas diplomatic missions occupies 
a significant part of the broader discussion of governmental revamping of the 
national foreign policy machinery. Rice’s (2006) ‘transformational diplomacy’, a 
most innovative approach in contemporary diplomacy, relies on the re-
arrangement of diplomatic networks. Diplomatic missions, the ‘nerve endings’ of 
the foreign policy machinery, are naturally faced with similar challenges to the 
rest of the foreign policy machinery and the foreign ministry. In the light of the 
profound changes taking place in the international setting such as climate 
change, natural catastrophes and global financial crises, governments and 
states have no other means to promote their interests and manage the 
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constraints imposed on them than foreign policy and diplomacy exercised by 
their overseas diplomatic missions (Sanders, 2010).  
The world economic crisis, the widening notion of security to encompass the 
concept of human security and the placement of ‘soft power’ at the core of 
states’ foreign policy reflecting the evolving architecture of power manifest in 
the expansion of information technology (Cooper, 2001: 116) has urged 
governments to rethink their overseas missions (CSIS Report, 1998). Under the 
strain of governments’ financial cuts and with IT challenging if not 
‘disintermediating’ diplomatic missions (Bátora , 2009; Metzl, 2001; CSIS 
Report, 1998) and more specifically embassies which until recently were 
considered as the most important intermediaries between one government and 
another (Bátora, 2009: 5) but currently their very raison d’être requires 
rethinking.  
This is because even though overseas missions were considered to be the 
most well informed networks in comparison to outside counterparts they may be 
less so today as they are challenged by IT and non-governmental networks 
which seem to be broader, deeper and more crosscutting (Metzl, 2001: 80). 
And whilst there are arguments which view the future and role of embassies 
and other missions as uncertain and declining, other voices suggest that 
embassies, similarly with other structures for the conduct of foreign policy and 
diplomacy, are resilient and adaptive (Bátora, 2009; Berridge, 2005; Hocking 
and Spence, 2005; Melissen, 2005; Hocking, 1999).  
This is because governments are in a process of re-arranging their diplomatic 
missions, reallocating resources while at the same time prioritising public 
diplomacy as their key function which appears to be one of the main themes in 
the study of foreign and international policy management in the contemporary 
transforming world. Evidence suggests that alongside governmental re-
arrangement of overseas diplomatic representation significant modernisation 
and reform of the diplomatic profession and its infrastructure is also taking 
place (CSIS report, 2007).  
However, even though there is ongoing discussion with regards to the future 
and re-arrangement of diplomatic overseas missions, there is a considerable 
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lack of qualitative empirical data on the missions’ routines, working procedures 
and communication patterns. For this purpose Hocking and Bátora (2009: 166) 
suggest that the change and adaptation of diplomatic overseas missions have 
to be seen through the prism of their evolving function and role. Based on this 
premise, the study of the Greek diplomatic network in the contemporary, 
transforming world must be one that concerns its nature, role and function. 
Respective evidence will provide inferences with regard to its evolution and 
future and at the same time in relation to assumptions supporting theses of 
adaptation through transformation or decline. Institutionalist thinking can inform 
well courses of change and adaptation. Some of the key questions that need to 
be addressed concern the functions and role of the Greek diplomatic network 
and their course of adaptation. More specifically, questions concerning whether 
the Greek diplomatic network adapts to current developments or presents 
instead elements of ‘stickiness’ to prior institutional arrangements and 
commitments (Campbell, 2004: 33-35; Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001: 12). 
Similarly with the previous chapters, this chapter will start with a section that 
addresses the key themes which emerge in the wider discussion of the role and 
operation of overseas diplomatic missions in the context of transforming world 
politics and will then proceed to the exploration of the Greek case.  
 
The functions and role of overseas diplomatic missions: 
elements of change 
 
Diplomatic missions, the nerve endings of the foreign policy machinery, are 
faced with a number of challenges which require rethinking and reorganisation 
(Blue Ribbon Panel Report, 2009; Gyngell and Wesley, 2003: 122). Missions 
appear to have largely retained their traditional core competence, epitomised in 
the political, economic and consular functions which involve information 
gathering and analysis, reporting, policy advocacy and alliance building, 
consular services and the overview of the whole spectrum of bilateral relations 
(Paschke, 2007; 2000; Rana, 2004). The latter applies mostly in the context of 
the EU where, even though heads of government and officials know each other 
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well and communicate directly with their communication facilitated by 
information technology, embassies retain their bilateral significance with the 
majority of their functions remaining unchallenged (Paschke, 2007; 2000; Rana, 
2004).  
Analyses which consider the embassies as retaining their traditional functions 
and remaining central in the conduct of foreign and international policy also 
suggest that they are growing in significance and scope with new functions 
being added in their structure and operation for purposes of adapting to 
contemporary demands (Rana, 2007). Rana (2007: 30-31) suggests that we 
are witnessing the metamorphosis of diplomatic networks whereby the 
aforementioned traditional functions constitute only a fraction of what overseas 
missions are expected to do today. Such suggestions are embraced by others 
who also view the embassies as growing in importance and extending their 
scope to new functions, stemming from public diplomacy and extensive 
business activity which have become the milestones of the missions’ operation 
(Paschke, 2007; Rana, 2004; US Department of State, 1999: 24; 26).  
Notably, the commercial function has become more prominent than ever before 
given the present state of the international political economy. Commercial 
advocacy has always been central to the missions’ function but in the era of 
commerce without borders in a global market, on which national prosperity 
depends, it has been raised, for most missions, to their most important and 
urgent function (US Department of State, 1999: 28). With the overseas 
diplomatic network traditionally having been the ultimate governmental driver to 
boosting national economies and commerce, governments1 have prioritised the 
expansion of markets and attraction of investments on the missions’ agenda in 
order to contribute to the earnings of national treasuries (Sanders, 2010).  
Metamorphosis assumptions, in which the concept of transformation is inherent, 
can be explained through institutionalist approaches. Institutionalist 
‘transformation as adaptation to operational environments’ (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991) helps us to understand the course of adaptation of overseas 
                                                        
1
 Such as the British government following the election of the coalition govt in May 2010 
(newspaper references in FT)  
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diplomatic missions to their changing operational environment through re-
organisation and change. Metamorphosis theses  which herald a departure 
from the embassy in its traditional form are substantiated by evidence which 
describes embassies as transforming into ‘offshore government hubs’ or else a 
microcosm of government with the whole of government being represented 
abroad thus terminating the monopoly of the MFA in representation (Blue 
Ribbon Panel Report, 2009: 37). In this sense, the traditional embassy staffed 
by a core of foreign affairs officers augmented by attached specialists is being 
replaced in many cases by the diplomatic mission as an ‘offshore whole-of-
government hub’ (Blue Ribbon Panel Report, March 2009: 37). 
At the same time however, there are assumptions -relating to globalist 
approaches-according to which embassies are declining in significance due to 
the enhanced availability of instant electronic communications which have 
enabled a two-way exchange of information between governments, non-state 
actors and domestic and international publics (Garson, 2007: 212; Melissen, 
2005) and thus ‘permanently altered the balance of power between foreign 
services and their political masters’ (Langhorne and Wallace, 1999: 17). Such 
observations also presented by Bátora (2008) are linked to arguments 
supporting processes of ‘disintermediation’ between one government and the 
other with the aid of IT and thus imply the decline of the embassy as the 
intermediary between governments.  
And while it is widely acknowledged that embassies worldwide are confronted 
with challenges stemming from the pace at which technology and business 
processes evolve (CSIS Report, 2007: 12) public diplomacy, often linked to 
networking and lobbying, is viewed as becoming their number one priority as 
well as the main axis for their re-organisation (Paschke, 2000) which for Rana 
(2004) further substantiates the metamorphosis thesis. Public diplomacy, 
translated into promoting, explaining and putting across to the wider public the 
achievements and attractions of the state they represent has not only been 
added to the core political functions of embassies but has also transformed the 
understanding, promotion and conduct of other functions such as the promotion 
of businesses activity overseas, which, as mentioned above, has gained 
significant prominence (Paschke, 2000).  
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Public diplomacy, having become a core element of foreign policy (Cull, 2008: 
17) and reflecting government strategy to influence the public over certain 
images, has become a top priority for missions abroad2 (Srivihok, 2007: 66) and 
the main axis for their re-arrangement (Rana, 2007: 30-31; Melissen, 2005). 
However, even though public diplomacy has gained ground in a number of 
national foreign policy systems, governments seem to be at different stages in 
the evolution of their thinking on public diplomacy (Hemery, 2005: 196).  
A number of states such as Canada, Denmark, Norway, the UK and the US 
have acknowledged its importance by initiating strategic and organisational 
reforms to their public diplomacy structures and processes. Such reforms 
involve, primarily, the reorganisation of their diplomatic network, the 
centralisation of the public diplomacy function either within the foreign ministry 
often under the Secretary General as in France and the UK (Rana, 2007: 30-
31) or in a semi-autonomous authority, tightening public diplomacy strategy and 
messages, coordinating public diplomacy across stakeholder groups, providing 
additional resources and using the Internet and new media techniques such as 
Youtube, Flickr and Twitter (Blue Ribbon Panel Report, 2009: 31).  
The usage of IT and media techniques have been also considered to transform 
the relationship between the missions and the foreign ministry. The foreign 
ministry, the foreign policy system’s core and the embassies, its nervous 
endings, are moving into a new relationship described by Rana (2007: 24) as 
‘foreign ministry-embassy integration’. Germany is the epitome of promoting 
integration by creating a ‘single diplomatic network’ in place of the earlier 
conceptual division between the HQ and the field units. The innovative Paschke 
Report (2000) is one illustration of such evolution. The foreign ministry in 
Thailand has become the back office which supports the ‘Team Thailand’ 
overseas. Arguably, holistic approaches to foreign policy management and 
international policy coordination and integration abroad as well as between 
home and abroad cannot be achieved unless there is unity and integration at 
the HQ (Srivihok, 2007: 64).  
                                                        
2
 For instance for Thailand, promoting Thai-ness abroad was a core target around which 
missions were organised (Shrivhok, 2007: 66). 
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Changes in the functions of the embassies with the addition of the function of 
public diplomacy which focuses on image promotion at the host country and in 
the relationship with the HQ has altered old notions of the embassy being 
merely a tool of policy implementation transmitted from the centre and attached 
renewed significance to the missions which are now more policy productive. 
Some countries, such as Canada, Germany and the UK have reorganised the 
functioning of their embassies on this premise. The 2000 Paschke report 
suggests that a significant amount of work such as dossier contributions and 
briefings for the minister, previously carried out by HQ staff, must be prepared 
by embassies. As a result the German Foreign Office has implemented such 
change which led to a gradual thinning of territorial units.  Accepting that the 
bilateral embassy is in the best position to advise on relationship management, 
has drastically reduced staff in territorial departments redeploying HQ 
personnel for thematic tasks (Rana, 2007: 26-27). Austria and Canada also 
recognised this need and delegated more power to the envoy whereas others 
such as China, India and Japan are reluctant to use intranet fearing security 
leaks (Rana: 2007: 28).   
 
Resources 
Pressures for reorganising overseas missions have become more acute due to 
financial constraints inflicted on foreign offices (Paschke, 2000). Sensible 
employment of resources is at the heart of reorganisation efforts such as the 
case of Rice’s (2006) ‘transformational diplomacy’ which centres upon the 
rearrangement of the diplomatic network and reallocation of resources. 
Naturally however, although technological means make re-organisation of 
missions easier (Gyngell and Wesley, 2003: 124) no government is prepared to 
replace face-to-face diplomacy with technology despite the acute pressures 
stemming from world’s diminishing resources (US Department of State, 1999: 
29).  
Nonetheless, as human and financial resources remain scarce, governments 
have to find cheaper ways to maintain a network overseas and to think outside 
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of the box in making ‘maximum coverage with minimum resources’ (Srivihok, 
2007: 64). In their revamping of the overseas mission for the purpose of 
managing diminishing resources while at the same time addressing 
contemporary demands governments have experimented with different 
organisational approaches.  
Some states such as Australia, established micro-posts with only one diplomat 
located within existing Canadian missions. Canada was chosen because it runs 
a similar network as that of Australia (Gyngell and Wesley, 2003). Other models 
and experiments carried out in embassies involve inter alia non-resident 
ambassadors3, concurrent accreditation method with a senior ambassador 
responsible for a number of countries, ‘joint ambassadors’4, and thinning out 
embassies by cutting staff and offering positions to Locally Engaged Staff5 
(LES) (Rana, 2007: 30-31). Missions nowadays rely on LES who provide 
valuable local knowledge, contacts, language capabilities and continuity of 
service within missions (CSIS Report, 2007: 12; Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, 2007: 16; Gyngell and Wesley, 2003: 121).  
Other experimental schemes for addressing contemporary demands focus on 
business promotion and management, such as the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) scheme6 initiated by the Thai Government. The CEO scheme is based 
on the application of a business model to the Thai bureaucratic system for the 
purpose of pushing forward Thai competitiveness and strategies in an 
integrated approach by shifting the emphasis towards leadership and 
teamwork, shared vision, mission and strategy. The CEO scheme has 
reshaped the operation of numerous embassies which now work under the 
leadership of the CEO ambassador (Shrivihok, 2007: 62-65). Other 
governments - such as the British and Chinese7- integrate business and politics 
by appointing businessmen to key ambassadorial posts (Sanders, 2010).  
                                                        
3
 Where the ambassador is based at home like in Singapore and Malta 
4
 Used by the nine Eastern Caribbean state groups OECS or co-location as performed by some 
EU states as well as Nordic states 
5
 For instance Australia has handed over the jobs of trade commissioners in its consulates to 
qualified local personnel on the premise that they know best how to promote exports to the US 
market.  
6
 For more on the CEO scheme see Srivihok (2007: 62-65) 
7
 The Chinese government in 2009 appointed a businessman as an ambassador in Athens  
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Evaluation and training  
 
And whilst it is widely recognised that the overseas network constitutes the 
main driver for the promotion of national interests abroad, diplomatic missions 
face scrutiny over their performance and value (Rana, 2004: 22). Systems for 
evaluating performance have been introduced with one of the most common 
devices, popular in 1990s, being annual action plans produced by the missions. 
A few foreign policy systems have adopted ISO8 9000 certification for the 
services they provide while others, such as Singapore, adopted ‘fast-track’ 
policies with an appraisal model borrowed from Shell9. Linked to performance 
evaluation are selection procedures and diplomatic training. Changing curricula 
in diplomatic academies also appear to form a trend. With regards to selection 
procedures, most Western countries including Peru and Brazil, apply in-service 
exams and rigorous interviews in order to identify the best talent. Some require 
officials to apply for senior positions and failure to achieve this over the years 
can mean an exit, under ‘up-or-out’ formulas. At the other end of the scale 
however, some countries like India and Japan stick to seniority with 
unsatisfactory results (Rana, 2007: 35).  
With regards to diplomatic training, as the world political system is in transition 
moving from hierarchical modes of operation and organisation towards 
networks between people and institutions similarly diplomatic training regimes 
appear to be in transition by adapting to such changes with increasing attention 
paid to public diplomacy (Kummer, 2007: 184-185; Hemery, 2005: 196). In their 
attempt to modernise overseas missions a number of foreign policy systems, 
such as the American and the British, have incorporated public diplomacy 
training in their curriculum (Hemery, 2005: 203). Other foreign policy systems 
have a tradition of continuous training and skills enhancing workshops, such as 
in Canada and the US which are also leading in e-learning (Rana, 2007: 36).  
Other countries, such as France, Germany, Japan, Russia and the UK rely on 
additional means such as annual conferences of all ambassadors, convened in 
the capital, usually coinciding with annual leave so as to economise on travel 
                                                        
8
 International Standardisation Organisation 
9
 For a detailed account on evaluation techniques see Rana (2004) 
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cost (Rana, 2004: 167). Diplomatic training is indicative of the ways in which 
foreign policy machineries perceive world politics as it reflects the skills that the 
machinery deems necessary for its diplomats in order to represent the 
government overseas. And even though diplomatic training regimes vary for 
instance, according to governments’ evolution of their thinking on public 
diplomacy (Hemery, 2005: 196), there are certain challenges posed to 
contemporary diplomats which appear to be applicable universally. 
 
The changing role of diplomats: towards holistic approaches 
 
A central aspect of the public diplomacy debate, which as previously 
mentioned, constitutes a continuing theme regarding embassy transformation 
arguments, relates to the impact that it is having on national diplomatic systems 
as well as to the broader discussion on the role and future of professional 
diplomats (Hocking, 2005: 40). One of the most significant functions of 
contemporary diplomats is ‘outreach’ which Hocking (2005: 40) views as central 
to any self-respecting diplomat’s duties. This function however as the author 
stresses takes the diplomatic profession to a new direction which places new 
demands on diplomats but at the same time affirms their significance.   
Traditionally, diplomacy has been conducted by career diplomats who tended to 
operate ‘as members of an elite global club with its own rules and protocols10 
[...] mostly concerned with government to government relationships’ (Blue 
Ribbon Panel Report, 2009: 38). The role of the ambassador conventionally 
identified with presenting and explaining national foreign policy interests to 
overseas counterparts, is now being transformed to a communicator of all 
national policy sections to publics of the host country.  
In order to achieve this, the ambassador ‘must build up and cultivate a dense 
and stable network of contacts in all areas of society [...] a great deal of which 
depends on his personal communication skills which he should have the 
                                                        
10
 For a historical account of the role of the ambassador see Rana, K, (2004), The 21st century 
ambassador: plenipotentiary to chief executive 
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opportunity to train and refine’ (Paschke, 2000, Recommendation no. 1).  
Srivihok (2007: 63) describes the diplomat as ‘a door-knocker or pathfinder who 
utilizes his professionalism in establishing a close relationship with foreign 
countries’. It becomes obvious that in the increasingly complex international 
public policy environment traditional diplomats staffed only with traditional 
diplomatic skills are no longer sufficient (Blue Ribbon Panel Report, March 
2009: 37).   
The new diplomat is perceived as an active force in advancing national 
interests rather than merely gathering and transmitting information. For this 
purpose they must be comfortable with the latest technologies and with 
interacting with non-governmental actors and people from a variety of 
backgrounds and prepared for new types of assignments outside the confines 
of the embassy (CSIS Report, 2007: 8; 11; Kummer, 2007: 182). Diplomats, 
inter alia, have to become familiar with serving direct intergovernmental 
contacts with foreign publics which are translated into collaboration with local 
expertise inside and outside the embassy (Melissen, 2005: 22). Kummer (2007: 
182) suggests that ‘interaction with new stakeholders requires an adaptation to 
a different professional culture’ whereby the necessary skills are political 
diplomacy, economic diplomacy and media-image-public diplomacy11 (Rana, 
2004: 170).  
Diplomats, representing a wider spectrum of policy than ever before, need to 
have a holistic approach to foreign policy and diplomacy, the so called ‘broad-
band’ approach, which is necessary to cope with the blurred internal-external 
boundaries in policy making (Rana, 2004: 171) so as to reflect systemic change 
(Shrivhok, 2007: 63). This becomes necessary with ambassadors being viewed 
as assisting the PM in carrying out overseas governmental policy in its entirety 
(Srivihok, 2007: 63). The Blue Ribbon Report (2009: 38) describes the 21st 
century diplomat as a skilled and expert individual who is able to work across 
traditional policy divides and levels of government. 
The ambassador has grown in vocation as the ‘relationship manager’ in the 
country of assignment. Ambassadors are the country’s best resource in terms 
                                                        
11
 For an analysis of the required diplomatic skills see Rana (2004) 
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of bilateral relationships. As Rana (2004: 33) explains, no territorial division or 
bureau in the MFA is able to keep track of sectoral activity of the actions of 
technical ministries and other actors in the target country. With embassies 
becoming a microcosm of the government the ambassador becomes the leader 
and manager of a diverse group of employees who work together in a host 
country (US Department of State, 1999: 31). Thus ambassadors and generally 
diplomats are required to perform strategic and managerial roles in addition to 
their traditional competencies of representation and negotiation (Srivihok, 2007: 
63). In other words, ‘the ambassador’s plenipotentiary powers heading the 
envoy have long withered away. [...] today an appropriate analogy for the 
ambassador is the chief executive of a country unit of a transnational 
enterprise’ (Rana, 2004: 36).  
Rana (2004: 24, 36) argues that the chief executive analogy brings value added 
as it sheds the baggage of pomp manifest in ceremonial and ritual which are 
globally decreasing and concentrates on the promotion, outreach, negotiation, 
feedback, management, and servicing functions; described as the six principal 
functions of contemporary diplomacy. The ambassador as a CEO argument is 
closely linked to the aforementioned assumptions of the transformation of the 
embassies (Paschke, 2007). Nevertheless, the evolution in the understanding 
of the new diplomat’s role as well as state responses to systemic change varies 
significantly.  
 
The rise of consular affairs 
 
In the wider discussion concerning the diplomatic missions’ transformation, the 
rise of consular affairs constitutes a key theme. Consular affairs, once 
considered as a second-class activity for ministries and diplomats and having 
received lukewarm responses on behalf of officials who considered consular 
affairs outside the realm of diplomacy, have climbed up the governmental 
agenda (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2007: 4). Globalisation processes 
and changing patterns of tourism, business transactions, cross-border crime, 
international terrorism and natural disasters account for a rise in consular 
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services demands in nearly every country in the world (US Department of State, 
1999: 24).  
Citizens’ wellbeing and distress abroad are firmly on the diplomatic agenda and 
foreign ministries acknowledge that part of their overseas network’s mission is 
to deliver services to their citizens with such services having a direct impact on 
the foreign ministry’s reputation at home. This is because consular matters are 
seen as ‘diplomacy for people’ and they tend to get more news coverage than 
other foreign affairs issues. As a result, the reputation of the foreign ministry at 
home depends on assisting citizens because people evaluate the work of the 
foreign ministry, if not of the whole government, based on their experience with 
consular offices (Rikmunas, 2007: 186).  
This new reality has not escaped senior management in foreign ministries 
which has moved consular affairs higher up on the foreign affairs agenda. Even 
though consulates and consular affairs are not directly involved in government 
to government interaction (Gyngell and Wesley, 2003: 122) they receive 
attention to the highest level (Heijmans and Melissen, 2007: 192-193; US 
Department of State, 1999: 24) thus heralding the strengthening nexus between 
diplomacy and society, or else a trend towards the ‘societization’ of diplomacy 
(Heijmans and Melissen, 2007: 193). Foreign ministries often request reviews 
of consular services and have tried to boost their performance in various ways 
including the involvement of more diplomatic staff (Heijmans and Melissen, 
2007: 198). In several countries consular experience has become a prerequisite 
for diplomats and in Japan, Canada, Peru and the UK special career paths 
have been developed for diplomats to gain experience in the consular field.  
Globalisation, in all its aspects and with all its consequences is considered as 
the overall cause for the growing emphasis on consular affairs and dictates new 
roles for consulates which are increasingly seen as an integral part of the 
diplomatic network (Heijmans and Melissen, 2007: 199; 201-202). Speaking in 
institutionalist terms, the new emphasis on consular affairs constitutes an 
institutional response to the increasing demands of government assistance to 
citizens abroad and at the same time the recognition that consular affairs are 
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part of a wider phenomenon affecting foreign ministries (Heijmans and 
Melissen, 2007:197).   
In the UK, consular services to British nationals abroad, in normal times and in 
times of crises become part of the FCO’s overall purpose and one of the ten 
strategic priorities across the whole of government (Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, 2007: 6). In Lithuania, part of the governmental strategy 
is to re-organise consular services by re-allocating human and other 
resources12 (Rikmunas, 2007: 188). Consular cooperation between countries is 
also increasing as well as with organisations and stakeholders in the field. 
Outside the government cooperation with NGOs and private companies is 
essential in delivering the high standard of consular services demanded by the 
public (Heijmans and Melissen, 2007: 201-202). Delivering high standard 
services to nationals and promoting governmental policies overseas have 
become the top priority of national diplomatic networks.  
The previous sections briefly presented some of the main themes that occur in 
the exploration of governmental revamping of overseas diplomatic networks. 
Such themes involve the re-organisation of embassies and other diplomatic 
missions around the functions of economic and public diplomacy, the rise of 
consular affairs and the changing role of contemporary diplomats. Evidence 
suggests that the embassy, as the key agent of the diplomatic network 
undergoes significant change and re-organisation in the course of a process of 
adaptation in order to maintain its relevance in the transforming of world 
politics. Given that the change and adaptation of diplomatic overseas missions 
have to be seen through the prism of their evolving function and role (Hocking 
and Bátora, 2009: 166) and with institutionalist thinking explaining the course of 
adaptation of institutions on the basis of their nature the following sections will 
shed some light on the character, functions and roles of the Greek diplomatic 
network.   
 
                                                        
12The Lithuanian consular services re-organisation model was characterised by a qualitative 
and quantitative stream of change and reform which was based on training and quality 
improvement and redistribution of resources respectively. For more on this model see 
Rikmumas (2007).  
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The Greek diplomatic network 
 
The Greek diplomatic network as estimated in 2007 (Karabarbounis, 2007: 223) 
comprises 86 embassies13, 63 consulates and 9 main permanent 
representations such as the PeRepGr, the Greek Permanent Representation to 
the Western Union, NATO and others while there are also a small number of 
small ad hoc and revocable missions which vary according to specific 
demands. And whilst the embassies and consulates were considered to be the 
key overseas actors, the 32 press and communications offices14 (PCO) and the 
52 economic and commercial offices15 (ECO or OEY in Greek), have come to 
constitute equally crucial components of this network (Interview, no 50). The 
Greek diplomatic network, classified as medium in size and capability has 
expanded significantly in the last three decades as a response to the changing 
international conditions (Interview, no 3; 25; 26; 49).  
The post-Cold War world led to the proliferation of states that Greece 
cooperates with politically and economically, and together with the increased 
needs for diplomatic representation within the EU triggered an explosion in the 
number of Greek overseas missions. Greece has extended its network of 
embassies16 to newly emergent states such as Azerbaijan, Armenia and 
Georgia (Interview, no 13). In addition, Greece strengthened its existing 
diplomatic network with new offices and personnel in Kuwait, Pakistan, the 
United Arab Emirates and Israel (Karabarbounis, 2007: 200) with an emphasis 
on economic and commercial offices especially towards the Middle East and 
Asia (Interview, no 28). Similar expansion is documented in the consular 
network, despite views which support their diminishing significance 
Karabarbounis, 2007: 203). Table 5.1 demonstrates the opening of embassies 
and consulates in the last three and a half decades. 
                                                        
13
 There are 13 additional embassies which have suspended operation without being abolished 
14
 See General Secretariat of Communication and Information, Press offices abroad  
 http://www.minpress.gr/minpress/en/index/ministry/ministry-abroad-list.htm 
15
 See MFA’s AGORA portal to International Economic Relations and Development 
Cooperation 
http://www.agora.mfa.gr/frontoffice/portal.asp?cpage=NODE&cnode=64&clang=1 
The number of commercial  offices has been reduced from 42 to 32 due to Greek government’s 
cuts  
16
 For a more detailed account of the locations of new embassies see Karabarbounis (2007: 
203) 
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Figure 5.1 EXPANSION OF THE GREEK DIPLOMATIC NETWORK  
 
The expansion of the Greek consular network has been mostly oriented, for 
political purposes, towards the Balkans and the countries that emerged after 
the break-up of the Soviet Union (Karabarbounis, 2007: 203) whereas 
significant expansion also took place in Western Europe for purposes of serving 
large Greek populations (Interview, no 45). Naturally, the significance of 
location infuses a certain character to the missions, which is manifest in their 
organisational arrangement. For instance, a Greek embassy in Brazil differs in 
complexity and concentration of diplomatic staff to the Greek to Greek embassy 
in Washington DC or Turkey. The latter two have a highly political character as 
well as representation from a number of domestic departments. Greek 
diplomatic staff have emphatically argued that the given ongoing Greek national 
security issues are embedded in the contemporary image of the Greek 
Date Institution opening Location 
1974 Consulate  Johannesburg (South Africa) 
1975 Embassy  Kuwait  
 Consulate  Dortmund (Germany)  
1976 Embassy  Ireland  
 Consulate  Korce (Albania) 
1977 Embassy  Pakistan  
1980 Embassy  Luxembourg, United Arab Emirates, 
Zimbabwe 
 Consulate  Los Angeles (California), Houston (Texas) 
1984 Embassy  Cuba  
1987 Embassy  Uruguay  
1988 Embassy  Vatican  
1990 Embassy  Israel  
1991  Embassy  Peru, Chile, South Korea  
1992 Embassy  Lithuania, Latvia and Esthonia, Azerbaijan, 
Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine 
and the Philippines      
 Consulate  Gjirokastra (Albania), Brussels (Belgium), 
Vienna (Austria), Durban (South Africa) 
1993 Embassy  New Zealand  
 Consulate  Odessa (Ukraine), Leipzig (Germany) 
1994 Embassy  Slovenia and Croatia 
 Consulate  Podgorica (Montenegro) 
1996 Embassy  Slovakia, Bosnia/Herzegovina and Belarus  
 Consulate  Sofia (Bulgaria), Konstanz (Germany), 
Petersburg (Russia), Novorossiysk 
(Russia), Marioupoli (Ukraine), Hong Kong 
(China)  
1999 Embassy  Vietnam 
 Consulate  Belgrade (Serbia), Nis (Serbia), Moscow 
(Russia), Shanghai (China) 
2003 Embassy  Malta  
 Consulate  Taba (Egypt) 
2006 Embassy  Qatar  
 Consulate  Guangzhou (China) 
2007 Embassy  Montenegro  
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diplomatic network thus determining its fabric (Interview no, 5; 13; 26; 30; 39; 
41; 42; 43; 44; 48; 49). More specifically, an official in London (Interview, no 48) 
argued  
‘The fact that Greece has such major national security issues at stake 
determines its overseas representation. Political representation is 
dense at key posts such as Ankara, Skopje and Washington whereas 
secondments from home ministries are of secondary importance’. 
More specifically, the structure of Greek overseas representation has been the 
outgrowth of Greek traditional and persistent foreign policy concerns such as 
negotiations of the continental shelf and security issues with Turkey. Naturally, 
such preoccupations have led to increased demands for secrecy and control 
which contribute to centralised and hierarchical practices and organisation as 
well as diplomatic staff engrained with high levels of confidentiality and political 
responsibility (Interview, no 30).  
The persistence of military preparedness and geopolitical balances of power in 
Greek foreign policy, as discussed in chapter two, infused a number of Greek 
embassies and other missions with what is considered as an excessive political 
substance. This  characterises their character and composition in locations 
such as in Washington, Ankara, London, Paris and Berlin where Greek 
embassies are programmed to exercise political leverage for purposes of 
promoting key strategic stakes concerning Greek security issues (Interview, no 
30; 48). For these and other reasons elaborated below, Greek missions have 
been described as traditional and conventional (Interview, no 30) and as 
corresponding to a ‘Westphalian state model’ in terms of organisational 
arrangement, instead of being tuned to globalisation (Papkonstantinou, date not 
available: 24).  
Recently however, the re-shuffling and re-deployment of available Greek 
diplomatic capital became a top priority of Greek governments for purposes of 
promoting Greek foreign policy with a proclaimed emphasis on Greek economic 
diplomacy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Extracts from FM, 2006; Interview, no 23; 
28; 45). 
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‘Economic diplomacy has become the main priority of the 
government and huge importance has been attached to it which 
becomes evident with the institutional changes introduced such as 
the transfer of the competence of economic diplomacy to the MFA 
together with the respective bureaucracy including overseas 
missions’ (Interview, no 37). 
This shift was materialised with the 2007 Charter which added economic 
substance to Greece’s international relations by integrating economic and 
commercial offices into Greek embassies, altered the diplomatic academy’s 
curriculum in this direction and heralded a change in the role of the Greek 
diplomat towards more integrated approaches discussed below. These 
changes were proclaimed by the Greek political leadership (MFA Report, 
Bakoyianni Address, 2009) with the aim to reform the Greek diplomatic service 
and turn it into a strong, flexible and effective tool for the strengthening of 
Greece’s international position. The diplomatic service from a tool of foreign 
policy implementation is now envisaged as a ‘force multiplier’, a deterrent and 
at the same time a ‘producer of wealth’ for the national economy (MFA Report, 
Bakoyianni Address, 2009). Such attitudinal change is reflected in recent 
demands for enhanced diplomatic representation and the performance of 
certain functions overseas whilst at the same time constituted evidence that the 
significance of the overseas diplomatic network is in a process of being re-
affirmed (Interview, no 30).  
Greek diplomats acknowledge that demands faced by Greek diplomatic 
missions are closely linked to globalisation and regionalisation which have not 
only expanded the geographic scope and reach of Greek international 
engagement but have also brought forward an unprecedented growth in Greek 
social, political and economic interests in areas such as the Middle East and 
Asia as well as within the EU and the southern Balkans.  
This growth has also contributed to the increase of Greek business and politico-
economic transactions abroad and cooperation with a number of new 
stakeholders (Interview, no 31). This is translated into Greek nationals and 
businesses operating overseas thus creating needs for representation and 
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support. And even though the new extended economic reach of Greece creates 
much needed financial opportunities it also means that the government needs 
to realign its diplomatic resources with Greek commercial interests. As a result, 
the aforementioned process of change, network expansion and relocation of 
resources has been triggered (Interview, no 13).  
 
A compartmentalised model of representation  
 
Greek diplomatic missions overseas are headed by the ambassador and 
postings constitute career appointments within the MFA’s diplomatic service. 
Press, commerce, defence and other specialists and their offices are 
accountable to the embassy or where there is no embassy to the general 
consulate. According to Stoforopoulos and Makridimitris (1997: 119) the 
traditional role of Greek missions is centred upon the following: 
• Representation and promotion of Greek interests overseas 
• Information gathering, analysis and channelling to the HQ 
• Transfer, promotion and explanation of Greek national positions to 
overseas leaders  
The functions of overseas diplomatic missions involve military, economic, 
commercial and cultural affairs (Stoforopoulos and Makridimitris, 1997: 119) 
with commercial issues recently rising to the top of the governmental foreign 
policy agenda following the incorporation of economic diplomacy in the MFA’s 
structure (Interview, no 13; 23; 28; 30). A very characteristic element in the 
structure of overseas missions is that there has traditionally existed an 
insulation of the various competences which becomes manifest in their 
organisation. More specifically, the various competences such as economic 
diplomacy, public diplomacy, traditional political diplomacy and cultural affairs 
have been distinct in that they correspond to different organisational structural 
units and are performed by different bureaucratic sections.  
For instance, embassies are largely in charge of political affairs and staffed with 
diplomats who graduate from the MFA’s diplomatic academy, whereas 
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economic diplomacy is performed by economic and commercial attachés who 
are graduates of the National School of Public Administration (NSPA)17 and 
staff separate economic and commercial offices (usually but not always 
attached to Greek embassies) which were previously responsible to the MNEC 
but transferred with the 2007 Charter to the MFA.  
In turn, public diplomacy is allocated to the section of information and press 
attachés, also graduates of the NSPA but accountable to the General 
Secretariat of Information and Communication under the Ministry of Interior and 
finally, cultural affairs, which either fall within consulates’ remit or constitute the 
subject of cultural experts who are either attached to the embassies or other 
overseas missions and are usually independent consultants. This fragmentation 
in structure and operation provides evidence for a compartmentalised approach 
to the management of foreign policy which contrasts with contemporary trends 
focusing on integrated approaches.  
Compartmentalisation in diplomatic representation follows the organisational 
model of foreign policy at home. Chapter four presented the current structure of 
the MFA which is the product of centralisation of a number of competences 
translating to number of vertical and hierarchical pillars which correspond to 
distinct divisions of foreign policy, namely political, technical/sectoral and 
economic. This ‘pillarisation’ becomes also manifest and characteristic in the 
model of overseas diplomatic representation which is based on the 
compartmentalisation of the management of foreign policy effectively mirrored 
in the allocation of certain functions - political, economic and recently public 
diplomacy into respective sections of foreign policy bureaucracy (Interview, no 
30).  
Not only does this organisational model perpetuate the distinction between 
political and economic/sectoral affairs but it also prevents integrated 
approaches to foreign policy management (Interview, no 30). This has major 
implications for the role of Greek diplomats but also for the operation of Greek 
foreign policy bureaucracy in its entirety. With globalisation and regionalisation 
bringing t to the foreign policy machinery issues that cut across policy domains 
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 http://www.ekdd.gr/esdd/index.php 
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and are impossible to order neatly along vertical organisational units there have 
emerged a number of grey areas at their interface which cannot be addressed 
by the insulated fractions of Greek foreign policy bureaucracy. Naturally, this 
leads to bureaucratic overlaps and waste of resources (Interview, no 30). 
Organisational compartmentalisation promotes equal rigidity and unilateralism 
in recruitment with only given sections of bureaucracy being able to staff some 
overseas posts and to carry out certain overseas functions. Effectively, this 
phenomenon results in the insulation of parts of the foreign policy bureaucracy 
which is translated into different career paths and employment law. 
Traditionally, the diplomatic network in its entirety had been ‘trichotomised’, 
effectively being split into three main parts: the HQ, the embassies and the 
consulates whilst an additional distinction applies to the press, economic and 
cultural offices overseas.  
All aforementioned branches operated separately with their own rules of 
recruitment, promotions, transfers and career paths. Recently, the division of 
the three former parts of the diplomatic network has been abolished and 
movement of staff between different sections is allowed and lately encouraged, 
with the only exception being the entry qualifications of staff to the various 
sectors (Karabarbounis, 2007: 221-222). It is not surprising that such insulation 
has prevented to a large extent missions – HQ integration.  
 
The role of Greek embassies: ‘sticky’ or transforming?  
 
Greek embassies are headed and managed by MFA civil servants of 
ambassadorial rank or when necessary by the next diplomat in rank or the 
consul-general in locations where there is a consulate-general. Greek presence 
overseas however is materialised through a range of officials who carry out 
specialist roles such as military, cultural, agricultural, educational attachés and 
others, all accountable to the ambassador head of mission. A typical embassy 
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comprises the head of mission who is a diplomat of ambassadorial rank18, their 
assistant who is also a diplomat and in charge of the running of the embassy 
and one or two diplomats (a counsellor and a secretary) who are in charge of 
the political office of the embassy which assesses and evaluates the local 
political situation (Interview, no 49).   
In addition there is usually a press office attached to the embassy as well as an 
economic and commercial office, the significance of which has grown over the 
last few years. This is because the competence of economic offices from 
bilateral has become multilateral and thus their scope has widened significantly 
(Varvarousis, 1983: 119-120). There is also always a defence attaché and at 
least one representative from the Greek police (Interview, no 47). 
Embassies such as those in Washington, London, Paris and Ankara constitute 
the epitome of multi-representation by Greek standards and their extended 
structure involves attachés for cultural, tourist, educational, commercial and 
maritime affairs, as well as Hellenic Air Force and Hellenic Army attachés. This 
however constitutes an exceptional structure which cannot be applied to many 
locations due to financial constraints (Interview, no 47; 48; 49). In the last year 
or two there has been a tendency for a number of embassy staff to be recalled 
back to the centre in Athens due to the Greek financial crisis but this is believed 
to be an ad hoc measure rather than indicative of significant structural change 
(Interview, no 47). 
Greek embassies largely do not present evidence for a case of diverse 
representation from the whole of government and are far from being described 
as off-shore governmental hubs. The extension in functions and scope 
emanating from processes of globalisation and regionalisation are not 
accompanied by respective secondment of experts from home departments but 
rather involve the changing job description of existing embassy diplomatic staff. 
As a result, Greek embassies do not resemble models of embassy organisation 
whereby patterns of ‘whole of government’ representation are observed, 
prescribing what Bátora and Hocking (2009) have termed as ‘domestication of 
                                                        
18
 The MFA Charter provides for the assumption of the post of the head of mission from junior 
diplomats or even from people outside the service for purposes of facilitating movement within 
the service and carrying out governmental policies more effectively 
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embassies’ (Interview, no 47; 48; 49). In this light, arguments suggesting the 
‘metamorphosis’ of embassies on the grounds of their transformation into hubs 
of intensified domestic representation do not seem to apply to the Greek case. 
Rather, adaptation to contemporary demands is demonstrated within existing 
organisational arrangements and through the expansion of involvement of 
existing diplomatic staff in various new areas of international policy. More 
specifically, younger diplomats are placed in charge of an extended spectrum of 
issues ranging from migration, to environment, business and consular affairs 
thus creating a new generation of Greek diplomats19 discussed in the following 
section (Interview, no 49). Evidently, despite the unprecedented widening of the 
policy areas that Greek embassies are confronted with (Interview, no 25; 26; 
47; 48) their organisational structure remains fundamentally unaltered in 
contrast to their expanding functions (Interview no 47; 48; 49).  
In institutionalist terms this could mean that a certain degree of isomorphism or 
else adaptation to operational environments for the purpose of ensuring survival 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) takes place but with given constraints prescribed 
by national organisational traditions which form part of the national foreign 
policy system (Clarke and White, 1981; 1989). With the chosen course of 
action, embassies manage to experiment with their extended competence and 
as Meyer and Rowan (1991: 41) suggest for organisations in general, they are 
‘increasing their legitimacy [...] independent of the immediate efficacy of the 
acquired practices and procedures.’ 
In the wider discussion of whether the role of embassies is transformative or 
residual (Bátora and Hocking, 2009) an interesting point emerged with regards 
to the functions of Greek embassies which concerns economic diplomacy, the 
newly added function of the MFA.  In seeking to explore the implications of this 
extended MFA function for the Greek embassies, interviews (no 11; 43; 47; 48) 
revealed that the absorption of the competence of economic diplomacy from the 
MFA so far has had less impact upon the organisation of Greek embassies and 
more upon the role and future of Greek diplomats. This is because economic 
diplomacy albeit having been promoted to the central pillar of Greek foreign 
                                                        
19
 This is also due to understaffing  
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policy, not only remains under the control of the economic and commercial 
offices but is also threatened as a partial embassy function from alternative 
sources of information provided by IT. A diplomat in London (Interview, no 48) 
argued  
 
‘Economic diplomacy may have been recently proclaimed by the 
government to have become the main pillar of Greek foreign policy 
but its implications for the organisation of Greek embassies and other 
missions has been largely overestimated. This is because, economic 
diplomacy in the Greek context really refers to commercial diplomacy 
which has been there forever and constituted the main function of the 
economic and commercial offices. Not only does this function not 
constitute a new addition to the Greek diplomatic network but if there 
is one function which is under threat from IT then this is it.  This is 
because the embassy has no time or capability to monitor global 
business trends. Business transactions are beyond the capacity of 
the Greek embassy the way it currently stands.’ 
Arguably, in the era of direct communication, Greek officials anticipate that 
stakeholders and businesses will rely less and less on embassies for economic 
information, if they ever did. Instead, stakeholders have direct online access to 
governmental figures and statistics and maintain connections with networks as 
well as recruiting their own economic experts and advisors thus outnumbering 
the handful of diplomats in embassies who struggle to catch up with 
developments in global economic affairs (Interview, no 48).  
The interviewee (no 48) stressed that it is common practice for Greek business 
missions to visit certain countries without notifying Greek embassies, which are 
informed about the visit after the mission has returned home. This is because 
such business missions, which may often support the PM’s business trips, rely 
on expert economic consultants which are to be found outside the Greek 
diplomatic network. As a result, Greek diplomats feel that if there are elements 
indicating the disintermediation of Greek embassies then those elements have 
so far belonged to the realm of economic diplomacy and are far from affecting 
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the embassies’ political functions which are very crucial for Greece (Interview, 
no 48).  
In terms of communication between the overseas diplomatic missions and 
Athens the MFA constitutes the ultimate linkage. Communication is channelled 
through the MFA and only if and when the issue at hand concerns strictly 
another governmental department will direct communication with respective 
departments take place. Direct communication is encouraged for the purposes 
of saving time and resources however, it rarely happens (Interview, no 26). 
In the last decade, a closer relationship has been fostered between embassies 
and the HQ summarised in mutual understanding and shared ways of operating 
under pressure, facilitated by a continuous, safe and circular communication 
loop between the two (Interview, no 26). However, this does not necessarily 
imply the increase in the missions’ input in the foreign policy process.  
The role of Greek embassies has been largely defined in political terms. This is 
because they identified as negotiators and promoters of Greek national security 
stakes, due to the ongoing Greek security problems. Recently, however, 
embassies have acknowledged that they are confronted with an expanding 
spectrum of policies which has implications for their mandate. This shift 
gradually makes them shed their traditional profile relating to the management 
of issues linked to Greek territorial integrity and urges them instead to develop 
skills and knowledge that are necessary for managing international policy in 
more multilateral fora This expansion stems from the intertwined processes of 
globalisation and regionalisation which brought to the Greek embassies’ agenda 
issues such as migration, climate change, international cooperation, finance and 
others (Interview, no 3; 8; 12; 13; 26; 27; 30; 31; 42; 43; 47; 48; 49). A diplomat 
in Brussels (Interview, no 26) argued that:  
‘The scope and reach of our [embassies’] functions have widened so 
much that we are not yet fully aware of what new areas have been 
brought to us. Until less than two decades ago, Greek diplomats 
could not even imagine the extent of the complications and policy 
areas that globalisation and membership to the EU would bring 
about. Change has been and is exponential. If one thinks that the 
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diplomatic service has to reflect the constantly changing anatomy of 
the international environment then one can understand that in 
embassies we are in a constant struggle to comprehend and respond 
to issues of supranational, multilateral and bilateral significance about 
which we have no prior experience’.  
Embassies within the EU and especially the embassy in Brussels20  are today 
significantly aided by the PeRepGr which undertakes a large part of their 
multilateral competence (Interview, no 26). With regards to assumptions which 
view the role of the embassies as diminishing, evidence suggests that Greek 
embassies’ bilateral significance has been receding. However, it is increasing in 
political significance especially within the EU framework. This is because 
bilateral issues are shrinking as they now become of supranational significance 
and are dealt with in multilateral fora or are transferred to EU institutions. 
Therefore, Greek embassies in the EU are largely stripped from multilateral 
issues and limited to bilateral issues thus becoming in a way more ‘traditional’ 
as those issues revolve around Greek territorial concerns and security issues 
(Interview, no 26).  A diplomat in the Greek embassy in Brussels argued 
(Interview, no 26)  
‘The role of the embassies is being mutated in a way analogous to 
the deepening and integration of European relations. The greater the 
deepening the more we go back to what we were before joining the 
Union. This mutation and change is ongoing and shows no sign of 
ending. We have to think seriously about the overall future of Greek 
bilateral and other missions.’   
The issue of traditionalism occurred several times in the discussion, not only 
with regard to the nature of the foreign policy priorities for Greek embassies but 
also with regards to their organisational culture and operation. Varvarousis 
(1983: 145) argued that the operation and culture of Greek embassies is closely 
related to their very ‘raison d’être’. If one considers that in many cases the 
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 Which is small as far as both the number of diplomats and the officials seconded by other 
government departments are concerned in comparison to its significance of location. Its small 
size can be explained with the proximity of the PeRepGr which undertakes representation and 
management of multilateral international issues 
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rationale for the set-up of Greek missions has been highly political revolving 
around the international projection of Greek ongoing security problems or highly 
commercial, then the traditional and hierarchical character of Greek embassies 
may be more easily explained (Interview, no 30).  
  
Persistence of hierarchy in embassy organisation and operation  
 
The maintenance of hierarchy in the operation of Greek embassies constitutes 
an end in itself for purposes of maintaining order (Interview, no 47; 48; 49) and 
is manifest in a number of ways ranging from the processing of issues within 
the embassy to maintaining the protocol and communication. For instance, 
junior diplomats are often discouraged from expressing their views or 
suggesting recommendations to their seniors and ambassadors or heads of 
missions and thus ‘corrective feedback’ which could possibly change ineffective 
practices is normally out of the equation (Interview, no 30; 48; 49). In turn, 
senior diplomats are often in a position whereby expressing their views to the 
political leadership and having an input to the foreign policy process is 
discouraged. As an embassy counsellor (Interview, no 46) argued: ‘Greek 
diplomats are castrated; junior and senior alike’. 
Such hierarchical practices have elevated the head of mission, the 
ambassador, to the position of the government’s confidant and relegated the 
rest of the mission to policy execution which is commonly detached from 
government policy (Interview, no 30). Such arguments reaffirmed Greek 
literature which describe the Greek head of mission as a ‘junior prime minister’ 
(Stoforopoulos and Makridimitris, 1997: 137) and the rest of envoy as policy 
implementation bodies (Griva, 2008: 428).  
Evidently, Greek embassies remain very hierarchical and traditional in their 
operation and the widening spectrum of policy preoccupations, as previously 
mentioned, appears to have altered the job of Greek diplomats rather than their 
very organisation. By applying institutionalist approaches in explaining such 
evidence, one could presume that the course of change and adaptation 
demonstrated by Greek embassies discussed in the previous sections is 
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significantly conditioned by certain prior organisational and operational 
practices such as hierarchy and traditionalism. Naturally, such practices present 
an adaptation course on behalf of Greek embassies which conforms to 
‘stickiness’ to prior modi operandi and organisational arrangements.  
Traditionally concerned with government to government relations, Greek 
embassies have recently started to realise that intensive involvement with local 
publics is essential for the promotion of Greek interests abroad (Interview, no 
17; 48; 45). Greek embassies generally have a good record of maintaining 
excellent relations with host countries and are in a process of enhancing 
cooperation with NGOs and national civil societies21. Part of the Greek 
embassies’ current strategy, which has become urgent in the face of the Greek 
economic crisis, is to develop a horizontal network of partners and to extend 
their reach and influence to foreign audiences (Interview, no 28; 45; 48).  
However, despite the added emphasis on increased cooperation with civil 
society and the widening spectrum of policies that constitute embassies’ 
contemporary preoccupations, public diplomacy is still far from constituting a 
central function of Greek embassies never mind a central axis for their re-
organisation. Public diplomacy is assigned instead to the press and 
communication offices discussed in the following section (Interview, no 26; 28; 
30; 32; 47; 48; 49; 50).  
 
Public Diplomacy: at the interface of the MFA and the Press 
and Communication Offices  
 
Public diplomacy was described in the introductory sections as becoming a 
strategic priority for a number of Western European states overarching the 
whole spectrum of their embassies’ functions, political, cultural and economic 
alike (Srivihok, 2007: 66; Paschke, 2000). More specifically, public diplomacy 
constitutes the gist of the ‘embassy transformation’ argument with its 
prominence as a core element of foreign policy having been enhanced (Cull, 
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 Further thinking and exploration must take place with regards to global civil society  
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2008: 17) and with IT having altered the channels of communication between 
governments, non-state actors and foreign and domestic audiences (Garson, 
2007: 212; Melissen, 2005).  
Despite bewilderment in distinguishing cultural from public diplomacy22 and 
discrepancy in the stages of evolution in their thinking on public diplomacy 
(Hemery, 2005: 196) governments have taken various steps to rearrange their 
public diplomacy structures and processes. Such steps revolve involve 
reorganising their diplomatic network, centralising public diplomacy function 
either within the foreign ministry, frequently under the Secretary General or in a 
semi-autonomous authority, tightening public diplomacy strategy and 
messages, coordinating public diplomacy across stakeholder groups, providing 
additional resources and using the internet and new media techniques such as 
Youtube, Flickr and Twitter (Blue Ribbon Panel Report, 2009: 31). With the 
aforementioned taken into consideration this section will focus on the ways in 
which the function of PD is organised in Greece. 
Public diplomacy in Greece has become an issue of a certain priority only after 
2005 (Interview, no 17; 36) and hitherto public diplomacy initiatives and 
attempts have been ad hoc and sporadic (Interview, no 35). Unlike in other 
states, in Greece there has been neither a dedicated consultant attached to the 
PM nor an independent agent for public diplomacy (Interview, no 34; 35; 36; 
50). The competence has been allocated to the existing section of press and 
communication attachés and their Press and Communication Offices (PCOs) 
which are accountable to the General Secretariat for Communication and 
Information which belongs to the Ministry of Interior. When discussing the 
Greek model for public diplomacy a press officer stated ironically (Interview, no 
50): 
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 Public diplomacy must be misunderstood as being different from cultural diplomacy which is 
often mistaken for. Culture diplomacy, also central to the missions’ functions is regaining 
importance as a prime example of soft power or the ability to persuade through culture, values 
and ideas. For more see Schneider, 2005: 147. Cultural diplomacy involves a wide range of 
concepts and priorities such as the promotion of human rights, the spread of democratic values, 
a nation’s research, thinking and national debate one could argue that public diplomacy can be 
seen as closer to cultural diplomacy than national branding or propaganda, that is usually 
associated with (Melissen 2005: 22).   
22
 For instance for Thailand, promoting Thai-ness abroad was a core target around which 
missions were organised (Shrivhok, 2007: 66). 
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‘We managed to introduce an innovation with regards to 
organisational arrangements for public diplomacy. Greece is the only 
country in the world where public diplomacy is so uncoordinated and 
removed from the MFA and allocated to a section other than the 
MFA’s diplomats i.e. the press and communication attachés.’  
Arguably, the competence of public diplomacy was awkwardly assigned to 
PCOs, which albeit an integral part of the Greek diplomatic network, are 
accountable to the General Secretariat for Communication and Information 
(GSCI)23 (Interview, no 50). Even though in theory the competence of public 
diplomacy is co-shared between the MFA’s Service for Information and Public 
Diplomacy24 and the GSCI25 effectively, the former is restricted to presenting 
foreign policy and other national positions to Greek journalists mainly for 
domestic consumption whilst performance of public diplomacy overseas is 
managed by the latter through a network of 36 Press PCOs26 which as part of 
the Greek diplomatic network usually cohabitate with Greek embassies.  
This bipolarity confuses responsibility and creates overlaps between the MFA 
and GSCI with the former having maintained a passive role in the competence 
and the latter, which operates without central strategy from the MFA or the 
political leadership, leaving all public diplomacy responsibility in the hands of 
the limited number of press officers overseas who operate without instructions. 
The lack of instructions, strategic planning and central organisation and 
coordination, with the latter constituting a persistent but at the same time 
unsatisfied demand of the press attachés union (Press Attachés Union, 2008) 
instil a significant degree of pathology to the operation of Greek public 
diplomacy and render the Greek public diplomacy model weak and ineffective 
(Interview, no 28; 30; 36).  
                                                        
23Former Ministry of Press at http://www.minpress.gr/minpress/en/  
24
 The 1998 MFA charter introduced the DG under the title: ‘Information service’ and which was 
renamed to DG or Service for Information and Public diplomacy based on the 2007 MFA 
Charter. Art. 5 para 3 of the 2007 Charter provides that the MFA must inform foreign states, 
international organisations and international public opinion on Greek national positions 
25
 Law 3444/2006 accessed at http://www.minpress.gr/minpress/index/other_pages-
1/ministry_organikes_diataxeis_gge_gge.htm 
26
 Until early 2010 there were 41 Press and Communication Offices and there are plans for 
further cuts due to the Greek financial crisis. For a detailed list of PCOs see the official website 
of the GSCI http://www.minpress.gr/minpress/en/index/ministry/ministry-abroad-list.htm 
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As a result public diplomacy becomes dependent on personal willingness and 
initiative and its performance is fragmented comprising random activities 
(Interview, no 28). Most importantly, however, with the task of strategy setting 
remaining adrift and unclear, there is no public diplomacy consciousness either 
in the diplomatic academy or in career diplomats, who view public diplomacy as 
alien to their job and as part of the work of press officers who having graduated 
from the NSPA, have specialised in media and communication (Interview, no 
30).  
Notably, responsibility over the function of public diplomacy has divided the 
section of press officers and their union. Although the majority of press attachés 
fear that their section is endangered due to the widespread availability of IT and 
the shrinking dependability of governments on press offices’ input, they are 
divided against the prospect of the competence and their section being 
absorbed in its entirety by the MFA, with many officials demonstrating strong 
resistance (Interview, no 50).  
Objective voices foresee that the absorption of the section –which is currently 
being seen as having no identity- by the MFA is the only option for the conduct 
of effective public diplomacy (Interview, no 30; 50). Public diplomacy in Greece 
needs to be embedded on a firm institutional basis and this is a lesson that 
should have been learned by the recent financial crisis. An interviewee argued 
that it is somewhat surprising that Greece did not improve its public diplomacy 
mechanisms especially after the lukewarm and in some cases negative 
responses received by the EU and other states with regards to the economic 
crisis (Interview, no 50).  
Until today, as previously mentioned, public diplomacy efforts have been poorly 
integrated and untargeted, and far from constituting an axis for the re-
organisation of the embassies. Greek public diplomacy has tended to be rather 
marginal comprising random and uncoordinated efforts by press attachés in 
various embassies (Interview, no 35). Examples of personal initiatives are the 
usage of social network tools for instance by the Press Office in London which 
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set up the ‘Greek Network’27 and ‘A Pint of Greece’28 on Facebook, and 
newsletters attached on the Greek embassy’s website29.  
Nonetheless, such efforts are very sporadic and very recent. Characteristically, 
until one year ago the press office and embassy in London did not have a 
website, and were thus bound to have a rather low impact factor. As a press 
officer in London argued (Interview, no 50) the amounts of information received 
every day and the ever present pathology of the Greek administration system 
summarised in ‘qualitative under-staffing’ reduces press offices to information 
transmission belts translating and passing on information to the MFA’s GS 
(Interview, no 50).  
The MFA GS has a two way contact established with PCOs so that it can 
receive input to be used in policy making and formulation of national positions 
and send back to the missions respective information to be presented and 
publicised locally. According to an official of the GSCI (Interview, no 36) the 
contribution of the GS office to the public diplomacy process could be 
summarised as follows:  
1. Dissemination of information and presentation of Greek positions to 
foreign press through press attachés 
2. Formulation and influence of public opinion through the press offices in 
the host country  
3. Information of domestic publics via the MFA DG for Information and 
Public Diplomacy 
Evidently, characterisations of the public diplomacy model in Greece as weak, 
casual and fragmented have a solid foundation (Interview, no 48; 49; 50). 
Despite increasing awareness that public diplomacy constitutes a valuable tool 
for governments, its institutional incorporation under the organisational umbrella 
of the MFA is pending thus delaying its effective undertaking (Interview, no 34; 
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 http://www.facebook.com/pages/Greek-Network/110946355616226 
28
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35; 50). It is anticipated by the author that the organisational re-arrangement of 
public diplomacy will constitute a major innovation in the next MFA Charter 
which is currently being drafted. Besides, the fragmentation of the competence 
of public diplomacy and its partial management by the section of press attachés 
defies its very purpose in that public diplomacy must be seen as uniting and 
integrating rather than separating diplomacy from media and communication 
(Interview, no 50). 
Besides its weak institutional arrangement, Greece seems to lag behind other 
western states also in public diplomacy thinking. Such an assumption stems 
from a number of evidence gathered in the interviews with Greek officials. More 
specifically, even though all interviewees agreed that public diplomacy is 
gaining importance in the Greek foreign policy agenda, in-depth discussions 
with officials indicated significant discrepancy with regards to their 
understanding of public diplomacy.  
More specifically, public diplomacy is understood by some as being 
coterminous with cultural diplomacy (Interview, no 12; 20; 21; 51) and therefore 
its exercise and implementation is perceived as involving actors other than 
diplomats such as educational and cultural experts, architects, historians and 
authors. Public diplomacy is still perceived by some officials as propaganda and 
even as an oxymoron in that diplomacy exercised by diplomats cannot be 
communicated openly. Thus they are relatively suspicious of its methods and 
objectives (Interview, no 14; 17; 18; 42; 47). A GSCI official (Interview, no 35) 
suggested:  
‘Public diplomacy is about thinking outside the box and in Greece we 
do not even think about the box. Public diplomacy is a frame of mind 
which we are yet far from achieving’.  
Such perceptions are indicative of a more traditional understanding of 
diplomacy altogether and a delayed maturity in understanding that public 
diplomacy signifies a new framework of thinking in the conduct of diplomacy in 
the 21st century. This explains why a number of key MFA officials believe that 
the establishment of an office in the MFA in charge of information of Greek 
journalists serves the purposes of public diplomacy in an adequate fashion and 
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do not see the need for coordinating and organising public diplomacy centrally 
(Interview, no 14). Public diplomacy understanding appears to have matured 
more if not only, in the consciousness of press officers who perform the task of 
information gathering and dissemination inherent in the practice of public 
diplomacy. Press officers are more attuned to the necessity of communication 
with foreign audiences (Interview, no 50) but lack any strategic setting or action 
plan to this end. Another GSCI official (Interview no 36) who served several 
years abroad in PCOs argued that:   
‘Essentially we do what we always did. We promote a certain image 
of Greece abroad usually related to our glorious culture. The only 
difference is that now we do it more intensively, but not necessarily 
more coherently or strategically. In other words there is no coherent 
governmental strategy.’ 
 
 
The function of economic diplomacy: the awkward symbiosis 
of politics and economics  
 
As illustrated in the previous chapter, the function of economic, commercial and 
trade diplomacy, traditionally performed by economic and commercial attachés, 
an important constituent of the Greek diplomatic network, was transferred from 
MNEC30 to the MFA in 2002. In the MFA, the section was assimilated under the 
General Secretariat of International Economic Relations and Development 
Cooperation31 (GSIERDC or DOS in Greek) comprising DG B and YDAS-
Hellenic Aid and presided over by the MFA’s GS for International Economic 
Relations32. Economic and commercial attachés, graduates of the NSPA, staff 
the network of Economic and Commercial Affairs offices (ECA) attached to 
Greek embassies.  
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 The competence of economic diplomacy together with the section of economic and 
commercial  attachés previously belonged to the Ministry of Trade 
31
 PD 159/2002 
32
 Alongside the transfer of economic diplomacy to the MFA another significant institutional 
development was the centralisation of the Development Cooperation pillar under the aegis of 
the MFA in the DG YDAS-Hellenic Aid 
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Despite enthusiasm over change and adaptation of the mechanisms that deal 
with external policy to the transforming international and domestic settings there 
is evident scepticism over the chosen course of action. The majority of Greek 
officials both at home and abroad agree that the Greek foreign policy 
bureaucracy is undergoing a process of ‘large scale fermentation’ merging 
economic and political foreign policy. They also agree that this fermentation, 
necessary and overdue, indicates the harmonisation of the Greek foreign policy 
machinery and its adaptation to contemporary world politics demands 
(Interview, no 9; 28; 30; 32; 37).  
The assimilation of this segment of foreign policy bureaucracy in the MFA but in 
a distinct organisational MFA unit caused organisational conflict between 
traditional diplomats and the economic and commercial attachés while at the 
same time produced a grey area of competence and jurisdiction at the interface 
between political and economic diplomacy33 (Sitaras, 2005). Therefore, it raised 
concerns and scepticism over the implications of the chosen course of 
adaptation for the future and efficacy of the very function of economic 
diplomacy and the role of the Greek diplomat who is confronted with major 
challenges.  
The transfer of the economic diplomacy bureaucracy served the strategic 
purpose of rendering the MFA a productive ministry, in the sense of enhancing 
its economic policy-making capacity as well as intensifying economic activity 
overseas through the employment of economic missions in cooperation with the 
MNEC but under the MFA’s political leadership34 (Bakoyianni, 2009). According 
to an official of DG B (Interview, no 37): 
‘The rationale of this move was to achieve an osmosis of the political 
and economic elements in policy making which represent the two 
dimensions of foreign policy making capability of Greece. The 
merging of the two dimensions into a single pillar of representation 
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 See Sitaras (2005) for the application of theories on organisational conflict on the case of the 
transfer of the competence of economic diplomacy to the MFA 
34
 The articulation of the strategic target of this assimilation exemplifies again that the 
substance of the so called foreign economic policy is rather limited to commercial policy  
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serves the strategic purpose of enhancing Greek foreign policy 
capacity’.  
This was also perceived as the way to improve services offered by the Greek 
diplomatic network to Greek citizens and businessmen engaging in enterprises 
abroad. The international and domestic financial crises, with the latter posing 
more acute pressures to Greek governments and publics, necessitated more 
than ever before the boosting of Greek exports and enterprise outside the 
country. This urgency was further intensified due to demands created by 
globalisation processes which gave rise to new regional and world powers at 
the other side of the Atlantic thus increasing the need for commercial advocacy 
(Bakoyianni, 2009).  
In 2009, the then FM Bakoyianni (Bakoyianni, 2009) stated that ‘the absorption 
of economic diplomacy and the ECA section from the MFA and its embassies 
reflects an unprecedented intersection in Greek diplomacy which requires 
change of mentality and close partnership with private businesses with purpose 
of providing better goods and services overseas’. This shift has had major 
implications for economic and commercial attachés whose section as specialist 
graduates from the NSPA was abolished with the 2007 Charter, with the 
abolition coming into effect in 2012 (Interview, no 13).  
The section of economic and commercial attachés, in spite of its imminent 
extinction, currently constitutes a key element of the Greek diplomatic capital 
and is considered to be the most ‘globalised’ and ‘changed’ fraction of the 
Greek diplomatic network in terms of ‘outwardness’, modernisation, usage of IT 
and socialization with an ever widening cast of non-governmental agents and 
networks (Interview, no 37). This explains expectations that the transfer of the 
section into the MFA’s more traditional bureaucracy will bring significant change 
and modernization to the role of the Greek traditional diplomat on the basis of a 
‘spill over’ (Interview, no 22; 23; 37).  
One of the acute problems of the current organisation of economic diplomacy 
and the operation of the section of economic and commercial officers, similarly 
to other parts of the Greek bureaucracy is that it suffers from overlaps due to 
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co-responsibility with the MNEC35 but also due to the acute lack of policy 
planning (Interview, no 28; 30; 37). None of the adjectives; strategic, 
macroscopic or long-term, apply to foreign economic policy planning (Interview, 
no 37). 
‘There is an Exports Council which convenes once a year with 
domestic sectoral and economic ministries, sectoral businesses and 
business associations. This council, in theory, constitutes a very 
appropriate forum to bring together Greek businesses and 
associations with the political leadership and to draft guidelines and 
policy, in other words the blue print for foreign economic policy and 
for the organisation of our economic diplomatic representation 
abroad. Unfortunately, the council is limited to problem solving in 
terms of suggestions and proposals and it merely registers existing 
problems for future reference. Instead, it should constitute a very 
important sectoral tool in charge of coordination and policy 
formulation’ (Interview, no 37).  
This sectoral tool is presided over by the Minister of Economy and is now 
registered as an institutional body for the recording and monitoring of the 
problems encountered by businesses. In essence its biggest achievement is 
that it merges political leadership i.e. ministries with businesses. It was 
established two decades ago but it still cannot comprehend the new directions 
of business activity, the necessity for the government to act as a business and 
the need for collective commercial and business policy planning (Interview, no 
37). An MFA official for DG-B Business development (Interview, no 37) argued 
that the lack of economic policy planning has had a major cost for Greece. The 
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 There is no consolidation and integration of responsibility and tasks. For instance foreign 
investment in Greece is controlled and managed by the MNEC whereas ECA offices come 
under the control and instructions of the MFA. Another example is the Organisation for Greek 
Commerce which operates under the aegis of MNEC however it is the MFA which is in charge 
of representation in all international fora. Or the World Trade Organisation comes under the 
management of the MNEC however it is again the MFA which represents Greece in 
international fora. 
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official gave the example of the Greek business enterprise in the Balkans post 
1990: 
‘We, state owned businesses and private alike, ‘stampeded’ to invest 
in the Balkans without any central economic or commercial policy 
and without an investment strategy. Whoever got there first won. 
There was no framework or research with regard to the local sectoral 
needs and the Greek state sectors or businesses which could 
engage in commerce and offer support’ (Interview, no 37).  
Another official in Brussels (Interview, no 28) similarly emphasised the acute 
lack of policy planning in foreign economic policy and diplomacy by referring to 
the same example. 
 
‘In the early 1990s our target was a mass ‘outwardness, a regional 
opening up. We managed a massive exodus in the Balkan region 
with banks, industry and technical firms. Our presence in the Balkans 
was getting larger and larger. However, without central planning, 
strategy and regulation there was a clash in the register and an 
escalating conflict’ (Interview, no 28). 
 
Economic and Commercial Affairs Offices: the trajectory and role of 
the section 
 
The economic and commercial section was first established in 1969 in the 
Ministry of Trade, based on the Treaty of Vienna, with the ultimate objective to 
promote the ‘outwardness’ and intensification of Greek business enterprise and 
foreign economic policy overseas (Interview, no 28). According to the official 
website36 of the union of economic and commercial attachés the first 
commercial  consultant was attached to the Greek embassy in Berlin in 1937 
whereas the post of commercial attachés to Greek embassies was 
institutionalised in 194737. The section, often referred to as a ‘nomad section’ 
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 www.oey.gr 
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 http://www.oey.gr/site_v2/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=52:2009-11-26-
01-27-26&catid=22&Itemid=41 accessed 17.01.11 
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due to its transfer from one ministry to another (Interview, no 23) was 
transferred in 1981 from the Ministry of Trade to the MNEC only to be 
transferred two decades later to the MFA.  
In 2003, Law 3196/2003 transferred the competence of economic diplomacy 
and the commercial  attachés section to the MFA where they operated until 
2007. In 2007, the latest MFA Charter (Law 3566/2007) centralised foreign 
economic diplomacy under the organisational structure of the MFA and 
abolished the section of economic and commercial  attachés. The abolition, 
which as mentioned earlier aimed at making economic diplomacy a central 
pillar of the MFA, was accompanied by significant changes in the MFA’s 
diplomatic academy curriculum, which introduced compulsory six-monthly 
economic diplomacy training. The curriculum of the diplomatic academy is 
discussed later in this chapter.  
The network of the 6138 in 2011 ECA offices39 attached to the Greek embassies 
and staffed by members of the economic and commercial section has been a 
major player in the Greek diplomatic network in countries with a particular 
economic and commercial interest for Greece. With their role focusing on the 
systematic monitoring and analysis of economic developments in the host 
countries and on the consultation and support of those parts of the Greek 
government and Greek businesses engaging in businesses overseas, ECA 
offices have undertaken a very active consultative function and an inter-
ministerial coordinating role (Interview, no 37). The section’s main role as 
described by its staff (Interview, no 37) is to:  
• monitor the international and local markets in the host country and 
provide information and guidance to Greek governments and businesses 
on issues of sectoral significance 
• draw a yearly course of action and yearly reports and consult the MFA 
and the government on issues of foreign economic and commercial  
policy  
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 http://agora.mfa.gr/frontoffice/portal.asp?cpage=NODE&cnode=64&clang=1 accessed 
17.01.11 
39
 Their number has varied from 52 in 2009 to 60 in 2010 and to 61 in 2011 (Interview no 30)  
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• offer guidance, support and coordination to other government 
departments overseas  
• maintain a channel of communication between the HQ and Greek and 
foreign businesses and to co-decide over business activity and action 
plan  
• to organise exploratory and other business missions to accompany the 
PM, FM and deputy FM or the minister of economy  
ECA offices constitute this part of the Greek foreign policy bureaucracy, which 
arguably altered the dynamics between the overseas missions and the HQ in 
that they have undertaken an active role both in policy consultation and 
formulation. They see themselves as ‘the nerve endings of the machinery which 
sends stimuli back to the centre’ which changes previous images of the 
diplomatic network as being merely an executive tool (Interview, no 28).  
Obviously, it was not only the relationship with the HQ that ECA offices 
changed but also the relationship with the rest of the Greek administration. This 
is because their very function and role relies on cooperation and promotion of 
close partnership with the Greek Chambers of Commerce, the Greek Exports 
Council, the MNEC, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Transport and 
other productive ministries with which they organise joint business missions40 
(Interview, no 23; 28; 38).  
ECA officers are in constant communication with different government 
departments, non-governmental agents and Greek business and have learned 
to play the game of ‘building business networks’ outside the confines of Greece 
(Interview, no 28). Part of their job is to organise business events, conferences 
and business open days as well as engaging in ‘sectoral marketing’ (Interview, 
no 28). The section of the ECA was also the first section of Greek foreign policy 
bureaucracy41 to introduce process standardisation devices in the form of ISO 
9001:2000 (Interview, no 28; 37).  
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 This is why the abolition of the section of economic and commercial  attachés met with strong 
resistance and disapproval from Greek sectoral parts of the state and Greek businesses 
41
 ISO 9001 was later adopted by Consulates with regards to Schengen processes 
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ISO 9001, introduced in 2009, aimed at the standardisation of the Greek foreign 
economic policy for purposes of ensuring its functional efficiency through yearly 
scheduled plans on economic and sectoral issues and the standardisation of 
internal processes for policy planning and implementation. In other words, ISO 
9001 was meant to standardise the foreign economic policy process and to 
assess the quality of performance of ECA offices evaluating their output in the 
form of yearly performance reports and targets set by the government or Greek 
businesses (or the two together) (Interview, no 37). However, a more 
managerial approach to foreign affairs administration and its application to the 
entirety of foreign policy bureaucracy met with resistance from some traditional 
bureaucrats (Interview, no 28).  
The course of development with regard to performance assessment and foreign 
economic policy process standardisation was completed with the launch of the 
business portal AGORA42. AGORA offers a wide range of information 
concerning Greek and other economies in the form of research and market 
reports carried out and uploaded by ECA offices worldwide and in collaboration 
with the Greek Commercial Chambers, Greek Export Organisations and other 
bilateral chambers such as the Greek-Arab and the Sino-Greek Chambers of 
Commerce. The information managed on the AGORA portal is accessible to 
Greek and foreign public audiences, a step which heralded the start of a new 
era for the relationship of Greek foreign policy bureaucracy with the public and 
IT (Interview, no 23) discussed below. 
It is for all the aforementioned reasons that the economic and commercial  
section is considered to be the most ‘outward’ and ‘up to date’ -with regards to 
economic globalisation and IT- part of the Greek foreign policy bureaucracy. 
This is because, by definition, their tasks involve socialisation with local and 
international business communities outside the confines of the ministry or of 
their offices and interaction with a wide spectrum of governmental and non-
governmental actors and usage of IT (Interview, no 28; 38). Developments in 
the ways of communication and the types of actors ECA officers interact with 
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have had major implications for their profession over the last two decades. 
Characteristically, an ECA officer (Interview, no 28) stated that:  
‘When I started my career in the early 1980s, things were very 
amateurish. We had to support Greek businesses abroad and build 
business relations locally and we were given money in black bin 
bags. There was no logistical system and the movement of money 
did not appear anywhere. Our only instrument to start building 
business coalitions locally was the telephone but often without a 
phone book inherited from the previous post holder. In the mid 1980s 
I was sent to Beirut with an order to improve olive and olive oil 
exports. I did not know where to start, who to see, how to contact 
them. It took me months to start finding my way around and getting 
an idea of how the market there worked. Today things are more 
standardised and with the aid of IT there is ample information. We 
are now dispatched to a new post and from day one we have 
significant information about the local markets in the form of yearly 
local business reports on the MFA’s business portal AGORA and 
catalogued lists with our main stakeholders. We know their 
revenues, recruiting patterns, trends and numbers. We send a 
couple of emails and business starts!’ 
However, despite the significance of the role of ECA offices and the ‘added 
value’ they bring to the Greek diplomatic capital, their operation and 
performance is sometimes compromised by a general lack of business culture 
which is the by-product of the ongoing ‘Greek security issues’ which in practice 
downgrade the effective performance economic diplomacy and prioritise 
traditional diplomacy. For Greek ECA officers but mostly for Greek diplomats it 
is often considered a luxury to focus on international economic policy as their 
counterparts do for instance in New Zealand or the UK (Sitaras, 2005: 15; 
Interview, no 28; 30).  
Instead they often have to be preoccupied with national security issues; a fact 
which has determined their training, orientation and culture (Interview, no 30). 
Living in the turbulent region of the Balkans and being the only EU country with 
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ongoing and unresolved traditional security issues, Greek economic diplomacy 
is not concerned with international economic welfare but rather with 
strengthening commercial ties in order to ensure security (security first) 
(Sitaras, 2005: 15). As a result, even the job of ECA officers is instilled with 
strong political elements.  
Another factor which poses constraints to the organisation of an integral 
economic diplomacy is limited resources.  An ECA official in New York 
(Interview, no 30) argued that the budget allocated to economic diplomacy is 
extremely low for a country which has rendered economic diplomacy the main 
pillar of its foreign policy. More specifically, the official argued that  
‘The Greek yearly budget for economic diplomacy was in 2009, 
€900,000 for the totality of the 61 ECA offices worldwide when for 
instance Cyprus allocates €700,000 to their American office alone’.  
This combined with the ever persistent problem of under-staffing –qualitative or 
quantitative- pose serious hindrances to the effective organisation and 
operation of Greek economic diplomacy and foreign policy bureaucracy.  
‘We are faced with increasing demands for more economic diplomacy 
and more ECA offices but their number is bound to decrease due to 
scarce resources ’ (Interview, no 30).  
 
Information technology: underestimated and unevenly applied  
 
It becomes evident from the above that the role of the Greek foreign policy 
bureaucrat has been significantly affected by the extensive usage of IT and 
especially the section of economic attachés. Interestingly however, the 
responses provided by 51 interviewees on the question of whether and how the 
usage of IT has changed the job of the Greek diplomat, varied significantly. It 
appears that IT has not had the same impact on all sections of the Greek 
foreign policy bureaucracy and that the usage of the Internet is not as 
widespread as expected.  
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Seemingly, ECA officers as well as Press and Communications officers (all 
graduates from the NSPA43) lead the way, for Greek standards, in the use of IT 
and the internet with initiatives including examples of social network fora 
mentioned above. At the same time a significant amount of diplomats of the 
political branch of the MFA lag behind. It is not certain whether this discrepancy 
relates to the fact that the majority of the graduates of the Diplomatic Academy 
are graduates of law schools with a specific study culture whereas graduates of 
the NSPA are graduates from a wide range of faculties usually with 
postgraduate studies in foreign universities and with a demanding training 
curriculum.  
As far as the impact of IT on the conduct of Greek diplomacy is concerned, 
Greece has naturally gained significant diplomatic capital through membership 
to the EU and usage of the COREU44 system. This is because it gained access 
to information concerning foreign policy and diplomatic issues that were new to 
its agenda and added to its negotiating skills, especially towards third countries. 
The COREU network constituted a revolution in Greek access to foreign policy 
information thus empowering Greek diplomats (Interview, no 2) who previously 
viewed themselves as ‘followers’ with regards to international developments 
(Interview, no 28).  
Several younger diplomats view themselves as the generation of ‘laptop 
diplomats’ and can rely on the internet for their preparatory work. Supporters of 
this approach argue that the Internet gives them independence and freedom of 
movement and tackles effectively issues of scarcity of diplomatic information 
which constituted a prior weakness (Interview, no 33; 39).  
At the same time however, there is a significant part of Greek foreign policy 
bureaucracy which arguably, adapts very slowly to current developments due to 
their rejection of electronic communication. In the course of the interviews it 
was argued that a number of officials in the MFA prefer the old ways of 
communication and operation such as face to face interaction or the telephone 
on the grounds that they ensure safety. A large number of Greek MFA officials 
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 The reason why this is important is explained below  
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 the telex system used by member states for the transmission of CFSP matters 
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do not use emailing systems and other electronic social network fora and prefer 
to have emails printed out for them by administrative staff.  
Responses to electronic mail are managed by administrative support staff or 
even younger diplomats (Interview, no 38). The acutely hierarchical structure 
and operation of the MFA seems to encourage such practices on the grounds 
that memos and notes are effective for movement upwards whilst the telephone 
is deemed adequate for more ‘horizontal’ operation (Interview, no 38).  
In 2001, the MFA introduced a system of electronic document management45 
and emailing called SIDEE46 (Interview, no 11) which has rarely been used to 
its full potential and has been replaced by post-it notes circulating in the 
building (Interview, no 42). A number of Greek officials were hesitant to 
embrace the new technology and preferred the old ways of communicating and 
filing which results in increased needs for support staff, unanswered phone 
calls and large messy folders as well as being time consuming.   
A number of diplomats, both at home and abroad, reportedly do not use 
personal computers or any kind of electronic communication whatsoever. This 
causes serious delays and loss of information which relies for circulation on 
hand written notes (Interview, no 43). An MFA diplomat argued that such 
traditionalist practices are not cost-effective and occupy personnel who, freed 
from this kind of procedural tasks, could focus on the analysis of available 
information and on input to the foreign policy process (Interview. no 38; 42; 43).   
Despite the limited usage of IT from certain segments of foreign policy 
bureaucracy, mostly comprising senior diplomats, a number of interviewees 
argued that their job has been altered with the vast amounts and speed of 
transfer of available information. For some parts of the bureaucracy such as the 
press and communication section, their job has become so reliant on the 
internet that it is impossible to deliver without it and social network fora and the 
internet have become their main instrument (Interview, no 50). Similarly, for the 
economic and commercial  section, the internet and online communications 
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 The MFA has also been seeking since 2005 to digitalise its archives and for this reason it has 
been pursuing funding from the 4th Community Support Framework (Greek Embassy in 
Washington 2006 Report).  
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have become inherent in their section’s culture and officials rely on electronic 
documentation and uploaded reports and information.  These use the internet 
for commercial information that no embassy or permanent diplomatic mission 
could ever provide (Interview, no 48).  
 
The Greek diplomatic profession: towards a new integrationist 
paradigm?  
 
The previous section demonstrated a discrepancy in the impact of IT to the job 
of contemporary Greek foreign policy bureaucrats. This impact seems to be 
more significant for the sections of economic and commercial attachés as well 
as for the section of press and communication attachés and less significant for 
traditional political diplomats of the MFA. Irrespective of the extent to which 
their profession has been affected by the IT, Greek diplomats generally agree 
that their profession has changed as a result of globalisation and membership 
to the EU as well as to other regional configurations such as Euro-
Mediterranean Cooperation or the Organisation for the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation (Interview, no 40).  
Drastic change is also occurring in the domain of traditional diplomats, which is 
bound to become more manifest in the near future due to the addition of 
economic diplomacy as a central function of the MFA. This is because their 
curriculum has been enriched with compulsory economic modules. Most 
importantly, however, because when the abolition of the section of economic 
and commercial  attachés comes into effect political diplomats are expected to 
take over the function of economic diplomacy which goes hand in hand with IT 
usage.  
The addition of the economic diplomacy competence in the job description of 
the MFA’s political diplomat provides evidence that the profession of the Greek 
diplomat is in a process of dramatic change (Interview, no 22; 23; 26; 37) and 
according to an MFA official, on the way to a new paradigm for Greek 
standards which will comprise a single expertise area (Interview, no 28). And 
even though this merging is deemed necessary to address policies and issues 
267 
 
which require integrated approaches, an official in Brussels (Interview, no 28) 
expressed his concerns with regards to the fusion of economic and traditional 
diplomacy in the name of the creation of the so-called ‘holistic diplomat’. The 
official argued,  
‘I am not sure the path we have taken is the right one. The abolition 
of the ECA section and the transfer of economic diplomacy under 
the umbrella of political diplomacy means that instead of having 
experts on either economic or political matters we will have all 
encompassing new diplomats. In essence, fusion is taking place 
which indicates how the economic aspects have infiltrated the 
political aspects as a result of globalisation. However, my concern is 
that ECA officers have acquired a specific economic and 
commercial  culture that traditional diplomats do not, naturally 
possess. The question is whether these new holistic diplomats are 
able to reach the same levels of expertise in both and other areas 
and in the case they do not, if it matters.  
Such fears are considered to be valid if one takes into consideration that the 
expected success of the new paradigm as the result of the aforementioned 
fusion, relies on a spill over effect rather than on in-depth planning and re-
organisation. In other words, the hasty abolition of a very productive section of 
foreign policy bureaucracy with a given ethos and tradition and its assimilation 
in the MFA is expected to modernise a traditional and often outdated section of 
Greek bureaucracy and to accomplish the lifting of the barriers overseas 
between two different, and until recently, rigidly separate compartments of 
Greek foreign policy. 
In theory, it is hoped that this arrangement will merge two previously distinct 
dimensions of Greek foreign policy on a structural level with the aim of 
facilitating the maturity of the new Greek diplomat and the creation of a single 
space of expertise. Such an approach would have been more plausible had the 
barriers between the various organisational compartments in the MFA’s 
organisational structure at home been lifted as well. For, even if the ultimate 
aim is to produce integrated diplomats of a wider reach for the future, reality 
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shows that this centralisation of competences under the heading of the ‘MFA 
diplomat’ without respective training and corresponding organisational 
arrangements at the HQ has limited possibilities to succeed. 
Interviewed Greek diplomats argued that the changes they have experienced in 
their profession in the last three decades have been immense. According to an 
official located in Brussels (Interview, no 28):  
 ‘One parameter of change concerns the fact that we now work on a 
supra- national level. Even if it is regulated and effective for policy 
environments such  as this of the EU and more anarchic outside the 
EU it is still a new way of work’.  
Another Greek diplomat in Brussels (Interview, no 26) added that the scope of 
the job of the Greek diplomat has seen an unprecedented widening in the last 
two decades, to policy areas that were previously unknown or formed part of 
the mandate of domestic departments. And even though such policy areas 
reflect the constantly changing anatomy of the international environment, for a 
country like Greece and its diplomats such areas form a new reality. Greek 
diplomats feel more intensely than ever before that:  
‘Our service has to try to comprehend the changing external and 
domestic environments and procure for tools and mechanisms that 
will enable the government to pursue the state’s and its citizens’ 
interests. Until two decades ago we could not even imagine the 
extent of the complications that globalisation and similarly the EU 
would bring forward’ (Interview no, 26).  
Another official explained that their profession has changed in both substance 
and methods in that ‘we are not abroad anymore to merely execute orders from 
the centre. We are there to investigate and consult, promote and sell, blend in 
the market and make the best out of IT’ (Interview, no 28). Greek officials 
emphasise that the implications of globalisation and the EU47 for their 
profession are such that it currently takes much longer for younger diplomats to 
                                                        
47
 which they all view as the vehicle with which Greece experiences globalisation in terms of 
policy making 
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learn how to be effective. This is because they have to perform on a much 
wider spectrum of sectoral issues and policies such as those concerning the 
environment, development and cooperation, culture, international humanitarian 
crises, asymmetrical threats and others and at the same time they are 
confronted with large scale available expertise and limited resources (Interview, 
no 26; 47).  
And even though the widening of the policy spectrum which preoccupies Greek 
diplomatic missions has not resulted in any change of embassy structure or 
patterns of posting officials from home ministries –also due to financial 
constraints- it has intensified cooperation and contact between diplomats and 
technical ministries as well as a wider cast of non-governmental collaborators, 
with cooperation normally channelled through the MFA (Interview, no 47; 48; 
49). Without having physical representation from home departments abroad, 
Greek diplomats represent and are accountable to the entirety of the Greek 
public sector. And whilst their embassies remain traditional in structure the 
content of their job has changed with a number of sectoral issues forming part 
of their agenda (Interview, no 47).  
Such developments are believed to have diversified the profession of Greek 
diplomats who view themselves as on the way to becoming ‘all in one’ or 
‘holistic diplomats’ (Interview, no 33; 49). The ‘all in one’ trend is also applied at 
a more practical level due to the acute lack of resources and shortage of staff in 
overseas missions, especially in the last few years, and the simultaneous 
increase in demands.  
Effectively, the scarcity of resources and personnel as well as the recruiting 
trends which do not generally support engagement of locals but sometimes rely 
on appointments based on family criteria to low clerical positions resulting in 
extra burden to the mission48 has major implications for the profession of Greek 
diplomats, keeping them hostage to limited input to the foreign policy process 
(Interview, no 49). As a result, diplomats find themselves running the mission 
                                                        
48
 On a number of occasions family appointments have applied instead of appointing locals for 
the post of the driver, telephone operator or embassy receptionist. The implications were that 
posted staff did not speak the local language and did not help by providing linkages with own 
local networks but instead needed support from embassy diplomats in translation and carrying 
out clerical tasks.  
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from the smallest clerical detail such as queuing in Pakistani public 
administration branches in order to pay electricity bills to issues of ultimate 
diplomatic and political significance (Interview, no 49).  
It is believed that changes in the profession of the Greek diplomat would have 
been more emphatically pronounced had they not been so consumed in the 
execution of purely administrative tasks and in traditional modes of operation. 
Such modes, indicating elements of path dependence, attribute a more 
administrative dimension to their job at the expense of input to policy making, 
analysis and research (Interview, no 49). 
‘Needs are increasing for the growth of the Greek diplomatic capital 
and we are confronted with demands to become more productive 
and more active. Especially with regards to economic diplomacy and 
our image abroad we need to sell and we are assessed every day by 
the media, by businesses, by foreign publics and our citizens. Every 
minister and head of mission has to think of themselves as a chief 
executive officer and focus on sales and productivity at a time when 
resources are diminishing but demands for diplomatic representation 
and action are increasing. To some extent and some of our 
colleagues have abandoned and need to abandon the attitude of a 
cardinal. We are not here to play ambassadors in cocktail parties 
and drink Martinis. We are here to work with targets and to develop 
the currently limited business activity. Some of us try to abandon 
hierarchy and protocol and do our job as we think right. 
Unfortunately, however, more of us still stick to hierarchical practices’ 
(Interview, no 28). 
Even though change in their profession has been significant, especially in the 
last two decades, with a large quantity of information being flown in and IT 
changing the pace of work49 dramatically, there are still some factors which, 
arguably, differentiate Greek diplomats from other western counterparts 
(Interview, no 30). Greece still has major national security issues at stake which 
determine the composition of diplomatic representation overseas. It is not only 
                                                        
49
 Greek diplomats until the late 1990s were using electric typewriters  
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security issues that require dense political representation at key posts such as 
Ankara, Skopje and Washington rendering secondments from home ministries 
of secondary importance but they also determine the orientation of Greek 
diplomats with national security issues taking precedence over international 
issues (Interview, no 28; 30; 39; 45; 47; 48; 49). In addition, they determine 
recruitment patterns which do not support schemes of appointing LES. Most 
Greek missions have high political stakes to recruit locals. They need to keep 
confidentiality at high levels and ambassadors fear that engaging locals will 
compromise confidentiality (Interview, no 48; 49).  
These elements are closely related to the persistence of the acutely hierarchical 
and traditional character and operation of overseas missions where allegiance 
and respect to the head of mission is required by younger and other senior 
diplomats (Interview, no 48; 49). The head of mission, currently also considered 
as the line manager for the mission’s staff, in an attempt to sound more like 
western models, is in charge of the unofficial assessment procedures which 
take place three-yearly (sometimes every four years) usually in the form of a 
few paragraphs which can be either appraising or indifferent. Overall, the head 
of mission is in charge of the general running of the mission and constitutes the 
link with the political leadership (Interview, no 48; 49). 
Such observations suggest that hypotheses that the Greek diplomat may be 
moving towards a new integrated paradigm are exaggerated. This is because 
traditional political diplomats may be unable to carry out the technical issues 
inherent in international economic relations, despite their advantage in 
comparison to ECA officials in such areas as treaty and agreement drafting. 
Besides, this is the reason why their role in economic matters has so far 
remained largely limited to coordinating rather than making foreign economic 
policy. It is important to point out that it was the weakness of Greek diplomats in 
managing economic relations that led the MFA in 1975, during the pre-
accession negotiations for Greek entry to the EEC, to seek extra-MFA 
economic experts. Evidently, Greek traditional diplomacy failed then to manage 
the institutional dimension of negotiations with an economic substance (Sitaras, 
2005:15).    
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Greek diplomats operate in hierarchical ways for purposes of maintaining the 
status quo and traditionalism, both deeply ingrained in their organisational 
culture (Interview, no 47). Sticking to hierarchy and seniority are considered to 
be vital in ensuring order in the missions. An embassy official (Interview, no 47) 
suggested, ‘if you leave too much scope for individual action then you have lost 
the game. Hierarchy ensures order and we like order’. In this context it is not 
unusual for younger diplomats to be expected to stand up when the head of 
mission appears and to refer to them only after permission is granted. Closely 
linked to aspirations of maintaining the traditional character of diplomatic 
representations are traditional approaches to promoting diplomacy involving 
cocktail parties, impressive houses and dress codes. Such traditional 
approaches are also considered as the means by which Greek diplomats seek 
to impress and gain acceptance from their American, British or French 
counterparts who enjoy acceptance, by definition, without effort (Interview, no 
47).  
Unlike traditional approaches to diplomacy preferred mostly by senior officials, 
younger  diplomats seem to disagree with the very hierarchical operational 
model of embassies as it causes delays and most importantly wastes resources 
(Interview, no 48; 49). With a fresh mentality young diplomats would like to 
utilise a wider range of their capabilities and to push towards more modern 
approaches to diplomacy and more casual ways of work but the status quo 
seems unchangeable. A young diplomat in the Greek embassy in London 
(Interview, no 48) suggested that, ‘even simple things such as the British dress 
down Friday is miles away from our culture. We would not even dare suggest it 
to the head of mission’. 
    
The Diplomatic Academy: a first step towards merging 
economic and political diplomacy  
 
The Diplomatic Academy was established in 1999 and operates as an 
independent organisational unit of the MFA accountable directly to the FM. The 
main objective of the Academy is to deliver training and education for its 
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students who are diplomatic candidates who succeeded in the MFA’s entry 
examinations. Besides educating students, the Diplomatic Academy is also in 
charge of delivering professional training by organising seminars and training 
courses for all branches of the MFA but also for professionals of other home 
departments on issues which fall under the competence of the MFA.  
Furthermore, in the context of promoting good relations with third countries the 
Academy has concluded a number of bilateral and multilateral memoranda with 
a number of similar foreign institutions for the purpose of promoting cooperation 
over diplomatic education such as the program for joint training with Azerbaijan 
in 2009 (Diplomatic Academy Charter).  
The Diplomatic Academy is headed by a diplomat of ambassadorial rank 
appointed through a presidential decree by the FM and is aided by academic 
consultants. The entrance exams to the Diplomatic Academy have always been 
very difficult and the system appeared closed and elitist favouring law 
graduates (Interview, no 44). The main modules that candidates are examined 
on and their worth in the overall entry mark are as follows (Interview, no 44) 
• Oral competence and essay writing worth 15% 
• French language test worth 15% 
• English language test worth 15% 
• Diplomatic history worth 15% 
• International Law worth 15% 
• International Finance worth 15%  
• Secondary tests worth 10% 
The curriculum of the diplomatic academy changed in 2007 with the MFA 
Charter and added six monthly compulsory studies in foreign economic affairs 
in an attempt to start bridging the gap between political and economic 
substance of foreign policy. Currently, Diplomatic Academy studies are yearly 
with the first semester involving the following core modules  
a. Public administration and human resource management  
b. Diplomatic practice and issues of etiquette, protocol and diplomatic 
correspondence  
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c. Administrative documentation and diplomatic terminology 
d. Consular practice  
e. Negotiating skills – crisis management  
f. Foreign policy (political, economic, cultural and other dimensions) 
g. Communication  
h. IT 
 
During the second semester the taught modules are as follows: 
a. International and European economic relations – International and Greek 
Economic Diplomacy 
i. International Political Economy and Greek Economic Diplomacy 
ii. European Union: Internal Market – Sectoral Policies and Common 
Trade Policy 
iii. Issues of Development Cooperation  
b. International Trade System  
i. International Trade and Fiscal System  
ii. Law of international commerce and trade 
iii. Attracting and evaluating business plans 
c. Organisation and Operation of ECA offices –Principles of International 
Marketing, Marketing of Greek Exports 
d. Special IT applications  
i. Advanced Communication Services on the Internet  
ii. E-commerce 
 
Diplomatic training  
 
According to the 2007 MFA Charter, the Diplomatic Academy is in charge of 
ongoing diplomatic training for the MFA’s officials. In this context it organises 
every year a series of seminars on  
• Economic Management 
• Consular Affairs 
• Computing  
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• Foreign Languages  
The Academy’s revised curriculum and professional training indicate that an 
international and European orientation has become part of the process and is 
now formulating the profile of the candidates and attachés (Passas, 2005: 368). 
The 2007 MFA Charter ensures that the Diplomatic Academy promotes close 
partnership and cooperation with the National School for Public Administration 
(NSPA) for the communal training of embassy attachés as well as the conduct 
of research programmes between the two, and national universities and 
research centres (Griva, 2008: 534). The revision of the Diplomatic Academy’s 
curriculum is aimed at educating more open minded diplomats and merging the 
study and training of different areas of foreign policy into a single forum 
(Interview, no 44). 
Nevertheless, despite the seemingly satisfactory curriculum, diplomatic training 
effectively remains rather traditional and legalistic in its approach. A diplomat in 
London (Interview, no 48) suggested that  
‘The majority of continuing education training and seminars that the 
MFA organises focuses mostly on improving IT skills. Existing 
training does not bring in to the service food for thought and 
discussion of issues that concerns 21st century diplomacy. Training 
and education do not connect employees with the rest of the world’.  
Similarly, an official at the HQ (Interview, no 22) argued that  
‘Greek diplomatic training is basic and far from reflective of the 
transformation that the world is undergoing. It revolves around the 
same technical issues and is delivered by senior or retired diplomats 
who have lost touch with the changing world already two decades 
ago but with ongoing political connections, hence our lagging behind 
in comparison to our European counterparts’.  
Besides the basic and sometimes obsolete character of the training another 
problem which further limits its impact on Greek diplomats is that it is always 
organised at the HQ in Athens and effectively diplomats seconded in overseas 
missions can hardly attend. This is due to the cuts in travelling but also due to 
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the missions’ understaffing which does not encourage diplomats to travel for 
training and educational purposes (Interview, no 48; 49).  
 
Greek consular missions 
 
The explosion in Greek overseas missions was accompanied by an expansion 
of the Greek consular network, especially in the region of the ex-Soviet Union 
and the Balkan region after the break-up of Yugoslavia. Karabarbounis (2007: 
203) suggests that an interesting expansion of the consular network took place 
towards Western Europe and especially in Germany, Belgium and Austria 
where there are significant working Greek communities and increased 
commercial interests. Greek consulates are generally programmed to serve 
Greek interests abroad and are vested with the promotion of Greek culture and 
cultural diplomacy often in collaboration with the Hellenic Culture Centre50. 
They are at the service of the well-being and support of Greek nationals, 
travellers and businessmen abroad and are in place to serve their economic, 
cultural, maritime and commercial interests (Interview, no 29; 46).  
A very important function performed by contemporary Greek consulates is 
serving as embassies’ ‘satellites’. This effectively means that they constitute 
embassies’ partners who are close to local publics and are thus able to gather 
field information and then transmit it to the embassy (Interview, no 45). The 
more specific roles of consulates largely depend on the location and the local 
demands. For instance the consulate-general in Cologne is a special consulate 
because it serves a large proportion of ‘Greek society’ which amounts to 
100,000 residing outside the Greek borders51.  
The location of consulates largely depends on the size of Greek populations 
locally. However, an equally significant criterion for their location is the 
maintaining or strengthening of political bilateral relations. For instance the 
consulate in Leipzig was established on strictly political grounds because the 
                                                        
50
 http://www.hcc.edu.gr/  
51
 The north-Rhine Westphalia is the most populous, most powerful economically part of 
Germany with a population of 17 million.  
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Greek government wished to have ‘an eye focused on this part of the east’ 
(Interview, no 45).   
In terms of communication, contact with the HQ in Athens is usually channelled 
through the embassy. It is normal for all tasks and functions performed by the 
consulate to also be communicated to the embassy for purposes of avoiding 
duplication (Interview, no 46). Greek consulates operate on the basis of 
‘unofficial targets’ aiming at processing as many administrative requests as 
possible by citizens and businesses so that the embassies are freed from 
bureaucratic tasks and focused on performing their political functions. For this 
purpose, Greek consulates have been given a certain degree of autonomy and 
independence to process requests by citizens, companies, groups of people or 
businesses which they communicate to the embassy. This autonomy and 
freedom of action is restricted if funding is required in which case the requests 
are channelled to the embassy and permission is granted by the centre 
(Interview, no 45).  
Greek consulates have an impressive record of peaceful and productive 
cooperation with local authorities with which they co-organise events, student 
exchanges, cultural, educational and commercial projects, exhibitions, 
commercial  fairs and ‘twinning’ of cities52. Most importantly, one of the highest 
priorities of Greek consulates has been to integrate Greek nationals abroad into 
local societies53 through programmes with a particular emphasis on education, 
employment and social integration54.  
With the issues of nationals’ integration being very high on the Greek consular 
agenda along with the promotion of ‘Greekness’ abroad, Greek consulates 
have an inherently dual role to perform (Interview, no 45). This duality rests on 
the simultaneous promotion of Hellenism and ‘Greekness’ by nurturing the 
Greek identity of nationals abroad and their systematic efforts to avoid the 
creation of Greek ‘ghettos’ by integrating its nationals in local communities. This 
                                                        
52
 For instance Cologne, where the interview took place is twined with Thessaloniki  
53
 In the Greek General Consulate in Cologne there is a special German-Greek linkage which 
works as a channel of communication between Greek and German businesses, sponsored by 
the German Government, which organises special training for Greek nationals.  
54
 A long project was completed in Germany at the end of 2009 which aimed at integrating 
Greek nationals 
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is achieved by the consulates through exposing Greeks to local businesses and 
cultures and vice versa in a series of events and socials (Interview, no 45).  
Greece is a very small country but with a massive history. Because its soft 
power abroad can rely neither on its national business community engaging in 
enterprise overseas nor on the size of the aid it offers55 the ultimate means 
embraced by Greek consulates in an effort to sharpen Greek international 
reflexes is the ‘strengthening through unity’ [ισχύς εν τη ενώσει] of Greek 
human capital abroad (Interview, no 45). This is why Greek governments have 
relied so heavily on consulates to keep together and support Greek human 
capital and lobbying. Greek consulates systematically try to be in touch and 
strengthen the position of the numerous Greek individuals, who work in the City 
in the UK, in foreign universities56 or for the US government. For instance, in 
London, the consulate-general together with the embassy and the press office 
have initiated a project which aims to foster continuous cooperation between 
Greek academics in the UK and elsewhere as well as support their integration 
in the local educational system. This project, titled ‘Pytheas’ will be launched 
mid-2011. In Germany, the consulate-general in Cologne supported a Greek 
national who ran with the German MEPs and got elected.  
For such purposes, promoting solidarity and support constitutes a priority for 
Greek consulates especially amongst the Greek diaspora the dynamics and 
potential of which are deemed to be immense.  
‘What we have learned to do effectively abroad is to create a culture 
of integrated Greek communities all around the world and this 
constitutes our ultimate consular policy and aim. We gradually build a 
network of Greek nationals, who are educated, socially active and 
well respected’ (Interview, no 45).  
With regard to their diplomatic functions, as previously mentioned, Greek 
consulates consider themselves to be the ‘eye of the embassy’ in multiple loci 
by monitoring not only civil and political activity locally but also international and 
regional organisations. Despite arguments in existing literature (Karabarbounis, 
                                                        
55
 For instance in Haiti it was only €200,000 
56
  
279 
 
2007: 203) that Greek consulates’ significance is receding in spite of their 
increasing number, opinions in the field differ. More specifically, interviewees 
(Interview, no 27; 29; 45; 46) suggested that the role, significance and future of 
a consulate depends amongst other things on the location, the local political 
situation and the proximity of the embassy. ‘A consulate in Istanbul is not of 
lesser importance than the embassy in Ankara’ (Interview no 45).  
Naturally, the consulate-general in Cologne will have a more significant political 
and diplomatic role to play than those in big capitals such as London or 
Brussels where the consulates are attached to the embassy. This applies to 
issues ranging from representation and physical presence of the consul-general 
in various business oriented or political fora, to carrying out cultural events and 
maintaining bilateral relations, which in the case of capitals are carried out by 
embassies and their cultural and commercial offices (Interview, no 45).  
The Consul-General in Cologne gave an example to demonstrate the 
differentiation in the role of consulates according to location which concerned 
the 11th anniversary of Ocalan’s arrest on 15th February 2010. The MFA’s 
Action Plan which involved securing extra vigilance with the local police and 
authorities was undertaken by the embassy in places where there was one but 
by the consulate where there was no embassy. Naturally, the management of 
consular affairs also differs outside the EU where consulates are faced with 
increased consular demands and functions but have at the same time acquired 
a higher political and commercial importance (Interview, no 45). The argument 
for the increase in their diplomatic significance, even if it applies in given 
locations, is further supported by the function of crisis management they have 
recently undertaken.  
Crisis management in a more collective form constitutes one area whereby 
Greek consulates feel that their competence has expanded. Even though they 
have always been in place to protect Greek nationals overseas, being involved 
in international crises and in post-crisis rehabilitation projects constitutes a 
recent development for which they cooperate intensively with the Greek public 
sector and the MFA’s General Secretary. A characteristic example is the 
involvement of the Greek Consulate in Georgia, Tbilisi in the crisis in Ossetia as 
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well as the involvement of Greek Consulates in the Balkan region in the delivery 
of HiPERB (Hellenic Plan for the Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans) 
(Interview, no 18).  
The large amounts of Greek travellers, students and businessmen in foreign 
countries have increased demands for support and have prioritised ‘closeness’ 
with Greek citizens overseas (Interview, no 29; 46). Most importantly, consuls 
and consulate officials observe that the relationship between Greek citizens 
abroad and consular authorities has changed in substance. ‘It is closer, more 
casual and much more supportive (Interview, no 29) 
‘If a student needs to go home or needs help and support day or 
night the consulate is the first point of contact. All a Greek national 
has to do is contact us and ask for our help. We take it from there’ 
(Interview, no 46).  
Besides the integration in the relationship between consulates and Greek 
citizens abroad, consulates are also undergoing change with regard to their 
relations with Greek embassies. IT has contributed significantly to this change 
with consulates today having access to unprecedented volumes of diplomatic 
information which they share with embassies and being able to take initiatives 
and underpin embassies’ political, economic and cultural functions.  
‘Today, consulates are informed about events and developments at 
the same time as the embassies and this facilitates their diplomatic 
action. In the past, messages were transferred with the diplomatic 
folder to the embassy first and they would travel to the consulate 
only if they immediately concerned it. IT has facilitated a more 
homogenous consular policy but most importantly it has facilitated 
homogeneity in all our overseas missions’ (Interview, no 45).  
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter explored the nature and responses of the Greek diplomatic 
network in the context of transforming world politics. The present exploration 
formed part of the wider discussion concerning governmental revamping of 
overseas diplomatic missions which constitute an integral part of national 
foreign policy machineries. The transforming international and domestic policy 
environments have urged governments to rethink their overseas missions, 
which albeit previously the most well informed networks in comparison to 
outside counterparts, they may be less today as they are challenged by IT and 
non-governmental networks which seem to be broader, deeper and more 
crosscutting.  
As previously noted, the general lack of empirical data originating from 
overseas missions has necessitated the study of their processes and structure 
as well as their adaptation on the basis of their evolving functions and role. In 
this light, the above sections were organised on the basis of the main functions 
and competences of the Greek diplomatic network and addressed questions 
regarding their evolving role.     
The chapter has identified a number of critical issues such as traditionalism and 
hierarchy in the organisation and operation of the Greek diplomatic network 
which emerged from evidence gathered in a large number of interviews both at 
the HQ and in overseas diplomatic missions. Such issues determine the 
contemporary character and organisation of the Greek model of diplomatic 
representation. At the same time the model of the Greek diplomatic network 
portrays the ways in which Greek governments perceive and organise foreign 
policy but also their fundamental assumptions about the ways in which world 
politics are developing and managed. Evidence presented in this chapter 
appear to be in agreement with evidence presented in the previous chapter 
which focused on the organisation of the MFA as far as the Greek 
understanding and organisation of foreign policy is concerned in the context of 
the transforming world politics.  
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Specifically, the Greek diplomatic network, similarly with the MFA appears to 
conform to the compartmentalisation of foreign policy to distinct organisational 
domains. Compartmentalisation in the management of foreign policy becomes 
manifest in the arrangement and allocation of different functions and policy 
areas such as political, economic and, recently, public diplomacy into distinct 
sections of the foreign policy bureaucracy. Such models perpetuate the 
distinction between political and economic or sectoral affairs and prevent 
integrated approaches to foreign policy management prescribed by increased 
interdependence and globalisation. In addition, this compartmentalised model 
indicates a long-routed unilateral and traditional understanding of foreign policy 
whereby economic, political and other competences are distinct. 
Despite sporadic elements of change and adaptation manifest in various parts 
of the Greek diplomatic network and a relative extension in its functions and 
scope, a more in-depth exploration of Greek embassies and other missions do 
not show evidence supporting a case of ‘transformation’ in the form of 
adaptation and re-organisation on the basis of economic diplomacy or public 
diplomacy which constitutes the main pivot for re-organisation of other states’ 
embassies. On the contrary, the Greek diplomatic network in its entirety 
presents a case of stickiness to prior organisational and operational modes 
summarised in hierarchy, traditionalism and a compartmentalised approach to 
the management of foreign policy and diplomacy.   
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Conclusion  
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis has focused on a set of issues concerning the management of Greek 
foreign policy in the context of transforming world politics. These issues were 
encapsulated in the four research questions set out in the introduction on pages 7 
and 8. With a research agenda informed by literature on the management of 
foreign policy and diplomacy in contemporary world politics and documentation on 
national responses of a number of foreign policy machineries, the thesis sought to 
evaluate the contemporary Greek FPS and locate its place within global trends. In 
doing so, the thesis explored the responses of the Greek foreign policy machinery 
to the transforming international and domestic policy environments through the 
study of its contemporary organisation, role culture and functions. This exploration 
was pursued through extensive research in the available primary and secondary 
sources relating to the management of Greek foreign policy together with fieldwork 
involving a total of 51 interviews. 
National responses to the management of foreign policy in an era of considerable 
change are manifested in change and adaptation in the role and structure of the 
national foreign policy machinery and its core constituent, the foreign ministry. 
Given that the foreign ministry is the part of the national bureaucracy which 
traditionally reflects the relationship of a state with its international environment, 
the patterns of change within its structure, processes and operation reflect states’ 
responses to external change as well as their fundamental assumptions about 
world politics (Hocking, 2007: 4). Taking this into consideration, the thesis 
investigated the structure and role of the Greek foreign policy machinery and its 
main constituents, the MFA and the diplomatic network. The preceding chapters 
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have revealed a number of significant features of what we have referred to as the 
Greek `foreign policy system’ and these cannot be restated here. Rather, the aim 
of this conclusion is to indicate the significance of some of the broader issues -as 
framed in the research questions- in understanding how Greece has managed its 
foreign and international policy, and the challenges that it faces in this respect.  
 
Rethinking Greek foreign policy: at crossroads between 
geopolitical and globalist approaches  
 
 
Current developments embodied in processes of globalisation and regionalisation 
in conjunction with the emergence of horizontal networks and IT, have transformed 
the spatial organisation of world affairs. As a result they have challenged our 
analytical capacity which is rooted in methodological territorialism and in 
geopolitical approaches to interpreting global issues (Scholte, 2005; Held et al., 
1999). Geopolitical approaches provided the dominant framework for the study of 
international politics and foreign policy for much of the twentieth century assuming 
that geographical and geopolitical dynamics constituted the primary variables 
(Anderson, 1998: 106). Such approaches closely linked to compartmentalisation in 
the understanding and organisation of foreign policy along vertical organisational 
domains (Cooper, 2001) and traditional assumptions of FPA (Webber and Smith, 
2002; Keohane and Nye, 1989) have been considerably challenged.  
For purposes of utilizing a flexible analytical framework that addresses 
contemporary developments in the analysis of foreign policy such as its 
domestication, the thesis employed the concept of ’transformational FPA’ 
developed by Manners and Whitman and others (Manners and Whitman, 2000) 
which accommodates a wider range of policy actors, state and non-state, domestic 
or international, that may function horizontally. At the same time, transformational 
FPA encourages the exploration of linkages between foreign and other areas of 
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governmental policy-making as well as the investigation of a much wider set of 
foreign policy issues beyond high politics. As a result, the research agenda of 
transformational FPA allowed us to embrace actors -beyond the MFA- with a 
traditionally domestic competence such as the Ministry of Economy or the 
Parliament as well as issues that require horizontal -inter-departmental 
cooperation. Such an approach challenging the insulation of foreign policy as a 
distinct governmental public policy area extends to issues traditionally falling under 
domestic policy areas.  
This offers a fresh approach because it breaks up the monopoly of the foreign 
ministry over foreign policy and offers the opportunity for a fresh look at the way 
we handle international relations in a system of global networks and eroded 
foreign/domestic divides. Therefore, it allowed for the re-evaluation of the Greek 
foreign policy system through a new lens. In the course of the re-evaluation 
limitations of the foreign policy bureaucracy in the MFA and its diplomatic network 
were not taken for granted. Rather the search for foreign policy bureaucracy was 
extended to other departments such as the Ministry of Interior and the Secretariat 
for Communication and Information which proved to constitute an integral part of 
Greek overseas representation. This approach allowed the exploration of a 
possible widening in the management of contemporary Greek foreign policy to 
other parts of domestic bureaucracies and provided significant conclusions which 
have been discussed in the previous chapters.  
The re-evaluation of the Greek foreign policy system and the study of its 
organisation presented some interesting conclusions with regards to contemporary 
understanding not only of Greek foreign policy processes but also of Greek foreign 
policy substance. It appears that up to date Greek understanding of foreign policy 
has relied on the perception that it is divided into distinct domains such as 
traditional foreign policy associated with military issues, European policy and 
international economic and development policy. Such understanding explains the 
compartmentalised organisational structure of the MFA discussed below, which 
essentially indicates the employment, not integration, of different branches of the 
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bureaucracy for the execution of different foreign policy functions under the 
leadership of the MFA. The course of the interviews provided ample evidence to 
support this distinction.  
More specifically, Greek foreign policy bureaucrats understand external policy as 
comprising three different branches, namely foreign, European and international 
policy. Foreign policy [εξωτερική πολιτική] is associated with traditional military 
security issues and high politics and is often coterminous with the ongoing issues 
of FYROM, Turkey and Cyprus. European policy [Ευρωπαϊκή πολιτική] is 
associated with sectoral/technical and economic policies whereas international 
policy [διεθνής πολιτική] is associated with international economic and 
development matters. The interviews also emphasised the primacy of Greek 
foreign policy in its traditional high politics form vis-á-vis the other branches of 
external policy. It is not surprising for a country like Greece, with its historic 
dependence on foreign powers and ongoing security threats to its territorial 
integrity, to present a foreign policy agenda which is dominated by high politics. 
The nature of such preoccupations implying imminent security threats render the 
model of Greek foreign policy organisation traditionalistic and associated with 
realist, state-centric accounts of international relations and diplomacy.   
In this context, it is natural for the MFA to have been perceived as the country’s 
fortress against the enemy and the diplomatic service as Greece’s security 
negotiator towards other governments. Such a tendency is further reinforced with 
the particular politico-administrative culture discussed in chapter two, which has 
ascribed a traditionalist view to society, political systems and public policy-making 
generally and which extends to foreign policy-making. Based on this 
understanding, it is natural for the foreign policy process to be highly politicised 
and to constitute to a great extent the prerogative of the PM and the FM, especially 
when issues involve Greek national security concerns. 
Entry to the EU and the intensification of globalisation processes with the aid of IT 
which dictates the addition of a large number of economic and technical or 
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otherwise low policy areas has had major implications for the Greek foreign policy 
system. A number of issues have been added to the foreign policy agenda 
alongside traditional security concerns that urged Greece to shed its strictly 
parochial national character and become more actively involved in the globalised 
policy arena. The growth in Greece’s preoccupations toward a large -or at least 
larger than before- number of international policy domains has added a new 
dimension to its understanding of foreign policy. Nevertheless, it has not removed 
those traditional elements which have shaped its understanding to date based on 
the existing and pressing traditional security concerns.   
Therefore, with regards to questions concerning the impact of globalisation and 
regionalisation on the contemporary Greek understanding and organisation of 
foreign policy, one could argue that the Greek foreign policy system, albeit in a 
process of deepening symbiosis between the different branches of foreign policy, 
for obvious reasons, has not yet managed to achieve an integrated approach. 
Despite the fact that the post Cold War era marked the end of geopolitical 
arrangements and thinking, such approaches are still present in the Greek foreign 
policy system. Geopolitics still provides the dominant framework for the 
understanding and organisation of Greek foreign policy resisting the penetration of 
globalist and more networked approaches to organisation. As a result, one could 
argue that Greece, which until two decades ago had been at crossroads between 
the East and the West, is currently found at a crossroads between geopolitical and 
globalist approaches.  
Globalist approaches, being associated with deterritorialisation, cross-cutting 
policy issues and horizontal and thematic arrangements of foreign policy, cannot 
explain contemporary Greek foreign policy structures which are organised on 
vertical geographical and thematic divisions, with the latter distinguishing only 
between political and technical or economic issues. It is a valid claim that the acute 
centralisation, hierarchy and verticality present in the entirety of the Greek FPS 
reflect a hierarchical understanding of foreign policy and diplomacy, which 
conforms more to state-centric approaches to international relations and 
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understandings of diplomacy based on the Westphalian state-model. In this light, it 
is not surprising that there is no significant evidence to substantiate the existence 
of an extensively widened foreign policy community in Greece as well as a de-
centralisation of foreign policy.   
 
A micro-foreign policy community and limited horizontalisation 
 
The rise of low policies as a result of globalisation and EU membership has 
challenged the Greek foreign policy machinery  which is gradually and slowly 
opening up to a number of bureaucratic agents and expanding both within and 
outside the MFA. The most characteristic example of expansion outside the MFA 
to date is the Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU (PeRepGr) which 
constitutes perhaps the only instance whereby foreign and international policy 
making is explicitly handed over to a section of bureaucracy outside the MFA. With 
regards to expansion within the MFA, this is manifested in centralisation and the 
addition of organisational units for the competences of European, international and 
foreign economic policy and diplomacy.  
The PeRepGr, comprising domestic officials, is the only part of the Greek 
bureaucracy that provides some evidence of a limited horizontal spread towards 
other domestic bureaucratic agents, and supports claims for a case of a limited 
widening foreign policy community in Greece. This, together with evidence 
supporting limited development of international policy capacity in domestic 
departments thus not amounting to significant foreign policy decentralisation, has 
produced what was termed in chapter three a micro-foreign policy community. 
Therefore, with regards to the question of whether there is a foreign policy 
community emerging in Greece, the answer is that it is in an embryonic stage of 
development but it is anticipated that its evolution is being precipitated by pressing 
demands for the intensification of international policy making in various 
government departments.  
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Bureaucratic policy coordination: far from WOG approaches  
 
Coordination has become a dominant theme in the discussion of governmental 
management of international policy. Its prominence is closely linked to the growth 
of government, the meshing of the domestic and international policy environments 
and the respective involvement of a wide cast of domestic government 
departments and the creation of foreign policy communities. Given that 
coordination schemes reflect national political and administrative cultures (Hocking 
and Spence, 2005) evidence gathered from the exploration of coordination 
practices in Greece, not surprisingly, do not differ from the general Greek politico-
administrative tradition. With coordination practices operating on both vertical and 
horizontal levels, different conclusions can be drawn from its operation on each 
level.  
Interview evidence suggested that Greece does not fall into the category of states 
that view policy coordination as an end in itself or, in other words, as a 
bureaucratic strategy. Rather, the function of coordination in Greece, imbued as it 
is with political significance, besides serving purposes of pulling together the 
threads of governmental policy, constitutes an indicator of added monitoring power 
vested in a given government department and is linked to its primacy vis-á-vis 
other government departments. In the Greek coordinating scheme the MFA has 
always been central both in coordinating foreign policy in its traditional form but 
also European and other international policies.  The MFA’s centrality has been 
reaffirmed in the latest MFA Charter in 2007. The Greek FPS accords with 
observations which suggest that the foreign ministry’s exclusivity in international 
policy management is linked to vertical and hierarchical, top-down 
conceptualisations of coordination. In such systems as in Greece, the foreign 
ministry acquires the role of the dominant foreign policy agency 
Interestingly, interviews did not raise questions regarding coordination of those 
branches of foreign policy linked to traditional foreign policy. More specifically, with 
a centralised scheme which involves the PMO, the MFA and the MoD, crystallising 
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the holy triangle of Greek foreign policy, coordination appears to be effective and 
unproblematic by being hierarchical and centralised. The Achilles heel for Greek 
policy coordination occurs when coordinating on a horizontal level, between both 
the vertical organisational units within the MFA and on an inter-ministerial level 
between ministries which engage in international dealings. The Greek coordination 
model is highly hierarchical and centralised for purposes of ensuring high levels of 
coordination. However it presents significant weaknesses and delays when 
confronted with the management of more horizontal and cross-cutting policies 
prescribed by globalisation and regionalisation. The weakness seems to be in 
proportion to the extent of internationalisation: the more the foreign policy system 
moves away from traditional foreign policy towards European or international 
policy, the more problematic the coordination process.  
Altogether, the existing coordinating mechanisms demonstrate that Greece is far 
from claims for integrated approaches to international policy coordination defined 
as ‘whole of government’ approaches commonly emphasised in other countries. 
Hierarchy, verticality and co-responsibility which characterise the coordination 
system result in responsibility confusion, waste of resources –human and others- 
as well as overlaps in policies and programmes. In addition, there is significant 
bureaucratic antagonism which is closely linked to turf wars between governmental 
departments based on the premise of competing fortresses rather than parts of an 
integrated system. In this competitive domestic environment the primacy of the 
MFA over policy coordination amongst Greek bureaucratic agents has been 
reinforced in new international policy areas thus strengthening its role and 
centrality in the management of international policy.    
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The MFA: continuity and change  
 
Based on the premise that environmental change is manifested with change and 
adaptation at the bureaucratic level, organisational and operational change in the 
MFA and its diplomatic network offer significant evidence with regards to the 
adaptation of Greek foreign policy management. Organisational re-arrangement of 
the MFA in Greece has been primarily the product of the need to adapt to the 
transforming external policy milieu. With the MFA perceived as the main Greek 
bureaucratic agent focused on the external environment, change and adaptation in 
its organisation reflect the need to respond to international developments. 
Effectively, the MFA has been in search of a new identity and functions with which 
to extend its reach towards new international policy areas as well as an expanded 
and refined organisational structure to reflect the complexity of its international 
tasks.  
As with other EU foreign ministries, the Greek MFA has been resistant to change 
due to its organisational culture, which allows less flexibility and adheres to a high 
politics agenda not allowing for low politics to come into play. Simultaneously, as in 
the majority of EU member states as well as a number of small states, the foreign 
policy system in Greece has maintained the MFA as its central foreign policy actor. 
Thus, the MFA has manifested resilience and a significant degree of adaptability 
which is manifest in the extension of its functions and organisational change. 
Organisational change, developed through a series of organisational expansions 
and centralisation of competences under the MFA, has been small, incremental 
and based on existing practices. Based on this, the tool of path dependence has 
proved very useful in analysing it. Such change prescribes a case of change and 
adaptation as response to external stimuli rather than transformation in the sense 
of radical reform. With adaptability understood as occurring within existing 
institutional frameworks in order to maintain existing structures and transformation 
understood as establishing fundamentally new structures (Löf, 2010) it is easy to 
locate the Greek case as fitting well in the former. Interviews revealed that the 
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adaptation of the Greek foreign policy system does not constitute a strategy in 
itself but rather a reflexive response to given stimuli. Based on the premise that 
adaptability is manifested by the foreign ministry taking on new tasks and functions 
with the aim of becoming more competitive in a number of newly added issue 
areas (Moses and Knutsen, 2001) it can be concluded  that the MFA has been 
engaged in a process of change and adaptation.  
The MFA is characterised by a hierarchical model of organisation based more on a 
geographical than a thematic approach. When a thematic approach applies it is 
limited in distinguishing between political and economic affairs. Recent reforms 
introduced in the last ten to fifteen years have rendered the organisational 
structure of the MFA more complex and multilayered. This process has been the 
product of attempts to adapt the organisation of the MFA based on the principle of 
functionality which was added to the traditional principle of territoriality for 
purposes of responding to those issues that stem from increased economic 
interdependence and globalisation. Nevertheless, despite elements of functional 
expansion and increased complexity the MFA is far from adopting a horizontal and 
integrated approach to the organisation of foreign policy.  
More specifically, the MFA reflects a traditional approach to foreign policy 
organisation which divides foreign policy into vertical organisational compartments 
which remain insulated from one another due to a persistent hierarchical modus 
operandi. Effectively, the MFA appears to conform to images of foreign ministries 
which remain compartmentalised by function and imbued with verticality in terms of 
design and inculcated with traditional perceptions of foreign policy. Such models 
reinforce and perpetuate hierarchical structures which often relate to elements of 
secrecy and introversion at the expense of information sharing networks. Such 
images seem to explain well the relation between structure and operation of the 
MFA which by retaining the model of vertical silos prevents the development of 
networked policy environments and poses obstacles to policy coordination.  From 
this follows questions concerning the position of the MFA in terms of debates 
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about decline versus non-decline and gate-keeping versus boundary spanning 
images.   
 
Whither the MFA?  
 
Based on the premise that the position and role of the foreign ministry in the 
context of transforming world politics reflect the ways in which states respond to 
changes taking place in the international and domestic policy milieus, the study of 
the MFA presents some very interesting conclusions. Overall, the MFA seems to 
have benefited from the processes of globalisation and regionalisation in that it has 
been strengthened due to the centralisation of European and international policy 
processes. As a matter of fact, the MFA has ensured pre-eminence within the 
national foreign policy machinery in shaping and implementing Greek foreign 
policy in both the context of globalisation and supranationality in the EU. In the 
wider discussion of strong and weak foreign ministries (Hocking and Spence, 
2005) the Greek MFA can be classified as a strong foreign ministry in that it 
occupies the most significant position in the national foreign policy bureaucracy. 
Beyond doubt, forces of change and transformation have challenged its role and 
significance but the MFA still remains at the epicentre of the national foreign policy 
system. 
With assumptions in the literature over the foreign ministry’s declining role focusing 
either on the position of the foreign ministry within the national bureaucratic 
architecture or on the domestication and horizontalisation of foreign policy, the 
image of the contemporary Greek MFA demonstrates that it does not accord with 
such assumptions. It is the evidence of adaptability discussed in chapter four that 
challenges the conventional arguments regarding the MFA’s decline.  
The course of adaptation that the MFA has embarked upon provides substantial 
evidence that not only is the MFA not declining as the ultimate Greek foreign policy 
actor but is being strengthened by becoming more complex in structure and 
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operation to reflect the changing policy milieus in which it operates. For instance, 
the centralisation of the economic diplomacy function within the MFA follows 
examples of other strengthening foreign ministries which have re-integrated trade 
and foreign policy into a single department as a way of responding to the growing 
significance of economics in foreign policy. The same applies to the function of 
international policy coordination and crisis management which when allocated to 
the foreign ministry are indicative of its strengthening position. 
With regard to the added European and international dimensions of foreign policy, 
both in the MFA but also in other home departments, it seems that these have not 
occurred at the expense of the MFA but have instead contributed to the MFA’s 
growth as a stronger political actor. At the same time the aforementioned 
dimensions helped to develop an added sectoral dimension to the MFA due to the 
extension of its reach to technical/sectoral and economic policies as well as a 
significant newly added consultative role over issues of protocol and 
administration. 
Whilst some might argue that the role of the MFA is in decline or bypassed by the 
PMO in policy making in the context of multilateralism and supranationalism, 
empirical evidence suggests that the MFA is becoming established as the most 
valued bureaucratic actor with an increasing input in the foreign policy process. 
With its skills expanding into policy consultation the MFA remains at the centre of 
Greek international policy engagements at all levels and is transforming into a 
modern foreign policy actor with increasing sectoral competence. Strong evidence 
of this is provided by interviews which suggest that the MFA is engaged in a 
process of change and adaptation aimed at finding its place in a renewed and 
Modern Greek foreign policy system. 
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More of a gatekeeper and less of a boundary-spanner  
 
In the framework of the two different models of contemporary foreign ministries 
summarised by the gate-keeper and boundary spanner images (Hocking, 2005) 
the MFA appears to relate more to the former whilst recently displaying elements 
of the latter. This is because the MFA’s image rests on a number of inter-linked 
assumptions presented by the two images. Concomitant with gate-keeping 
understandings of the foreign ministry associated with the centrality of the territorial 
state, the primacy over control of boundaries and the communication flows that 
cross them, the MFA retains its exclusivity in the management of international 
policy and pursues the role of the dominant policy coordinator through which it 
establishes its primacy vis-á-vis the rest of Greek bureaucracy in the management 
of foreign policy.  
In accordance with the gatekeeper image, Greek foreign policy is equated with 
high politics and the pursuit of certain identifiable national interests mostly 
concerning national security issues defined in terms of military security. Most 
importantly, as prescribed by gate-keeping images and observed in the present 
investigation of the MFA, its exclusivity in international policy management and its 
perseverance as the dominant foreign policy actor within the governmental 
apparatus are linked to compartmentalised and hierarchical organisations.  
The MFA relates less to images of the foreign ministry as boundary spanner which 
corresponds more to the emergent global and regional policy environments. The 
rationale for this model rests on the capacity of the foreign ministry to ‘span’ 
boundaries, which themselves are changing by becoming penetrable and at the 
same time colonised by new agents such as epistemic communities, specialist 
groups, think tanks, and NGOs. The Greek MFA only recently started to display 
some of these elements and this is manifested in its deepening cooperation with 
civil society and business communities due to the expansion of its functions. 
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The fact that the MFA falls somewhere in the middle of the two images of 
contemporary foreign ministries –even if the balance tilts in favour of the 
gatekeeper image - further emphasises the views expressed above that the MFA 
together with the foreign policy machinery in its entirety are at a crossroads 
between traditional -in the form of state-centric and geopolitical- and globalised 
approaches to foreign policy. In a more optimistic explanation, the MFA is in a 
process of change from a traditional approach to foreign policy which in the Greek 
case was closely related to past emotional, maximalist -in the sense of a radical 
political and nationalist approaches- and security-charged foreign policy towards a 
new, more globalised and networked approach which is more harmonious with 
international and economic policies based on minimalist criteria advocating 
minimal and technical reforms.   
 
The Greek overseas diplomatic network: sticky and hierarchical 
 
Diplomatic networks, the nerve-endings of national foreign policy machineries, 
similarly with foreign ministries, are in a process of profound change and 
adaptation as a response to their transforming operational environment. And whilst 
globalist approaches assume the disintermediation and decline of the network’s 
central constituent, the embassy, more moderate approaches suggest that 
diplomatic networks, similarly with other structures for the conduct of foreign policy 
and diplomacy, are resilient and adaptive. Analyses which consider the embassies 
as retaining their traditional functions and remaining central in the conduct of 
foreign and international policy and diplomacy also suggest that they are growing 
in significance and scope with new functions being added to their structure and 
operation for purposes of adapting to contemporary demands. In this light, the 
thesis sought to explore how the Greek diplomatic network and its central 
elements, the Greek embassies, relate to such assumptions.  
Despite ongoing discussion concerning the role and future of national diplomatic 
representation, there is a considerable lack of qualitative empirical data on 
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missions’ routines, working procedures and communication patterns. For this 
purpose, change and adaptation of diplomatic overseas missions have to be seen 
through the prism of their evolving function and role. It was due to the lack of 
empirical data that part of this study focused on the exploration of the Greek 
diplomatic network. Besides contributing empirical data to general literature on 
overseas diplomatic representation the thesis sought to contribute to Greek foreign 
policy literature by exploring this dimension of the foreign policy machinery which 
has been significantly understudied. In doing so, the thesis investigated the 
structure and character of the Greek overseas diplomatic network in its entirety, 
that is including permanent missions other than those administered by the MFA, as 
well as the processes and functions it undertakes in the context of contemporary 
world politics.  
The exploration of the Greek contemporary diplomatic network provided significant 
information concerning its role, functions, organisation and operation as well as 
evidence regarding the nature of its adaptation to contemporary demands. The 
study also identified a number of critical issues concerning the organisation and 
operation of the Greek diplomatic network such as persistent traditionalism and 
hierarchy. These issues have shaped the character and organisational culture of 
the Greek overseas missions while at the same time determined the course of the 
network’s responses to changing operational conditions, which have been slow 
and resistant thus drawing the contemporary image of the network as sticky. 
 Evidently, the character of the Greek overseas diplomatic missions emerged as 
more conservative than that of the MFA as a whole and more resistant to change. 
Persisting fragmentation based on the division of foreign policy processes and 
functions, such as economic and public diplomacy, consular work and crisis 
management between different organisational units further supports claims about 
the network’s stickiness.  
With the character and organisation of the overseas missions indicating 
governments’ perceptions of foreign policy in the context of the transforming world 
298 
 
as well as their fundamental assumptions about how world politics are developing 
and managed, conclusions can be drawn for the Greek case. Fragmentation, 
traditionalism and hierarchy in the organisational model of Greek overseas 
missions, as with the MFA, can be argued to reflect an understanding of foreign 
policy which conforms to its compartmentalisation into distinct organisational 
domains. Such models largely perpetuate divisions between political and economic 
or sectoral affairs and prevent integrated approaches to foreign policy 
management necessitated by increased interdependence and globalisation. In 
other words, such models reflect a deep-rooted unilateral and traditional 
understanding of foreign policy whereby economic, political and other 
competences are distinct and diplomacy targets foreign governments rather than 
foreign audiences. 
The elements of change manifested through the addition of functions, such as 
economic and public diplomacy, to Greek missions do not amount to claims 
supporting transformation. These additions did not result in the reorganisation of 
missions but rather added functions to existing sections. On the contrary, elements 
such as potent traditionalism and hierarchy indicate a course of adaptation which 
is characterised by incrementalism, that is to say slow adaptation, within a pre-
determined path. In institutionalist terms a certain degree of isomorphism or 
adaptation to operational environments has occurred expressed through changes 
in the commerce and press sections but with the respective constraints prescribed 
by national organisational traditions which form part of national foreign policy 
systems (Clarke and White, 1981; 1989). In other words, the Greek diplomatic 
network in its entirety presents elements of path dependence by sticking to prior 
organisational and operational modes summarised in hierarchy, traditionalism and 
compartmentalisation in the organisation of diplomacy.   
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The dual image of the Greek FPS: between isomorphism and path 
dependence 
 
Altogether, the evidence gathered in the course of the fieldwork initially produced 
an ambiguous picture of the Greek foreign policy machinery. This is because at 
times it appeared to oscillate between two contrasting images. The first image, 
largely implying that the foreign policy machinery embraces contemporary foreign 
policy developments, is one of change and adaptation in response to the changing 
operational environment. The second image closely related to the wider Greek 
politico-administrative culture, depicts the foreign policy machinery as being 
traditionalist and infused with elements of politicization, hierarchy and 
centralisation and influenced by geopolitical approaches. Both images providing 
elements of both change and continuity constitute valid accounts and are 
considered as complementary in their depiction of the current state of the Greek 
foreign policy machinery.  
The differing views emerging from the interviews generated a number of questions 
with regards to their validity. For purposes of clarification further interviews were 
conducted which effectively enabled the elaboration and reconciliation of the two 
different images. The employment of institutionalist thinking functioned as a 
catalyst in this process. This is because new institutionalist isomorphism proved 
very helpful in understanding the course of change and adaptation undertaken by 
the Greek foreign policy machinery in order to adapt to the complex 
interdependent environments in which it operates. In this context, isomorphism 
informed the first image of the foreign policy machinery which supports a case of 
adaptation through the undertaking of new functions and roles.   
At the same time, however, there existed the second set of evidence which 
depicted the Greek foreign policy machinery as traditionalist and resistant to 
change. To aid the understanding of this interpretation, the thesis employed an 
additional analytical framework which suggests that national adaptation of foreign 
policy structures and processes varies depending on the nature of the national 
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FPS in its entirety. The FPS defined by Clarke and White (1981; 1989) as 
comprising foreign policy structures and processes together with their surrounding 
operational environment involving elements such as politico-administrative culture, 
particular national circumstances, interests and identities proved very informative.  
The conceptualisation of the Greek FPS as the aggregate of foreign policy 
structures, processes and environmental variables that are particular for Greece 
added significant explanatory value to the understanding of the character of the 
Greek foreign policy machinery and its preferred course of adaptation to the 
changing operational environment. The elaboration of the Greek politico-
administrative variables analysed in chapter two, helped explain why, in the face of 
the challenges and changes posed by globalisation and regionalisation, the Greek 
foreign policy system demonstrates a significant degree of path dependence 
expressed through stickiness to prior practices associated with persistence over 
traditionalism and hierarchy in foreign policy organisation.  
Finally, in relation to discussions concerning the two main trends, fragmentation or 
concentration identified in contemporary national foreign policy and diplomatic 
systems (Hocking, 2007: 9) the Greek FPS could fit well into the latter. With 
fragmentation relating to the diversification within the national diplomatic system as 
line ministries come to assume a growing interest in the international dimension of 
their own portfolios and concentration relating to the enhancement of foreign policy 
capacity of prime ministerial and presidential offices and other central agencies, it 
is easy to position the Greek FPS amongst centralised systems where the foreign 
policy making power rests with the PM and the MFA. Given that both 
developments trigger a series of shifts of dynamics within traditional foreign policy 
institutions (Langhorne, 2000: 42), the present investigation demonstrated that the 
entirety of the Greek foreign policy machinery has been affected - as for instance 
with the centralisation of economic diplomacy and the transfer of the economic 
section to the MFA.   
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Future scenarios  
 
 
With regards to likely future developments, it is inevitable that as European and 
international agendas continue to impact on Greece as elsewhere, domestic and 
foreign policies will become increasingly intertwined. In this context, international 
policy capacity at domestic ministries is bound to develop and decentralisation of 
foreign policy to take place thus promoting the widening of the Greek foreign policy 
community in the domestic environment, which will require further investigation.  
It is not impossible for the Greek foreign policy machinery as it is today to become 
overloaded and the MFA incapable of coordinating all those aspects of foreign 
policy - especially foreign economic policy given contemporary financial 
constraints. One problem which is bound to be aggravated concerns the 
coordination of international policy which is very weak and ineffective vis-á-vis 
growing international demands. A possible scenario is the transformation of the 
Ministry of National Economy to the central Greek foreign policy actor in the face of 
its intensified international engagements with international actors such as the IMF 
and the European Central Bank resulting from the Greek economic crisis. These 
areas need to be studied in greater depth given the change in substance of Greek 
international dealings. 
The vertical organisation of the MFA is bound to be rendered outdated very soon 
and incapable of managing the increasing load of horizontal cross-cutting policies. 
With the foreign policy system constituting a living organism, responses to its 
operational environment must be studied on a continuous basis. One moment for 
such study will be after the new MFA Charter, which is currently being drafted, 
comes into effect. Related to this is the function of public diplomacy which it is 
anticipated will constitute the linchpin of the new Charter. Given the negative 
responses and criticism Greece received from its European partners after the 
outbreak of the domestic financial crisis, it will be interesting to investigate whether 
the organisation of public diplomacy is strengthened for purposes of influencing 
foreign audiences.  
302 
 
Drawing these points together, the thesis has, by means of a synthesis of several 
literatures, primarily those identified with ‘transformational’ FPA, new approaches 
to diplomatic studies informed by insights from institutionalist approaches and 
combined with extensive fieldwork within the Greek bureaucracy and the 
diplomatic network,  sought to cast light on a relatively understudied area: namely 
the character and organisation of the Greek foreign policy system in an era of 
considerable domestic, regional and international change. Given the growing 
pressures emanating from an increasingly complex environment and in the light of 
major economic and geopolitical events, understanding the international policy 
capacity of states - as reflected in their foreign policy machinery - provides 
significant evidence of their varied responses to the impact of globalisation, 
regionalisation and localisation in the 21st century.   
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In the interest of anonymity, the interview numbers in this table have been deliberately shuffled 
so that they do not correspond to the numbers of the interviews quoted in the text. Interviews 
took place over the period from 20th December 2006 until 9th December 2010.  
 
POSITION  INSTITUTION/LOCATION  
1 Director, General Secretariat for EU 
affairs 
General Secretariat for EU Affairs, Greek Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Athens, Greece 
2 Embassy Counsellor, Consultant to the 
Prime Minister’s Diplomatic Cabinet 
Prime Minister’s Diplomatic Cabinet, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Athens, Greece 
3 Advisor to the Diplomatic Cabinet of 
Deputy Foreign Minister for Consular 
Affairs 
Deputy FM Diplomatic Cabinet, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Athens, Greece 
4 Director, Geographic Policy and Strategic 
Planning, YDAS - DG International 
Development Cooperation  
YDAS, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, Greece 
5 Head of Humanitarian Aid, YDAS- DG 
International Development Cooperation 
 
YDAS, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, Greece 
6 
 
Head of General Secretary Office General Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Athens, Greece 
7 Head of Crisis Management Unit, 
General Secretary Office 
General Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Athens, Greece 
8 Head of Scientific Centre for Analysis and 
Planning 
EKAS, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, Greece 
9 Advisor to Scientific Centre for Analysis 
and Planning 
EKAS, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, Greece 
10 Advisor, DG A General Political Affairs  DG-A Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Athens, Greece 
11 Embassy Counsellor B, DG-A 1 
European Affairs  
DG-A Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Athens, Greece 
12 Embassy Counsellor B, DG-A 1 
European Affairs 
DG-A Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Athens, Greece 
13 Embassy Counsellor, DG-A5 Russia, 
Belarus and Black Sea states 
DG-A Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Athens, Greece 
14 Embassy Counsellor, DG-A6 Arabic 
states and the Middle East 
DG-A Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Athens, Greece 
15 Embassy Counsellor, DG- A6 Arabic 
states and the Middle East  
DG-A Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Athens, Greece 
16 Director,  DG-B1 Strategic 
Planning/Economic Diplomacy 
DG-B Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Athens, Greece 
17 Head of DG-B7 International Energy 
Security  
DG-B Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Athens, Greece 
18 Director, DG-B8 Business Development  DG-B Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Athens, Greece 
19 Director, Peripheral DG International 
Economic Relations  
Peripheral DG International Economic Relations, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thessaloniki, Greece 
 
20 Coordinator of Euro-Mediterranean 
Commission  
EURO-MED, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, 
Greece 
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21 Diplomatic Advisor, Linkage of the MFA 
to the Ministry of Culture 
Ministry of Culture, Athens, Greece 
22 Advisor, MFA Linkage Office to the 
Ministry of Culture 
Ministry of Culture, Athens, Greece 
23 Brigadier Director of International 
Relations Unit, Ministry of Defence 
Former Greek Representative to the 
CFSP  
Ministry of Defence, Athens, Greece 
24 Director, MFA linkage to the Ministry of 
Development, former President of MFA 
Diplomatic Academy  
Ministry of Development and Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs  
25 General Secretary, Press Offices section, 
General Secretariat of Information and 
Communication (GCIG)  
General Secretariat of Information and 
Communication, Ministry of Interior, Athens, Greece 
26 Vice-President of Press Attachés Union, 
General Secretariat of Information and 
Communication (GCIG) 
General Secretariat of Information and 
Communication, Ministry of Interior, Athens, Greece 
27 Communication Advisor, former General 
Secretary of General Secretariat of 
Information and Communication (GCIG) 
General Secretariat of Information and 
Communication, Ministry of Interior, Athens, Greece 
28 Member of Greek Parliament, Permanent 
Parliamentary Committee on European 
and Foreign Affairs 
Greek Parliament, Thessaloniki, Greece 
29 Librarian- ELIAMEP- Greek Foreign 
policy research  
ELIAMEP research centre, Athens, Greece 
30 Greek members of the European 
Parliament – Roundtable on Greek 
foreign affairs and induction to Greek 
stagiaires 
European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium 
31 Advisor of cultural affairs of the European 
Parliament and Liaison for Greek MEPs 
to the EP 
European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium 
32 Second Secretary, Antici, General 
Coordination-COREPER II- Permanent 
Representation of Greece to the EU   
Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU, 
Brussels, Belgium   
33 First Counsellor –Head of Unit External 
Relations, Permanent Representation of 
Greece to the EU 
Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU, 
Brussels, Belgium   
34 Deputy Permanent Representative, 
Permanent Representation of Greece to 
the EU 
Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU, 
Brussels, Belgium   
35 On behalf of Second Secretary, 
COREPER I, Permanent Representation 
of Greece to the EU   
Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU, 
Brussels, Belgium   
36 First Secretary- Department of External 
Relations and Enlargement, Permanent 
Representation of Greece to the EU 
Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU, 
Brussels, Belgium   
37 Economic and Commercial Affairs 
Advisor- Economic and Financial Policy 
Unit, Permanent Representation of 
Greece to the EU 
 
Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU, 
Brussels, Belgium   
38 Greek Ambassador to Belgium, Greek 
Embassy  
Greek Embassy, Brussels, Belgium 
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39 First Embassy Counsellor, Political 
division of Greek Embassy in Belgium  
Greek Embassy, Brussels, Belgium 
40 Embassy Counsellor, Political Division  Greek Embassy. London, UK 
41 Embassy 1st Secretary, Political Division  Greek Embassy, London, UK 
42 Embassy 2nd Secretary, Political Division Greek Embassy, London, UK 
43 Minister Counsellor, Cultural Division  Greek Embassy, London, UK 
44 Officer, Visa Section, General Consulate 
in Brussels  
Greek General Consulate, Brussels, Belgium  
45 General Consul to London Greek General Consulate, London, UK 
46 General Consul to Cologne Greek General Consulate, Cologne, Germany 
47 Honorary Consul to Birmingham  Greek Honorary Consulate, Birmingham, UK 
48 Head of Economic and Commercial 
Affairs  
Greek Economic and Commercial Office, Brussels  
49 Economic and Commercial attaché 
(telephone interview) 
Greek Economic and Commercial Office, New York  
50 Economic and Commercial attaché 
(telephone interview)  
Greek Economic and Commercial Office, Sydney, 
Australia  
51 Head of Press Office  Press Office, Greek Embassy in London, UK 
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ANNEX I: INTERVIEW SCHEDULES 
 
 
SCHEDULE 1: Interview with diplomats at various MFA General Directorates in Athens  
Structure-Functions-Role 
• Could you please describe the structure of your DG?  
• What are the main functions and role of the DG/ your office? 
• What would you consider to be its input to the foreign policy process? 
Communication-Linkages 
• Could you please identify who gives instructions to your DG? Is this an institutionalised process 
or ad hoc? 
• What are the main linkages of your DG?  
 For instance, do you communicate with overseas missions directly? Is there an open 
communication loop? 
 Do you communicate/cooperate with other government departments and for what 
purposes? Any examples? 
 Do you communicate/cooperate with extra-MFA and extra-governmental elements such 
as NGOs/businesses? Any examples? 
• Do you consider the level of communication/cooperation satisfactory?  
• Do you identify any problems in communication?  
Change  
• Do you and/or your colleagues perceive any change in the functions and processes of your DG  
• Do you anticipate more change? If yes, what makes you believe this?   
• Is the Greek foreign policy agenda changing in accordance to international policy agendas with 
issues being added such as international development, the environment and so on?  
 Are there any other international issues that are particular to Greece? Why? 
• Do you think that the nature of Greek foreign policy is changing?  
• As a result, has your job changed over the last few years?  
 If yes, in what ways? 
Policy Coordination  
• Are there any particular government departments in charge of different branches of foreign 
policy? For instance, is there one department in charge of what we call traditional matters of 
foreign policy linked to security and another one or more of more contemporary issues of foreign 
policy such as economic and international policy matters (e.g. humanitarian aid, development and 
so on)?   
• How does international policy coordination take place? What are the main mechanisms?  
• What is the role of the MFA in foreign and international policy coordination?  
 Has its role in policy coordination increased/declined over the last few years? Would this 
have to do with the nature of Greek foreign policy?          
• Does foreign or/and international policy coordination constitute an issue for Greek governments?  
• Could you please identify at what level does policy coordination is and is not satisfactory? For 
instance how would you describe policy coordination within the MFA and between the MFA and 
overseas missions/other government departments?  
Intra-bureaucratic collaboration – widening of foreign policy community   
• With regards to international policy, does the MFA work closely together with other government 
departments? What is the form of this collaboration? Is it for instance in the form of 
consultations/recommendations or anything like this? Is it official and institutionalised? 
• Are there any particular policy areas that the MFA collaborates with other departments? What are 
those? 
• It is common for some foreign ministries to create linkage offices in other government 
departments, is this the case with the MFA?  
• Could it be argued that the MFA co-manages certain areas of international policy with other 
government departments?  
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• Is this collaboration more intensified with given departments? What are these departments?  
Crisis management 
• Which actor is in charge of coordination in crisis management?  
• Are there any mechanisms in place to manage crises? How are they activated? 
• Has this become an institutionalised function for the MFA? How is it organised?  
 Is it well developed? Effectively performed? 
• What are the implications of managing crises for the structure of the MFA?  
• Does communication/cooperation take place with the overseas missions? 
• What are the main home/local partners of the MFA in the management of crises? 
Public and economic diplomacy 
• Public/economic diplomacy has come to constitute one of the major axis of re-organisation for a 
number of foreign ministries worldwide. Is public/economic diplomacy rising on the Greek foreign 
policy agenda? Could it be argued that it constitutes the pivot for the re-organisation of the MFA 
and/or the Greek diplomatic network?  
• How is public/economic diplomacy organised? What are the main mechanisms and actors 
involved? 
• Is there a special unit for public/economic diplomacy at the PMO? 
• Does the MFA take leadership in this field?  
 Is public/economic diplomacy a cross-departmental activity? 
• Is public/economic diplomacy becoming part of the Greek foreign policy consciousness?  
• Do you think it receives due attention? Is it adequately performed? 
• Commonly, with issues areas such as public and economic diplomacy there is a growing synergy 
between the HQ and the overseas missions. Is this the case in Greece?  
The MFA 
• What is the structure of the MFA? Is it reflective of Greek foreign policy demands in the 21st 
century?  
• Are there any weaknesses in the current structure of the MFA?  
• What are the functions of the MFA?  
 Have the functions changed/increased to new areas? Could you please elaborate? 
• What is the role of the MFA? For instance, is its role political/economic? 
 Has its role changed over the last few decades? If yes, why and into what? 
• How does the MFA perceive itself? Is it a modern ministry?  
• Is there a specific bureaucratic/departmental culture in the MFA? What are the main 
characteristics?  
• Are there any official documents/reports/Organogram available? 
Career-path and professional development  
• Is professional development and training offered to MFA officials? What kind?  
• Do you believe that diplomatic training is adequately delivered? Do Greek diplomats/officials 
perceive themselves as adequately equipped to perform their role?  
 
Could you please refer me to any of your colleagues who has expertise in any of the themes we 
discussed? 
 
 
SCHEDULE 2: interview with diplomats in overseas missions 
Structure- Functions-Role 
• Could you please describe the structure of your mission?  
 Is this a typical structure for all such missions? 
• What are the main functions of the mission?  
 Do smaller/larger missions have different functions/role to deliver?  
• Are the different functions viewed/performed as different parts of the same job? The diplomat’s 
job? Are they performed by officials of different qualifications? 
• Does the mission have a coordinating function? Any examples? Who does it coordinate? Is this 
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becoming more intensified? Why?  
• What would you consider to be its input to the foreign policy process? 
• Who is in charge of giving instructions to your mission?  
Significance of location 
• Is an embassy/consulate in London different to other locations? Why? 
• Does location have an impact on the character of the mission? 
• Does its mission based on location have a different agenda?  
Linkages 
• What are the main partners of the mission?  
• Does the mission work with local NGOs/Businesses/other national actors/foreign missions 
locally/local government? 
Communication  
• Who is the main communication partner of the mission back home?  
• Does the mission communicate directly with home departments? Under what circumstances? 
• Does the embassy communicate with the Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU? Under 
what circumstances? 
Staffing and recruitment  
• In a many countries it is common for a number of government departments to dispatch their 
officials to embassies overseas? Is there such wide governmental representation in Greek 
embassies?  
• Would this be something to expect in the future? Why? 
• Do Greek embassies employ local people?  
Change  
• Have the missions’ functions changed over the last few years? If yes, why, when and how? 
• What is the nature of the mission’s role? Is it political/commercial? Has this changed over the 
years? 
• Is the role and agenda of the mission bilateral/multilateral or both? Is this changing? 
• Do you and/or your colleagues perceive any change in your role and responsibilities? 
• Is the role of the Greek diplomat changing? In what ways? 
 Do Greek diplomats have to perform more/less tasks?  
Consular affairs? 
• Is there an increase/decrease in consular matters?  
• What kind of consular matters have increased/decreased? Why? 
• Are consular matters perceived as equally important to the other functions of the mission or 
considered as second class?  
Crisis management 
• In case of a crisis, how and when is the mechanism activated from your mission? 
• Who are the linkages at home? 
• Which actor is in charge of coordination in crisis management?  
• Has this become an institutionalised function of your embassy?   
 Is it well developed? Effectively performed? 
• What are the local partners of the mission in the management of crises? 
Public diplomacy? 
• Is public diplomacy organised in Greece? What are the main mechanisms and actors involved? 
• Does it constitute a priority for Greek governments with regard to the function of overseas 
missions? Do you receive any instructions from the centre? 
• Has PDcy had any implications for your job? The mission’s structure/functions?  
• Do you think public diplomacy will become a central function in the future? 
Economic diplomacy?  
• How does this mission support Greek business activities overseas? 
• Does this function alter the character of a mission?  
• Do you think that the model for the conduct of Greek economic diplomacy is effective?  
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General  
• How would you describe the model of Greek overseas representation?  
• Is this model effective?  
• Does it move towards more holistic/integrated approaches? Is it becoming more integrated itself? 
 
Could you please refer me to any of your colleagues who has expertise in any of the themes we 
discussed? 
 
 
 
 
